Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Rumours & News
Reload this Page >

Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Rumours & News Reporting Points that may affect our jobs or lives as professional pilots. Also, items that may be of interest to professional pilots.

Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 28th Apr 2019, 18:49
  #4521 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: UK
Posts: 2,210
Originally Posted by Organfreak View Post
Quite. Welcome to 2019. So I would submit that, given the environment in which we find ourselves, it's no wonder that 737 Driver insists that we know how to fly the damn plane. Seems pragmatic and very healthy. This debate doesn't need to be so polarized.
I only disagree with 737 Driver over his assertion that flying the aircraft in those circumstance was always achievable. I maintain that for many crews it would have been unachievable, owing to the combined human factor issues that saturate the environment, inhibiting the execution of normal flying skills. In my experience of major failures in real life, getting over the hill is harder than you think. Much harder. And very low hour FOs are very, very useful. Controversial, I know (especially to US pilots), but that's what I discovered for real.
HundredPercentPlease is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 19:50
  #4522 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2012
Location: Welsh Marches
Posts: 63
meleagertoo

Originally Posted by meleagertoo View Post
No, of course I don't.

Who ramped this up to "LEGAL", this isn't a court of law. Or are you changing the rules midstream?

No kangaroo court - back to hysterical overstatement again! The evidence for pilot's actions? The preliminary reports and the data traces are all we have to go on but they're enough to tell a great deal. Or do you hold them discredited due to some hitherto unsuggested collusion or corruption?

I'm surprised you even need to ask that question...
I wasn't changing the rules just seeking to separate which things I should give more weight. I added "LEGAL" to mean officially sanctioned findings that have considered all available evidence rather than subjective personal, opinions which, however qualified the authors may be as pilots or whatever are merely that - subjective. The preliminary reports and data are just that, preliminary. My (your view) "hysterical overstatement " comment about a kangaroo court was simply trying to draw the distinction between judgments made with full evidence and those which are personal opinions.

My original question to you was trying to point out the contradiction between your "Despite the amount of unequivocal evidence of misdeeds by the pilots" and your wish for evidence to be present evidence and discuss it rationally. My reading of the posts on this thread by qualified pilot does lead me to conclude that everyone is of that opinion and I merely suggesting that before making such a statement you should provide evidence of such.

Finally, as for your "hysterical overstatement" remark, you might like to go back and re-read your post where phrase such statements abound "hysteria ramps up and wild totally unsubstantiated accusations of bodgery etc etc", "shrill and baseless . nothing short of scurrilous etc etc". You might also like to check out other posts on this thread (eg FAA getting comments on their whistleblower phoneline) which suggest that these unsubstantiated accusations are less than unsubstantiated.

Sorry that I had to take up your time explaining this again.
Alchad is online now  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 20:24
  #4523 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: A place in the sun
Age: 78
Posts: 818
wonkazoo, I have sent you a PM
Bergerie1 is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 20:26
  #4524 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2015
Location: Cape Town, ZA
Age: 58
Posts: 424
Originally Posted by MurphyWasRight View Post
Auto pilot was also a 'known' protection against MCAS as mentioned in one of the safety reports a page back or so.
Had the auto pilot stayed engaged another couple of minutes we might not be having this discussion.
Just to clarify something which was discussed previously: Enabling the autopilot would certainly inhibit MCAS. However this is only true if there were no other factors in play. In the accident scenarios the problems cascaded, and AOA disagree triggered unreliable airspeed, which limited the possibility that the autopilot could be used to inhibit MCAS.

Analysing all of this in a short period of time, would have required exceptional knowledge, and in the absence of an AOA value or AOA disagree display, an understanding of the links between the sensors and the flight systems may have been beyond the scope of the crew.
GordonR_Cape is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 20:43
  #4525 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2010
Location: Boston
Age: 69
Posts: 440
Originally Posted by GordonR_Cape View Post
Just to clarify something which was discussed previously: Enabling the autopilot would certainly inhibit MCAS. However this is only true if there were no other factors in play. In the accident scenarios the problems cascaded, and AOA disagree triggered unreliable airspeed, which limited the possibility that the autopilot could be used to inhibit MCAS.

