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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 8th May 2019, 00:40
  #5101 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by patplan View Post
Just another reiteration of some issues with MCAS' flawed logic, as discussed here and elsewhere... (with my emphasis)

Boeing says no flaws in 737 Max. Former engineer points to several



- https://www.kuow.org/stories/engineer-gap-flaw-mcas
Muilenburg really needs to stop trying to dodge the reality of this thing. Although knowing what I do of the Corporate mindset, I reckon Hell will freeze over before that happens!

At the end of the day though, I believe that MCAS should go down as an example of the most monstrous Corporate and Regulator failure in the history of modern commercial aviation.

Last edited by KRUSTY 34; 8th May 2019 at 00:56.
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Old 8th May 2019, 00:50
  #5102 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by L39 Guy View Post


I think everyone is in agreement that MCAS needs to be fixed.

None of the aviators that have defended Boeing or MCAS find this situation “acceptable” at all. What we have a hard time accepting is that “professional pilots” could not manage this situation in 2/3 of the events. If they had even done the UAS drill they likely would have survived as both crews lost control of the aircraft as they were racing around at an unacceptably high speed. If either of the crews had trimmed the pitch, a perfectly natural and instinctive reaction, they would have disabled MCAS each and every time. If the crews had done the Stab Trim Runaway memory checklist, which is for events just like this, they would have disabled MCAS just like the crew of the Lion Air incident did and indeed flew the aircraft for an hour and a half with unreliable airspeed and MCAS just waiting to rear its ugly head.

These drills (UAS and Stab Trim Runaway) are not complex; pulling the throttle back to control the airspeed is basic flying just as trimming the aircraft. What has aviators like myself, 737 Driver, Lost in Saigon and others deeply concerned about is that the basic flying skills to deal with these situations are no longer present in today’s professional pilot. When everything works it’s all good...just put ‘er on the autopilot and off you go. But when a curveball is thrown at you, you’re not there when you’re needed the most. That should be of serious concern to the airlines, the regulators, the manufacturers and the professional pilot community.

The measure I used as an instructor and a commercial airline pilot was “would I put my family on an aircraft flown by less than competent pilots”? If the answer is no then we have a problem and I would submit that there is a problem in parts of the world that seem to be crashing aircraft these days.
Well L39 Guy,

I’m sincerely hopeful that as part of your instructing duties you are not responsible for matters concerning Human Factors. Hopefully we will never be thrust into such an unexpected and mind numbing situation as befell these poor crews.
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Old 8th May 2019, 01:18
  #5103 (permalink)  
 
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pulling the throttle back to control the airspeed is basic flying just as trimming the aircraft.
Trimming. Now there's an interesting concept. Let's see. AP on at 500ft after takeoff. No pilot trim required. AP out at 500ft on final approach. No pilot trim required. In some companies, this is the recommended/preferred SOP.

How is a pilot expected to instinctively trim in such a diabolical scenario when he doesn't do it at any other time?

Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 8th May 2019 at 04:14.
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Old 8th May 2019, 01:38
  #5104 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by L39 Guy View Post
...as both crews lost control of the aircraft as they were racing around at an unacceptably high speed.

If the crews had done the Stab Trim Runaway memory checklist, which is for events just like this, they would have disabled MCAS just like the crew of the Lion Air incident did and indeed flew the aircraft for an hour and a half with unreliable airspeed and MCAS just waiting to rear its ugly head.
...
ET was at ~250 when MCAS dumped in 9 seconds of ND trim which led to sharp speed increase. Even so they were still well under VMO when they disabled all electric trim and were apparently unable to manually trim due to aero loads possibly compounded by lack of training in the unloading technique.

This period is unfortunately not well covered in the prelim report but to say they were 'racing around' does seems a bit harsh.

Other pilots have stated that chopping power would need to be done very carefully given the conditions and altitude.
I am not saying they did not simply miss the 'autothrottle off' step but that only added to problems later on.
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Old 8th May 2019, 02:37
  #5105 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by L39 Guy View Post

The measure I used as an instructor and a commercial airline pilot was “would I put my family on an aircraft flown by less than competent pilots”? If the answer is no then we have a problem and I would submit that there is a problem in parts of the world that seem to be crashing aircraft these days.
Do you mean Texas or Florida?
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Old 8th May 2019, 04:56
  #5106 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by edmundronald View Post
Erasing culpability for a bad certificate won't erase the design issues that make the certificate bad.

