MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Sad, really sad.
His observations are valid across the globe in my experience, when you've been stuffed by these people you tend not to forget. I apply a jaundiced eye to the media in general, the bland truth seldom generates clicks/revenue etc. They seem to print what they think folks want to read.
Sad, really sad.
Sad, really sad.
Those days are sadly gone - unbiased reporting has become the exception, not the rule. TV tends to be worse than print, but they are all guilt (some more than others). The NYT used to be considered 'the paper of record', but now they have some of the worst bias. The focus is now 'what sells' - and quite frankly good news doesn't sell.
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It's been termed the Gell-Mann Amnesia effect.
A more detailed explanation by Ben Hunt.
“Briefly stated, the Gell-Mann Amnesia effect is as follows. You open the newspaper to an article on some subject you know well. In Murray's case, physics. In mine, show business. You read the article and see the journalist has absolutely no understanding of either the facts or the issues. Often, the article is so wrong it actually presents the story backward—reversing cause and effect. I call these the "wet streets cause rain" stories. Paper's full of them.
In any case, you read with exasperation or amusement the multiple errors in a story, and then turn the page to national or international affairs, and read as if the rest of the newspaper was somehow more accurate about Palestine than the baloney you just read. You turn the page, and forget what you know.”
― Michael Crichton
In any case, you read with exasperation or amusement the multiple errors in a story, and then turn the page to national or international affairs, and read as if the rest of the newspaper was somehow more accurate about Palestine than the baloney you just read. You turn the page, and forget what you know.”
― Michael Crichton
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”The analysis determined that the underlying risks from the MCAS design were unacceptably high without at least some FAA action". My bold.
Some action was taken. The Emergency AD 2018-23-51 was issued straight away.
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That tends to be a US thing.
Most countries in the UK and Europe regulate TV output so thay although they can show bias, TV channels cannot lie, whereas newspapers can pretty much say and do what they want, as long as they don’t libel an individual.
Most countries in the UK and Europe regulate TV output so thay although they can show bias, TV channels cannot lie, whereas newspapers can pretty much say and do what they want, as long as they don’t libel an individual.
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The TARAM Policy Memo and TARAM handbook are publicly available at this web page if anyone wants to see the policy referred to in the article.
PS-ANM-25-05 Risk Assessment Methodology for Transport Category Airplanes
PS-ANM-25-05 Risk Assessment Methodology for Transport Category Airplanes
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Agreed - there was a time when most reporters strived to give accurate, unbiased information - they were not always successful since it's impossible to filter out all bias - but they tried.
Those days are sadly gone - unbiased reporting has become the exception, not the rule. TV tends to be worse than print, but they are all guilt (some more than others). The NYT used to be considered 'the paper of record', but now they have some of the worst bias. The focus is now 'what sells' - and quite frankly good news doesn't sell.
Those days are sadly gone - unbiased reporting has become the exception, not the rule. TV tends to be worse than print, but they are all guilt (some more than others). The NYT used to be considered 'the paper of record', but now they have some of the worst bias. The focus is now 'what sells' - and quite frankly good news doesn't sell.
I had the feeling that the NYT, the WSJ, the Seattle Times, Leeham News, to name a few of the media, provided clear, detailed and unbiased info, as confirmed by the the FAA officials testimonies at Congress.
The only discrepancy seems to be that according to press reports, safety has been compromised, whereas those FAA member keep stating that safety is their highest priority...
Why does it not add up? It does not say that the FAA determined the aircraft should be grounded. It says:
”The analysis determined that the underlying risks from the MCAS design were unacceptably high without at least some FAA action". My bold.
Some action was taken. The Emergency AD 2018-23-51 was issued straight away.July 31, 2019 5:32 am ET An internal risk analysis after the first of two Boeing 737 MAX airliner crashes showed the likelihood was high of a similar cockpit emergency within months, according to a Federal Aviation Administration official familiar with the details and others briefed on the matter.The regulator’s analysis, not previously reported, showed that it “didn’t take that much” for a malfunction like the one confronted by the pilots of the Lion Air flight that crashed into the Java Sea last year to occur, one of the people briefed on the analysis said.
