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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 7th May 2019, 22:49
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Originally Posted by Double07
Please excuse me if I am repeating something that has been discussed earlier in this thread, but from the schematic for the “Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Control System – Functional Description – Electric Trim” (see PPRUNE thread entitled 737MAX Stab Trim architecture, post #194), one can see that when MCAS is active, then STS in inactive.
And when MCAS is inactive, then STS is active.
Is it possible that after a pilot electrically trims the aircraft nose-up after an MCAS nose-down trim event, then the STS system will activate to trim the aircraft nose-down again before the next MCAS nose-down trim event? Recall that the STS system trims the aircraft in the direction opposite to the speed change. So if the pilot has just trimmed with a nose-up command, then wouldn’t the STS system counter with a nose-down trim command? This same operation would still apply if the autopilot thought the aircraft had a higher angle of attack as a result of a defective AoA sensor (the autopilot controls the STS trim even when the autopilot is off). Could this help to explain the failure of the ET302 pilot to trim back to a fully neutral trim after an MCAS trim event?
STS respects the control column cutout switches, so any time that virtually any amount of forward or backward pressure was being applied to the yoke, STS would not be able to make any input. Additionally, STS has its own Stall ID mode which, in the presence of a stall signal, would command the trim nose down and override any other STS input. This nose down trim input is also inhibited by the control column cutout switches.

One thing that confuses me here is that I’ve read that STS activates 5 seconds after release of the manual trim switches. MCAS has a similar 5 second delay. This may mean that any STS trim would be canceled by an MCAS trim event. But could there be a delay in MCAS activation relative to STS activation? By the way, STS trim and manual electric trim have the same trim rates, but differ in direction. Also, any STS trim should be canceled by the simultaneous activation of manual electric trim by the pilot. But if the pilot released the manual trim button when he believed the aircraft trim to be at neutral, then STS might give a short nose-down trim command before MCAS activates to give a larger nose-down command.
Both have a 5 second delay because MCAS is actually a sub-function of STS (though MCAS is not inhibited by the control column cutout switches). STS can trim in both directions. If near neutral trim, STS might make an input (nose up or nose down) but any further inputs would be inhibited if the control column was displaced from neutral.

Also, the same schematic shows that the two pedestal cutout switches on the 737MAX operate as a logical “AND” function (“&” function) as follows:
Manual electric trim = [PRI] & [B/U]
Autopilot trim = [PRI]
STS speed trim = [PRI]
MCAS trim = [PRI] & [B/U]

This means that there is no way to turn off all automatic trim functions while keeping the manual electric trim operative. However, it would be a trivial change to have the switches operate as follows:Manual electric trim = [PRI]
Autopilot trim = [PRI] & [B/U]
STS speed trim = [PRI]
MCAS trim = [PRI] & [B/U]

In this case the pilots would be able to turn off the autopilot trim and MCAS trim by turning off only the B/U cutout switch while keeping the manual electric trim and STS trim active by leaving the PRI cutout switch on. This would make the 737 MAX operate more like the 737NG aircraft, allowing full use of manual electric trim at all times. Why has this not been done?
Under current procedures, we never use the cutout switches individually on the 737NG or the MAX. We always use them together. There have been extensive discussions regarding the why's and wherefore's of the change in switch functionality, but procedurally it makes no difference at all.

Is it because it would have required re-certification of the aircraft by giving the pilots control over the MCAS function? Was certification of the 737NG with new lift-causing engines dependent upon the MCAS correction function operating only in the background without control from the pilots?
Pilots have never had direct control over the STS function, so I'll speculate that giving them direct control over MCAS never crossed anyone's mind. MCAS was required for certification, but I don't think those certification rules cared whether the system operated in the foreground or background.
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Old 7th May 2019, 23:16
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Originally Posted by fergusd
It may be interesting to note that what appears to be the vast majority of people who are responsible for designing, developing and delivering safety critical systems for a living (I am another example - high software content military life critical systems amongst other things) who have commented find the Boeing approach at best questionable, and for my part very concerning (as a very regular pax). I had expected better from the aviation regulation process.

Equally concerning are the folk that fly these machines who also appear to feel that this type of potentially inadequate (and demonstrably dangerous) systems design is acceptable, it may be the norm, and it may be what you are used to . . . but I'm surprised . . .

