B-737 Cargo Plane down in Hawaii
The only thing we know for sure is that the remaining engine was overheating. All the crew stated was that they were dealing with some sort of powerplant problem, not the nature of it. There are any number of scenarios that could explain what happened but if you want the facts then you will have to wait for the preliminary which will be delivered in 30 days after the accident.
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switch_on_lofty
As a result of this incident, I proposed that, whenever possible, and accepting that this would often be difficult, power on remaining engines should be ‘proved’ well before final approach. (BA777 LHR with two ‘good’ engines!)
If I recall correctly, in the Kegworth incident, incorrect information was given to the flight deck from cabin staff, or have I made that up?
As a result of this incident, I proposed that, whenever possible, and accepting that this would often be difficult, power on remaining engines should be ‘proved’ well before final approach. (BA777 LHR with two ‘good’ engines!)
If I recall correctly, in the Kegworth incident, incorrect information was given to the flight deck from cabin staff, or have I made that up?
yes true BUT they still mis identified the failure on the Engine instruments. The design of the new style (new then) Engine instruments with a very small Vib indicator was a contributing factor.
roundsounds
"Perhaps they did shutdown the good engine? Probably a greater chance of that than both engines quitting at the same time, unless fuel related."
Well yes, although there are other possible causes not related to fuel that could lead to a double engine failure, as discussed above.
"Perhaps they did shutdown the good engine? Probably a greater chance of that than both engines quitting at the same time, unless fuel related."
Well yes, although there are other possible causes not related to fuel that could lead to a double engine failure, as discussed above.
My recollection of Kegworth was that a smell of burning on -200 and -300 737s was an indication of a failure on the side the flight deck air was fed from..
On a 737-400 they had swapped sides that fed the FD, which led to an immediate wrong conclusion as to which side engine had failed and a strong confirmation bias even when faced with the vibration indicator.
What similar issue could have affected the accident aircraft this time ?
On a 737-400 they had swapped sides that fed the FD, which led to an immediate wrong conclusion as to which side engine had failed and a strong confirmation bias even when faced with the vibration indicator.
What similar issue could have affected the accident aircraft this time ?
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Oil loss
The three double engine failures I remember were all caused by faulty maintenance before the last flight. With most checks you check all power plants and in these cases whoever carried out the procedure did it incorrectly on all engines. The Tristar case and only affecting 1 and 3 was possibly because of the difficulty in accessing number 2. It happened in one of my companies in the 70s but iirc it was a 1-11 which had the water injection tank filled with jet fuel which melted the engine..technical term.
Kegworth
The cause was a fan blade fracture leading to air conditioning smoke due to engine damage.
The crew failed to notice the vib gauge which would have identified the damaged engine.
The smoke cleared when thrust was reduced on the damaged engine leading to confirmation bias having already shut down the undamaged engine.
They did not have a fire warning until on final, 36 seconds before initial impact.
The cabin crew did not give the flight deck crew incorrect information.
The cause was a fan blade fracture leading to air conditioning smoke due to engine damage.
The crew failed to notice the vib gauge which would have identified the damaged engine.
The smoke cleared when thrust was reduced on the damaged engine leading to confirmation bias having already shut down the undamaged engine.
They did not have a fire warning until on final, 36 seconds before initial impact.
The cabin crew did not give the flight deck crew incorrect information.
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Recorder recovery efforts?
In the meantime . . . any news on efforts to recover the FDR and CVR?
How deep is the wreckage site?
I presume the first step would be try to triangulate the beeps with surface craft and/or remote vehicles until the batteries fade, and if that fails, to do a sonar sweep followed by underwater video survey on identified site(s).
Would NTSB bring in the Navy or private contractors to use the relevant technologies?
How deep is the wreckage site?
I presume the first step would be try to triangulate the beeps with surface craft and/or remote vehicles until the batteries fade, and if that fails, to do a sonar sweep followed by underwater video survey on identified site(s).
Would NTSB bring in the Navy or private contractors to use the relevant technologies?
I wouldn't put too much faith in the FDR. Assuming it's the same type delivered with the aircraft 45 years ago (and a cargo outfit is unlikely to update it), it's going to be pretty rudimentary (if it was working at all) - and engine parameters will likely be limited to EPR. However (if it was working) it should be good enough to determine if they shut down the wrong engine.
Listening to the ATC comms I did get the impression the crew didn't really communicate the severity of their plight, although they were no doubt 100% focused on checklists etc. The ATC gal was slightly off her game too although the situation wasn't helped early on by the presence of another company jet with a near identical callsign.
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dead_pan
As I said many posts ago even if the 'one engine inoperative at 2000 feet checklist' doesn't say it explicityly; confirming the health of the remaining engine, trying for more height anyway, and heading for the two nearby landing opportunities would have been my priorities . .
As I said many posts ago even if the 'one engine inoperative at 2000 feet checklist' doesn't say it explicityly; confirming the health of the remaining engine, trying for more height anyway, and heading for the two nearby landing opportunities would have been my priorities . .
As a layman, with the aircraft not being able to hold height on one, so assuming it was full of fuel and cargo, would you not try to diagnose the problem and recitfy that first as opposed to turning, I ask that simply because how much height would they lose doing a 360 at 2000 ft on an aircraft that was struggling to maintain altitude? Would that not thus limit your airborne time available to rectify the problem?
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I thought turning 90degreees right early on would have been quite useful if they had picked the right moment as would not continuing out to sea . . still we should wait for the report
dead_pan
The "near-identical callsign" would, I think, be a lot less likely to occur in Europe because of the use of alpha-numeric callsigns to mitigate the risk of confusion in such situations. Am I right in thinking that this system has not been adopted widely in the US?
The "near-identical callsign" would, I think, be a lot less likely to occur in Europe because of the use of alpha-numeric callsigns to mitigate the risk of confusion in such situations. Am I right in thinking that this system has not been adopted widely in the US?
I ask that simply because how much height would they lose doing a 360 at 2000 ft on an aircraft that was struggling to maintain altitude?