Based on the findings, the regulator decided it was sufficient to inform pilots about the hazards of an onboard sensor malfunction that led to a flight-control system pushing down the plane’s nose. The belief was that if pilots were aware of the risk and knew how to respond, it was acceptable to give Boeing and regulators time to design and approve a permanent software fix to MCAS, the flight-control system
implicated in the crash, according to the agency official and people briefed on the findings.The FAA’s early goal, one of these people added, was: “Get something out immediately and then mandate something more permanent.”Specifically, the FAA’s analysis suggested that a warning to pilots would be enough to provide Boeing about 10 months to design and implement changes to MCAS, according to a person close to the manufacturer. Boeing had been planning to complete the changes by April, within the 10-month period, this person said.Boeing and the FAA’s risk projections faced a real-world crisis in less than five months. Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 went down on March 10 in a similar nosedive prompted by the same type of automated MCAS commands pilots couldn’t overcome. The dual crashes took a total of 346 lives.
This is the response :-
This AD was prompted by analysis performed by the manufacturer showing that if an erroneously high single angle of attack (AOA) sensor input is received by the flight control system, there is a potential for repeated nose-down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer. We are issuing this AD to address this potential resulting nose-down trim, which could cause the flight crew to have difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to excessive nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss, and possible impact with terrain.
* Take out the standard/similar text of most AD's and it hardly reads as a critical thing that is of a very high priority.
Would it be possible to have more specific information on what was biased or inaccurate in the media reports on the subject of interest here, the 737 MAX issues ?
I had the feeling that the NYT, the WSJ, the Seattle Times, Leeham News, to name a few of the media, provided clear, detailed and unbiased info, as confirmed by the the FAA officials testimonies at Congress.
I had the feeling that the NYT, the WSJ, the Seattle Times, Leeham News, to name a few of the media, provided clear, detailed and unbiased info, as confirmed by the the FAA officials testimonies at Congress.
BTW, most of the stuff I've seen in the Seattle Times appeared to be reasonably accurate.
As I've noted before, I know and have worked with some of the people quoted in the NYT article, and I don't consider them to be particularly credible.
---
Edited to add:
I find it somewhat telling that the NYT article focused on rotor burst - one of the most complex aspects that they portrayed as a simple 'yes/no', totally ignoring the inherent complexity of the issue. Gee, those wicked penny pinchers at Boeing could easily have changed the rudder control to make it very slightly better for rotor burst - but somehow never mentioned that maybe Boeing had good reason to be leery of messing with a rudder control system had previously caused two fatal crashes before they figured out what was wrong.
Unintended consequence is the nightmare of every aviation designer. The path of making 'simple' safety changes is paved with a great deal of blood.
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This is the response :-
This AD was prompted by analysis performed by the manufacturer showing that if an erroneously high single angle of attack (AOA) sensor input is received by the flight control system, there is a potential for repeated nose-down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer. We are issuing this AD to address this potential resulting nose-down trim, which could cause the flight crew to have difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to excessive nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss, and possible impact with terrain.
* Take out the standard/similar text of most AD's and it hardly reads as a critical thing that is of a very high priority.
The point I made to catch21, which you have not answered with this red herring, was simple enough but let me put it another way to try and help you understand. There is nothing, not one thing, in that article that "does not add up" with the salient facts and chronology of this fiasco. After Lion Air the FAA assessment was done and the Emergency AD was issued. Your pointing out that it was insufficient is beyond yesterdays news. Since the day the MAX was grounded we had enough information to assume that Boeing and the FAA cocked up both the certification and response to Lion Air. Change the record mate it is so boring.
Er well, that was part of the response. But I form my opinions independent of what the WSJ wants me to assume.
The point I made to catch21, which you have not answered with this red herring, was simple enough but let me put it another way to try and help you understand. There is nothing, not one thing, in that article that "does not add up" with the salient facts and chronology of this fiasco. After Lion Air the FAA assessment was done and the Emergency AD was issued. Your pointing out that it was insufficient is beyond yesterdays news. Since the day the MAX was grounded we had enough information to assume that Boeing and the FAA cocked up both the certification and response to Lion Air. Change the record mate it is so boring.