Edit : A wise man in the military safety community once told me that if I wasn't personally prepared to trust my life to the system I designed I shouldn't be in the industry . . . I wonder whether that ethos has been diluted in aviation . . . I hope not . .
Fd
I think everyone is in agreement that MCAS needs to be fixed.

None of the aviators that have defended Boeing or MCAS find this situation “acceptable” at all. What we have a hard time accepting is that “professional pilots” could not manage this situation in 2/3 of the events. If they had even done the UAS drill they likely would have survived as both crews lost control of the aircraft as they were racing around at an unacceptably high speed. If either of the crews had trimmed the pitch, a perfectly natural and instinctive reaction, they would have disabled MCAS each and every time. If the crews had done the Stab Trim Runaway memory checklist, which is for events just like this, they would have disabled MCAS just like the crew of the Lion Air incident did and indeed flew the aircraft for an hour and a half with unreliable airspeed and MCAS just waiting to rear its ugly head.

These drills (UAS and Stab Trim Runaway) are not complex; pulling the throttle back to control the airspeed is basic flying just as trimming the aircraft. What has aviators like myself, 737 Driver, Lost in Saigon and others deeply concerned about is that the basic flying skills to deal with these situations are no longer present in today’s professional pilot. When everything works it’s all good...just put ‘er on the autopilot and off you go. But when a curveball is thrown at you, you’re not there when you’re needed the most. That should be of serious concern to the airlines, the regulators, the manufacturers and the professional pilot community.

The measure I used as an instructor and a commercial airline pilot was “would I put my family on an aircraft flown by less than competent pilots”? If the answer is no then we have a problem and I would submit that there is a problem in parts of the world that seem to be crashing aircraft these days.
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Old 7th May 2019, 23:48
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Salute!

Losing credibility faith in you, Murph...... to wit:
Other than it's existence and a few things posted here I have no knowledge of sts, however does not look to be a significant factor in ET case.
Even Driver has referenced STS and that MCAS was considered a sub-mode by some folks. And due to STS rolling that trim wheel a lot, the Lion crew commented that STS was working backwards. I would also like to hear the CVR on that flight, as all we hear via the rumor mill is the jump seat guy saved the day. Until we have the trial testimony and depositions, we may not know. Maybe the CVR had some of the conversation, as the FDR had a lotta hours. My not so humble opinion is that crew lucked out and "went manual" when the trim system was not acting as they expected. I give them a lotta credit for doing all that with then shaker goingon, but their CVR shoul give us a clue if it ever becomes public.

Comes down to same thing - longitudinal pitch moments and such, not simply back stick forces per AoA unless you are flying a pure cable and pulley plaine. The 737 variants added STS after a coupla generations because it had to satisfy FAR speed stability reuqirements. And BTW, I do not like that "speed" term. It's AoA and basic aero to force the nose down/up when decreasing/increasing speed/AoA from a reference speed/AoA. It's called "trim".And most here learned all about it back when learning in the Tiger Moth or Aeronica or Cessna or.........

Big B has a lotta public relations work in store, and I am not sure they will recover for long time. Irritates this old fart, as I always liked their control authority philosophy.

Gums sends...
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Old 8th May 2019, 00:08
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Threat and Error Management

Part 5

Continuing the Threat and Error Management discussion......


Okay, the question has been asked, "Why bother with the TEM model? What good is it?"

The TEM model is widely used in aviation, and it is a fundamental part of the language of aviation safety. It often is the language that is directed toward flight crews by their airlines in order to build a case for better safety practices. I am suggesting that it is also a useful tool not only for an individual pilot's safety assessment, but also as a way to engage in a dialogue back up the management chain. I am admittedly putting an unorthodox spin on TEM by raising the issue of "barriers as threats." However, sometimes when our airlines think they are creating barriers, they may actually be creating threats. By looking closely at some of the assumptions underlying many barriers, it is possible to identify these new potential threats. Once these threats are identified, steps can then be taken to mitigating those threats, perhaps by building additional barriers. Yes, there is a potential matryoshka doll type quality to this recursive analysis, but I don't it needs to be taken through too many layers.

In Part 4 of this series, I listed some questions to asked regarding the traditional barriers available to the flight crew. Perhaps you have some of your own. Those questions may lead to the identification of a threat in the guise of a barrier.

