It would help if posters referred to the report (
https://www.bea.aero/fileadmin/user_...20-0065.en.pdf) so that questions can be posed based on a common document.
PF surprised - this was in relation to ‘
the day’s meteorological conditions, the predictive windshear warning’ (page 9).
The PM initiated the GA; the checklist had a note (before the memory items !), that after risk assessment a predictive (Red) warning could be disregarded !
The ‘
captain-PM who called out “Go-Around”, the copilot-PF had replied, “Go-Around flaps” and the captain retracted one notch of flaps’; the soft GA mode was used, which with config change suggested a normal GA - missed approach procedure (page 10).
The narrative suggests that the crew were ‘behind the aircraft’ after GA selection(PF thought the AP was engaged), and due to the lower than standard altitude limit, coincident with a procedural turn.
The Capt took control after the Alt Bust, aiming to regain the cleared altitude. There was conflicting traffic above, ATC requested a turn. Further ATC calls added urgency about the traffic, and then cleared the aircraft for further climb; potential for high task workload, with distracting aircraft alerts, and ATC calls.
The report covers the scenario from each crew members viewpoint.
Pre briefing specific drills (based on hindsight), #97 could bias crews to select incorrect procedures - this event only required a missed approach or even none at all.