The point I made to catch21, which you have not answered with this red herring, was simple enough but let me put it another way to try and help you understand. There is nothing, not one thing, in that article that "does not add up" with the salient facts and chronology of this fiasco. After Lion Air the FAA assessment was done and the Emergency AD was issued. Your pointing out that it was insufficient is beyond yesterdays news. Since the day the MAX was grounded we had enough information to assume that Boeing and the FAA cocked up both the certification and response to Lion Air. Change the record mate it is so boring.
Unless of course the MAX is actually safe and always has been - but it is only grounded to make it "one of the safest" aircraft.
You will not that the tune of the record may seem the same, but if you listen - it is singing very different stories, but the same boring ending.
On the current trend we can expect more new releases of the same tune, that may be another 3 beat song but could be a 7 or 8 beat. The music is not stopping.
Nor do Boeing or FAA hear the music, they seem to think the supply of chairs is endless, even this many moths later.
What is good is there seems very little leaks from the other regulating countries to-date, seems they are very serious.
Exactly. It might lead to nothing where Boeing used to be.
The grandfathering itself is not problematic; issue is whether it was applied properly and legally. While a rose by any other name would smell as sweet, labeling the gizmos as speed-something or augmentation-something-else instead of stability augmentation system/stall prevention system might avoid: 1) the issues whether their application is proper in grandfatherly certified design 2) the requirement to demonstrate reliability and overridability required of SAS/SPS.
Indeed, it might never get involved in an accident again.
It actually adds up if you consider the possibility that it was never an official policy, just that some specialists made the risk assessment which got rejected by their superiors.
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Lets put it this way. You go to an organization with 100 people. 95 of the people are happy, 5 are not. You interview all 100 people, but you write your article based entirely on what the 5 unhappy people said, leaving out what the 95 happy people told you. Do you think the result will be an accurate representation? If the idea is to write an article critical of Boeing and the FAA management, it's simple to leave out anything that doesn't support that position. In fact, that's exactly what passes for journalism these days, and the NYT has shown themselves to be particularly adept at that.
BTW, most of the stuff I've seen in the Seattle Times appeared to be reasonably accurate.
As I've noted before, I know and have worked with some of the people quoted in the NYT article, and I don't consider them to be particularly credible.
BTW, most of the stuff I've seen in the Seattle Times appeared to be reasonably accurate.
As I've noted before, I know and have worked with some of the people quoted in the NYT article, and I don't consider them to be particularly credible.
Understand your view, but that would mean that for a safety issue to be considered, more than 50% of the people implicated should be willing to report.
Whereas only one report from a whistleblower should trigger an inquiry, be it from a disgruntled employee or not.
When you say some people in the article are not credible, do you mean they lied and the conversations, email exchanges, documents do not exist, or do you just mean they are not competent in the particular subject ?
That's quite a different thing, isn't it ?
BTW, if the articles in the Seattle Times and the testimony of FAA members at Congress are accurate, lots of people at FAA and Boeing do not appear to be especially credible ;-)
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MAX Control Column Cutout Switches - Reinstated?
So - are the control column cutout switches returning to the MAX?
Or is there a typo in the AWST article?
https://aviationweek.com/commercial-...cent-max-issue
Or is there a typo in the AWST article?
https://aviationweek.com/commercial-...cent-max-issue
Software Fix Will Address Most Recent MAX Issue
Aug 1, 2019 Sean Broderick | Aviation Week & Space Technology
The latest Boeing 737 MAX flight control computer system anomaly that the FAA has ordered fixed is addressable through software changes and presents less risk on older 737s, Aviation Week has confirmed.
The failure scenario involved forcing a flight control computer (FCC) processor command to the horizontal stabilizer nose-down after detecting specific flight profile conditions, a source with knowledge of the issue says. It also bypassed the control column inputs, meaning pulling back on the column, or yoke, does not interrupt the stabilizer movement. Finally, the fault was to happen while the autopilot was engaged during cruise. The anomaly has never occurred during flight operations, but the FAA wanted to see what would happen if different combinations of faulty data fooled the FCC.