Edmund
There are industry wide standards for the hard and software when flight control surfaces are moved outside the direct control of the pilots i.e. for fly by wire aircraft.

It smells that Boeing tries to get away with the next substandard solution to save some bucks. Panels or groups tend to agree on more risky solution than single persons or entities where their name would be written alone on the next fatality case.

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Old 8th May 2019, 05:40
  #5107 (permalink)  
 
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To me it also sounds like a plan B if the international sister *AAs are not as servile as expected in providing a waiver for the design.

Having read most of the 256 pages - did we have somewhere a comparison of the implementation of MD11s LSAS and MCAS?
IIRC LSAS hat two computers (left and right) selectable by flight crew? Can't remember if each of those two computers had a left and right channel as well.
Is MCAS and LSAS a good comparison, given that the one is active most of the time and the other only in a very specific corner of the envelope? What does that mean in terms of safety requirements?
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Old 8th May 2019, 05:47
  #5108 (permalink)  
 
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Here is a good recent article on Boeing certification problems:

https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...uding-737-max/

Fly SAFE!

God bless, and Namaste...
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Old 8th May 2019, 06:02
  #5109 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by BDAttitude View Post
To me it also sounds like a plan B if the international sister *AAs are not as servile as expected in providing a waiver for the design.

Having read most of the 256 pages - did we have somewhere a comparison of the implementation of MD11s LSAS and MCAS?
IIRC LSAS hat two computers (left and right) selectable by flight crew? Can't remember if each of those two computers had a left and right channel as well.
Is MCAS and LSAS a good comparison, given that the one is active most of the time and the other only in a very specific corner of the envelope? What does that mean in terms of safety requirements?
Just another thing - seems the simulator does not simulate MCAS, another over site to rectify.

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/28/a...ntl/index.html

Chief Pilot and Vice President of Flight Operations Yohannes HaileMariam is at the helm of our simulated flight. Everything during the re-creation is designed to be as real as possible, including videos of runways and airports around the world that play on the screens, simulating the cockpit's wind screen. Guided by HaileMariam, our simulated flight rises and is airborne for 15 minutes before gliding to a stop.
During our simulated flight, there is no sign of a downward tug on the plane's nose, a concern at the center of investigations into the two crashes. The 737 Max 8's MCAS lowers the plane's nose when a sensor detects that the aircraft is at risk of stalling.
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Old 8th May 2019, 06:21
  #5110 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Bend alot View Post
Just another thing - seems the simulator does not simulate MCAS, another over site to rectify.

...

Chief Pilot and Vice President of Flight Operations Yohannes HaileMariam is at the helm of our simulated flight. Everything during the re-creation is designed to be as real as possible, including videos of runways and airports around the world that play on the screens, simulating the cockpit's wind screen. Guided by HaileMariam, our simulated flight rises and is airborne for 15 minutes before gliding to a stop.
During our simulated flight, there is no sign of a downward tug on the plane's nose, a concern at the center of investigations into the two crashes. The 737 Max 8's MCAS lowers the plane's nose when a sensor detects that the aircraft is at risk of stalling.
Would be very suprised if it was so. FCCs should have the same Software as in the real plane, shouldn't they?
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Old 8th May 2019, 06:59
  #5111 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by BDAttitude View Post
Would be very suprised if it was so. FCCs should have the same Software as in the real plane, shouldn't they?
Lots of us are very surprised about a lot of things coming to light, on the MAX systems/changes and it's certification.

What cost cutting measures were applied to the simulators that "are not really required anyway" as it basically fly's like a NG and MCAS only operates in the back ground.
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Old 8th May 2019, 07:46
  #5112 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Bend alot View Post
Lots of us are very surprised about a lot of things coming to light, on the MAX systems/changes and it's certification.

