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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 27th Apr 2019, 04:03
  #4401 (permalink)  
 
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[color=left=#000000]Boeing’s proposed computer-based training can be completed on laptop or tablet computer, and takes as little as 15min, sources say[/color]
Well that sounds like thorough and comprehensive training to me! Seriously, four hundred people died, it was the pilot's fault entirely, and this is their solution?

Last edited by Water pilot; 27th Apr 2019 at 04:32.
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 04:21
  #4402 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Winemaker View Post
Pretty interesting video about pilot decision making.
Interesting indeed. Covered in a thread on this forum last year: Miss Velma's engine failure and crash landing at Duxford from the cockpit
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 04:27
  #4403 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Water pilot View Post
Well that sounds like thorough and comprehensive training to me! Seriously, four hundred people died, it was the pilot's fault entirely, and this is their solution?
Water pilot, you do understand it is in addition to the differences training that can be done in under an hour on the iPad!

I hope the rest of the world regulators fight for correct training levels - what ever that maybe, but I doubt 15 mins cuts it!
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 04:29
  #4404 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Water pilot View Post
Well that sounds like thorough and comprehensive training to me! Seriously, four hundred people died, it was the pilot's fault entirely, and this is their solution?
15 minutes training? No offense to all the professionals on this forum, but I will not get close to any MAX, an unstable airframe will be fixed by a software patch, and such will require 15 min training? When certifications were written there was bot software patch, airframes havd to complay by DESIGN
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 04:29
  #4405 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Water pilot View Post
Well that sounds like thorough and comprehensive training to me! Seriously, four hundred people died, it was the pilot's fault entirely, and this is their solution?
How many hours/days/weeks/years of training do you suggest is appropriate to reinforce/retrain that one needs to use normal trim to re-trim to an appropriate speed and then use the pitch trim disconnect switches in the event of an MCAS or runaway trim event?
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 04:37
  #4406 (permalink)  
 
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Objectively, seven pilots from various countries failed to recognize the "obvious" fact that they had runaway trim. A whole bunch of people died as a result. If this is a training issue, I want however much training is required to correct this deficiency.
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 04:40
  #4407 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by formulaben View Post
How many hours/days/weeks/years of training do you suggest is appropriate to reinforce/retrain that one needs to use normal trim to re-trim to an appropriate speed and then use the pitch trim disconnect switches in the event of an MCAS or runaway trim event?
When you kill that MCAS or it has it's once limited "correction" - you are flying an aircraft that can no longer meet the certification requirements that it is approved for!

So say again - it no longer can meet certification requirements in certain flight modes/areas.

So how often do you fly outside certification limits? and how much training did you receive to do that? and was it on an Ipad?

This is not retaining - you have never flown in un-certifiable condition before on a 737 where MACS is required but not available.

Note this has nothing to do with a MCAS run away or trim run away - this is in normal flight when MCAS has been shut down (a number of events can now do this) or had one input and can not now, put in a second input to keep in certification limits..
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 04:48
  #4408 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Bend alot View Post
When you kill that MCAS or it has it's once limited "correction" - you are flying an aircraft that can no longer meet the certification requirements that it is approved for!

So say again - it no longer can meet certification requirements in certain flight modes/areas.

So how often do you fly outside certification limits? and how much training did you receive to do that? and was it on an Ipad?

This is not retaining - you have never flown in un-certifiable condition before on a 737 where MACS is required but not available.

Note this has nothing to do with a MCAS run away or trim run away - this is in normal flight when MCAS has been shut down (a number of events can now do this) or had one input and can not now, put in a second input to keep in certification limits..
Sorry, I can't interpret your answer. Perhaps you must have misinterpreted my question, so I'll ask it again and this time I'll go slowly and use different words: you seem upset with the re-training procedure; so I will ask again what quantity of training do you suggest is appropriate to reinforce/retrain that one needs to use normal trim to re-trim to an appropriate speed and then use the pitch trim disconnect switches in the event of an MCAS or runaway trim event? What amount of training is appropriate for any other event?
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 05:01
  #4409 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by formulaben View Post
Sorry, I can't interpret your answer. Perhaps you must have misinterpreted my question, so I'll ask it again and this time I'll go slowly and use different words: you seem upset with the re-training procedure; so I will ask again what quantity of training do you suggest is appropriate to reinforce/retrain that one needs to use normal trim to re-trim to an appropriate speed and then use the pitch trim disconnect switches in the event of an MCAS or runaway trim event? What amount of training is appropriate for any other event?
You do understand MCAS is a requirement for flight within certification requirements?