FAA pilots tested the scenario in mid-June—one of about 30 scenarios trialed during the session—in Boeing’s 737 engineering simulator, or e-cab. They were able to recover using the runaway stabilizer emergency procedure, the source said. There was no hardware failure, and the aircraft’s systems reacted exactly as they are designed to do.
But at least one pilot determined that the time needed to identify the failure as a runaway stabilizer was too long, and the FAA ordered Boeing to address the issue. Boeing’s solution, the source says, is a software modification that monitors the FCC’s output. If the combination of erroneous data is detected, the second FCC and autopilot take over, eliminating the chance of stabilizer runaway.
Details of the issue, many of which have not been previously reported, underscore the FAA’s heightened focus on eliminating risk as it scrutinizes the MAX’s design and evaluates when the aircraft will be safe to fly again. The FAA grounded the MAX on March 13, three days after the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (ET302), the second fatal MAX crash in five months. Other agencies, seeing similarities between the two accident flight profiles, began grounding the aircraft within a day of ET302, and the entire 380-aircraft fleet remains parked.
Investigators soon made a definitive link between ET302’s accident sequence and the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610). In both cases, errant angle-of-attack (AOA) data being fed to the MAX’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law triggered nose-down stabilizer inputs as the aircraft were climbing shortly after takeoff. Both flight crews struggled to counter the system, which continued to operate, responding to the errant data. Both accident sequences ended in final dives that killed all onboard the aircraft.
The MCAS is an extension of the 737 Next Generation (NG) speed-trim system (STS), which adjusts the stabilizer to ensure pitch is maintained as speed increases. The MCAS activates when the aircraft’s speed approaches threshold AOA, or stick-shaker, stall-warning activation, for the aircraft’s configuration and flight profile. It was added to the MAX to enhance pitch stability with slats and flaps retracted at very light weights and full aft center of gravity. The MCAS ensures the MAX, which features larger-diameter engines that generate more lift than those on its NG predecessor, handles like the NG, helping the two models earn a common type rating and minimizing differences training.
Details from both ongoing accident probes, plus internal analysis, led Boeing and the FAA to determine that the MCAS needed changes. Boeing completed its software modifications in May and is awaiting word from the FAA on new training requirements that must be developed for MAX pilots.
The JT610 and ET302 accident sequences prompted the FAA to reexamine its approval of the MAX, including system safety evaluations. Prior to Boeing’s changes, the MCAS relied on a single source of AOA data. In each accident, issues with the AOA sensors meant the data stream was communicating an impossibly high AOA value to the FCC. Instead of ignoring the anomalous data—another change incorporated into the new MCAS logic—the system responded with nose-down stabilizer actions when they were not needed. Boeing and the FAA assumed such a failure would be both remotely possible and, if it did occur, quickly recognized by pilots as runaway stabilizer. Both MAX accident sequences show they were wrong.
As part of its MAX reevaluation, the FAA examined other anomalies considered remote and flagged the latest issue. Like the MCAS failure scenario, it would only be triggered by faulty data and require pilots to quickly identify runaway stabilizer.
“We identified a very remote failure case. Knowing what we know [following the accidents], we really needed to go back and see, if this occurs, can flight crews recover?” Ali Bahrami, FAA associate administrator for aviation safety, told U.S. lawmakers during a July 31 hearing. “Our test pilots [decided] that the level of proficiency that is required to recover from this event was exceptional. That’s why the software changes are being incorporated.”
The scenario is not linked to the MCAS system. While it can occur on the NG, modifications to that fleet are not as pressing and may not be required at all.
Pilots on the NG can counter any uncommanded stabilizer input by moving the yoke. On the MAX, Boeing bypasses this function—often called the column cut-out switch—when the MCAS is active, because it concluded that countering the MCAS by pulling back on the yoke could negate the system’s purpose. Because the column cut-out switch function is on the MAX, Boeing incorporated it into the latest round of worst-case failure scenarios trialed by the FAA’s pilots.