Analysing all of this in a short period of time, would have required exceptional knowledge, and in the absence of an AOA value or AOA disagree display, an understanding of the links between the sensors and the flight systems may have been beyond the scope of the crew.
My earlier point was that the autopilot was engaged for about 35 seconds, this could have tricked the pilot into thinking things were (more or less) ok spurious warnings only, this led to flap retraction.This is supported by the almost normal seeming events in cockpit at this time, selecting altitude etc

Flap retraction led to 2 things in short order:
1: Autopilot dropped off.
2:Mcas added it's first ND input.

So the pilot was dealing with 2 things at once.
MurphyWasRight is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 21:27
  #4526 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: UK
Posts: 2,210
Originally Posted by MurphyWasRight View Post

Flap retraction led to 2 things in short order:
1: Autopilot dropped off.
2:Mcas added it's first ND input.

So the pilot was dealing with 2 things at once.
1: Autopilot dropped off.
2: Mcas added it's first ND input.
3. Stick shaker still going off and fault not resolved.
4. Unreliable airspeed.
5. ATC blah blah

Overload.

HundredPercentPlease is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 21:36
  #4527 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2017
Location: England
Posts: 75
Am I right in thinking that - even with the 'fix' - there will be no clear indication to the pilot that MCAS has kicked in? If the difference between AOA sensors is less than 5.5 degrees, does this mean that even the little mustard 'AOA-disagree' alert won't show, but MCAS will fire if other conditions are met?

I guess this means that pilots will have to infer that MCAS is live from the uncommanded AND, having quickly checked whether the other conditions apply (flaps, autopilot)?

I can't see that this does much to advance the pilot's ability to diagnose the problem. Why can't some space be found for a flashing red 'MCAS active' alert to show exactly what's happening?
PaxBritannica is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 21:45
  #4528 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: UK
Posts: 2,210
No space needed if a voice says "MCAS MCAS" as it's trimming.

If you're not in the high AoA regime (ie it's faulty) then that would be a great time to flick the switches.

No hardware mods required.
HundredPercentPlease is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 21:54
  #4529 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 1999
Posts: 542
737 Driver isnt going away...and thats lucky for us.What he says is undeniably true.
These accidents are not just about MCAS.
I think we need to focus on UAS.Boeing article below discusses it best.The uncertainty
when faced with conflicting or spurious data can be unsettling.The alarms can make it
a real test of focus over distraction.If trained in UAS,the startle factor is surmountable,
recovery is always assured.If not,things can go south pretty quick.
Training,experience,airmanship is everything.Nothing else matters.Nothing.
Erroneous Flight Instrument Information - Text Only
Attached Files
File Type: pdf
Copy of UAS.pdf (42.4 KB, 38 views)
Rananim is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 22:31
  #4530 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: USA
Posts: 217
Originally Posted by Smythe View Post
737 driver, looking at the TO greenband, on the 738, (and all other NG that I can remember)it is 1.5 to 6.5, while on the MAX it is 3 to 8...this is a significant difference. Thoughts?
Not sure where you are getting those numbers as they don't match what's in my FCOM. (Actually, no actual numbers are provided, but I can read the pictures ). My thoughts are this: the manufacturer determines what the allowable range is and my job is to stay with that range. That being said, after a certain amount of time with any aircraft, one should have a decent idea of what a "normal" trim setting should be. But once again, I don't know any pilot who flies around and sets the trim by looking at the index. You set it by feel. The index isn't even the most useful visual tool to clue you into a runaway trim. That honor goes to the trim wheel. It takes about 15 rotations to make one degree of movement, and it has a bright white stripe that flashes at you as the wheel is spinning. Hard to miss if you are looking at it.
737 Driver is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 22:51
  #4531 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: 60 north
Age: 55
Posts: 15
I think the point is the Max has a nose heavy empty weight and that the take off trim band ( Green) has been moved aft to compensate!
The question is did Boeing have to move/ expand the rest of the envelope to avoid restrictions on the loading of the aircraft making a not so fantastic economic choice?
BluSdUp is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 22:56
  #4532 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2011
Location: Lower Skunk Cabbageland, WA
Age: 70
Posts: 354
Originally Posted by PaxBritannica View Post
Am I right in thinking that - even with the 'fix' - there will be no clear indication to the pilot that MCAS has kicked in? [SNIP]

I guess this means that pilots will have to infer that MCAS is live from the uncommanded AND, having quickly checked whether the other conditions apply (flaps, autopilot)?

