EK-131: Airbus seconds from doom over Moscow (Report in The Times)
- they are thrust levers connected to electronic resolvers which electronically 'talk' to the FADECs. What you're used to is actual metal cables strung over all sorts of pulleys and expansion adjusters, running all the way to the carburettor or FADEC. I used to shudder, looking at all the 'Meccano' and pulley wheels and bits of string in the main wheel bay during my 737 walk-arounds. If you had trouble with four very easy to move Airbus thrust levers, how did you manage with the Boeing mechanical ones?
Dreamed of my lovely ole DC3, coaxing those big P&W's into burping, farting, starts on cold mornings at Gatters.
I nailed it. My first was the venerable Shed.
Don't get me started on Tractors to Beamers mate. Done that. Brand new, all singing, dancing beamer that even talks to me..............
Safe flying and clear skies to you sir
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That's an over-simplistic comparison between the AB and Boeing autothrottles. You don't get more thrust if you simply push the AB thrust levers forward if they're already in a gate. Boeing's don't have a physical gate but they work the same without having to physically move them (they move themselves) for takeoff or climb. On the Boeing's it's also easier to override the thrust lever motors and place them manually without having to turn the autothrottles/thrust off like you do on the AB. There is no override function on an AB - it's either fully automatic of fully manual.
I've flown both, the Boeing design is better. BTW, I land almost every landing with the autothrust/throttles off in Boeing and AB products. So I'm not a slave to the automation. But I'm a fan of the automation because it allows us to focus on other stuff. Overall the automation increase has been a huge improvement but it has it's downsides.
I've flown both, the Boeing design is better. BTW, I land almost every landing with the autothrust/throttles off in Boeing and AB products. So I'm not a slave to the automation. But I'm a fan of the automation because it allows us to focus on other stuff. Overall the automation increase has been a huge improvement but it has it's downsides.
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BF's son just got qualified on the 737. He came off of the CRJ-200/700/900. He's very impressed with the ability of the automation and autothrottles, VNAV/LNAV, but didn't realize how much the workload was to adjust to it. As a jumpseater he'd watched guys who were fully up to speed on the automation who made it look easy. Now that he's in the seat, versus observing from the jumpseat, he's realized the learning curve is steeper than he realized despite having watched it numerous times.
I've flown both as well, the Airbus FBW design is better.
We will have to agree to disagree, because auto-thrust is a huge divisive subject, and I have drifted this thread too far already in my defence of Airbus design
Apologies to the OP.
We will have to agree to disagree, because auto-thrust is a huge divisive subject, and I have drifted this thread too far already in my defence of Airbus design
Apologies to the OP.
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There's a thread drift about Moscow incident. It has nothing to do with automation or manual flying or Airbus thrust levers. It's the result lack of information about the accuracy zone of GS signal, following an incorrect procedure on part of the PF and lack of situational awareness on part of both. The procedure of capturing the GS from above comes into contention when established on localizer. The PF distracted by false GS should have cross checked D×3 which he didn't then out of ignorance applied the procedure without getting on the localizer. It appears the PM had off day and was not with the aircraft and played no part in the proceedings CRM or otherwise. There's no need to comment on equipment or automation which is executing 1000s of approaches without any problems all over the world.
It has nothing to do with automation or manual flying or Airbus thrust levers.
It appears the PM had off day and was not with the aircraft and played no part in the proceedings CRM or otherwise.
As for the "Capturing the GS from above procedure", one is asking for trouble setting the ALT SEL above you. I'm surprised Airbus would use that as it's policy. It should be set to 1500ft AAL and if you capture the altitude before the GS, tough, GA and do it again. This and many other recent incidents are showing crews becoming more and more detached from the aircraft and having procedures that are one step away from failure, so close in to the airport, is just asking for trouble.
What is it with pilots using Open Descent close in to the airport to facilitate a descent? The poor technique of using the secondary effect of controls to control the flight path again!
Quote of the report: "In this situation (GSIFA), taking into account the ground and the obstacles, and if ATC permits, it may be appropriate to perform a 360° turn before resuming the approach". In a 380?
