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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 15th Mar 2019, 04:04
  #1421 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Mad (Flt) Scientist View Post
Something isn't quite making sense here....

IF that supposed ATC info is correct - that there seemed to be a sustained and abnormal acceleration - and this DOES seem to be borne out by the FR24 data, which seems to show increasing speed and increasing altitude then the aircraft flight path is NOT the same as Lion Air. Whatever various press releases seem to be claiming.

The Lion Air FDR data appears to show an aircraft exchanging kinetic and potential energy as it dives and accelerates, then climbs and slows , as it either is "MCASed" nose down or pulled back nose up alternately. The final DIVE is where the speed finally builds to by far the highest speed in the whole accident sequence.

ET doesn't do that. The FR24 data (unless there's something newer floating around) shows ground speed continuously increasing (albeit not at a constant rate) while the overall altitude trend is to climb - albeit with some instability. In other words, the ET aircraft seems to be gaining significant energy throughout the flight. No stab system malfunction can add total energy to the aircraft.

Dare I suggest something totally unrelated to MCAS, even though everyone has already jumped on that bandwagon (and grounded the aircraft). What about an uncontrolled high thrust event? Too much thrust, inability to reduce power from TO, something like that.
Either they where to busy controlling the A/C and did not reduce thrust or they hoped the nose up momentum caused by engine thrust would help them to overcome a nose down trim or whatever caused the dive.

The normal reaction to too much thrust would be to simply continue the climb. That would buy some time to sort out whatever happened.
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 04:17
  #1422 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by KRviator View Post
Given boeingboy737 has been here since 1999 and has 20 times the number of posts you do that's a funny call.
i said draw your own conclusions. But with 737 in the screen name Im happy that hes not flying a Max, with or without the training that goes with it. Of course other than Brazil, there would have been no training. And I wonder what the Brazilian certifying authority allowed as training since they grounded their fleet anyway.
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 04:21
  #1423 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by CONSO View Post
if you find the link to the nasa anon reporting system for pilots, etc that apply to 737max- you will find one descriptioon of an uncommaned throttle change which I recall was the opposite ( throttle cut ) but my memory may be incorrect . .
Correct, the AT failed to maintain thrust. It's recorded in ASRS as ACN: 1590012. Here's the narrative:

After 1000 feet I noticed a decrease in aircraft performance. I picked up that the autothrottles were not moving to commanded position even though they were engaged. I'm sure they were set properly for takeoff but not sure when the discrepancy took place. My scan wasn't as well developed since I've only flown the MAX once before. I manually positioned the thrust levers ASAP. This resolved the threat, we were able to increase speed to clean up and continue the climb to 3000 feet.

Shortly afterwards I heard about the (other carrier) accident and am wondering if any other crews have experienced similar incidents with the autothrottle system on the MAX? Or I may have made a possible flying mistake which is more likely. The FO (First Officer) was still on his first month and was not able to identify whether it was the aircraft or me that was in error.

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Old 15th Mar 2019, 04:26
  #1424 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by EDML View Post
Either they where to busy controlling the A/C and did not reduce thrust or they hoped the nose up momentum caused by engine thrust would help them to overcome a nose down trim or whatever caused the dive.

The normal reaction to too much thrust would be to simply continue the climb. That would buy some time to sort out whatever happened.


What if they were so concerned about MCAS that they were taking THOSE actions even though it wasn't an MCAS issue? And not addressing the thrust?

Ive seen previous cases where crews were so focused on the 'threat of the week' that they reacted to other symptoms as if they wree the expected, high profile, event.
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 04:41
  #1425 (permalink)  
 
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One options suggested by the FR data is that there was no flap set for takeoff.

The data shows a 63 second ground roll followed by a rotation at 207 knots. At this point the MCAS may have simply been doing its job.

Hard to believe this would happen, but it's happened before.
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 05:19
  #1426 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Capt Kremin View Post
One options suggested by the FR data is that there was no flap set for takeoff.

The data shows a 63 second ground roll followed by a rotation at 207 knots. At this point the MCAS may have simply been doing its job.