Examples of responses that raise some flags:
.
  • Our company SOP's emphasis on automation as a "safety" tool is causing my hand-flying skills to degrade.
  • Our company's established reporting system for for operational concerns is so onerous that most pilots don't bother using it.
  • Our training program's focus on standardization relies too much on rote actions, predetermined training events, and a "tick box" mentality that does not allow for the introduction of novel events that require higher order thinking. There are no attempts to induce a "startle" effect or create ambiguity.
  • Our company's hierarchical structure and emphasis on the Captain's authority makes First Officers reluctant to speak up and correct the Captain when necessary.
  • The First Officers I fly with know their systems, are whizzes at programming the box and have no problem with the automation, but they seem to have little "feel" for flying or having the "big picture."
  • When I point out that one of our checklists has a potential trap, the response is something like, "Smarter people than you made that checklist. Just stick to it."
  • We hire people from around the world, and frankly communicating with some of them outside the expected checklist responses is challenging.
.
In each of these cases, one of the traditional barriers of the TEM model was hiding a potential threat. Now what?

The TEM model shows the way. Once threats are identified, the flight crew (or individual pilot) should use whatever tools available to mitigate those threats or even develop a new barrier. How the pilot mitigates the threat will depend heavily to his company's openness to dialogue as well as that pilot's personal initiative to mitigate threats as they arrive in daily operations.

On a group or organizational level this may include lobbying the airline managers and/or regulators for appropriate changes to training standards, automation policy, and operational reporting system. Use the TEM model as a tool this dialogue. Push for enhanced training for First Officers that emphasizes their role as a proactive barrier on the flight deck, and recommend creating a forum where operational safety concerns can be freely discussed without fear of retribution. Where managements are resistant, engage with outside safety organizations or other entities that have influence. Remind managers that not all costs can be entered into a spreadsheet before the fact, but they can certainly be tallied later. Some of those costs are paid in bent metal and broken bodies. Carry a picture of the crater left by ET302 as a constant reminder of the consequences of ignoring these issues.

On an individual level, spend some time looking at your company's safety culture and identify existing threats. If the airline will not take appropriate steps to mitigate the threat (e.g. pressure to meet schedule or contain costs overrides your specific issue), use whatever tools you have to contain the threat even if it means walking off the airplane. Brief every flight as if it were your last. If you are a Captain, make your expectations clear to your First Officers and insist that they speak up as necessary. If you are a First Officer and you have a "difficult" Captain, remember its your butt up in the cockpit, too. Use diplomacy, social skills, and/or direct language as appropriate. If your airline won't provide the training you think you need, train yourself. Memorize the "mantra" and share it with the pilots you fly with. "Chair" flying is always available and desktop simulators are cheaper than ever. Click off the automation every chance you get. Review your procedures, memory items, and limitations regularly. Look for potential traps in those procedures and have a plan for them. If you have a concern in the cockpit, speak up! It may be nothing, it may be something. Don't assume the other person is aware of everything that you are aware of. Don't assume that you are aware of everything you need to be aware of. Get plenty of rest, and take care of your health.

Yes, it is a lot to ask, however, never forget that the pilots are usually the first ones to the scene of the accident. Our standards and expectations ought to be higher.
.

​​​​​​"Our problem is not that we aim too high and miss, but that we aim too low and hit." - Aristotle
.
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Old 8th May 2019, 00:42
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Originally Posted by GordonR_Cape
Isn't that statement a logical fallacy for two reasons:
- An aircraft can stall at any speed, if the altitude is sufficiently high, and the the wings are in a banked turn (accelerated stall).
- MCAS is not an anti-stall system, so that statement has no bearing on its activation.

No, it really isn't, there is no way you can stall a 737 at 350kts indicated, because the wings will come off before you hit the critical angle of attack.

MCAS is not anti-stall. it just prevents the pilots from stalling (you see how that sounds?)
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Old 8th May 2019, 00:55
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Originally Posted by gums
Salute!

Losing credibility faith in you, Murph...... to wit:
Quote:
Other than it's existence and a few things posted here I have no knowledge of sts, however does not look to be a significant factor in ET case.
Even Driver has referenced STS and that MCAS was considered a sub-mode by some folks. And due to STS rolling that trim wheel a lot, the Lion crew commented that STS was working backwards. I would also like to hear the CVR on that flight, as all we hear via the rumor mill is the jump seat guy saved the day. Until we have the trial testimony and depositions, we may not know. Maybe the CVR had some of the conversation, as the FDR had a lotta hours. My not so humble opinion is that crew lucked out and "went manual" when the trim system was not acting as they expected. I give them a lotta credit for doing all that with then shaker goingon, but their CVR shoul give us a clue if it ever becomes public.