I can't see that this does much to advance the pilot's ability to diagnose the problem. Why can't some space be found for a flashing red 'MCAS active' alert to show exactly what's happening?
No, Boeing has stated (I read it here somewhere) that there will be a warning light/message when MCAS is engaged.
Organfreak is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 23:01
  #4533 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Paris
Age: 70
Posts: 275
According to the WSJ, and taken up by CNBC, it now seems the AoA disagree functionality in the Max airframes belonging to SWA was DISABLED, and some FAA officials contemplated grounding the plane.

Southwest Airline’s statement:

Upon delivery (prior to the Lion Air event), the AOA Disagree lights were depicted to us by Boeing as operable on all MAX aircraft, regardless of the selection of optional AOA Indicators on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). The manual documentation presented by Boeing at Southwest’s MAX entry into service indicated the AOA Disagree Light functioned on the aircraft, similar to the Lights on our NG series. After the Lion Air event, Boeing notified us that the AOA Disagree Lights were inoperable without the optional AOA Indicators on the MAX aircraft. At that time, Southwest installed the AOA Indicators on the PFD, resulting in the activation of the AOA Disagree lights - both items now serve as an additional crosscheck on all MAX aircraft.

Federal Aviation Administration safety inspectors and supervisors were also unaware of the change, according to government and industry officials that spoke to The Wall Street Journal.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/28/boei...d-off-wsj.html


Edmund

Last edited by edmundronald; 28th Apr 2019 at 23:18.
edmundronald is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 23:14
  #4534 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: USA
Posts: 217
Originally Posted by MurphyWasRight View Post
The report does state that the FO called trim runaway so he was not totally inert.
There is a saying in medicine that rare conditions are most likely to be diagnosed by bright interns or very experienced doctors. The intern does not have the experience to reject improble diagnoses while the very experienced are more likely to pick up on the "something does not fit" observations. From your description one would have to say the Captain was in the moderately (at best) experienced category.
I would have given a gold star to the First Officer if he had called for the trim cutout switches the first time MCAS took its 9-second, 37-spin journey toward oblivion. But yes, he did eventually see what the Captain did not, and that should be acknowledged. However, beside that one expression of independent thought and assertiveness, I pretty much see a First Officer doing what he is asked to do.

To be fair, it is entirely possible that more was being in said in the cockpit than what has been released in the transcript, though I would think any relevant comments would have been included. What strikes me most about the CVR transcript is not so much what is being said, but what is not.

There is obviously something wrong with the aircraft. The Captain is struggling to maintain control. I see little if any cross-talk about airspeeds, altitudes, power settings, etc. I see no discussion regarding non-normals. Other than the stab trim cutout call, I do not see the First Officer prompting the Captain in any meaningful way.

I do see a lot of (mostly unnecessary) communicating with and about ATC. Ever hear the phrase, "Aviate, navigate, communicate"? If you don't have the first item under control, then you don't have much business moving onto the third.

Part of every briefing I give at the beginning of a trip with a new FO (or one I have not flown with recently) is this statement: "Each and every leg of this trip I am absolutely guaranteed to screw up at least one thing. Please note that I say at least, and not only, one thing. Your job is to catch my mistakes, and my job is to catch yours."

