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PIA A320 Crash Karachi

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PIA A320 Crash Karachi

Old 27th Jun 2020, 04:56
  #1421 (permalink)  
 
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AFAIKT it sounds like they were never switched to tower. Approach cleared them to land after making a phone call to tower, and tower phoned approach to tell them about the "pod strike".
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 04:59
  #1422 (permalink)  
 
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Perhaps if you had bothered to actually read the Preliminary Report and numerous posts in this thread you would have known that the aircraft was not on the tower frequency.
h) Since the approach to land was continued, “Karachi Approach” instead of changing over the aircraft to “Aerodrome Control”, sought telephonic landing clearance from the “Aerodrome Control”. The “Aerodrome Control” conveyed a landing clearance of the aircraft (without observing the abnormality that the landing gears were not extended) to “Karachi Approach”. Subsequently “Karachi Approach” cleared the aircraft to land
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 05:41
  #1423 (permalink)  
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Did not want to comment on the many inaccuracies or rather misconceptions regarding the regulations and how ATC works , but since I am grounded today due CBs here it is :

Yes normally after established on ILS and clear of other traffic an APP controller transfers the aircraft to the Tower controller who will issue a landing clearance . Keeping the aircraft on the APP frequency and issuing the landing clearance is however foreseen in the regulations (ICAO annex 11 ) and frequently done in LVP ops. Keeping the aircraft on the frequency is even recommended in case of emergency of difficulties to avoid switching frequencies and de-concentrating a crew trying to solve problems. This recommendation has been one of the recommendation and consequences of the El Al B747 accident in Amsterdam .
I am not saying this is the reason he kept it , but could well be. In any case what he did was in accordance with ICAO regulations and it made sense.
The tower controller sawing the pod strike and informing the APP controller, did the correct thing .
The APP controller not passing that info to the Crew: Does anyone honestly think that the crew did not notice they hit the runway 3 times and telling them this would have made the lightest difference to the outcome ? But having had the info, the APP controller could already treat the aircraft as an emergency before the crew declared it .
ATC is not there to fly the aircraft , speed ( when not restricted) , when and where to set flaps and gear is the PIC prerogative and we do not comment on those on the frequency ( in the bar that is another matter ). Airport controllers are here to make sure no other traffic is conflicting with you and the runway is clear and passing weather, wind and anywhere relevant information , not to tell you how to fly the aircraft.

The remark of the Pakistani aviation Minister that the controller did not follow procedures is therefore incorrect , according ICAO regulations at least ,I think he was badly advised and possibly trying to score issues with his CAA. There could be local procedures I am unaware of , but as far as we see so far ATC did nothing to contribute to this accident .
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 06:47
  #1424 (permalink)  

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Originally Posted by ATC Watcher View Post
.......There could be local procedures I am unaware of , but as far as we see so far ATC did nothing to contribute to this accident .
I am not familiar with Karachi airport or their ATC set up. Perhaps someone can clarify a few points.

1. Is there a radar feed for the aerodrome controller to monitor? Primary/Secondary?

2. Did the approach radar controller notify the aerodrome controller of the abnormal ‘presentation’
of the aircraft in terms of speed, range, altitude once on final?

3. Looking at the aerodrome charts the VCR is poorly situated especially for runways 25 L/R.
To what extent is traffic on final clearly visible.

4. Given the ‘presentation’ of the aircraft, would using binoculars have spotted that the gear was NOT down.

All questions which I am sure the final report will cover and explain.

Within a year would be useful, otherwise we will have moved onto the next major nasty, and the lessons to be learnt will start to fade away?
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 07:52
  #1425 (permalink)  
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Parkfell :
I am not familiar with Karachi airport or their ATC set up. Perhaps someone can clarify a few points.
Neither am I , but I have visited numerous TWRs around the world and set up and procedures are relatively standard .