Comes down to same thing - longitudinal pitch moments and such, not simply back stick forces per AoA unless you are flying a pure cable and pulley plaine. The 737 variants added STS after a coupla generations because it had to satisfy FAR speed stability reuqirements. And BTW, I do not like that "speed" term. It's AoA and basic aero to force the nose down/up when decreasing/increasing speed/AoA from a reference speed/AoA. It's called "trim".And most here learned all about it back when learning in the Tiger Moth or Aeronica or Cessna or.........

Big B has a lotta public relations work in store, and I am not sure they will recover for long time. Irritates this old fart, as I always liked their control authority philosophy.

Gums sends...
What I mean is that in ET case it was clear from the traces that although there was one probable STS trim it had no impact on the accident sequence.
I was attempting to answer a question about STS possible active involvement in the ET accident.
.
Not at all saying that STS was not of overall significance, possibly by adding confusing expectation of intermittent auto trim, although the magnitude and other behavior is much more benign than MCAS.

While MCAS is a subsystem of STS it would be confusing (to say the least) to blame "STS" for the difficulties faced by the crews.

BTW: 737 driver STS explanation is much better than mine since it also includes response to column cutout switches etc further supporting the case that it had no direct role in ET.
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Old 8th May 2019, 01:40
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Originally Posted by patplan
Just another reiteration of some issues with MCAS' flawed logic, as discussed here and elsewhere... (with my emphasis)

Boeing says no flaws in 737 Max. Former engineer points to several



- https://www.kuow.org/stories/engineer-gap-flaw-mcas
Muilenburg really needs to stop trying to dodge the reality of this thing. Although knowing what I do of the Corporate mindset, I reckon Hell will freeze over before that happens!

At the end of the day though, I believe that MCAS should go down as an example of the most monstrous Corporate and Regulator failure in the history of modern commercial aviation.

Last edited by KRUSTY 34; 8th May 2019 at 01:56.
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Old 8th May 2019, 01:50
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Originally Posted by L39 Guy


I think everyone is in agreement that MCAS needs to be fixed.

None of the aviators that have defended Boeing or MCAS find this situation “acceptable” at all. What we have a hard time accepting is that “professional pilots” could not manage this situation in 2/3 of the events. If they had even done the UAS drill they likely would have survived as both crews lost control of the aircraft as they were racing around at an unacceptably high speed. If either of the crews had trimmed the pitch, a perfectly natural and instinctive reaction, they would have disabled MCAS each and every time. If the crews had done the Stab Trim Runaway memory checklist, which is for events just like this, they would have disabled MCAS just like the crew of the Lion Air incident did and indeed flew the aircraft for an hour and a half with unreliable airspeed and MCAS just waiting to rear its ugly head.

These drills (UAS and Stab Trim Runaway) are not complex; pulling the throttle back to control the airspeed is basic flying just as trimming the aircraft. What has aviators like myself, 737 Driver, Lost in Saigon and others deeply concerned about is that the basic flying skills to deal with these situations are no longer present in today’s professional pilot. When everything works it’s all good...just put ‘er on the autopilot and off you go. But when a curveball is thrown at you, you’re not there when you’re needed the most. That should be of serious concern to the airlines, the regulators, the manufacturers and the professional pilot community.

The measure I used as an instructor and a commercial airline pilot was “would I put my family on an aircraft flown by less than competent pilots”? If the answer is no then we have a problem and I would submit that there is a problem in parts of the world that seem to be crashing aircraft these days.
Well L39 Guy,

I’m sincerely hopeful that as part of your instructing duties you are not responsible for matters concerning Human Factors. Hopefully we will never be thrust into such an unexpected and mind numbing situation as befell these poor crews.
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Old 8th May 2019, 02:18
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pulling the throttle back to control the airspeed is basic flying just as trimming the aircraft.
Trimming. Now there's an interesting concept. Let's see. AP on at 500ft after takeoff. No pilot trim required. AP out at 500ft on final approach. No pilot trim required. In some companies, this is the recommended/preferred SOP.

How is a pilot expected to instinctively trim in such a diabolical scenario when he doesn't do it at any other time?

Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 8th May 2019 at 05:14.
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Old 8th May 2019, 02:38
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Originally Posted by L39 Guy
...as both crews lost control of the aircraft as they were racing around at an unacceptably high speed.