I fly, I am human, humans err, therefore I err when I fly. QED. This is the foundational message of the crew concept. A good First Officer is more than a co-worker who flies the aircraft according to the airline's scripts and follows the direction of the Captain. A good First Officer not only knows their aircraft and procedures, but he/she is also assertive enough to speak up when the Captain is going off into the weeds. At every point that the Captain was doing something that was either inadvisable or ineffective, a good First Officer should have spoken up. In extreme cases of Captain befuddlement, a First Officer should say loudly and firmly "My Aircraft!" and do what needs to be done to save the ship. None of these things happened.

I haven't been too hard on the FO, because I don't really expect much from a 360-hour, three-month pilot. It is my personal opinion that this gentleman was simply put in a situation beyond his capacity to function effectively. Some people have suggested that I shouldn't be so biased against a low-time pilot. Well, if that's truly the case, then they probably won't like what I have to say about the FO's performance either.

Last edited by 737 Driver; 28th Apr 2019 at 23:54.
737 Driver is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 23:24
  #4535 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: USA
Posts: 217
Originally Posted by BluSdUp View Post
I think the point is the Max has a nose heavy empty weight and that the take off trim band ( Green) has been moved aft to compensate! The question is did Boeing have to move/ expand the rest of the envelope to avoid restrictions on the loading of the aircraft making a not so fantastic economic choice?
I have no data to suggest that changes any changes to the c.g. envelope have any meaningful impact to the operation of the MAX vs the NG. During normal airline operations, it is highly unusual to see this aircraft loaded anywhere near a limit. That generally comes up only on ferry/reposition flights with certain fuel loads or situations where a cargo compartment is placarded.
737 Driver is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 23:45
  #4536 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2010
Location: Boston
Age: 69
Posts: 440
Just noticed this on AV herald, if true it is shocking and may explain some of the crews confusion/actions. My bolding, strongly suggest reading the whole article at:
Crash: Ethiopian B38M near Bishoftu on Mar 10th 2019, impacted terrain after departure

Coverage released on Apr 16th:

On Apr 11th 2019 The Aviation Herald received a full copy of the Flight Operations Manual (FOM), Revision 18B released on Nov 30th 2018, which is currently being used by Ethiopian Airlines (verified in April 2019 to be current). Although Boeing had issued an operator's bulletin on Nov 6th 2018, which was put into Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2018-23-51 dated Nov 7th 2018 requiring the stab trim runaway procedure to be incorporated into the FOM ahead of the sign off of this version of the FOM (the entire document is on file but not available for publishing), there is no trace of such an addition in the entire 699 pages of the FOM.

...
...
It turned out, that only very cursory knowledge about the stab trim runaway procedure exists amongst the flight crew of Ethiopian Airlines even 5 months after the EAD was distributed.
...
...
I may have missed this if it was posted earlier, it is hard to keep up given the volume of posts.
MurphyWasRight is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 23:45
  #4537 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: USA
Posts: 217
Originally Posted by HundredPercentPlease View Post

How did he know he was going to have an MCAS event? He was dealing with a stall warner that shouldn't have been warning.
Not sure what you mean by a warning that shouldn't have been a warning. As to the question why the Captain should have at least considered the possibility of a MCAS event, then I should ask in return why would the Captain be so unaware of the circumstances surrounding Lion Air 610? Lot's of information was in circulation regarding MCAS, it's operating parameters, and the things one would expect to see in case of a AOA-malfunction after this accident. Some here have even suggested that the fear of this being another Lion Air type event may have been one of the things that caused the Captain's brain to go up and locked. I'll grant the possibility that Ethiopian Airlines may have done a piss poor job of passing the information along, and perhaps the Captain did not have the inclination or resources to research it himself. However, that still leaves us with the fact that crew was faced first with an AOA failure that was handled poorly which then set them up for a runaway trim event that was handled worse.


I would avoid making assumptions about the skills of the crews. In Europe it's easy to do too - we hear incompetent sounding fat cigar chewing fools who don't know that you can have a flight level of 90, but we try to remember that judging ability by nationality or assumed education is very, very wrong.
I am not judging the crew by nationality or education. I am judging them by the smoking hole they left at the abrupt termination of their flight.
737 Driver is offline  
Old 28th Apr 2019, 23:53
  #4538 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2017
Location: London
Posts: 91
Originally Posted by 737 Driver View Post
exactly how long should a qualified 737 type-certified Captain who is hand-flying the aircraft let the trim run in one direction before he/she does something about it?
​​​​​​

In quiet cockpit, vmc, no distractions, no turbulence, hands on controls: 3 seconds. 1: a/c is just "doing its thing". 2: thats weird. 3: wtf? Hit elec trim.

