Sheremetyevo Superjet 100 in flames
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Crashed Superjet's pitch fluctuated before fatal touchdown
- 18 May, 2019
- SOURCE: Flight Dashboard
- BY: David Kaminski-Morrow
- London
Russian investigators have disclosed that the Sukhoi Superjet 100 involved in a fatal accident at Moscow Sheremetyevo was 1.6t over its maximum landing weight, and experienced two impacts in excess of 5g as it bounced on landing.
The Interstate Aviation Committee says it has completed an initial analysis of information from the flight-data recorder retrieved from the Aeroflot jet after the 5 May event.
Investigators have revealed that the crew received windshear warnings on approach and that the aircraft experienced pitch fluctuations just before the fatal touchdown.
Federal air transport regulator Rosaviatsia, in a detailed outline of the flight, states that the aircraft suffered an electrical failure at 8,900ft – about 5min after take-off from runway 24C – while following the KN 24E standard departure pattern for a service to Murmansk.
The aircraft’s autopilot disengaged and the aircraft’s flight control system dropped into direct law.
Rosaviatsia does not specifically state that the aircraft was struck by lightning, but it does point out that the aircraft was flying within a “zone of thunderstorm activity”.
The flight recorder registered disengagement of the autothrottle, and Rosaviatsia says the captain manually controlled the aircraft for the remainder of the flight.
Unable to communicate on the approach frequency, the crew restored VHF radio links using the emergency frequency 121.5MHz, and was vectored back to Sheremetyevo while transmitting the squawk code ’7600’ for loss of communication.
The aircraft conducted an ILS approach, in manual mode, to runway 24L.
Rosaviatsia says the aircraft had departed with a take-off weight of just over 43.5t and that its weight upon entry to the glideslope was 42.6t – which, it says, exceeded the maximum landing weight by 1.6t.
As required for the overweight landing, and the direct-law control, the flaps were set to 25°. The crew also upgraded the squawk code to the emergency setting ‘7700’.
The aircraft remained largely stable on the approach – performed in a crosswind from the left of up to 30kt – with an airspeed of 155-160kt.
As the Superjet descended through 1,100-900ft above ground, the crew received five predictive windshear “go around” warnings.
The aircraft began to dip below the glideslope at about 260ft and, at 180ft, a glideslope alert sounded.
Thrust was subsequently increased, with the throttle levers alternately advanced and retarded between 18° and 24° as the aircraft descended to 40ft. This resulted in the airspeed increasing to 164kt as it crossed the threshold and 170kt at 16ft from touchdown.
As the captain retarded the throttle to idle, says Rosaviatsia, he made several alternating inputs to the side-stick with “large amplitudes” – up to the maximum – which resulted in the pitch varying between 6° nose-up and 2° nose-down.
While the aircraft had appeared close to touchdown at about 700m from the threshold, Rosaviatsia says the first three-point contact with the runway occurred at 900m from the threshold at 158kt, when the aircraft experienced an impact of more than 2.5g, and bounced to about 6ft.
Rosaviatsia says the aircraft’s spoilers did not deploy automatically. Aeroflot stresses that its procedures do not require the manual deployment of spoilers until thrust-reverse is activated and the aircraft is settled and stable on the runway.
“In the absence of a stable course the release of the spoilers was impossible,” the carrier adds.
Having bounced, the aircraft touched down 2s later on its nose-gear at 155kt, with a heavy impact of 5.85g, causing the Superjet to bounce a second time, to a height of 18ft. The third, and final, impact occurred at 140kt – reaching at least 5g – and was immediately followed by damage to the aircraft’s structure, a fuel spill and fire.
As the aircraft decelerated through 100kt, sliding along the runway, a fire alarm was triggered in the aft baggage and cargo compartment, followed by a fire alarm in the auxiliary power unit 16s later. The aircraft’s PowerJet SaM146 engines continued operating until the end of the flight-data recorder trace just after 18:31.
Rosaviatsia says the captain had logged 1,570h on type out of a total of 6,844h while the first officer had 623h on type.
The aircraft (RA-89098) had accumulated 2,710h over the course of 1,658 cycles.
Rosaviatsia says the fatalities comprised 40 of the 73 passengers and one of the five crew members, while six passengers and three crew were injured.
Aeroflot stresses that the preliminary information disclosed by Rosaviatsia does not reference errors by the crew or any violation of procedures, and that final conclusions have yet to be released by the investigating authorities.
The Interstate Aviation Committee says it has completed an initial analysis of information from the flight-data recorder retrieved from the Aeroflot jet after the 5 May event.
Investigators have revealed that the crew received windshear warnings on approach and that the aircraft experienced pitch fluctuations just before the fatal touchdown.
Federal air transport regulator Rosaviatsia, in a detailed outline of the flight, states that the aircraft suffered an electrical failure at 8,900ft – about 5min after take-off from runway 24C – while following the KN 24E standard departure pattern for a service to Murmansk.