If the crews had done the Stab Trim Runaway memory checklist, which is for events just like this, they would have disabled MCAS just like the crew of the Lion Air incident did and indeed flew the aircraft for an hour and a half with unreliable airspeed and MCAS just waiting to rear its ugly head.
...
ET was at ~250 when MCAS dumped in 9 seconds of ND trim which led to sharp speed increase. Even so they were still well under VMO when they disabled all electric trim and were apparently unable to manually trim due to aero loads possibly compounded by lack of training in the unloading technique.

This period is unfortunately not well covered in the prelim report but to say they were 'racing around' does seems a bit harsh.

Other pilots have stated that chopping power would need to be done very carefully given the conditions and altitude.
I am not saying they did not simply miss the 'autothrottle off' step but that only added to problems later on.
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Old 8th May 2019, 03:37
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Originally Posted by L39 Guy

The measure I used as an instructor and a commercial airline pilot was “would I put my family on an aircraft flown by less than competent pilots”? If the answer is no then we have a problem and I would submit that there is a problem in parts of the world that seem to be crashing aircraft these days.
Do you mean Texas or Florida?
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Old 8th May 2019, 05:56
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Originally Posted by edmundronald
Erasing culpability for a bad certificate won't erase the design issues that make the certificate bad.

Edmund
There are industry wide standards for the hard and software when flight control surfaces are moved outside the direct control of the pilots i.e. for fly by wire aircraft.

It smells that Boeing tries to get away with the next substandard solution to save some bucks. Panels or groups tend to agree on more risky solution than single persons or entities where their name would be written alone on the next fatality case.

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Old 8th May 2019, 06:40
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To me it also sounds like a plan B if the international sister *AAs are not as servile as expected in providing a waiver for the design.

Having read most of the 256 pages - did we have somewhere a comparison of the implementation of MD11s LSAS and MCAS?
IIRC LSAS hat two computers (left and right) selectable by flight crew? Can't remember if each of those two computers had a left and right channel as well.
Is MCAS and LSAS a good comparison, given that the one is active most of the time and the other only in a very specific corner of the envelope? What does that mean in terms of safety requirements?
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Old 8th May 2019, 06:47
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Here is a good recent article on Boeing certification problems:

https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...uding-737-max/

Fly SAFE!

God bless, and Namaste...
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Old 8th May 2019, 07:02
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Originally Posted by BDAttitude
To me it also sounds like a plan B if the international sister *AAs are not as servile as expected in providing a waiver for the design.

Having read most of the 256 pages - did we have somewhere a comparison of the implementation of MD11s LSAS and MCAS?
IIRC LSAS hat two computers (left and right) selectable by flight crew? Can't remember if each of those two computers had a left and right channel as well.
Is MCAS and LSAS a good comparison, given that the one is active most of the time and the other only in a very specific corner of the envelope? What does that mean in terms of safety requirements?
Just another thing - seems the simulator does not simulate MCAS, another over site to rectify.

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/28/a...ntl/index.html

Chief Pilot and Vice President of Flight Operations Yohannes HaileMariam is at the helm of our simulated flight. Everything during the re-creation is designed to be as real as possible, including videos of runways and airports around the world that play on the screens, simulating the cockpit's wind screen. Guided by HaileMariam, our simulated flight rises and is airborne for 15 minutes before gliding to a stop.
During our simulated flight, there is no sign of a downward tug on the plane's nose, a concern at the center of investigations into the two crashes. The 737 Max 8's MCAS lowers the plane's nose when a sensor detects that the aircraft is at risk of stalling.
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Old 8th May 2019, 07:21
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Originally Posted by Bend alot
Just another thing - seems the simulator does not simulate MCAS, another over site to rectify.

...

Chief Pilot and Vice President of Flight Operations Yohannes HaileMariam is at the helm of our simulated flight. Everything during the re-creation is designed to be as real as possible, including videos of runways and airports around the world that play on the screens, simulating the cockpit's wind screen. Guided by HaileMariam, our simulated flight rises and is airborne for 15 minutes before gliding to a stop.
During our simulated flight, there is no sign of a downward tug on the plane's nose, a concern at the center of investigations into the two crashes. The 737 Max 8's MCAS lowers the plane's nose when a sensor detects that the aircraft is at risk of stalling.
Would be very suprised if it was so. FCCs should have the same Software as in the real plane, shouldn't they?
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Old 8th May 2019, 07:59
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Originally Posted by BDAttitude
Would be very suprised if it was so. FCCs should have the same Software as in the real plane, shouldn't they?
Lots of us are very surprised about a lot of things coming to light, on the MAX systems/changes and it's certification.