But. With stick shaker distraction: add time. With any other alarm, add more time. Add IMC, double it. If you're concentrating on another task: Add time. With noise that masks clacks: more time. Add "I have control" there's another half second. Add fatigue: more time.

MCAS is a slow-motion catastrophic control surface failure, taking 12 seconds. (For those who haven't followed all 228 pages of this thread, see this post detailing why MCAS is so insidious and lethal to a pilot.) You're treating it like an engine fail on takeoff. It has more in common with wonkazoo's snapped rudder cable. An engine fail on takeoff you'd pretty much expect to see at some point in your career. Before Lion Air and ET, no-one would be expecting to see trim runaway. This surprise factor again adds time.

They ran out of time.

Every time you say 'just fly the plane' or 'basic airmanship' or 'get another career' you're completely ignoring human factors. This is as dangerous as not knowing how to fly the aircraft. And this is why you're getting such a deservedly robust response from others on here.
PerPurumTonantes is offline  
Old 29th Apr 2019, 00:16
  #4539 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: Bavaria
Posts: 17
I did not read the discussion for a weak and I find it partly very useless.
As an (automotive) safety engineer, I categorize the 'controllability' of an event in simple (>99%), normal (>90%) or difficult (<90%) according to ISO26262.
And yes, difficult and uncontrollable are the same.
So as long as less than 90% of the pilots here are saying 'piece of cake', it's the same as uncontrollable.
The reason is very easy: If you design a system, you can estimate an order of magnitude of the error probability. Sensor redundancy doubles the number fields on your lottery ticket, so would you bother about the exact probability, third digit? Probably not if you're going from one in a million to one in a trillion (lost flights / winning tickets...).
What's better? Rely on the estimate that 70% of professional pilots can handle the event with training instead of 40% or just make it one in a million years instead of 2 times in 4 months by a simple plain stupid sensor compare of existing sensors?

Together with other estimates (exposure, severity), where MCAS has both won the jackpot (highly probable situation with fatal outcome), this looks like a highly critical system to me.

As an engineer, this tells you that you really need redundancy. There is always a remaining probability (like lot's of goose at low attitude as common cause for a dive in the Hudson...) where the pilot may have a chance of not being part of the 'remaining accepted risk of flying' by our society. But how often did it happen? Based on how many planes in the air? Would anyone blame the captain if this would have gone wrong?
Recently I read the report and told another safety engineer that the FBW system prevented a stall while the pilot pulled the stick and would have caused it. The first question I got was: Did he count on this function? Like with ESP: you do not longer consider blocking tires, just press hard... The automation assists you even in critical situations, that's state of the art (instead of 37 turns on a handwheel).

The obvious underestimation of this MCAS function is one thing, but no engineer would DEACTIVATE an existing diagnostic function while at the same time ADDING a safety critical system to the (no longer) diagnosed input.
Especially with the explanation that this one true warning may cause side effects while the pilot gets shitloads of false ones (stickshaker...). But media reports indicate that this is the case.

This would scream at you at so many stages of the design process that it would be almost impossible to overlook. Except there is something wrong with your process..

In addition, if this turns out to be a defective cabling as whistleblowers describe, it would make things even far worse:
-> Cabling diagnostics are the first thing an engineer does on EVERY cable he can find. It's easy to implement and cuts the error probability a lot.
-> Range check is the second one and a no-brainer... (which pilot did ever encounter a real/plausible AoA of 75 from below? Free-fall at 0 speed, flying in reverse gear or over an active volcano?)
-> If this was due to a foreign object close to the cabling, this opens up another big question mark: Production quality?

