PIA A320 Crash Karachi
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So its the people that need to adapt and work with systems. ATC is more likely to be fully automated before Pilots are taken out of the aircraft
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Separate discussion perhaps covered elsewhere but.... when that time comes, how many pax will willingly board such an aircraft?
Back on topic. I'm only SLF (though I work in aerospace for one of the big players and have a keen interest, and some training, in aviation safety) but when I watched the Mentour video on this crash, I spent most of it aghast at what I was seeing. I've followed this topic on here from the beginning but it still shocked me, and the shocks kept coming. This, surely, has to be about as bad as it gets up the front of a commercial airliner. Truly an eye-opener even for this relatively informed amateur.
Back on topic. I'm only SLF (though I work in aerospace for one of the big players and have a keen interest, and some training, in aviation safety) but when I watched the Mentour video on this crash, I spent most of it aghast at what I was seeing. I've followed this topic on here from the beginning but it still shocked me, and the shocks kept coming. This, surely, has to be about as bad as it gets up the front of a commercial airliner. Truly an eye-opener even for this relatively informed amateur.
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Usual airline ops use about 2% of the airplane flight domain. Test pilots do things that you can't even imagine.
However, beyond the limits of the FO, it's indeed very clear.
But that misses the point. And to say you prefer messy landings over deadly accidents...we all do, but how about neither with a perfectly-good aircraft on a clear, calm day?
The accident one hundred percent would not have happened if the Captain had flown a stabilized approach before attempting to land. Period. End of story.
The accident one hundred percent would not have happened if the Captain had flown a stabilized approach before attempting to land. Period. End of story.
Again, it all boils down to the F/O.
Yes, the captain has final responsibility over the aircraft, and that includes making up for the F/O's mistakes.
But the F/O is also a trained professional whose duty is to do his job correctly, that includes not doing everything that he did, including things at a time when everything was still perfectly normal.
A toxic combination of high authority gradient, low skill/knowledge levels and a complete inability to modify the plan when it was obviously failing had a large part in their demise. I wouldn’t heap the majority of the blame on the P2 as, yes, he wasn’t doing a very good job but there was no effective monitoring from the P1. The P2 also tried to intervene but without success, due to inadequate advocacy and the aforementioned authority gradient. If the P1 had become incapacitated, would the P2 have continued the approach? Probably not; would the P1 have done the same had the P2 passed out - much more likely as he had a track record of doing exactly that.
I can’t access the report from the country I’m currently in, but I’m reasonably sure they went a long way into the red with flaps/slats somewhere on the approach? Given aerodynamic forces increase with speed squared, it doesn’t take much of an excursion to get to ultimate design loads. They may have been where no test pilot had gone before, as TPs understand the much tighter margins when it comes to speed limitations...
The airplane was far, far, within its limits
In a two-pilot operation, keeping within P2's limitations is just as much part of the captain's responsibility as keeping within the aircraft's limitations. This captain failed in his responsibility to do so. [Arguments about whether P2s should be able to do more than follow SOPs are beside the point so long as airlines only train them to do just that.]
Which report have you been reading? I've been reading the one where the captain overrides the FO's suggestions and then ATC's instructions to orbit. Let me guess, you are going to absolve the captain on the basis that the FO and ATC were insufficiently assertive?
Why were they high in the first place ? Because the F/O, who was PF, didn't properly check his descent distance and missed an orbit that made the flight path longer than it was.
Again, it all boils down to the F/O.
Again, it all boils down to the F/O.
This whole flight and accident process was under control of the Captain.
The F/O might well have made errors, but any given F/O might be nervous and/or be on their first line flight after passing their final line check. So a Captain has to not only be a "normal" Captain but will sometimes have to "babysit" new F/Os, and be prepared to offer advice, command certain actions, or take over if need be. That's what the fourth stripes are for.
The responsibility for conducting a safe flight begins and ends with the Captain, but in this accident flight, it was the Captain who was at fault. The F/O might be very new to the company and the environment. If a normal, approachable Captain makes a mistake, you can easily point out their error, and they will say "Ah, good spot, thank you", but put in the situation of a terrible autocratic Captain, it is a really big ask to expect a new or unassertive F/O to override the Captain and take control - (unless they are literally flying towards a cliff).
CRM is often cited, but it is not always as easy as remembering some special magic words to say when a fierce, autocratic Captain is shouting at you. And F/Os are not, in my experience, given actual training in dealing with fierce autocratic Captains, they are just told to say certain phrases.