With MCAS disabled (due now to any of a number of reasons) - how is flight within certification requirement limits meet?

Nothing at all to do with any trim event (Important you understand that) but what is flight like outside the certifiable limits?

I will agree there is NO REQUIREMENT for a trim run away - extra training, it is pointless



I do believe that training is required if the aircraft has probable possibility to be flown outside certification limits, but within the approved flight envelope of the aircraft.

Training required is not known by most of us, but only those that have flow MCAS during it's testing. It is reasonable to believe that the difference with MCAS and without MCAS is pretty large, as design used 0.6 degrees as the input but in flight tests 2.5 was required to get the correct feel.
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 05:02
  #4410 (permalink)  
 
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Just getting caught up after a long day of family stuff.

First I want to thank the individuals who had kind words, or otherwise expressed positive thoughts about my post from last night. After putting it out there I was torn, worried that I had made a mistake- I now see I did not.

Second- 737 Driver and others bring up really valid points and if/where we see things differently it isn't in the idea that the system failed completely. I would argue that putting a kid with less than 300 hours in the right seat of any transport category aircraft is near malpractice, and should said aircraft hit the ground in an uncontrolled dive blaming that kid is not only unfair, it is downright obscene. When I shared what I did last night it wasn't to expiate the guilt of the crews, but instead to try and get people to realize that "blaming" people who are no longer here to defend themselves is a bit disingenuous, and equally it distracts us from the very real root causes of the two incidents.

There is one huge difference between my position and that expressed most recently by 737 Driver, and that is to the responsibility for the outcome of what happened. Note that I say responsibility and not blame. After reviewing the technical and other data in great detail I am confident that responsibility lies solely with one party, as aided and abetted by another. Once the dominoes had been lined up the outcome was basically assured as it was only a matter of time.

Specifically: Boeing designed and placed into service an airplane with an active control system that had unilateral control over the horizontal stabilizer, with enough authority to place the airplane in an unrecoverable state if just a single component failed. Further this system gave no indication to the pilots that it was operating, or when malfunctioning that it was operating in error. Additionally this system, which was created solely to increase the amount of force required to pitch up the aircraft at high AOA used the most critical part of the airframe to do this minimal task, instead of using a passive system that had no control authority.

The result of this sad effort was a system that, if it failed, would basically try to kill the pilot and everyone on board. I say again: MCAS will try to kill everyone on board if it fails.

I simply cannot recall (but am inviting others here to fill in the blanks if you can) another system on a transport category aircraft with a failure mode that defaulted to "I'm going to try to fly the airplane into the ground. If you line up all the dots and pull two switches at the right moment I will let you live. Otherwise you die... Oh, and BTW I'm also going to fail concurrently with three or four other systems, which actually will alert you to their issues, unlike me, who will sit here quietly winding your trim forward until you get to the point where you cannot wind it back. Sorry about that!!" (It's also worth noting here that the Emergency AD that was put out only gave instruction on what was essentially an enhanced trim runaway. There is no actual way (that I have seen) for a pilot to actually determine if MCAS is malfunctioning. At best you are to stop the resultant (trim runaway) and remain in ignorance over the state of MCAS. WTF?? A system with complete authority over the horizontal stab and you have no way of knowing anything about it. Failure modes, operational status, errors, nothing. Just "If the airplane is trimming down (for whatever reason) and you don't want it to pull the console switches." Really??)

These incidents, indeed the entirety of MCAS' existence are a failure of corporate responsibility aided and abetted by a complete abrogation of regulatory responsibility. All in the pursuit of profits for shareholders.

We can blame the previous Lion Air Crew and maintenance for a lot. We can find fault with the performance of the crews, and we will. But in the end, the only entity who both could have designed a safe airplane, and who not only failed but by all appearances worked to conceal their failure through omission, was Boeing. And the agency that looked the other way was the FAA.

Those are the responsible parties, and that is what I hope people will look carefully at. It starts with the airplane. Build a safe one and operators will still find a way to muck things up, and crews will still make mistakes. But step one, the most important step, is build an effing safe airplane.