What cost cutting measures were applied to the simulators that "are not really required anyway" as it basically fly's like a NG and MCAS only operates in the back ground.
It's just that I don't see the costs that could have been cut by doing so.
The CNN feature you have linked seems to be very superficial. I can't see them trying to stall the aircraft or introducing a AOA fault. So where should MCAS come into action. It's a scenic flight in the simulator and the statement that there was no MCAS intervention is ambiguous to me.

However there is still negligence and the bad suprises are many.
Maybe someone has more detailed knowledge one the capabilities of the 8 MAX simulators (one of which seems to be located in Ethopia, which is at least suprising to me).
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Old 8th May 2019, 08:04
  #5113 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by KRUSTY 34 View Post


Well L39 Guy,

I’m sincerely hopeful that as part of your instructing duties you are not responsible for matters concerning Human Factors. Hopefully we will never be thrust into such an unexpected and mind numbing situation as befell these poor crews.
I spent part of my instructing time in standards, i.e. upholding the standards. And part of the "standard" is human factors such as being able to cope with emergencies complete with bells and whistles going off, the startle factor, unfamiliarity of the situation, etc. In fact, one of the interesting things teaching flying in the military jets is that everyone wears oxygen masks and one can hear the other person breathing. And sure enough, when giving a student an emergency such as a simulated engine failure, one could hear the breathing rate increase - perfectly natural and visceral response. It was always instructive to tell the student to listen to their breathing as a means to settle things down.

I guess I am kind of old fashioned; I expect professional pilots - those who are being paid by someone to transport them from A to B - to be able to cope with emergencies. That is part of the contract between the passenger and the airline and the pilot. I expect that the pilot be properly trained and evaluated to handle the known emergencies - that is the responsibility of the airline and the regulator. I expect that professional pilots know their emergencies, particularly the memory drills, 12 months of the year not just before simulator sessions. And that might mean dragging out the checklist during cruise to go over an emergency or two just to keep them fresh. That is all part of being a "professional" much like I expect an emergency room physician to know their emergencies.

BTW, there is no such thing as an "expected" emergency. Emergencies happen out of the blue often with no warning. That's the nature of the beast and the startle factor is always there.

Nobody wants to be thrusted into emergency situations but they happen in aircraft - that's the nature of the business, systems fail, parts break and you simply can't pull over to the side of the road to figure it out. But this MCAS situation is not mind numbing - what is mind numbing is a double engine failure after take-off, flying into volcanic dust at night, losing all of the hydraulics in an aircraft that supposedly can't fly without them (United DC10, Sioux City), etc. None of these emergencies had checklists or an opportunity to be exposed to them in a simulator first.

An unreliable airspeed after take-off complete with stick shaker is not a "mind numbing" emergency. There is a memory checklist for it, it is something that one could have or should have seen in a simulator as part of getting a type rating, and it is a really easy emergency - magic off, set and attitude and power setting then get the checklist out. Then, and always, fly the aircraft. Ain't that hard regardless of how many bells and whistles are sounding. Not doing this simple emergency drill prior to raising the flaps and MCAS starting up (about two minutes after take-off) would have lead to an entirely different outcome, as the Lion Air incident flight showed. I am not going to repeat the rest of the stuff about stab trim runaway, etc. as that has been beaten to death on this forum already.
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Old 8th May 2019, 08:11
  #5114 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Water pilot View Post
Do you mean Texas or Florida?
Runway overrun in Florida and the B767 in Houston? Fair enough although let's see what caused the B767 accident first. But if you want to delve into overruns, check out avherald.com and see the Lion Air incidents.

Quick quiz: how many jet aircraft fatalities in the US in the past 10 years? In Canada in the past 30? Same for Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Western Europe (UK, France, Germany, Italy, etc)? Answer to the first two is 1 and 16, respectively.
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Old 8th May 2019, 08:12
  #5115 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by BDAttitude View Post
It's just that I don't see the costs that could have been cut by doing so.
The CNN feature you have linked seems to be very superficial. I can't see them trying to stall the aircraft or introducing a AOA fault. So where should MCAS come into action. It's a scenic flight in the simulator and the statement that there was no MCAS intervention is ambiguous to me.

