Boeing stays firmly on course... to the bottom
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Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".
That is what all of us involved in aviation do, every time we fly. There is nothing remarkable about it.
In terms of 'What could the FAA or Boeing best do with the next hour of their time?', this matter wouldn't be on the agenda. Old aircraft like the 727 are much more crash-prone for a million reasons, and addressing a minor issue like this one is, if one does the maths, a pointless waste of time.
In terms of 'What could the FAA or Boeing best do with the next hour of their time?', this matter wouldn't be on the agenda. Old aircraft like the 727 are much more crash-prone for a million reasons, and addressing a minor issue like this one is, if one does the maths, a pointless waste of time.
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But only once all the higher priorities have been dealt with - and they are legion.
Regulators and accident investigation organisations often obsess about the trees, while the wood burns around them. This is certainly one of those cases. (Manufacturers, in the main, are quite good at trying to make profit, as their first goal, as they should).
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Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".
While the MAX’s problems stemmed from a misguided design of automation, many engineers and airline executives remain confident that properly devised computerized features have proven extremely reliable and will prevent accidents. They cite the safety benefits of everything from automated engine adjustments to computer-controlled landing maneuvers that are more precise and predictable than any pilot commands. Over the years, Boeing rival Airbus has tended to devise systems where pilots are trained to let automated systems handle emergencies, and company executives say that approach will continue. Executives at Boeing and Airbus have said they are also designing flight-control systems tailored for younger pilots, who generally have less flying time in their logbooks—and a more innate familiarity with technology—than aviators of years past.
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Airbus has tended to devise systems where pilots are trained to let automated systems handle emergencies, and company executives say that approach will continue. Executives at Boeing and Airbus have said they are also designing flight-control systems tailored for younger pilots, who generally have less flying time in their logbooks—and a more innate familiarity with technology—than aviators of years past.
FADEC is designed to exploit maximum performance from an engine while protecting it from overtemp / overboost, yet I don't hear people complaining about it.
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Well, if you don’t have any pilots, you don’t need to worry about stick force gradient (which is where MCAS came in), and with direct control of power and attitude the computers could be programmed to avoid the envelope corners which cause the problem. I’m not saying I agree with the premise, or that the 737 is equipped with sufficient air data sensors to implement in this case, but there is at least some logic there.
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You might think that there would have been more important things for NHTSA to worry about than the safety of World War II era amphibious vehicles with no particular commercial or military value. However, a marketing genius decided to convert them into tourist attractions in coastal cities such as Seattle. One of them lost an axle on the Aurora bridge and swerved into an oncoming tour bus, killing and maiming passengers in both vehicles. Another one sank in a thunderstorm, killing all aboard (I believe.) While you could argue that the passengers on the vehicle should have known the risks of riding a discarded military assault craft, certainly the Japanese tourists in the properly modern and licensed tour bus had the right to assume that all of the other vehicles on the road were as safe as modern practice can make them.
If there is an unsafe old aircraft out there, somebody is going to find a reason to fly it; maybe they got it for free so in the short term the fuel costs are immaterial. In my opinion, a few man weeks of engineering time is really a small price to pay to ensure that at least the obvious faults are either fixed or the airframe is grounded. Owners of old commercial buildings have have to spend millions to retrofit them to survive earthquakes; a much grumbled about cost but when an earthquake causes mass casualties in other countries the first thing we point to is "lax building codes."
If there is an unsafe old aircraft out there, somebody is going to find a reason to fly it; maybe they got it for free so in the short term the fuel costs are immaterial. In my opinion, a few man weeks of engineering time is really a small price to pay to ensure that at least the obvious faults are either fixed or the airframe is grounded. Owners of old commercial buildings have have to spend millions to retrofit them to survive earthquakes; a much grumbled about cost but when an earthquake causes mass casualties in other countries the first thing we point to is "lax building codes."
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The Boeing SFAR 88 report for the Model 727 showed that a combination of an in-tank wire fault or contamination condition (which can remain latent for multiple flights) and a hot short outside of the tank between the affected FQIS tank circuit and other aircraft power wiring cobundled with FQIS tank circuit wiring could result in an ignition source in the fuel tank. That combination of failures was classified by the FAA as a “known combination of failures” under the criteria in the policy memo due to the similarity of the Model 727 FQIS system architecture and design details to those of the Boeing Model 747 airplane involved in the TWA Flight 800 catastrophic fuel tank explosion accident in 1996. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that an FQIS failure combination as described above was the most likely cause of that accident.