Hard to believe this would happen, but it's happened before.
well here is a comparison plot just found in seattle times




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Old 15th Mar 2019, 05:26
  #1427 (permalink)  
 
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and some more data

https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/20...37-max/584791/


https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/database.html

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Old 15th Mar 2019, 05:39
  #1428 (permalink)  
 
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Did the aircraft even make it to FMC thrust reduction altitude? Capt Kremin's scenario of a flapless takeoff, MCAS activation at liftoff and takeoff thrust for almost the entire duration of the flight could provide a plausible explanation for the continuous increase in speed during the sequence from the known data.
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 05:43
  #1429 (permalink)  
 
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I have no quibble about the MCAS being involved somehow; but while we know why Lion Air had its activation of the MCAS, we don't know why ETH 302 did. This may be a reason. The aircraft took over 3 minutes to get above 500' AGL This points to very early activation of the MCAS, which needs the flaps to be up to work.
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 05:43
  #1430 (permalink)  
 
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Apologies if already posted.

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Old 15th Mar 2019, 06:09
  #1431 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by CONSO View Post
well here is a comparison plot just found in seattle times
Just one thing to note in that comparison graphic is that the altitude axis scale for the Ethiopian flight is 2,000 feet, but the altitude axis scale for the Lion Air axis is 5,000 feet.
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 07:28
  #1432 (permalink)  
 
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If the MCAS is triggered by one sensor, than simply adding another won't be enough. There needs to be three just like having a standby A/H as a tie breaker.

Surely any mandated modification will require more than a simple software update.

Concorde was grounded for a lengthy period after a design flaw led to a disaster. Extensive modifications were required to the wing tanks before the aircraft was deemed safe. Any solution proposed by Boeing will need to be very conclusive in restoring safety for it to be accepted and it won't be quick or cheap.
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 07:32
  #1433 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by krismiler View Post
Any solution proposed by Boeing will need to be very conclusive in restoring safety for it to be accepted and it won't be quick or cheap.
And this time EASA may well not rely on the FAA for lifting ban or even worse re-certification if required...
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 07:37
  #1434 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by GarageYears View Post
Either it’s a different sensor, new with the MAX
Discussed in the Lion Air thread. It's the same part number on the NG and Max. I'd have been surprised if it wasn't.

Originally Posted by CONSO View Post
And BA knows how to make a comparison for example 787
In fact Boeing knows how to make a comparison on the Max (and NG) too - if you pay the extra $$$ when you buy your 737, Boeing will add a few more lines of code to your Air Data System software that enables the "AOA DISAGREE" warning functionality. Both SWA and AAL have that on their aircraft.
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 07:52
  #1435 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
In fact Boeing knows how to make a comparison on the Max (and NG) too - if you pay the extra $$$ when you buy your 737, Boeing will add a few more lines of code to your Air Data System software that enables the "AOA DISAGREE" warning functionality. Both SWA and AAL have that on their aircraft.
If that is the case then there is likely only one version of the code (eases management of it), but a flag set Yes or No if the fee has been paid or not.

If so, and the right code to avoid the issue was actually installed in the aircraft but deliberately switched off, lawyers for the pax, especially those from the second accident, will have a field day.

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Old 15th Mar 2019, 07:58
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Originally Posted by WHBM View Post
If that is the case then there is likely only one version of the code (eases management of it), but a flag set Yes or No if the fee has been paid or not.

If so, and the right code to avoid the issue was actually installed in the aircraft but deliberately switched off, lawyers for the pax, especially those from the second accident, will have a field day.
Yes, that's what I meant. In the old days, we would call that a compiler directive. The same would apply to the bit of code (also a $$$ option) that adds the AoA indicator to the PFD.
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 08:02
  #1437 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by CONSO View Post
well here is a comparison plot just found in seattle times
It's probably worth pointing out that the altitude anomaly shown at 08:40:51 on the ET plot is spurious.
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 08:03
  #1438 (permalink)  
 
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This from Reuters. (It appears the lawyers want the claims heard outside the USA)

The crash of Boeing Co's 737 MAX 8 passenger jet in Ethiopia raises the chances that families of the 157 victims, even non-U.S. residents, will be able to sue in U.S. courts, where payouts are larger than in other countries, some legal experts said.

