MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
It does frequent test flights from Boeing field with what appears to be the MCAS 2.0 built. Doing slow flights, stalls and wind up turns if the radar tracking gets it right.
Psychophysiological entity
They managed to extend the program from about half an hour, even given one should allow the emotional side appropriate air time. Heart rending, but with all due respect, I feel that issue should be in a different kind of program.
They repeatedly showed the vane on the starboard side. (once showing being broken off.) Not the biggest of issues, but then as usual, they said the device showed the angle of the nose.
All in all I thought it was a poor program, with a seemingly endless list of repeated statements. The producers seemed to have an outline knowledge but nothing like the awareness needed for an hour long program of such a serious nature.
They repeatedly showed the vane on the starboard side. (once showing being broken off.) Not the biggest of issues, but then as usual, they said the device showed the angle of the nose.
All in all I thought it was a poor program, with a seemingly endless list of repeated statements. The producers seemed to have an outline knowledge but nothing like the awareness needed for an hour long program of such a serious nature.
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Heading downhill, at rapid ROD, close to the ground, no pilot is going to release up elevator to try and use manual trim !!!!!
Self preservation cuts in with instinctive action to PULL, just as it was with the Valiant when training for a runaway stab.
Self preservation cuts in with instinctive action to PULL, just as it was with the Valiant when training for a runaway stab.
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February 1959: Pan Am Flight 115, a Pan American World AirwaysBoeing 707, upset and went into a high-speed dive while cruising over the Atlantic at flight level350. Control was not recovered until reaching 6,000 ft. After landing safely at Gander, extensive structural damage was found, but there were only a few minor injuries. The Captain was in the cabin when the autopilotdisconnected without adequate warning to the First Officer, who was distracted with a "howgozit" report form. It wasn't until the first officer felt the stall buffet that he realized they were descending rapidly and about to turn upside down. He was unable to level the wings. Fortunately, the Captain was able to return to the cockpit and strap into his seat while enduring significant G-forces. He took over the controls, leveled the wings and pulled out of the dive.
Maninthebar, Yes - here in Podcast No. 2
D P Davies interviews on certificating aircraft
D P Davies interviews on certificating aircraft
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It would appear there may be the POTENTIAL for a "differing of views" among the various regulatory staff on the question whether MCAS ever sees the light of day on a future MAX airframe. This may be the "fulcrum" which defines the future of this particular variant.
Canadian Official Calls for Removal of Key Software From 737 Max
A manager at Canada’s aviation regulator believes that Boeing should remove software that played a role in two deadly crashes of its 737 Max before the plane is cleared to fly again, according to emails between global aviation regulators this week that were reviewed by The New York Times.
The Max has been grounded since March, days after a crash in Ethiopia. Together, the two accidents killed 346 people and have sent Boeing into a crisis. The company is working furiously to get the Max back in service with a fix to the software system, known as MCAS.
“The only way I see moving forward at this point, is that MCAS has to go,” the official, Jim Marko, the manager in aircraft integration and safety assessment at Transport Canada Civil Aviation, wrote in the email. He sent the email on Tuesday to officials at the Federal Aviation Administration, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and Brazil’s National Civil Aviation Agency.
At least one F.A.A. employee shares his concerns, according to a separate email reviewed by The Times. Linh Le, a system safety engineer at the F.A.A., shared Mr. Marko’s message with others at the agency. He noted that the Canadian official believed that “MCAS introduces catastrophic hazards that weren’t there before,” that “it and the fix add too much complexity,” that “there have been many revisions to the software” and that “each was a band-aid.”
Mr. Le said he had similar misgivings about Boeing’s proposed fix for the Max. “I have held similar perspective (questioning the need for MCAS, at least from the system safety standpoint),” he said in the email to colleagues. It is unclear whether international regulators will take any action in response to Mr. Marko’s concerns.
The Max has been grounded since March, days after a crash in Ethiopia. Together, the two accidents killed 346 people and have sent Boeing into a crisis. The company is working furiously to get the Max back in service with a fix to the software system, known as MCAS.