Warm regards,
dce
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 05:14
  #4411 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Bend alot View Post
When you kill that MCAS or it has it's once limited "correction" - you are flying an aircraft that can no longer meet the certification requirements that it is approved for!

So say again - it no longer can meet certification requirements in certain flight modes/areas.

So how often do you fly outside certification limits? and how much training did you receive to do that? and was it on an Ipad?

This is not retaining - you have never flown in un-certifiable condition before on a 737 where MACS is required but not available.

Note this has nothing to do with a MCAS run away or trim run away - this is in normal flight when MCAS has been shut down (a number of events can now do this) or had one input and can not now, put in a second input to keep in certification limits..
I agree with most of your concerns, and have made similar comments myself. The revised MCAS details are still not clear, but there are two "escape" causes that could bypass your argument:
- The first is that MCAS may not be imited to one activation per flight, but can do so again, if a specific set of conditions permit. For example, nose-down trim unwinding, or AOA remaining below the threshold, together with no pilot control inputs for 15 continuous seconds.
- The second is that AOA disagree could be treated as a MEL equipment failure, and mandate landing at the nearest avaliable airport. I have not seen any reference to this, so the implication may be that MCAS is not flight critical, but rather a paper certification issue for a rarely encountered flight condition.

Whether the Joint Authorities Technical Review buy either of these arguments remains to be seen.

Edit: My comment was drafted while other replies to the same point were posted.
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 05:38
  #4412 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by GordonR_Cape View Post
I agree with most of your concerns, and have made similar comments myself. The revised MCAS details are still not clear, but there are two "escape" causes that could bypass your argument:
- The first is that MCAS may not be imited to one activation per flight, but can do so again, if a specific set of conditions permit. For example, nose-down trim unwinding, or AOA remaining below the threshold, together with no pilot control inputs for 15 continuous seconds.
- The second is that AOA disagree could be treated as a MEL equipment failure, and mandate landing at the nearest avaliable airport. I have not seen any reference to this, so the implication may be that MCAS is not flight critical, but rather a paper certification issue for a rarely encountered flight condition.

Whether the Joint Authorities Technical Review buy either of these arguments remains to be seen.

Edit: My comment was drafted while other replies to the same point were posted.
Yes details are low!

The fact you actually understand MCAS conditions are not limited to a "run away trim" and actually MCAS is required to meet certification requirements during manual flight and this may require training (hands on), is good to know - seems many do not understand.
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 06:11
  #4413 (permalink)  
 
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Rumors concerning whistleblower reports about the AoA sensor are emerging.

"One whistleblower reported to the FAA that they had seen damage to the electrical wiring connected to the plane’s angle of attack sensor from a foreign object, which feeds data to the MCAS system so it can determine whether it needs to engage to prevent the plane from stalling. "

https://interestingengineering.com/b...roblems-to-faa
Edmund
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 06:22
  #4414 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by edmundronald View Post
Rumors concerning whistleblower reports about the AoA sensor are emerging.

"One whistleblower reported to the FAA that they had seen damage to the electrical wiring connected to the plane’s angle of attack sensor from a foreign object, which feeds data to the MCAS system so it can determine whether it needs to engage to prevent the plane from stalling. "

https://interestingengineering.com/b...roblems-to-faa
Edmund
A single sensor failure of any kind on any airliner happens every day and is a no-brainer. Except on the MAX, thanks to Boeing and FAA.

We can blame the previous Lion Air Crew and maintenance for a lot. We can find fault with the performance of the crews, and we will. But in the end, the only entity who both could have designed a safe airplane, and who not only failed but by all appearances worked to conceal their failure through omission, was Boeing. And the agency that looked the other way was the FAA.

Those are the responsible parties, and that is what I hope people will look carefully at. It starts with the airplane. Build a safe one and operators will still find a way to muck things up, and crews will still make mistakes. But step one, the most important step, is build an effing safe airplane.
Thanks. Can't say it better.
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 06:39
  #4415 (permalink)  
 
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When you kill that MCAS or it has it's once limited "correction" - you are flying an aircraft that can no longer meet the certification requirements that it is approved for!