What cost cutting measures were applied to the simulators that "are not really required anyway" as it basically fly's like a NG and MCAS only operates in the back ground.
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Old 8th May 2019, 08:46
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Originally Posted by Bend alot
Lots of us are very surprised about a lot of things coming to light, on the MAX systems/changes and it's certification.

What cost cutting measures were applied to the simulators that "are not really required anyway" as it basically fly's like a NG and MCAS only operates in the back ground.
It's just that I don't see the costs that could have been cut by doing so.
The CNN feature you have linked seems to be very superficial. I can't see them trying to stall the aircraft or introducing a AOA fault. So where should MCAS come into action. It's a scenic flight in the simulator and the statement that there was no MCAS intervention is ambiguous to me.

However there is still negligence and the bad suprises are many.
Maybe someone has more detailed knowledge one the capabilities of the 8 MAX simulators (one of which seems to be located in Ethopia, which is at least suprising to me).
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Old 8th May 2019, 09:04
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Originally Posted by KRUSTY 34


Well L39 Guy,

I’m sincerely hopeful that as part of your instructing duties you are not responsible for matters concerning Human Factors. Hopefully we will never be thrust into such an unexpected and mind numbing situation as befell these poor crews.
I spent part of my instructing time in standards, i.e. upholding the standards. And part of the "standard" is human factors such as being able to cope with emergencies complete with bells and whistles going off, the startle factor, unfamiliarity of the situation, etc. In fact, one of the interesting things teaching flying in the military jets is that everyone wears oxygen masks and one can hear the other person breathing. And sure enough, when giving a student an emergency such as a simulated engine failure, one could hear the breathing rate increase - perfectly natural and visceral response. It was always instructive to tell the student to listen to their breathing as a means to settle things down.

I guess I am kind of old fashioned; I expect professional pilots - those who are being paid by someone to transport them from A to B - to be able to cope with emergencies. That is part of the contract between the passenger and the airline and the pilot. I expect that the pilot be properly trained and evaluated to handle the known emergencies - that is the responsibility of the airline and the regulator. I expect that professional pilots know their emergencies, particularly the memory drills, 12 months of the year not just before simulator sessions. And that might mean dragging out the checklist during cruise to go over an emergency or two just to keep them fresh. That is all part of being a "professional" much like I expect an emergency room physician to know their emergencies.

BTW, there is no such thing as an "expected" emergency. Emergencies happen out of the blue often with no warning. That's the nature of the beast and the startle factor is always there.

Nobody wants to be thrusted into emergency situations but they happen in aircraft - that's the nature of the business, systems fail, parts break and you simply can't pull over to the side of the road to figure it out. But this MCAS situation is not mind numbing - what is mind numbing is a double engine failure after take-off, flying into volcanic dust at night, losing all of the hydraulics in an aircraft that supposedly can't fly without them (United DC10, Sioux City), etc. None of these emergencies had checklists or an opportunity to be exposed to them in a simulator first.

An unreliable airspeed after take-off complete with stick shaker is not a "mind numbing" emergency. There is a memory checklist for it, it is something that one could have or should have seen in a simulator as part of getting a type rating, and it is a really easy emergency - magic off, set and attitude and power setting then get the checklist out. Then, and always, fly the aircraft. Ain't that hard regardless of how many bells and whistles are sounding. Not doing this simple emergency drill prior to raising the flaps and MCAS starting up (about two minutes after take-off) would have lead to an entirely different outcome, as the Lion Air incident flight showed. I am not going to repeat the rest of the stuff about stab trim runaway, etc. as that has been beaten to death on this forum already.
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Old 8th May 2019, 09:11
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Originally Posted by Water pilot
Do you mean Texas or Florida?
Runway overrun in Florida and the B767 in Houston? Fair enough although let's see what caused the B767 accident first. But if you want to delve into overruns, check out avherald.com and see the Lion Air incidents.

Quick quiz: how many jet aircraft fatalities in the US in the past 10 years? In Canada in the past 30? Same for Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Western Europe (UK, France, Germany, Italy, etc)? Answer to the first two is 1 and 16, respectively.
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