“The only way I see moving forward at this point, is that MCAS has to go,” the official, Jim Marko, the manager in aircraft integration and safety assessment at Transport Canada Civil Aviation, wrote in the email. He sent the email on Tuesday to officials at the Federal Aviation Administration, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and Brazil’s National Civil Aviation Agency.
At least one F.A.A. employee shares his concerns, according to a separate email reviewed by The Times. Linh Le, a system safety engineer at the F.A.A., shared Mr. Marko’s message with others at the agency. He noted that the Canadian official believed that “MCAS introduces catastrophic hazards that weren’t there before,” that “it and the fix add too much complexity,” that “there have been many revisions to the software” and that “each was a band-aid.”
Mr. Le said he had similar misgivings about Boeing’s proposed fix for the Max. “I have held similar perspective (questioning the need for MCAS, at least from the system safety standpoint),” he said in the email to colleagues. It is unclear whether international regulators will take any action in response to Mr. Marko’s concerns.
Canadian Official Calls for Removal of Key Software From 737 Max
Psychophysiological entity
That Pan Am was just before my time. Sheeesh! Both training captains. But was the skipper entitled to go back, or even be required to do a courtesy visit to the pax. A Civil prosecution seems a bit tough, especially since he hauled it out of the mire.
In a way we can segue back to the thread in as much as it spells out the need for skilled folk up front at all times. I could have forgiven a new kid but this . . .
A new question. Do the new longer range 737's allow their skippers to take brakes routinely, or only when urgent? I rather assume they do. That's often a very, very inexperienced bod/bodess left up front.
In a way we can segue back to the thread in as much as it spells out the need for skilled folk up front at all times. I could have forgiven a new kid but this . . .
A new question. Do the new longer range 737's allow their skippers to take brakes routinely, or only when urgent? I rather assume they do. That's often a very, very inexperienced bod/bodess left up front.
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Transport Canada said Friday that Mr. Marko’s position had not been subject to systematic review by the agency.
“The email reflects working-level discussions between highly trained aircraft certification experts of key aviation authorities who have been given wide latitude for assessing all issues and looking at all alternatives for the safe return to service of the aircraft,” Nicholas Robinson, director general of Transport Canada, said in a statement.
An F.A.A. spokesman, Lynn Lunsford, said in a statement: “The F.A.A. and its international partners have engaged in robust discussions at various stages in this process as part of the thorough scrutiny of Boeing’s work. This email is an example of those exchanges.”
The National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil said it had “received the email and will consider the content along with the studies being conducted on the subject.”
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency did not immediately reply to requests for comment.
“The email reflects working-level discussions between highly trained aircraft certification experts of key aviation authorities who have been given wide latitude for assessing all issues and looking at all alternatives for the safe return to service of the aircraft,” Nicholas Robinson, director general of Transport Canada, said in a statement.
An F.A.A. spokesman, Lynn Lunsford, said in a statement: “The F.A.A. and its international partners have engaged in robust discussions at various stages in this process as part of the thorough scrutiny of Boeing’s work. This email is an example of those exchanges.”
The National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil said it had “received the email and will consider the content along with the studies being conducted on the subject.”
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency did not immediately reply to requests for comment.
Last edited by OldnGrounded; 23rd Nov 2019 at 02:42. Reason: Separate the vanishing paragraphs.
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https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...oeing-737-max/
Letter from the Air Current article:
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...-from-737-max/
Via Air Current
Canadian air safety official urges removal of key software from Boeing 737 MAX
Nov. 22, 2019 at 7:05 pm Updated Nov. 22, 2019 at 7:45 pm
By Dominic Gates
Seattle Times aerospace reporter
A senior engineer at Canada’s air-safety regulator this week expressed low confidence in Boeing’s fix for the flight-control software on the 737 MAX, citing “new issues constantly appearing” with the proposed upgrade, and urged instead the removal of the software from the aircraft.