So say again - it no longer can meet certification requirements in certain flight modes/areas.
This is true but only in one very specific flight regime at very high angles of attack, near the critical angle, which during a lifetime of line flying a crew is unlikely to ever get near.

You try make it sound like the aircraft is uncontrollable if the trim disconnects are selected off and MCAS is isolated. Nothing could be further from the truth.

So how often do you fly outside certification limits? and how much training did you receive to do that? and was it on an Ipad?
With the trim disconnects off you will not be flying outside of limits, only at VERY high AoA and WTF are you doing flying there?

If I remove the interior rear vision mirror from my car it is no longer equipped "as certified" by Australian Design Rules (ADR) and would not be roadworthy, technically. Is it still safe to drive, of course it is.
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 06:43
  #4416 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Bend alot View Post
You do understand MCAS is a requirement for flight within certification requirements?

With MCAS disabled (due now to any of a number of reasons) - how is flight within certification requirement limits meet?

Nothing at all to do with any trim event (Important you understand that) but what is flight like outside the certifiable limits?

I will agree there is NO REQUIREMENT for a trim run away - extra training, it is pointless



I do believe that training is required if the aircraft has probable possibility to be flown outside certification limits, but within the approved flight envelope of the aircraft.

Training required is not known by most of us, but only those that have flow MCAS during it's testing. It is reasonable to believe that the difference with MCAS and without MCAS is pretty large, as design used 0.6 degrees as the input but in flight tests 2.5 was required to get the correct feel.
MCAS is NOT required for certification. It is the feedback that is required.

Yet AGAIN, I ask you (perhaps pointlessly, and for the 3rd effing time) since you seem to be unsatisfied with the training program, I say again, how much training do you suggest is appropriate to reinforce/retrain that a professional pilot needs to use normal trim to re-trim to an appropriate speed and then use the pitch trim disconnect switches in the event of an MCAS or runaway trim event? What amount of training is appropriate for any other event?

I am actually asking for a quantitative number, not rhetoric, as your last answers suggest.
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 07:06
  #4417 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by formulaben View Post
MCAS is NOT required for certification. It is the feedback that is required.

Yet AGAIN, I ask you (perhaps pointlessly, and for the 3rd effing time) since you seem to be unsatisfied with the training program, I say again, how much training do you suggest is appropriate to reinforce/retrain that a professional pilot needs to use normal trim to re-trim to an appropriate speed and then use the pitch trim disconnect switches in the event of an MCAS or runaway trim event? What amount of training is appropriate for any other event?

I am actually asking for a quantitative number, not rhetoric, as your last answers suggest.
The area of training in the mentioned area of WTF are you doing here/ how am I here - as mentioned in Icarus 2001's post

You do seem rude and yes I am unsatisfied with the training program - I think everyone is/was unsatisfied with the original and hidden release of MCAS (not even mentioned) training - even now Boeing! so why just agree with Boeing's new training - we do not even know what it is other than a very short iPad or PC event, or do you have details?

I want to know how the aircraft feels both with and without MCAS and do not think that is possible on a PC or iPad session.

Please be professional and polite in your reply.

My reply is FAR more training, and with training that contains the elements effected - "FEEL"
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 07:22
  #4418 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Bend alot View Post
Please be professional and polite in your reply.
I am not rude and I asked 3 times...thank you for finally answering that you have no clue how much more training is required.
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 07:40
  #4419 (permalink)  
 
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At the end of this it doesn't matter what you all think the training should be or will be. Each Airline has to do an assessment and think about what their crew needs are. I know a couple of major Airlines that haven't done a Runaway Stab event in years so I would say they may revisit that.

Certainly at the end it will be public opinion that determines a lot of this. Good luck to the CEO of any airline operating MAX's that says we only did the CBT as that is all the FAA said to do. The Twitter feedback will be huge...
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Old 27th Apr 2019, 07:53
  #4420 (permalink)  
nyt
 
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Boeing cut cost by patching big engines on an old airframe design, requiring MCAS to be certified. Boeing crippled (let me know if you find a better word) MCAS to limit training / certification costs. There's only so much you can do to cut costs before bad things happen, and it looks like they still don't get it by not going back to the drawing board and think that "fixing" MCAS is enough. At the very least, they redesign MCAS properly with all the necessary training, and if it means a new type rating, so be it. Time will tell !
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