Boeing says it expects to deliver its package of MAX updates—including the completed MCAS changes, additional software modification and related training packages—to the FAA “in the September time frame.” The agency is expected to take several weeks to review the package before deciding whether to lift its grounding. It also will address all return-to-service recommendations made by its Technical Advisory Board, a group of FAA and outside engineers tasked with reviewing the MCAS update, related system safety assessment, and training.
“To be clear, the FAA will lift the 737 MAX grounding order only when it is safe to do so,” FAA Administrator Dan Elwell wrote in a July 30 letter to Congress. “While the FAA hopes to achieve nearly simultaneous approval from the major civil aviation authorities around the world, ultimately the U.S. and each country that grounded the 737 MAX will make its own determination based on its local requirements and processes.”
Elwell added that the FAA is “offering assistance to any and all countries to support their return-to-service decisions” and is “working with our colleagues from the European Union, Canada, and Brazil [the three other entities with agencies that oversee major aircraft manufacturing programs] to address their concerns.”
With the MCAS work done, Boeing’s main outstanding issues are the FCC software update to address the latest anomaly, certification flights to verify the package works as designed, and—perhaps most importantly—new training.
The FAA continues to acknowledge that pilots transitioning from the NG to the MAX were not given enough information on differences between the two aircraft. The MCAS system, designed to operate in the background, was not included in the original manuals or differences training. This has changed.
Some emergency procedures are also being revised, and new scenarios will likely be added to 737 recurrent simulator training, based in part on preliminary information gleaned from the two MAX accident probes.
“We recognized that some actions the [JT610 and ET302] flight crews took were inconsistent with what we assumed would be the correct reaction,” Bahrami says.
Aug 1, 2019 Sean Broderick | Aviation Week & Space Technology
The latest Boeing 737 MAX flight control computer system anomaly that the FAA has ordered fixed is addressable through software changes and presents less risk on older 737s, Aviation Week has confirmed.
The failure scenario involved forcing a flight control computer (FCC) processor command to the horizontal stabilizer nose-down after detecting specific flight profile conditions, a source with knowledge of the issue says. It also bypassed the control column inputs, meaning pulling back on the column, or yoke, does not interrupt the stabilizer movement. Finally, the fault was to happen while the autopilot was engaged during cruise. The anomaly has never occurred during flight operations, but the FAA wanted to see what would happen if different combinations of faulty data fooled the FCC.
FAA pilots tested the scenario in mid-June—one of about 30 scenarios trialed during the session—in Boeing’s 737 engineering simulator, or e-cab. They were able to recover using the runaway stabilizer emergency procedure, the source said. There was no hardware failure, and the aircraft’s systems reacted exactly as they are designed to do.
But at least one pilot determined that the time needed to identify the failure as a runaway stabilizer was too long, and the FAA ordered Boeing to address the issue. Boeing’s solution, the source says, is a software modification that monitors the FCC’s output. If the combination of erroneous data is detected, the second FCC and autopilot take over, eliminating the chance of stabilizer runaway.
Details of the issue, many of which have not been previously reported, underscore the FAA’s heightened focus on eliminating risk as it scrutinizes the MAX’s design and evaluates when the aircraft will be safe to fly again. The FAA grounded the MAX on March 13, three days after the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (ET302), the second fatal MAX crash in five months. Other agencies, seeing similarities between the two accident flight profiles, began grounding the aircraft within a day of ET302, and the entire 380-aircraft fleet remains parked.
Investigators soon made a definitive link between ET302’s accident sequence and the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610). In both cases, errant angle-of-attack (AOA) data being fed to the MAX’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law triggered nose-down stabilizer inputs as the aircraft were climbing shortly after takeoff. Both flight crews struggled to counter the system, which continued to operate, responding to the errant data. Both accident sequences ended in final dives that killed all onboard the aircraft.