The aircraft’s autopilot disengaged and the aircraft’s flight control system dropped into direct law.
Rosaviatsia does not specifically state that the aircraft was struck by lightning, but it does point out that the aircraft was flying within a “zone of thunderstorm activity”.
The flight recorder registered disengagement of the autothrottle, and Rosaviatsia says the captain manually controlled the aircraft for the remainder of the flight.
Unable to communicate on the approach frequency, the crew restored VHF radio links using the emergency frequency 121.5MHz, and was vectored back to Sheremetyevo while transmitting the squawk code ’7600’ for loss of communication.
The aircraft conducted an ILS approach, in manual mode, to runway 24L.
Rosaviatsia says the aircraft had departed with a take-off weight of just over 43.5t and that its weight upon entry to the glideslope was 42.6t – which, it says, exceeded the maximum landing weight by 1.6t.
As required for the overweight landing, and the direct-law control, the flaps were set to 25°. The crew also upgraded the squawk code to the emergency setting ‘7700’.
The aircraft remained largely stable on the approach – performed in a crosswind from the left of up to 30kt – with an airspeed of 155-160kt.
As the Superjet descended through 1,100-900ft above ground, the crew received five predictive windshear “go around” warnings.
The aircraft began to dip below the glideslope at about 260ft and, at 180ft, a glideslope alert sounded.
Thrust was subsequently increased, with the throttle levers alternately advanced and retarded between 18° and 24° as the aircraft descended to 40ft. This resulted in the airspeed increasing to 164kt as it crossed the threshold and 170kt at 16ft from touchdown.
As the captain retarded the throttle to idle, says Rosaviatsia, he made several alternating inputs to the side-stick with “large amplitudes” – up to the maximum – which resulted in the pitch varying between 6° nose-up and 2° nose-down.
While the aircraft had appeared close to touchdown at about 700m from the threshold, Rosaviatsia says the first three-point contact with the runway occurred at 900m from the threshold at 158kt, when the aircraft experienced an impact of more than 2.5g, and bounced to about 6ft.
Rosaviatsia says the aircraft’s spoilers did not deploy automatically. Aeroflot stresses that its procedures do not require the manual deployment of spoilers until thrust-reverse is activated and the aircraft is settled and stable on the runway.
“In the absence of a stable course the release of the spoilers was impossible,” the carrier adds.
Having bounced, the aircraft touched down 2s later on its nose-gear at 155kt, with a heavy impact of 5.85g, causing the Superjet to bounce a second time, to a height of 18ft. The third, and final, impact occurred at 140kt – reaching at least 5g – and was immediately followed by damage to the aircraft’s structure, a fuel spill and fire.
As the aircraft decelerated through 100kt, sliding along the runway, a fire alarm was triggered in the aft baggage and cargo compartment, followed by a fire alarm in the auxiliary power unit 16s later. The aircraft’s PowerJet SaM146 engines continued operating until the end of the flight-data recorder trace just after 18:31.
Rosaviatsia says the captain had logged 1,570h on type out of a total of 6,844h while the first officer had 623h on type.
The aircraft (RA-89098) had accumulated 2,710h over the course of 1,658 cycles.
Rosaviatsia says the fatalities comprised 40 of the 73 passengers and one of the five crew members, while six passengers and three crew were injured.
Aeroflot stresses that the preliminary information disclosed by Rosaviatsia does not reference errors by the crew or any violation of procedures, and that final conclusions have yet to be released by the investigating authorities.
all those figures seem in agreement with the video and I still don't understand why a relatively benign overweight / overspeed landing turned into this catastrophe. As others I really wonder if thrust was not applied after the second bounce. There seem to be a lot of energy added at that point.

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It is clear as water in the video that after the final bounce, the aircraft landed hard and went through the MLG. This in turn caused the aircraft to scrape along the runway, which ruptured the fuel tanks. It did not help that the engines were still running as well!
At least the LOT 767 pilots switched off their engines at the last second when they landed without a landing gear!
At least the LOT 767 pilots switched off their engines at the last second when they landed without a landing gear!
One Two Punch from CB
First the lightning strike and consequent degradation to direct law among other failures.
Then the windshear on short final. I am reminded of the Dallas DC-10, New Orleans 727 and Toronto A340 losses with nearby CBs.
The meteorology section of the final report will be interesting. Hopefully weather radar recordings will be available.
Then the windshear on short final. I am reminded of the Dallas DC-10, New Orleans 727 and Toronto A340 losses with nearby CBs.
The meteorology section of the final report will be interesting. Hopefully weather radar recordings will be available.
Looking at the better video (Post 405, time 00:20-00:21) of the bounces and aftermath, it can be seen that there is a separate fireball that occurs briefly in the wake, about 20 meters behind the aircraft. There was already fuel loose as a large fuel-vapor cloud (mixed with smoke) trailing behind the aircraft within a fraction of a second of touchdown.
