PIA A320 Crash Karachi
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I'll start off with not a pilot, but a career IT person with much background in machine/user interaction. The same thought came to me also after hearing so many truly knowledgeable pilots say the same thing. I haven't read through all of the posts on this thread....too many to do so. But has anyone raised the thought of something akin to hypoxia or carbon monoxide poisoning? These were not two rookies, and yet their behavior is beyond anything any pilot could imagine taking place in a commercial airliner. Could some fault in the pressurization or environmental systems cause them to be disoriented or partially incapacitated? It just does not seem possible that they could have made so many bad decisions along the way without realizing they were getting deeper and deeper into trouble and taking some corrective action. The fact that, as ferry pilot stated, they made so many deliberate actions that were all wrong begs for a better explanation other than they thought they could get away with it.
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Patrickal, Airbus has NOT given a technical recommendation. If there had been a problem with the airplane, they would have at least given a recommendation or comment. A possible line of inquiry would be the blood sugar levels of the pilots, as they may have been fasting, because of Ramadan.
By psychiatric test they mean psychological profiling. It is not fool proof. Moreover he has been in the business of aviation for 30 odd years and have logged 17000 hours. Psychological tests are very subjective and gives out very generalised opinions. Apart from Defence forces I doubt if it is being used anywhere else. The report (31 year old) is no reflection of pilots health as of today.
In my opinion it was a very rare occasion when small small issues aligned to gradually take the pilot into this mess. Ego, complacency, gap in flying, empty sky, over confidence and simply oversight made them high and hot. Thereafter they tried to catch up with it and in rush of things the two pilots went out of synchronisation. The number of parameters that they were juggling were simply beyond their cognitive abilities. Still seeing the runway straight ahead they thought they can salvage the approach.
Things would have worked out (in pilots opinion) but because of one aspect, gear, which he thought was down. I think the pilot all the time thought that the gear was down. Perhaps it could be on the back of his mind that in case they land too long he will go round. Moreover human is capable of doing something which escapes explanation. I feel sad for the Pilot monitoring who could not muster enough courage to challenge the pilot. I think it is an organisational issue.
In my opinion it was a very rare occasion when small small issues aligned to gradually take the pilot into this mess. Ego, complacency, gap in flying, empty sky, over confidence and simply oversight made them high and hot. Thereafter they tried to catch up with it and in rush of things the two pilots went out of synchronisation. The number of parameters that they were juggling were simply beyond their cognitive abilities. Still seeing the runway straight ahead they thought they can salvage the approach.
Things would have worked out (in pilots opinion) but because of one aspect, gear, which he thought was down. I think the pilot all the time thought that the gear was down. Perhaps it could be on the back of his mind that in case they land too long he will go round. Moreover human is capable of doing something which escapes explanation. I feel sad for the Pilot monitoring who could not muster enough courage to challenge the pilot. I think it is an organisational issue.
de minimus non curat lex
Probably because they have been getting away with it all along. I would think the problem starts at the top at this airline and as a pilot, there is NO CHANCE you will be called in to the Chief pilots office because the plane told him you landed the aircraft and never stabilized the approach.
Any “Pony Express” mentality?
Had the radar recordings prior to this tragic avoidable event been analysed (preserved for 30+ days before used again?) then a clearer picture would have emerged as to the modus operandi of PIA.
As for the concept of failing the psychometric testing prior to employment, appealing to a Tribunal, who can then instruct the employer to enrol them....more questions than answers....wonder if his training records any unusual qualities...? Just who was he?
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Despite all the evidence available, all the time that has passed and all the expert opinion offered on this forum, there has been no solution to this mystery. We know what happened, but we do not know why. So we speculate.
Having ruled out almost everything else, it looks like the pilots broke all the rules and tried to fly the airplane so far outside its operating limits and their own, they crashed it. In the worst case, they were having a little fun, playing a dangerous and illegal game that got out of hand. Hard to believe, but if there is a more forgiving explanation on the cockpit voice recorder we should be hearing it sooner rather than later.
If not, and this awful conclusion turns out to be correct, this crash was not an accident. It was a systemic failure. We don’t speculate on that. Or at least I don't
Having ruled out almost everything else, it looks like the pilots broke all the rules and tried to fly the airplane so far outside its operating limits and their own, they crashed it. In the worst case, they were having a little fun, playing a dangerous and illegal game that got out of hand. Hard to believe, but if there is a more forgiving explanation on the cockpit voice recorder we should be hearing it sooner rather than later.
If not, and this awful conclusion turns out to be correct, this crash was not an accident. It was a systemic failure. We don’t speculate on that. Or at least I don't
there has been no solution to this mystery.
By this I mean a properly translated record that captures the nuances of the language used in the technical environment. I would guess only a fellow native speaking Airbus rated pilot would be able to get the subtleties of the interraction between the crew and ATC.