The MCAS is an extension of the 737 Next Generation (NG) speed-trim system (STS), which adjusts the stabilizer to ensure pitch is maintained as speed increases. The MCAS activates when the aircraft’s speed approaches threshold AOA, or stick-shaker, stall-warning activation, for the aircraft’s configuration and flight profile. It was added to the MAX to enhance pitch stability with slats and flaps retracted at very light weights and full aft center of gravity. The MCAS ensures the MAX, which features larger-diameter engines that generate more lift than those on its NG predecessor, handles like the NG, helping the two models earn a common type rating and minimizing differences training.
Details from both ongoing accident probes, plus internal analysis, led Boeing and the FAA to determine that the MCAS needed changes. Boeing completed its software modifications in May and is awaiting word from the FAA on new training requirements that must be developed for MAX pilots.
The JT610 and ET302 accident sequences prompted the FAA to reexamine its approval of the MAX, including system safety evaluations. Prior to Boeing’s changes, the MCAS relied on a single source of AOA data. In each accident, issues with the AOA sensors meant the data stream was communicating an impossibly high AOA value to the FCC. Instead of ignoring the anomalous data—another change incorporated into the new MCAS logic—the system responded with nose-down stabilizer actions when they were not needed. Boeing and the FAA assumed such a failure would be both remotely possible and, if it did occur, quickly recognized by pilots as runaway stabilizer. Both MAX accident sequences show they were wrong.
As part of its MAX reevaluation, the FAA examined other anomalies considered remote and flagged the latest issue. Like the MCAS failure scenario, it would only be triggered by faulty data and require pilots to quickly identify runaway stabilizer.
“We identified a very remote failure case. Knowing what we know [following the accidents], we really needed to go back and see, if this occurs, can flight crews recover?” Ali Bahrami, FAA associate administrator for aviation safety, told U.S. lawmakers during a July 31 hearing. “Our test pilots [decided] that the level of proficiency that is required to recover from this event was exceptional. That’s why the software changes are being incorporated.”
The scenario is not linked to the MCAS system. While it can occur on the NG, modifications to that fleet are not as pressing and may not be required at all.
Pilots on the NG can counter any uncommanded stabilizer input by moving the yoke. On the MAX, Boeing bypasses this function—often called the column cut-out switch—when the MCAS is active, because it concluded that countering the MCAS by pulling back on the yoke could negate the system’s purpose. Because the column cut-out switch function is on the MAX, Boeing incorporated it into the latest round of worst-case failure scenarios trialed by the FAA’s pilots.
Boeing says it expects to deliver its package of MAX updates—including the completed MCAS changes, additional software modification and related training packages—to the FAA “in the September time frame.” The agency is expected to take several weeks to review the package before deciding whether to lift its grounding. It also will address all return-to-service recommendations made by its Technical Advisory Board, a group of FAA and outside engineers tasked with reviewing the MCAS update, related system safety assessment, and training.
“To be clear, the FAA will lift the 737 MAX grounding order only when it is safe to do so,” FAA Administrator Dan Elwell wrote in a July 30 letter to Congress. “While the FAA hopes to achieve nearly simultaneous approval from the major civil aviation authorities around the world, ultimately the U.S. and each country that grounded the 737 MAX will make its own determination based on its local requirements and processes.”
Elwell added that the FAA is “offering assistance to any and all countries to support their return-to-service decisions” and is “working with our colleagues from the European Union, Canada, and Brazil [the three other entities with agencies that oversee major aircraft manufacturing programs] to address their concerns.”
With the MCAS work done, Boeing’s main outstanding issues are the FCC software update to address the latest anomaly, certification flights to verify the package works as designed, and—perhaps most importantly—new training.
The FAA continues to acknowledge that pilots transitioning from the NG to the MAX were not given enough information on differences between the two aircraft. The MCAS system, designed to operate in the background, was not included in the original manuals or differences training. This has changed.
Some emergency procedures are also being revised, and new scenarios will likely be added to 737 recurrent simulator training, based in part on preliminary information gleaned from the two MAX accident probes.
“We recognized that some actions the [JT610 and ET302] flight crews took were inconsistent with what we assumed would be the correct reaction,” Bahrami says.
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Boeing 737 max documentary research query
Good morning all,
I'm writing from a production company in the UK, Arrow Media, where we are working on a documentary investigating the Boeing 737 MAX, for broadcast in the UK and the USA.