Sunday's crash occurred five months after the same model of the plane went down in Indonesia, an accident that prompted a string of U.S. lawsuits against Boeing by families of the 189 victims.

The company, which has its corporate headquarters in Chicago, has often convinced U.S. judges to dismiss air crash cases in favor of litigation in the country where the evidence and witnesses are, usually where the crash occurred.

That allows the company to avoid U.S. juries, which can award hefty punitive damages to accident victims for wrongful death, emotional suffering and economic hardships of surviving family.

Boeing may have a tougher time with that strategy after the Ethiopian crash, some legal experts said.

This is partly because eight U.S. citizens died and because plaintiffs could argue that liability hinges on system design and safety decisions made by Boeing executives since the Lion Air crash in Indonesia.

"Now with two crashes with a brand-new aircraft, what Boeing did in the intervening five months is more relevant, and that all happened in the United States," said Daniel Rose, a lawyer with Kreindler & Kreindler, a firm that represents air crash victims and their relatives.
Plaintiffs will also claim Boeing failed to exercise reasonable care in designing planes or failed to inform flight crews about how the planes operate, Wolk said.

Rose, the lawyer for passengers, said two accidents so close together will put the focus of any lawsuits on the Ethiopian crash on how Boeing tried to address problems with its MCAS system after the Lion Air crash.

"Were there other efforts by Boeing to essentially minimize the problem or hide the scope of the problem?" Rose asked. If lawyers can show Boeing management acted recklessly, it could clear the way for substantial punitive damages, he said.

Some lawyers who have worked on the other side of such cases are less sure about Boeing's potential liability.

Kenneth Quinn, a lawyer who represents airlines and manufacturers, said he thought Boeing had a good chance of getting both sets of U.S. cases dismissed on forum grounds.

He said the trend in U.S. courts was in Boeing's favor.

"Increasingly, attempts to litigate foreign crashes involving foreign airlines on foreign soil are being dismissed," he said.

In November, a federal judge in Washington, D.C. dismissed a case against Boeing and other defendants stemming from the disappearance of a Malaysian Airlines flight in 2014 because the presumed crash had a stronger connection to Malaysia than the United States.

In 2011, a federal judge in Los Angeles dismissed 116 wrongful death and product liability cases against Boeing over the 2008 crash of a Spanair jet on a domestic flight in Spain, where the judge determined the cases should be heard.

If the company has to defend U.S. cases, it would likely argue that claims against it are preempted because the FAA had approved the plane's design, said Justin Green, a plaintiffs lawyer.











https://mobile.reuters.com/article/a...mpression=true
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 08:34
  #1439 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by Capt Kremin View Post
One options suggested by the FR data is that there was no flap set for takeoff.

The data shows a 63 second ground roll followed by a rotation at 207 knots. At this point the MCAS may have simply been doing its job.

Hard to believe this would happen, but it's happened before.
Interesting and of course would throw a spanner in -

Would any 737 MAX pilot ever entertain a flap-less takeoff from Addis with a 2300m Elev? -
This was a normal early morning departure (Temp was 16c) - busy pax load (149) for a 2 hour leg to NBO
Not sure if at or near MTOW (any cargo>?)
VR at 207 kts?
puzzled....
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 08:56
  #1440 (permalink)  
 
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One thing is clear amongst all the scuttlebutt, the 737 MAX is a new type not an ng with a few tweaks and a slightly different cockpit layout.
Buying a new aircraft type is a big undertaking for any airline and expensive getting their existing pilots certified on the type while still operational on the existing 737 fleet. This makes it more difficult for Boeing to sign up customers for big orders so they tricked customers into buying the MAX by certifying the aircraft as a variant so that current ng type rating applied with only new cockpit familiarity checks.
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