However there is still negligence and the bad suprises are many.
Maybe someone has more detailed knowledge one the capabilities of the 8 MAX simulators (one of which seems to be located in Ethopia, which is at least suprising to me).
Since Ethiopian Airlines has only 4 (or 5) MAX aircraft delivered, and a total of 26 other B737 models in service, it would be rather surprising if they have one of the very few MAX simulators available worldwide. We do not know for sure (it may have been filmed elsewhere), and the CNN story is hardly proof either way. I don't think even Boeing have (or had) the ability to trigger an AOA fault, so this version seems rather irrelevant.
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Old 8th May 2019, 08:31
  #5116 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by BDAttitude View Post
It's just that I don't see the costs that could have been cut by doing so.
The CNN feature you have linked seems to be very superficial. I can't see them trying to stall the aircraft or introducing a AOA fault. So where should MCAS come into action. It's a scenic flight in the simulator and the statement that there was no MCAS intervention is ambiguous to me.
Way back in the LionAir threads it was revealed that Max simulator data packs are delivered as binaries with a fixed set of malfunctions, this is another change from NG, and almost certainly is cost-cutting. Result?:

operators no longer have any ability to pick and choose nor introduce malfunctions into their training programs

See post 813 on Lion thread: Indonesian aircraft missing off Jakarta

If you cannot simulate an AOA failing high (and not all AOA failures will trigger MCAS) then you could only trigger MCAS by flying into a part of the envelope where it is designed to activate in which case the result would be that, in terms of stick feel at least, MCAS counters the additional nacelle lift and it flies like an NG would. That isn't really any help...

It may well be that the only way to accurately simulate MCAS is in the engineering sims at Boeing (or arrange a test flight in an actual Max - plenty spare at the moment - and knock a vane off before you go...).
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Old 8th May 2019, 08:44
  #5117 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by GordonR_Cape View Post
Since Ethiopian Airlines has only 4 (or 5) MAX aircraft delivered, and a total of 26 other B737 models in service, it would be rather surprising if they have one of the very few MAX simulators available worldwide. We do not know for sure (it may have been filmed elsewhere), and the CNN story is hardly proof either way. I don't think even Boeing have (or had) the ability to trigger an AOA fault, so this version seems rather irrelevant.
Having worked in Africa for a number of years, I do not find it at all surprising that Ethiopian Airlines would have a MAX 8 simulator.

It is very possible that is standard practice in the company. An Aircraft division and a training division each with different managers. Both managers hold a cheque book and both get wined and dinned, I hardly see the training manager saying "Nah I do not need to go to the USA - it's the same as the NG"

Not having a trigger for a (or both) AoA fault/s in a simulator would be a very big surprise as they input a few systems.

L39 Guy - what would you class Botswana's safety record as?

Airline commercial obviously.
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Old 8th May 2019, 08:53
  #5118 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by infrequentflyer789 View Post
Way back in the LionAir threads it was revealed that Max simulator data packs are delivered as binaries with a fixed set of malfunctions, this is another change from NG, and almost certainly is cost-cutting. Result?:

operators no longer have any ability to pick and choose nor introduce malfunctions into their training programs

See post 813 on Lion thread: ...
If you cannot simulate an AOA failing high (and not all AOA failures will trigger MCAS) then you could only trigger MCAS by flying into a part of the envelope where it is designed to activate in which case the result would be that, in terms of stick feel at least, MCAS counters the additional nacelle lift and it flies like an NG would. That isn't really any help...

It may well be that the only way to accurately simulate MCAS is in the engineering sims at Boeing (or arrange a test flight in an actual Max - plenty spare at the moment - and knock a vane off before you go...).
Thank you very much for clarification and the link.
This is indeed another concerning development - and should have been vigorously fought by the Training Device Manufacturers and their customers!

So I would consider this not so much as a cost saving meassure but yet another a**h*** company culture thing trying to gain dominance over TDMs by revoking access to something one considers as Boeings intellecutal property.
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Old 8th May 2019, 08:57
  #5119 (permalink)  
 
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10 million views more than 5000 posts...and still discussing the same stuff
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Old 8th May 2019, 09:05
  #5120 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by LegioX View Post
10 million views more than 5000 posts...and still discussing the same stuff
Even if it does seem repetitive, this discussion is not going to go away. More than 300 people are dead, and Boeing still won't accept responsibility...
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