In an email sent Tuesday to peers in the U.S., Europe and Brazil, the senior safety official wrote that “The only way I see moving forward at this point … is that MCAS has to go.”
He was referring to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), the new flight-control software on the MAX that repeatedly pitched down the aircraft in the fatal accidents in Indonesia and Ethiopia.
Though Boeing has all but finalized substantial changes to MCAS that it believes will definitively prevent such accidents from recurring — and has said the target is to win FAA clearance by year-end — the Canadian engineer’s message casts doubt on whether the regulatory approval process can be completed that soon.
The message from Jim Marko, engineering manager for Aircraft Integration & Safety Assessment at Transport Canada and a 30-year veteran of the agency, refers to “the continuance of open issues and new issues constantly appearing” with Boeing’s proposed fix.
Even if Marko’s dissent gains no support and the regulatory authorities proceed with the software upgrade rather than its removal, at this late juncture his message indicates a surprising lack of confidence in Boeing’s fix.
“Judging from the number and degree of open issues that we have, I am feeling that final decisions on acceptance will not be technically based,” Marko wrote. “This leaves me with a level of uneasiness that I cannot sit idly by and watch it pass by.”
He sent his email, along with an attached presentation laying out some technical points, to counterparts at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Brazilian air safety regulator Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC).
In wording that may stoke public fears about the safety of the MAX, Marko wrote that his suggestion of removing MCAS is a way “to get some confidence back to us all that we as Authorities can sleep at night when that day comes when the MAX returns to service.”
“MCAS introduced nasty behaviors that have to be suppressed which are not on the (older model 737) NG,” he wrote. “Are we all smart enough to think that we have wrapped a net around anything that can go wrong from hereon in?”
Responding to news of Marko’s message, which was was first reported Friday by the New York Times, Transport Canada neither accepted nor rejected his views, instead characterizing the email as the product of “working level discussions between highly trained aircraft certification experts of key aviation authorities who have been given wide latitude for assessing all issues and looking at all alternatives for the safe return to service of the aircraft.”
“The views are at the working level and have not been subject to systematic review by Transport Canada,” said the agency’s director general for Civil Aviation, Nicholas Robinson, in a statement.
Boeing in a statement said that “we continue to work with global regulators to provide them the information they are requesting.”
And the FAA echoed Transport Canada’s position, citing its “transparent and collaborative relationship with other civil aviation authorities as we continue our review of changes to software on the Boeing 737 MAX.”
“The FAA and its international partners have engaged in robust discussions at various stages in this process as part of the thorough scrutiny of Boeing’s work,” the FAA added. “This email is an example of those exchanges.”
Marko’s suggestion of dumping the flight-control system instead of fixing it is startling because various investigative reports and briefings suggest that without MCAS, the MAX may not meet FAA certification requirements.
Boeing has said it added MCAS to make the MAX handle exactly like the older 737 NG model, specifically to achieve a smooth change in the forces on the control column as the plane performs an extreme maneuver called a “windup turn,” a spiraled banking turn that approaches a stall.
A smooth change in those control column forces in that turn is also a certification requirement. A recent report on the MAX accidents by a team of international regulators — the Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) — noted that “an unaugmented design (without MCAS) would have been at risk of not meeting (federal regulations that cover) maneuvering characteristics requirements due to aerodynamics.”
Marko suggests in his email that while taking out MCAS would have an impact on “handling and compliance” with certification requirements, the issues raised would be small enough in effect that it’s “something we could easily find a way to accept.”
Marko ends the email by stating that Transport Canada management may move on his concerns soon.
More than 700 MAXs are parked worldwide awaiting final clearance to carry passengers.
Marko’s full email message and presentation were published Friday afternoon on aviation news site The Air Current.
Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or [email protected]; on Twitter: @dominicgates.