attempting answers :
1- do not know, but if there is one it is likely a PC monitor replicated the TMA setting . But it is not there for monitoring APP but to verify position of traffic (e.g. VFR , etc..) many TWR controllers are not trained/qualified radar .
2. must be very unusual situation to do so. What we saw here would not be such a case in my opinion , since the aircraft rejoined the Glide at some point and declared he was "comfortable" withe the APP.
3. It is in the vast majority of cases impossible to verify gear from the TWR , too far away and anyway it is not part of his duties at all. In some modern new High TWRs ( like BKK for instance) the TWR is so high that an aircraft even on the runway looks like ant, a 1-2 mm spot..In addition he angle often prevent to see the gear on app..if you look from above. And you also need perfect visibility , which is often not the case due pollution or wx.
4- TWR Binoculars are not made and used for that , they are used to spot vehicles or persons near runways , or in case of emergency . The fist APP did not require this. Plus see point 3 above.
All questions which I am sure the final report will cover and explain.
I doubt this since the TWR ATC had no influence on this accident .
Within a year would be useful, otherwise we will have moved onto the next major nasty, and the lessons to be learnt will start to fade away?
Which lessons in this case ? Go around if not stabilized by 1000 or 500 ft ? already there. but to be cynical , it does not matter which recommendations comes out of any report , they all fade away . I was a bit involved in Teneriffe, lots of good recommendations came out at the time ,but it took a few years to implement the " line up and wait " phraseology , and even then our US friends did not like it and it took decades to convince them ... Learning from others mistakes and implementing changes is one of the most difficult things in aviation ...
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 08:08
  #1426 (permalink)  
 
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ATC Watcher, good posts

Why are people trying to blame ATC?

There were two (supposedly) qualified pilots on that flight deck, and the most fundamental thing you need to do to land is lower the landing gear.

ATC did warn the pilots several times about their descent profile, but ATC's advice was pushed aside

The two pilots on the flight deck were either monumentally incompetent or they were suffering an undetected fumes event, or perhaps undetected food poisoning, or undetected depressurisation. (no MAYDAY call).

To screw up the descent is one thing - we all have bad days and we all make mistakes. But to then NOT take appropriate action to recover the profile and the situation tells me that these pilots were either unqualified or mentally affected in some way.
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 09:24
  #1427 (permalink)  
 
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I agree that it is ludicrous to try to put any blame onto ATC, or worse, the cabin crew, for this fiasco. How can anyone imagine that a message saying 'for information, you appear to have crashed' would have changed anything? And imagine the slippery slope if it becomes ATC's job to examine each approaching a/c to decide if it is correctly configured!

But one persistent question is that instruction to turn left which was ignored. I was under the impression that such instructions require acknowledgment, and compliance. Or an explanation if unable or unwilling. Even if established on the ILS. Why did ATC not repeat that instruction and demand a response ? 'Established on ILS' is not a response. 'Negative, established on ILS' would have been. Strictly speaking, ATC did not know their request had been received and so were they not required to immediately repeat it?
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 16:38
  #1428 (permalink)  
 
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Whilst full agreeing with comments by fellow ATC colleagues up-thread, there is one significant aspect ... I doubt any Pakistani ATCO would be assertive enough to demand an acknowledgment of, or compliance with, an ATC instruction. We come back to cultural aspects, I regret.
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 16:56
  #1429 (permalink)  
 
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Gear put up at 1700 ft

The real mystery is why the gear was put up at 1700 ft. If they had left it down, as they were on the glide-slope by then, in the next 4 miles their speed would have reduced, and nobody would even know of this flight.
Perhaps the FO was setting up for a go-around, but the captain was not.
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 17:02
  #1430 (permalink)  
 
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I assume they just selected the gear up at the usual trigger point for selecting it down. This is assumption here, but SOPs, practical drift or perhaps the reality of repetitive line flying may dictate that in normal circumstances, the gear comes down at 1700 ft or whatever, this would have triggered them to reach and move the gear lever, without thinking what they were actually doing. Due to the panic/overload they were paying no attention to what they were doing and that is where the slips and errors just start to cascade. That is the only reason I can imagine this happening. Sure it has been done before but without these awful consequences.
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 17:24
  #1431 (permalink)  
 
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There was an OEB in effect a few years re L/G NOT DOWNLOCKED that required you recycle the gear to clear a jam of the Hydraulic actuator but had that been the case here then AIRMAN would have flagged it for Maintenance and Airbus and we'd most likely have seen something to that effect in the initial report.
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 17:38
  #1432 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by giggitygiggity View Post
I assume they just selected the gear up at the usual trigger point for selecting it down. This is assumption here, but SOPs, practical drift or perhaps the reality of repetitive line flying may dictate that in normal circumstances, the gear comes down at 1700 ft or whatever, this would have triggered them to reach and move the gear lever, without thinking what they were actually doing.
Looking at the diagram in the report, the gear up is selected just before meeting with the glide slope.
Then there is a brief interval when they descend below the slope, presumably because of the drag of the gear doors that open to let the gear back in.
There follows a period when the descent rate is about 1 degree, much less than the 3 degrees of the GS, and the IAS remains about 225kts.
This changes about 2.3NM before touchdown, possibly by the pilots noticing the need for correction, to another 5-6 degree dive to rejoin the glide slope, which they achieve about 1NM before the start of runway and by maintaining a speed of only about 215kts throughout the dive.
Did they engage any braking action during this interval? The report does not indicate such.
About 20 seconds later they meet the planet in an unexpected scratching fashion.
Is the above a possible scenario?
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 19:00
  #1433 (permalink)  
 
