Icelandair Maxes ferried to Spain with flaps 1?
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Boeing wanted an all new airplane instead of the Max. Unfortunately, fuel was expensive at the time and airlines insisted on a quicker fuel saving solution. Hence, the Max. Plenty of blame to go around, but airlines drove the decision for the Max instead of an all new aircraft.
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Boeing wanted an all new airplane instead of the Max. Unfortunately, fuel was expensive at the time and airlines insisted on a quicker fuel saving solution. Hence, the Max. Plenty of blame to go around, but airlines drove the decision for the Max instead of an all new aircraft.
Boeing found themselves in a corner where the only way out was a re-engined 737, given that they made a hash of doing that it's probably for the best that they didn't try for a complete new aircraft. Boeing weren't put in the corner by anyone else though, it was of their own making with the 787 debacle one of the primary causes.
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Never trust manufacturer's fuel burn figures for abnormal configurations. I'm sure they make them up using 'best guess' principles and they are always wildly optimistic. I once ferried a VC10 from the West coast of the USA with a main gear leg locked down. We knew from experience the burn figures were a bit on the light side, so we loaded extra fuel as a precaution. Yet, I was still surprised. And we had to endure calls from other aircraft at least every hundred miles of "Hey buddy, do you know you've got a gear leg stuck down".
And once, thanks to a (non flying) misdemeanour, I was first choice for a full flap ferry for a aircraft stuck in Germany. The engineers had been over to fix it, but couldn't find the fault, so it had to be flown back at 120 knots. The type was new in service and we had no experience or figures for this, so we phoned the manufacturers who came up with a fuel burn after an unfeasibly short period of reflection. However, in the cruise, it was soon clear that this figure was plucked out of thin air and was complete bollocks. The result was I had to drop into Coltishall for a hasty refuel. On landing back at base, I absentmindedly went into the after landing sequence and moved the flap lever to up. And the flaps retracted!
However, you can use this to your advantage. A WIWOL colleague was first choice for a gear down ferry in a Lightning from Leuchars to Binbrook - mainly due to being the junior pilot. Thinking out of the box, he worked out that the higher he went, the faster the trip would be. So, skywards he went at just under the gear limiting speed, which was quite high in the Lightning - which I know from experience having refuelled some in flight from a Victor when we had lots of spare gas. To save dumping it, the guys obliged by plugging in with their gear down. Back to the story - what the WIWOL mate failed to appreciate was that after some quite considerable altitude, but still lower than the Lightning's maximum, the gear limiting speed exceeded Mach 1. When English Electric tested the Lightning, no one considered that anyone would ever be daft enough to try to fly it supersonic with the gear down, so WIWOL mate was completely in unknown territory. As it transpired, the aircraft didn't like this very much and demonstrated it's displeasure by departing in a most spectacular fashion. After many tumbles and a dual engine flame out, he finally got it under control with both engines relit at quite a low altitude - too low to climb back up and make it back to Binbrook. So he diverted to Leeming and phoned his boss to tell that the gear down ferry burn figures were too low.
And once, thanks to a (non flying) misdemeanour, I was first choice for a full flap ferry for a aircraft stuck in Germany. The engineers had been over to fix it, but couldn't find the fault, so it had to be flown back at 120 knots. The type was new in service and we had no experience or figures for this, so we phoned the manufacturers who came up with a fuel burn after an unfeasibly short period of reflection. However, in the cruise, it was soon clear that this figure was plucked out of thin air and was complete bollocks. The result was I had to drop into Coltishall for a hasty refuel. On landing back at base, I absentmindedly went into the after landing sequence and moved the flap lever to up. And the flaps retracted!
However, you can use this to your advantage. A WIWOL colleague was first choice for a gear down ferry in a Lightning from Leuchars to Binbrook - mainly due to being the junior pilot. Thinking out of the box, he worked out that the higher he went, the faster the trip would be. So, skywards he went at just under the gear limiting speed, which was quite high in the Lightning - which I know from experience having refuelled some in flight from a Victor when we had lots of spare gas. To save dumping it, the guys obliged by plugging in with their gear down. Back to the story - what the WIWOL mate failed to appreciate was that after some quite considerable altitude, but still lower than the Lightning's maximum, the gear limiting speed exceeded Mach 1. When English Electric tested the Lightning, no one considered that anyone would ever be daft enough to try to fly it supersonic with the gear down, so WIWOL mate was completely in unknown territory. As it transpired, the aircraft didn't like this very much and demonstrated it's displeasure by departing in a most spectacular fashion. After many tumbles and a dual engine flame out, he finally got it under control with both engines relit at quite a low altitude - too low to climb back up and make it back to Binbrook. So he diverted to Leeming and phoned his boss to tell that the gear down ferry burn figures were too low.
Boeing is on the hook for most of it. They have already admitted to an 8 Billion US loss up to the third quarter, so likely this will end up costing them, with the many lawsuits filed, 15 Billion if the Max flies agin in January. At this stage there does not seem to be much chance of that given the world's regulators looking askance at Boeing and the FAA.
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If the AoA vane operation was checked prior to take off and no bird strikes were encountered below the first few thousand feet, the chance of a spontaneous AoA/computer hardware failure occurring in such a small number of flights is virtually nil. On top of that, the first signs of any trim related abnormality would be responded to correctly in seconds by a flight crew who would have a very heightened awareness of the MAX’s problems (the reason for their flight in the first place.) Flying a non-normal configuration could possibly increase the chances of a mishap more than a chance MCAS activation.
MCAS is a real danger to aviation in general, but in a small number of highly monitored flights that danger has got to be minimal.
Why?