Nov. 22, 2019 at 7:05 pm Updated Nov. 22, 2019 at 7:45 pm
By Dominic Gates
Seattle Times aerospace reporter
A senior engineer at Canada’s air-safety regulator this week expressed low confidence in Boeing’s fix for the flight-control software on the 737 MAX, citing “new issues constantly appearing” with the proposed upgrade, and urged instead the removal of the software from the aircraft.
In an email sent Tuesday to peers in the U.S., Europe and Brazil, the senior safety official wrote that “The only way I see moving forward at this point … is that MCAS has to go.”
He was referring to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), the new flight-control software on the MAX that repeatedly pitched down the aircraft in the fatal accidents in Indonesia and Ethiopia.
Though Boeing has all but finalized substantial changes to MCAS that it believes will definitively prevent such accidents from recurring — and has said the target is to win FAA clearance by year-end — the Canadian engineer’s message casts doubt on whether the regulatory approval process can be completed that soon.
The message from Jim Marko, engineering manager for Aircraft Integration & Safety Assessment at Transport Canada and a 30-year veteran of the agency, refers to “the continuance of open issues and new issues constantly appearing” with Boeing’s proposed fix.
Even if Marko’s dissent gains no support and the regulatory authorities proceed with the software upgrade rather than its removal, at this late juncture his message indicates a surprising lack of confidence in Boeing’s fix.
“Judging from the number and degree of open issues that we have, I am feeling that final decisions on acceptance will not be technically based,” Marko wrote. “This leaves me with a level of uneasiness that I cannot sit idly by and watch it pass by.”
He sent his email, along with an attached presentation laying out some technical points, to counterparts at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Brazilian air safety regulator Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC).
In wording that may stoke public fears about the safety of the MAX, Marko wrote that his suggestion of removing MCAS is a way “to get some confidence back to us all that we as Authorities can sleep at night when that day comes when the MAX returns to service.”
“MCAS introduced nasty behaviors that have to be suppressed which are not on the (older model 737) NG,” he wrote. “Are we all smart enough to think that we have wrapped a net around anything that can go wrong from hereon in?”
Responding to news of Marko’s message, which was was first reported Friday by the New York Times, Transport Canada neither accepted nor rejected his views, instead characterizing the email as the product of “working level discussions between highly trained aircraft certification experts of key aviation authorities who have been given wide latitude for assessing all issues and looking at all alternatives for the safe return to service of the aircraft.”
“The views are at the working level and have not been subject to systematic review by Transport Canada,” said the agency’s director general for Civil Aviation, Nicholas Robinson, in a statement.
Boeing in a statement said that “we continue to work with global regulators to provide them the information they are requesting.”
And the FAA echoed Transport Canada’s position, citing its “transparent and collaborative relationship with other civil aviation authorities as we continue our review of changes to software on the Boeing 737 MAX.”
“The FAA and its international partners have engaged in robust discussions at various stages in this process as part of the thorough scrutiny of Boeing’s work,” the FAA added. “This email is an example of those exchanges.”
Marko’s suggestion of dumping the flight-control system instead of fixing it is startling because various investigative reports and briefings suggest that without MCAS, the MAX may not meet FAA certification requirements.
Boeing has said it added MCAS to make the MAX handle exactly like the older 737 NG model, specifically to achieve a smooth change in the forces on the control column as the plane performs an extreme maneuver called a “windup turn,” a spiraled banking turn that approaches a stall.
A smooth change in those control column forces in that turn is also a certification requirement. A recent report on the MAX accidents by a team of international regulators — the Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) — noted that “an unaugmented design (without MCAS) would have been at risk of not meeting (federal regulations that cover) maneuvering characteristics requirements due to aerodynamics.”
Marko suggests in his email that while taking out MCAS would have an impact on “handling and compliance” with certification requirements, the issues raised would be small enough in effect that it’s “something we could easily find a way to accept.”
Marko ends the email by stating that Transport Canada management may move on his concerns soon.
More than 700 MAXs are parked worldwide awaiting final clearance to carry passengers.