Just the R/T side leaves too many questions.
.......... But has anyone raised the thought of something akin to hypoxia or carbon monoxide poisoning? These were not two rookies, and yet their behavior is beyond anything any pilot could imagine taking place in a commercial airliner. Could some fault in the pressurization or environmental systems cause them to be disoriented or partially incapacitated?
My reasoning, like yours, is because the actions of these pilots were not just accidentally negligent - they were deliberately and therefore criminally negligent. Why would two pilots be criminally negligent unless they were mentally compromised in some way?
I don't buy the assertion that the pilots were discussing Covid19 for the last 30 mins either.
Maybe the Captain's son was in his seat driving Daddy's plane, and it got out of hand before the Captain could get back in his seat? I hope not.
Pegase Driver
We need to "hear" the CVR in full.
By this I mean a properly translated record that captures the nuances of the language used in the technical environment. I would guess only a fellow native speaking Airbus rated pilot would be able to get the subtleties of the interraction between the crew and ATC.
Just the R/T side leaves too many questions.
By this I mean a properly translated record that captures the nuances of the language used in the technical environment. I would guess only a fellow native speaking Airbus rated pilot would be able to get the subtleties of the interraction between the crew and ATC.
Just the R/T side leaves too many questions.
As to the ATC R/T divulged on internet immediately after the accident , as I mentioned at the beginning here, for me it looks like there are transmissions missing ( not recorded) just like it was in the Kathmandu Dash 8 accident.
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CVR - wait for final report - but . . .
SLF (expanding into aviation law)
Isn't there a case in this exact kind of situation for the full CVR output to be made available to an authorized and official inquiry group to vet for some public disclosure? -- and for this to happen much quicker than the routine process of a full AAIB review and report?
Reason for advocating faster process in this situation has two parts. First is the fact that the globally widespread standing-down of civil aviation holds at least some prospect of decrease in overall performance attributes of returning pilots. Not all, and not necessarily serious where it does occur, but the situation is truly uncharted territory (isn't it?) and so a measure of urgency appears justified, despite the standard rule of waiting upon the final report. Second, whatever the truth turns out to be about why this accident occurred, the fact is that, today, it presents unknowns beyond the stock or catalog of occurrences with tragic results. I mean, probably dozens of very highly qualified aviators have weighed in on-thread about how the badly unstabilized approach, and how many if not mostly all of the two pilots' actions (or omissions of actions), just don't make any sense. (I'll rely on this second factor alone if the first one is too ill-informed.)
As for a vehicle within which to make this quite atypical disclosure, well Annex 13 isn't carved in stone (ask the Iranians . . . ) and so it "**should**" be possible and even feasible to create a subgroup, and to have the equivalent of what we do in courtrooms in the U.S. -- in camera review, where only the judge and his or her staff see the material, and then decide what -- if anything -- can be put on the record. I quite realize this process doesn't exist at present. But….some combination of 'necessity is the mother of invention' with 'hard cases with allegations of bribery in the background make uncomfortable law'.
Isn't there a case in this exact kind of situation for the full CVR output to be made available to an authorized and official inquiry group to vet for some public disclosure? -- and for this to happen much quicker than the routine process of a full AAIB review and report?
Reason for advocating faster process in this situation has two parts. First is the fact that the globally widespread standing-down of civil aviation holds at least some prospect of decrease in overall performance attributes of returning pilots. Not all, and not necessarily serious where it does occur, but the situation is truly uncharted territory (isn't it?) and so a measure of urgency appears justified, despite the standard rule of waiting upon the final report. Second, whatever the truth turns out to be about why this accident occurred, the fact is that, today, it presents unknowns beyond the stock or catalog of occurrences with tragic results. I mean, probably dozens of very highly qualified aviators have weighed in on-thread about how the badly unstabilized approach, and how many if not mostly all of the two pilots' actions (or omissions of actions), just don't make any sense. (I'll rely on this second factor alone if the first one is too ill-informed.)
As for a vehicle within which to make this quite atypical disclosure, well Annex 13 isn't carved in stone (ask the Iranians . . . ) and so it "**should**" be possible and even feasible to create a subgroup, and to have the equivalent of what we do in courtrooms in the U.S. -- in camera review, where only the judge and his or her staff see the material, and then decide what -- if anything -- can be put on the record. I quite realize this process doesn't exist at present. But….some combination of 'necessity is the mother of invention' with 'hard cases with allegations of bribery in the background make uncomfortable law'.
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 30th Jun 2020 at 11:09.
Yes, I suggested this a while back. Undetected fumes, e.g. CO, undetected food poisoning, undetected depressurisation.
My reasoning, like yours, is because the actions of these pilots were not just accidentally negligent - they were deliberately and therefore criminally negligent. Why would two pilots be criminally negligent unless they were mentally compromised in some way?