As part of our research I am investigating the chain of events both on and off the ground that culminated in the two disasters, the plane’s eventual grounding and the impacts moving forward. We are particularly interested in pilot’s perspectives of the story and the engineering and aeronautics.
Our film is an hour long specialist-factual commission so we are keen, and have the time, to properly dig into and clarify some of the technical aspects of the story. That will be our main focus - demystifying the aeronautics and aircraft engineering design for a lay-audience.
However, this is not simply an engineering story and we are keen to tell it properly by exploring all of the issues. There has been a huge amount of reporting on this, which we hope to distill into a clear picture of how several disparate circumstances can culminate in an event that no one wanted to happen; happening twice.
As this is a still developing story, I am seeking any insights or news that has not yet come to light or which those working in the field feel are salient but so far overlooked.
I am particularly interested in speaking to those with authoritative knowledge about:
1. The reports posted on ASRS regarding the 737MAX before the Lion Air incident, or other concerns that were lodged elsewhere.
2. Any one who has flown the 737MAX simulator.
3. The 'rollercoaster' (stick forward to trim) maneuver being removed from recent iterations of the manuals.
Any anyone with specific knowledge who might be happy to be talk on the record (anonymously if required) regarding:
1. The FAA delegation issue regarding the certification process of the MAX.
2. Safety analysis procedure of the MAX.
3. The design iterations of MCAS that led to its increased authority.
4. Flight testing of the MAX.
5. The work being done now to get the MAX back into operation.
6. Negotiations with airlines after the grounding of the MAX.
I am also interested in understanding broadly pilots' perspectives, and I recognize there are a range of opinions, on:
1. Whether the situation described in the Boeing Bulletin was putting pilot's into an unreasonably challenging scenario.
2. Whether Pilots feel their employer's are taking risks with their safety (not choosing to purchase optional safety extras etc) or if its usually a fair compromise. Are pilots included in these decisions?
3. Do you feel adequately trained? Is this a new issue or a developing one?
Thank you very much for sharing your experience with me on this matter. We recognize that this a hugely sensitive topic, which is why we are keen to speak directly to experts involved in order to confirm our story. Please do feel free to contact me privately.
Kind regards,
Clementine Cheetham
Arrow Media
I'm writing from a production company in the UK, Arrow Media, where we are working on a documentary investigating the Boeing 737 MAX, for broadcast in the UK and the USA.
As part of our research I am investigating the chain of events both on and off the ground that culminated in the two disasters, the plane’s eventual grounding and the impacts moving forward. We are particularly interested in pilot’s perspectives of the story and the engineering and aeronautics.
Our film is an hour long specialist-factual commission so we are keen, and have the time, to properly dig into and clarify some of the technical aspects of the story. That will be our main focus - demystifying the aeronautics and aircraft engineering design for a lay-audience.
However, this is not simply an engineering story and we are keen to tell it properly by exploring all of the issues. There has been a huge amount of reporting on this, which we hope to distill into a clear picture of how several disparate circumstances can culminate in an event that no one wanted to happen; happening twice.
As this is a still developing story, I am seeking any insights or news that has not yet come to light or which those working in the field feel are salient but so far overlooked.
I am particularly interested in speaking to those with authoritative knowledge about:
1. The reports posted on ASRS regarding the 737MAX before the Lion Air incident, or other concerns that were lodged elsewhere.
2. Any one who has flown the 737MAX simulator.
3. The 'rollercoaster' (stick forward to trim) maneuver being removed from recent iterations of the manuals.
Any anyone with specific knowledge who might be happy to be talk on the record (anonymously if required) regarding:
1. The FAA delegation issue regarding the certification process of the MAX.
2. Safety analysis procedure of the MAX.
3. The design iterations of MCAS that led to its increased authority.
4. Flight testing of the MAX.
5. The work being done now to get the MAX back into operation.
6. Negotiations with airlines after the grounding of the MAX.
I am also interested in understanding broadly pilots' perspectives, and I recognize there are a range of opinions, on:
1. Whether the situation described in the Boeing Bulletin was putting pilot's into an unreasonably challenging scenario.
2. Whether Pilots feel their employer's are taking risks with their safety (not choosing to purchase optional safety extras etc) or if its usually a fair compromise. Are pilots included in these decisions?