What I think is of greater concern generally is that Captains are often given some sort of protective wrapper once they have got into the LHS. I have seen poorly performing Captains in recurrent SIM checks and on the line, but they seemed to be protected by the company - despite poor performance - and not taken to task or demoted. There are thankfully many fewer "Atlantic Barons" these days, but there still needs to be a more robust way of dealing with and weeding out the bad line Captains.
The F/O might well have made errors, but any given F/O might be nervous and/or be on their first line flight after passing their final line check. So a Captain has to not only be a "normal" Captain but will sometimes have to "babysit" new F/Os, and be prepared to offer advice, command certain actions, or take over if need be. That's what the fourth stripes are for.
The responsibility for conducting a safe flight begins and ends with the Captain, but in this accident flight, it was the Captain who was at fault. The F/O might be very new to the company and the environment. If a normal, approachable Captain makes a mistake, you can easily point out their error, and they will say "Ah, good spot, thank you", but put in the situation of a terrible autocratic Captain, it is a really big ask to expect a new or unassertive F/O to override the Captain and take control - (unless they are literally flying towards a cliff).
CRM is often cited, but it is not always as easy as remembering some special magic words to say when a fierce, autocratic Captain is shouting at you. And F/Os are not, in my experience, given actual training in dealing with fierce autocratic Captains, they are just told to say certain phrases.
What I think is of greater concern generally is that Captains are often given some sort of protective wrapper once they have got into the LHS. I have seen poorly performing Captains in recurrent SIM checks and on the line, but they seemed to be protected by the company - despite poor performance - and not taken to task or demoted. There are thankfully many fewer "Atlantic Barons" these days, but there still needs to be a more robust way of dealing with and weeding out the bad line Captains.
However, being an F/O myself, I identify as him and am easily prone to blaming him, as I would blame myself if I performed this poorly.
The F/O made many mistakes. The captain didn't notice them and didn't compensate them.
Not the other way around. And that is very specific to this case. Other crashes happened differently.
I'm not going against the general rule that the captain has the ultimate responsibility for the airplane. I'm just saying that in this particular case, his job was made very difficult by this F/O.
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I disagree. The Captain made the decisions, did not observe what was going on, and chose to go-around, sentencing most to death. Himself included. Standard flight deck gradient in Pakistan. As steep as the North Face of the Eiger. Tough for the FO to climb successfully.
lol the mentally deficient FO (due to self enforced starvation from Ramadamingdong) entirely phucks the approach up; and it’s still the CPT (who also hasn’t had sniff of bacon sanger) fault?! 
My daily browse of X, Daily Wail & Pprubbish is complete
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My daily browse of X, Daily Wail & Pprubbish is complete
Off to communicate with adults
Errr.....well, it most certainly is the Captain's responsibility - in the same way as when an engine fails, the situation has to be dealt with and contained.
What were you told on your Command course - to just sit there and let the F/O crash the plane ???
~~~
Fasting for Ramadan might have made sense in the century's before the invention of complex machinery, but nowadays, it is beyond bizzare and extremely concerning that it is allowed amongst those operating aircraft.
Can they not get a dispensation and 'make up for it' in other ways to appease their gods ?
What were you told on your Command course - to just sit there and let the F/O crash the plane ???
~~~
Fasting for Ramadan might have made sense in the century's before the invention of complex machinery, but nowadays, it is beyond bizzare and extremely concerning that it is allowed amongst those operating aircraft.
Can they not get a dispensation and 'make up for it' in other ways to appease their gods ?
Had the captain saved the day, what treatment should this F/O have been given, after having repeatedly tried to kill everybody ?
Doing nothing would have been far better.
Doing nothing would have been far better.
CVividasku's post has certainly reinvigorated this thread with a lot of useful commentary. I think he may be making a more subtle point than is being credited. Yes the Captain was responsible and ran an appalling show with a litany of errors. If there is a value to negative examples then here you have it. If his behaviour or even a cursory compliance with SOPs had been there then nothing much would have happened. Do consider the FOs role though. Not only was it non challenging but also counterproductive as CVividasku pointed out. Accidents are the result of a multiplicity of factors and aviation personalities are very varied. I've flown with people in both seats who probably shouldnt have been in either. We probably know people like this, now just imagine if two are paired together on a bad day.