So if this turns out to be a management decision (or management decisions involved), good night Boeing... The 'training penalty' definitely counts as a motivation to do so.
Not because of MCAS but because it would put all decisions regarding safety of the last years into question since they could also be infected by financial aspects (including the FAA).

In my opinion everything points in this direction, since this thing is too big to be overseen within the safety engineering process.

But please, point the discussion in the direction of duct tape in the cockpit in case the pilot has to tape the wings back in place like every real pilot would do...
You couldn't do Boeing a bigger favour than this. Fighting the value of the third digit while there are several digits missing and maybe enough holes in the cheese for other surprises.

PS: Yesterday I had a turnament on ballroom dancing, first one after a long break. I trained for years and guess what: I learned that I need to dance the choreography I trained for months once directly before the turnament because with all the adrenaline in my blood I simply could not remember it / access my long term memory. It's like a tunnel, lost, gone for a moment... Ballroom competition dancing is considered one of the sports with the highest stress hormon levels (competitive sports + thinking + uncontrollable factors like your partner) and I finally realized what that means and does to you...
Having his life immediately threatened is probably far better than this, and the pilots had the full load ('sportive-elevator-pulling' + thinking + a mad MCAS). Nothing prepares you for this, no simulator, simply nothing... It may be comparable to doing a math test after your first bungee jump with fear of heights after a fast run... Simply do the math... sure...

Last edited by TryingToLearn; 29th Apr 2019 at 00:40.
TryingToLearn is offline  
Old 29th Apr 2019, 00:21
  #4540 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: USA
Posts: 217
Originally Posted by PerPurumTonantes View Post
​​​​​​

In quiet cockpit, vmc, no distractions, no turbulence, hands on controls: 3 seconds. 1: a/c is just "doing its thing". 2: thats weird. 3: wtf? Hit elec trim.

But. With stick shaker distraction: add time. With any other alarm, add more time. Add IMC, double it. If you're concentrating on another task: Add time. With noise that masks clacks: more time. Add "I have control" there's another half second. Add fatigue: more time.

MCAS is a slow-motion catastrophic control surface failure, taking 12 seconds. (For those who haven't followed all 228 pages of this thread, see this post detailing why MCAS is so insidious and lethal to a pilot.) You're treating it like an engine fail on takeoff. It has more in common with wonkazoo's snapped rudder cable. An engine fail on takeoff you'd pretty much expect to see at some point in your career. Before Lion Air and ET, no-one would be expecting to see trim runaway. This surprise factor again adds time.

They ran out of time.

Every time you say 'just fly the plane' or 'basic airmanship' or 'get another career' you're completely ignoring human factors. This is as dangerous as not knowing how to fly the aircraft. And this is why you're getting such a deservedly robust response from others on here.
Not ignoring the human element at all. Yes, the Captain was sufficiently distracted that he failed to take the most basic steps to fly his aircraft. There are all sorts of reasons why this can happen, but my point is that it should not have happened.

A significant part of the training of a professional pilot is how to handle things when things are going wrong. There is not a one of us who hasn't been in a sim when lights were flashing, alarms were blaring, systems were malfunctioning and the plane was trying to do something that it wasn't supposed to do. Is there some specified level of distraction at which we are excused from doing our job? If there is, I haven't heard of it.

And what is that job? At a minimum, when all is going to hell and you are really not sure what else to do - FLY THE AIRCRAFT. Turn off the magic, set the pitch, set the power, monitor the performance, trim the aircraft, move to a safe altitude. Do that until your head clears and you can sort out what else needs to be done. This action should be as reflexive as executing your takeoff reject procedures - if you have to think about it, you're too late.

Being able to respond correctly under pressure and distraction is one of those things professional pilots are supposed to train for and expected to do. There is no "pause" button we can hit to stop the motion. We need to have the ability to shake off the distractions and FLY THE AIRCRAFT, first, last, and always. Yes, there is some level of turmoil that will overcome the best of us, but the events surrounding these accidents come no where near that threshold.
737 Driver is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service - Do Not Sell My Personal Information

Copyright 2018 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.