If the AoA vane operation was checked prior to take off and no bird strikes were encountered below the first few thousand feet, the chance of a spontaneous AoA/computer hardware failure occurring in such a small number of flights is virtually nil. On top of that, the first signs of any trim related abnormality would be responded to correctly in seconds by a flight crew who would have a very heightened awareness of the MAX’s problems (the reason for their flight in the first place.) Flying a non-normal configuration could possibly increase the chances of a mishap more than a chance MCAS activation.
MCAS is a real danger to aviation in general, but in a small number of highly monitored flights that danger has got to be minimal.
Frying pan and fire seems the nearest analogue.
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You're right based on what we know but the JATR report has cast doubt on the unaugmented characteristics of the MAX and I suspect that they know more than they're letting on.
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- inhibit the MCAS software
- ensure that the aerodynamic problems which MCAS was designed to mitigate cannot arise (by changing the airflow over the wing). *
So belt and braces [ US suspenders].
Peter
* In https://leehamnews.com/2019/09/27/bj...-wire-part-10/
MCAS is not active on the 737 MAX when flaps are deployed. This is because when flaps are out the slats are out as well and these
diminish the disturbance to the pitch moment curve from the larger and further forward-higher slung engine nacelles.
For the last 10 + years Boeing CEO's have made share price and investor short term gains the companies number one priority. In that time they have returned almost 90 billion dollars to investors in dividends and share buybacks. That is money that could have been spent on aircraft development and manufacturing improvements and would have directly improved system safety. This was no accident, it was a choice and is IMO directly responsible for the root cause of the MAX fiasco which is changed a company culture of engineering excellence to a culture of fast and cheap inculcated from the C suite and which has permeated all the way down to the level of aircraft cleaners.
Sadly like example of Exxon Valdez or Deepwater Horizon, Boeing is now another example of what happens when bean counters run a technologically sophisticated and complicated industry sector like it was Walmart.or McDonald's
Sadly like example of Exxon Valdez or Deepwater Horizon, Boeing is now another example of what happens when bean counters run a technologically sophisticated and complicated industry sector like it was Walmart.or McDonald's
When the tanker route was first approved Exxon was required by the US Coast Guard to have many safety measures in place to reduce the chance of an accident.
Exxon immediately worked to water down the requirements to save money. They succeeded in
1) Elimination of the requirement for extra training for the ships officers
2) Elimination of the requirement for an extra officer so that the bridge watch would be well rested for the outbound passage
3) Elimination of the speed limit in the channel. This was the final cheese hole. Under the original requirements the speed was kept low because of floating ice in the channel from the glacier next to the channel. At the low speed the ship could just plow through ice and not be damaged, But to save 3 hrs of voyage time Exxon got permission to go to sea speed in the channel.
At sea speed the ship could not hit ice without sustaining damage and the reason the ship hit Blythe reef which was on the opposite side of the outbound channel, was the tired untrained mate who was maneuvering trying to avoid ice lost situational awareness and by the time he realized he was in trouble the situation was not recoverable
That sound familiar ?
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Perhaps a daft question but for all the 737 MAX aircraft already built, instead of being scrapped could they roll back the aircraft to a 737-800/737-900?
Change engines, remove MCAS etc?
Change engines, remove MCAS etc?
From the couple of Silk Air 737s I could find on FlightRadar heading to Alice Springs, normal cruise Flight Levels from Singapore to just before the Australian coast (at Derby), then they descended to FL190 for the remainder of the trip. Looks like CASA put the more limiting restriction in place, but not Indonesia or Singapore.
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Another option
These forums are fed by disaster negative thinking, I offer the following theory as a counter to the usual pessimistic view of those who post on these pages and like some posts above have no hard evidence to base it on.
Boeing must be quite close to a fix for this problem by now and while not wanting to say much until the authorities approve this fix are getting the aircraft gathered together in places that most of the work can be done without using hangar space. After all the weather in Iceland to northern Canada over the winter would considerably slow a work team down without the aircraft being hangared.
Boeing must be quite close to a fix for this problem by now and while not wanting to say much until the authorities approve this fix are getting the aircraft gathered together in places that most of the work can be done without using hangar space. After all the weather in Iceland to northern Canada over the winter would considerably slow a work team down without the aircraft being hangared.
These forums are fed by disaster negative thinking, I offer the following theory as a counter to the usual pessimistic view of those who post on these pages and like some posts above have no hard evidence to base it on.
Boeing must be quite close to a fix for this problem by now and while not wanting to say much until the authorities approve this fix are getting the aircraft gathered together in places that most of the work can be done without using hangar space. After all the weather in Iceland to northern Canada over the winter would considerably slow a work team down without the aircraft being hangared.
Boeing must be quite close to a fix for this problem by now and while not wanting to say much until the authorities approve this fix are getting the aircraft gathered together in places that most of the work can be done without using hangar space. After all the weather in Iceland to northern Canada over the winter would considerably slow a work team down without the aircraft being hangared.
I enjoy a good train wreck story as much as the next disaster maven, but I haven’t yet seen Boeing communicate a cogent plan to address the concerns of regulators and operators. I have my suspicions that Boeing is still trying to address MCAS while leaving the evidently inadequate manual trim system untouched. If a retroactive fix for the trim wheels is mandated, then it follows that Boeing will be exposed to providing 7000+ NG fixes too.
But sure, I fully expect the Max to fly again sometime in my lifetime.
From the couple of Silk Air 737s I could find on FlightRadar heading to Alice Springs, normal cruise Flight Levels from Singapore to just before the Australian coast (at Derby), then they descended to FL190 for the remainder of the trip. Looks like CASA put the more limiting restriction in place, but not Indonesia or Singapore.