I'm afraid the subtle undertones of "repeatedly tried to kill everybody" have eluded me. I eagerly await CVividasku's elaboration on what he meant by that. Also, "Doing nothing would have been far better" ... I was under the possibly mistaken impression that once the captain had taken control, that's pretty much what the FO did! Happy to be educated otherwise if I'm off the mark here.
Fasting for Ramadan might have made sense in the century's before the invention of complex machinery, but nowadays, it is beyond bizzare and extremely concerning that it is allowed amongst those operating aircraft.
Can they not get a dispensation and 'make up for it' in other ways to appease their gods ?
Can they not get a dispensation and 'make up for it' in other ways to appease their gods ?
I'm afraid the subtle undertones of "repeatedly tried to kill everybody" have eluded me. I eagerly await CVividasku's elaboration on what he meant by that. Also, "Doing nothing would have been far better" ... I was under the possibly mistaken impression that once the captain had taken control, that's pretty much what the FO did! Happy to be educated otherwise if I'm off the mark here.
So no, he didn't sit idle doing nothing. He did some things, some very stupid ones. He wasn't ill intentioned, but some ill intentioned would have done similar things.
Retracting the gear while the airplane was in descent, for starters. It's "positive climb, gear up", not "on final approach, gear up" and not even "I would like to go around, gear up".
Trying to go around after the airplane did a gear up landing...
The captain also has a huge responsibility for ignoring many rules and not monitoring properly his airplane, of course.
However, culturally, I don't see the captain as the man in charge and the F/O there with no responsibility. To me, flight conduct responsibility is shared 51/49 between the captain and the F/O.
As an F/O I will leave the captain with some area of responsibility (if he wants to do whatever with the pax commercial relationship, that sort of thing, so be it), but when it comes to flight safety, I consider that it's shared 51/49.
Other cultures have a different view on that. Maybe they're more prone to blaming the captain.
So to sum up what I mean, is that the F/O is 49% responsible for this crash, and the CPT 51%.
And from what I read, I feel like people are making the captain 90 or 99% responsible for it.
CVividasku, thank you for replying and clarifying. Your earlier posts gave the impression that you were making the FO 100% responsible for this ("it all boils down to the FO").
At the risk of going over old ground, I wonder how much significance ought to be given to the captain being initially declared "unfit" by PIA's psychiatrist (although later overturned by two second opinions) and the statement in the accident report that the captain "...was of bossy nature, firm, dominant and overbearing. He had below average intelligence. He tends to have little regard for the authority. He had low mechanical comprehension with low comprehension of space relations. His level of stress tolerance was also quite inadequate." There are no such medical or character notes against the FO (although the report did outline some underperformance in checks during the course of his progression to FO).
Also in the report, a nod to the captain's apparently gung-ho approach to flying: "After the accident, flights of Captain for last 12 months were analysed which indicated, numerous triggers during Approach related to High Speed, Path High, High Rate of Descent, Long Flare Distance and GPWS Warnings. There was no Go-Around initiated and several Unstabilized Approaches were continued." Again, there are no such comments against the FO.
Given these extracts from the report, it is understandable that one might lean towards blaming the captain rather more than the FO, especially as some of the crucial actions taken in the cockpit are unattributable to a specific seat. In the end I guess we will never truly know why this crew acted as it did.
At the risk of going over old ground, I wonder how much significance ought to be given to the captain being initially declared "unfit" by PIA's psychiatrist (although later overturned by two second opinions) and the statement in the accident report that the captain "...was of bossy nature, firm, dominant and overbearing. He had below average intelligence. He tends to have little regard for the authority. He had low mechanical comprehension with low comprehension of space relations. His level of stress tolerance was also quite inadequate." There are no such medical or character notes against the FO (although the report did outline some underperformance in checks during the course of his progression to FO).
Also in the report, a nod to the captain's apparently gung-ho approach to flying: "After the accident, flights of Captain for last 12 months were analysed which indicated, numerous triggers during Approach related to High Speed, Path High, High Rate of Descent, Long Flare Distance and GPWS Warnings. There was no Go-Around initiated and several Unstabilized Approaches were continued." Again, there are no such comments against the FO.
Given these extracts from the report, it is understandable that one might lean towards blaming the captain rather more than the FO, especially as some of the crucial actions taken in the cockpit are unattributable to a specific seat. In the end I guess we will never truly know why this crew acted as it did.