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I don't understand what's set up for go around. No aircaft GA starts with gear or flaps. It's TOGA, PITCH then everything else. How can you retract gear? One can understand instead flap one step gear retracted but even flap is not retracted first. It's not known whether they activate approch even. So speed wasn't going to reduce unless thrust was in manual at idle all along.
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 19:37
  #1434 (permalink)  
 
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I could imagine a situation where a poorly trained person immediately goes for gear and flaps when they hear "go around". For all intents and purposes, the FDR suggests they were both incapacitated. Trying to find logic in their actions will be futile. The CVR will only help a little in my opinion.

-At 15nm to go, they were at 10,000ft at 250 kts. At that stage, a competent crew would see that they had excess energy. The last (only?) logical action of this whole sequence was the disengagement of the AP.

-At 10nm to go, they were at 7000ft, still close to 250kt. If you thought you could salvage it before, it's clearly not going to work now.

-At 5nm to the runway, they're actually on the glideslope. Well done! Still 250kt and config 1 though. How'd they plan to lose over 100kt while on a 3 degree path? Forget about a stable approach. Now is a great time to go around.

-Less than 2 miles from the runway, at 500ft, they were at 220kt descending at 2000fpm, with the CRC sounding, and the EGPWS alternating between sink rate, terrain and gear. The ASI is well into the red band. Apart from death, what outcome could one reasonably expect?
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 21:12
  #1435 (permalink)  
 
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The preliminary reports that states the during runway contact, reverse was selected and gear was selected down then up. That would indicate to me that the flight deck crew knew they were on the ground. My understanding is both Airbus and Boeing state that you do not go around once reversers are selected.
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 21:25
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They disregarded all the other operating procedures. Why’d they pay attention to that one?
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 21:45
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Maybe after it became apparent that reverse wasn't being deployed ?
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 21:52
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Originally Posted by Check Airman View Post
-At 15nm to go, they were at 10,000ft at 250 kts. At that stage, a competent crew would see that they had excess energy. The last (only?) logical action of this whole sequence was the disengagement of the AP.
Really?! Their situational awareness was in the bin so the last thing they probably should do is disconnect the automatics. Except if it was done to briefly gain full speed brake authority (if they thought that would solve their problem - though here it clearly wouldn't have). If it was me, I'd be re-engaging the autopilot in that situation and certainly not considering taking it out. I realise that the result was a crash anyway, but the obvious problem was they were so fixated on making the runway from 10,000ft (or sooner?), manually flying would fill up their capacity bucket even further and for such an un-current pilot (given covid) would surely make the situation far far worse.

If your situational awareness is low, the logical action would be to do something to increase it, eg hand over control, increase the automatics or what they really should have done, is request an orbit or delaying actions to give themselves more time. The autopilot of a perfectly functioning aircraft does a very good job of helping you not to crash.

I'll open up a can of worms here, but before someone brings up the Children of the Magenta line video, I really don't think it applies here. There problem was a loss of SA and resultantly, capacity. The PF was so focused on the PFD that he couldn't even hear the TOO LOW GEAR call outs.
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 22:35
  #1439 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by clark y View Post
The preliminary reports that states the during runway contact, reverse was selected and gear was selected down then up.
Maybe the report is not quite clear on this. But it seems to say that gear was selected down and then up subsequently to ground contact:

The landing was discontinued and a go-around was executed. FDR recording indicates a brief action of selection of landing gear lever to down position, which was
immediately followed by its movement to up position.
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Old 27th Jun 2020, 23:02
  #1440 (permalink)  

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I read that as: After the G/A decision once airborne, they selected L/G down and up again immediately. I.e. they intended to close the L/G up, but the only direction the lever would move was in the opposite direction - DN. Having realized, perhaps for the first time, it was on the wrong side, it was selected UP again.
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