Only half a speed-brake
Originally Posted by report
"In this situation (GSIFA), taking into account the ground and the obstacles, and if ATC permits, it may be appropriate to perform a 360° turn before resuming the approach".
vilas
You argue appropriately that automation alone was not the dominant issue; however stating poor human performance - 'a day off', 'should have checked', is hindsight and does not consider why … pilots have 'poor days', or why they do not check every cue on every approach.
Captn Bloggs
Developing your question re inappropriate use of autoflight modes … they are used because they are there.
Systems are designed to meet specific needs; open descent is an asset in many situations, but not so in others - joining the GS from above. Thus a piloting task is to understand when a specific mode should / should not be used. Many modern aircraft have inhibitors to exclude inappropriate use, but for each preventative design there is a risk of an unforeseen outcome.
Also, if avoiding capture of GS from above was a consideration (false GS) then is this risk any greater than encountering the situation in this incident.
A balancing argument is that as disturbing this situation appears to have been, the mitigating features resulted in a safe outcome. How often are these situations encountered, how often are the industry safety systems aware of them.
You argue appropriately that automation alone was not the dominant issue; however stating poor human performance - 'a day off', 'should have checked', is hindsight and does not consider why … pilots have 'poor days', or why they do not check every cue on every approach.
Captn Bloggs
Developing your question re inappropriate use of autoflight modes … they are used because they are there.
Systems are designed to meet specific needs; open descent is an asset in many situations, but not so in others - joining the GS from above. Thus a piloting task is to understand when a specific mode should / should not be used. Many modern aircraft have inhibitors to exclude inappropriate use, but for each preventative design there is a risk of an unforeseen outcome.
Also, if avoiding capture of GS from above was a consideration (false GS) then is this risk any greater than encountering the situation in this incident.
A balancing argument is that as disturbing this situation appears to have been, the mitigating features resulted in a safe outcome. How often are these situations encountered, how often are the industry safety systems aware of them.
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I've operated into this airport - at first guess in terms of cause, this could be easily done when tired, for two reasons:
1. The elevation of the airfield not being accounted for in distance-to-run vs. expected altitude raw data calculations (elev. 593 ft AMSL)...
2. An error in the time consuming and cognitively taxing conversion (metres on QFE to feet on QNH) from the controllers instructions to descend in metres, to an altitude in feet (to set on the MCP/FCU). "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone"
1. The elevation of the airfield not being accounted for in distance-to-run vs. expected altitude raw data calculations (elev. 593 ft AMSL)...
2. An error in the time consuming and cognitively taxing conversion (metres on QFE to feet on QNH) from the controllers instructions to descend in metres, to an altitude in feet (to set on the MCP/FCU). "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone"
I have never flown metric altitudes, or the A380, but surely like other Airbusses, the A380 FCU ALT selector has a metres button, so no conversion from feet to metres is required - just press the button to change the ALT and PFD readouts to metres and then select the metric altitudes that ATC or the approach plate says?
Secondly, the elevation of the airfield is taken into account in the box on the approach plate of altitude versus DME, so you just read off the numbers to cross check - especially important when doing a non-standard approach, such as intercepting the GS from above.
Secondly, the elevation of the airfield is taken into account in the box on the approach plate of altitude versus DME, so you just read off the numbers to cross check - especially important when doing a non-standard approach, such as intercepting the GS from above.
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Originally Posted by Mendi Matt
I've operated into this airport - at first guess in terms of cause, this could be easily done when tired, for two reasons:
1. The elevation of the airfield not being accounted for in distance-to-run vs. expected altitude raw data calculations (elev. 593 ft AMSL)...
2. An error in the time consuming and cognitively taxing conversion (metres on QFE to feet on QNH) from the controllers instructions to descend in metres, to an altitude in feet (to set on the MCP/FCU). "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone"
1. The elevation of the airfield not being accounted for in distance-to-run vs. expected altitude raw data calculations (elev. 593 ft AMSL)...
2. An error in the time consuming and cognitively taxing conversion (metres on QFE to feet on QNH) from the controllers instructions to descend in metres, to an altitude in feet (to set on the MCP/FCU). "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone"