Marko’s full email message and presentation were published Friday afternoon on aviation news site The Air Current.
Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or [email protected]; on Twitter: @dominicgates.
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...-from-737-max/
Via Air Current
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I read that slide that way, that even the new MCAS authority limits still may lead to cathastrophic failure (status late spring).
Therefore two more patches were developed. First some dual processor activation logic (probably status July/August) and then the cross channel monitor which by the name seems some state of health check between the FCCs and most likely is the fix for the bit flipping issue.
So the good guy has concerns that either not all loopholes have heen identified in the rush and DAL is still insufficient or that the changes are so significant that validation depth and robustness is questionable at best - both concerns I share.
Therefore two more patches were developed. First some dual processor activation logic (probably status July/August) and then the cross channel monitor which by the name seems some state of health check between the FCCs and most likely is the fix for the bit flipping issue.
So the good guy has concerns that either not all loopholes have heen identified in the rush and DAL is still insufficient or that the changes are so significant that validation depth and robustness is questionable at best - both concerns I share.
maybe not a spins- but a rotating dive from wiki
February 1959: Pan Am Flight 115, a Pan American World Airways Boeing 707, upset and went into a high-speed dive while cruising over the Atlantic at flight level350. Control was not recovered until reaching 6,000 ft. .... The Captain was in the cabin when the autopilot disconnected without adequate warning to the First Officer, who was distracted with a "howgozit" report form.
February 1959: Pan Am Flight 115, a Pan American World Airways Boeing 707, upset and went into a high-speed dive while cruising over the Atlantic at flight level350. Control was not recovered until reaching 6,000 ft. .... The Captain was in the cabin when the autopilot disconnected without adequate warning to the First Officer, who was distracted with a "howgozit" report form.
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Furthermore, MCAS seems to be unceremoniously categorized as Stall ID aka stickpusher.
MCAS2.0 misfire seems still to be a catastrophic event.
He is genuinely concerned with umpteen levels of band-aids. A longitudinally unstable NG version would give him better sleep at night.
The good news: this is public before any crash...
Last edited by spornrad; 23rd Nov 2019 at 10:23.
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Removing MCAS from the 737 Max is "how to get some confidence back to us all that we as Authorities can sleep at night when that day comes when the MAX returns to service."
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...-from-737-max/
An idea which relies in the aerodynamics being "reasonably acceptable" without MCAS.
(quote: “Yes it does bring and (sic) impact with regards to handling and compliance but it looks more like a something we could easily find a way to accept.”)
I think this is the first time I've seen such a positive view of the MAX aerodynamics expressed which doesn't read like a knee-jerk reiteration of an unquestioned
dogma. What a pity that a little of the MAX down-time wasn't spent testing/demonstrating the truth of that position. (Which, if true, wouldn't have even required
B to admit any fault.)
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...-from-737-max/
An idea which relies in the aerodynamics being "reasonably acceptable" without MCAS.
(quote: “Yes it does bring and (sic) impact with regards to handling and compliance but it looks more like a something we could easily find a way to accept.”)
I think this is the first time I've seen such a positive view of the MAX aerodynamics expressed which doesn't read like a knee-jerk reiteration of an unquestioned
dogma. What a pity that a little of the MAX down-time wasn't spent testing/demonstrating the truth of that position. (Which, if true, wouldn't have even required
B to admit any fault.)
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Two more interesting points in the slide: A SW column cutout. Can be interpreted, that SW is now supposed to decide whether a pilot is flying into a stall, or if he is desperately trying to recover from a MCAS dive. E.g. more than 40 lb pull for more than 3 min is probably a desperate pilot... Good luck with that
...
The good news: this is public before any crash...
...
The good news: this is public before any crash...
However I think it's a position sensor based deactivation of MCAS - this data should be available from Elevator Feel and/or AP functions.
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They seem to have recognized that MCAS column cutout override robs the pilot of his natural countermeasure. Now they leave that override, and stick a SW band-aid on top. Arghhh...