3. Do you feel adequately trained? Is this a new issue or a developing one?
Thank you very much for sharing your experience with me on this matter. We recognize that this a hugely sensitive topic, which is why we are keen to speak directly to experts involved in order to confirm our story. Please do feel free to contact me privately.
Kind regards,
Clementine Cheetham
Arrow Media
Lets put it this way. You go to an organization with 100 people. 95 of the people are happy, 5 are not. You interview all 100 people, but you write your article based entirely on what the 5 unhappy people said, leaving out what the 95 happy people told you. Do you think the result will be an accurate representation? If the idea is to write an article critical of Boeing and the FAA management, it's simple to leave out anything that doesn't support that position. In fact, that's exactly what passes for journalism these days, and the NYT has shown themselves to be particularly adept at that.
Agreed! What's far worse is that the media is focusing on two 737s that fell out of the sky at high speed and killed all their occupants, rather than the thousands of 737s that fly multiple sectors safely every day.
//SARC OFF
News is the not normal, or the not-normal-until-now, by definition. And we're not just talking about employees grousing because the Keurig is on the blink, or even people who think that the safety culture is not working, but people who feel that way so strongly that they will put their careers at risk. The correct number of such people in a commercial airplane company is zero.
Agreed! What's far worse is that the media is focusing on two 737s that fell out of the sky at high speed and killed all their occupants, rather than the thousands of 737s that fly multiple sectors safely every day.
//SARC OFF
News is the not normal, or the not-normal-until-now, by definition. And we're not just talking about employees grousing because the Keurig is on the blink, or even people who think that the safety culture is not working, but people who feel that way so strongly that they will put their careers at risk. The correct number of such people in a commercial airplane company is zero.
Last edited by LowObservable; 1st Aug 2019 at 14:53.
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So - are the control column cutout switches returning to the MAX?
Or is there a typo in the AWST article?
https://aviationweek.com/commercial-...cent-max-issue
Or is there a typo in the AWST article?
https://aviationweek.com/commercial-...cent-max-issue
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Pilots on the NG can counter any uncommanded stabilizer input by moving the yoke. On the MAX, Boeing bypasses this function—often called the column cut-out switch—when the MCAS is active, because it concluded that countering the MCAS by pulling back on the yoke could negate the system’s purpose. Because the column cut-out switch function is on the MAX, Boeing incorporated it into the latest round of worst-case failure scenarios trialed by the FAA’s pilots.
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Clementine Cheetham:
I suggest you read the following for some insight on how these kinds of things happen. It's not an isolated incident.
https://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle...-contents.html
From Chapter 6:
I suggest you read the following for some insight on how these kinds of things happen. It's not an isolated incident.
https://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle...-contents.html
From Chapter 6:
2. Prior to the accident, neither NASA nor Thiokol fully understood
the mechanism by which the joint sealing action took place.
3. NASA and Thiokol accepted escalating risk apparently because they
"got away with it last time." As Commissioner Feynman observed, the
decision making was:
"a kind of Russian roulette. ... (The Shuttle) flies (with O-ring
erosion) and nothing happens. Then it is suggested, therefore, that
the risk is no longer so high for the next flights. We can lower our
standards a little bit because we got away with it last time. ... You
got away with it, but it shouldn't be done over and over again like
that."
the mechanism by which the joint sealing action took place.
3. NASA and Thiokol accepted escalating risk apparently because they
"got away with it last time." As Commissioner Feynman observed, the
decision making was:
"a kind of Russian roulette. ... (The Shuttle) flies (with O-ring
erosion) and nothing happens. Then it is suggested, therefore, that
the risk is no longer so high for the next flights. We can lower our
standards a little bit because we got away with it last time. ... You
got away with it, but it shouldn't be done over and over again like
that."
Last edited by thcrozier; 2nd Aug 2019 at 00:29.