My reasoning, like yours, is because the actions of these pilots were not just accidentally negligent - they were deliberately and therefore criminally negligent. Why would two pilots be criminally negligent unless they were mentally compromised in some way?
I do not believe for a second that the crew decided to land wheels up.
Hard as it is for those of us who fly in another hemisphere and culture, this sort of cowboy flying is not uncommon. Stable approaches are for the weak.
I can't say that they weren't incapacitated of course - and that still may be the case - but don't feel pressured to make up scenarios just to excuse what you or I would call incompetence and recklessness that subsequently leads to an accident.
I don't buy the assertion that the pilots were discussing Covid19 for the last 30 mins either.
Maybe the Captain's son was in his seat driving Daddy's plane, and it got out of hand before the Captain could get back in his seat? I hope not
de minimus non curat lex
As to why this occurred is at present subject to conjecture ~ fasting, dehydration might be two routes to explore? Toxicology report awaited.
As far as has been disclosed in 22 June report, no evidence of fumes in the cockpit / decompression.
The jigsaw is far from complete.
Their mental state is central to this tragic crash. I would suggest that during the (late) descent the chemical and electrical pathways in the brain were such that an ‘abnormality of the mind’ occurred. The psychologists views on the CVR will be interesting.
As to why this occurred is at present subject to conjecture ~ fasting, dehydration might be two routes to explore? Toxicology report awaited.
As far as has been disclosed in 22 June report, no evidence of fumes in the cockpit / decompression.
The jigsaw is far from complete.
As to why this occurred is at present subject to conjecture ~ fasting, dehydration might be two routes to explore? Toxicology report awaited.
As far as has been disclosed in 22 June report, no evidence of fumes in the cockpit / decompression.
The jigsaw is far from complete.
But as it stands we have:
- a distracted crew from COVID,
- not very current
- missed the TOD from (1)
- possible pride “real pilots don’t orbit or go around”
- meek FO
- gear out at 7k to help descent
- gear up on GP intercept (meek FO moves the handle the only way it will go, maybe getting confused for a go around?)
- Approach waaay to fast and no Dangling Dunlops that normally slow them down when they might have done this before.
- real pilots don’t go around. That’s embarrassing.
- oh crap the gear is up.
There may be one, I can’t say there is t just as you can’t say there is. But there’s enough in the list above not to need one.
I have sat at at the holding point in India on a 2000m runway. Pretty much half way along the runway. We were waiting for the arrival on an aircraft inbound so we could enter and backtrack. It was a bit over 10 years ago, actually right in the midst of the last fake pilot scandal.
We commented how high the aircraft was on final.... we sat waiting for the go around. It never came. The 320 was well past us before it touched down.
Last edited by compressor stall; 30th Jun 2020 at 11:57.
de minimus non curat lex
Perhaps the original psychometric testing had revealed an important characteristic?
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As Rednerib also points out above, this Twitter post is way over the top. A psychometric test does not address "psychiatric issues". And the conclusions based on a test made more then 30 years ago have little or no validity that concerns the present day individual.
I am trying to see things from their point view. I agree that the approach had no chance of resulting in safe landing even with undercarriage down. But had undercarriage been down they would have been saved doomsday as after landing they could have sat on brakes and may be overshot the runway or in other case they would have gone round safely after touch down too. I do not fly this aircraft but I do feel the pilot did see some scope of forcing a landing. How that the gear was not down was the weakest link which was missed out. When I say this I do not by any stretch of imagination approve of such acts. The approach , sensibly should have been aborted. Thanks for your reply.
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Compressor stall
Something is misfiring here. 2000m runway you are holding at halfway and an A320 flashes past you and touches down after that and stops in remaining say 800m? Some Airbus I must say.
Something is misfiring here. 2000m runway you are holding at halfway and an A320 flashes past you and touches down after that and stops in remaining say 800m? Some Airbus I must say.
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Parkfell :
Which lessons in this case ? Go around if not stabilized by 1000 or 500 ft ? already there. but to be cynical , it does not matter which recommendations comes out of any report , they all fade away . I was a bit involved in Teneriffe, lots of good recommendations came out at the time ,but it took a few years to implement the " line up and wait " phraseology , and even then our US friends did not like it and it took decades to convince them ... Learning from others mistakes and implementing changes is one of the most difficult things in aviation ...
Which lessons in this case ? Go around if not stabilized by 1000 or 500 ft ? already there. but to be cynical , it does not matter which recommendations comes out of any report , they all fade away . I was a bit involved in Teneriffe, lots of good recommendations came out at the time ,but it took a few years to implement the " line up and wait " phraseology , and even then our US friends did not like it and it took decades to convince them ... Learning from others mistakes and implementing changes is one of the most difficult things in aviation ...