See also post 38 - previous SSJ MLG collapse which also spilled a lot of fuel (fortunately, without ignition).
Wonder what they're trying to say here
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-...-says/11127638
Wonder also about the nature of the horizontal stab issue
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-...oscow/11086258
The RIA-Novosti news agency said it had obtained a report from Rosaviatsiya, the civil aviation authority, which showed the brakes — flaps that hang down from a plane — were not used
Wonder also about the nature of the horizontal stab issue
Also known as the Superjet, it was heralded as a new phase for Russia's civil aviation industry.
But the plane has been troubled by concerns about defects in the horizontal stabilisers.
In 2017 Russia's aviation authority ordered inspection of all Superjets in the country because of the problems
But the plane has been troubled by concerns about defects in the horizontal stabilisers.
In 2017 Russia's aviation authority ordered inspection of all Superjets in the country because of the problems
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It is clear as water in the video that after the final bounce, the aircraft landed hard and went through the MLG. This in turn caused the aircraft to scrape along the runway, which ruptured the fuel tanks. It did not help that the engines were still running as well!
At least the LOT 767 pilots switched off their engines at the last second when they landed without a landing gear!
At least the LOT 767 pilots switched off their engines at the last second when they landed without a landing gear!
The massive shower of sparks from the tail scrapping over the tarmac ignited the fuel vapor
Ground spoilers. In direct law they need to be deployed manually.
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And the massive airflow from the running engines allowed perfect atomisation of the fuel burning at a much higher rate and with much more heat generated than a burning puddle on the tamac, once the aircraft came to a standstil !
This turned the fire into a massive blowtorch.
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They quite verbally replied to the ATC just before landing that the landing will be normal.
Last edited by Pilot DAR; 20th May 2019 at 23:45. Reason: Went to the effort to replace "b4" with "before"...
Generally after an initial activation I've not seen fire service pack up until the aircraft has rolled out and been confirmed ok... Do they have a different method of escalation/emergency activation for arff in Russia?
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Right, so until that point you would expect they'd have been ready and waiting as the situation was an unknown, return to field with possible control issues.
Generally after an initial activation I've not seen fire service pack up until the aircraft has rolled out and been confirmed ok... Do they have a different method of escalation/emergency activation for arff in Russia?
Generally after an initial activation I've not seen fire service pack up until the aircraft has rolled out and been confirmed ok... Do they have a different method of escalation/emergency activation for arff in Russia?
For me as a layman that Q and A between the pilot and the ATC was clearly about: "Do you need the ARFF?" - "No".

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Looks like it's the end of the line for SSJ, next will be the chop, as they are quoting exaggerated figs of a 7 billion funding fig.
People are scared to fly on the thing!
What a shame, it's one of the most gorgeous A/c to fly on I have been on in years
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/...l-crash-a65850
People are scared to fly on the thing!
What a shame, it's one of the most gorgeous A/c to fly on I have been on in years
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/...l-crash-a65850
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The the cracks were not in the horizontal stab rear spar. The inspection was of the horizontal stab attachment bracket lugs, the cracking was due to the interference fit bushes being fitted with too tight a tolerance into the lugs.
Once the fleet were modified there was never to my knowledge any more issues, although they still required inspection at an increased interval.
Once the fleet were modified there was never to my knowledge any more issues, although they still required inspection at an increased interval.

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Those 41 are not coming back from the dead, like the JAK 42 accident in Jaroslavl (which was pilot error)..
Sarcasm is supposed to be the lowest form of humour.
I wouldn't be at all suprised if this final nail in the coffin for SSJ was actually nothing to do with the A/c which has its own share of maintenance issues, but some newby who couldn't land an (admitted overweight) plane in circumstances where it was quite likely could have continued with some fun and games - but nevertheless continued to its original destination...
Sounds suspiciously like pilot error on this one, nothing whatsoever to do with MAX issues thanks...
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Looks like it's the end of the line for SSJ, next will be the chop, as they are quoting exaggerated figs of a 7 billion funding fig.
People are scared to fly on the thing!
What a shame, it's one of the most gorgeous A/c to fly on I have been on in years
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/...l-crash-a65850
People are scared to fly on the thing!
What a shame, it's one of the most gorgeous A/c to fly on I have been on in years
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/...l-crash-a65850
It's not a bad aircraft to fly on, certainly there's plenty of space in the cabin although I think it was a bit noisy.
Any crew I spoke to loved flying them !
It's a pity they never sorted out the spare parts problem or amended the manuals. It's very difficult to operate an aircraft with a very limited MEL and an SRM that contains next to no allowable damage.
In addition to that, add in the amount of man-hours required for the routine inspections (most based on calendar date) and the aircraft doesn't really stand a chance in comparison to it's western competitors.