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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 17th Apr 2019, 23:07
  #4101 (permalink)  
 
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Thanks meleagertoo. Yes simultaneous postings. Thankfully with the same message. As they say out in my part of the world: 'Happy Landings'.
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Old 17th Apr 2019, 23:23
  #4102 (permalink)  
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Do the engines in the MAX have a time limit at TOGA?
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Old 17th Apr 2019, 23:54
  #4103 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Loose rivets View Post
Do the engines in the MAX have a time limit at TOGA?
In my AOM, the only time limit on TOGA is associated with max EGT. 1038 C for 5 mins, with a 30 sec exceedence allowed to 1048.

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Old 18th Apr 2019, 09:02
  #4104 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by meleagertoo View Post
Good question. How indeed?
For a moment or two after rotation when the stickshaker and stall warning burst out you are doubtless momentarily and firmly in the land of half-crown, threepenny bit, dustbin lid. But within a very short period of time you see TOGA thrust confirmed, airspeed/groundspeed confirmed, attitude correct and your sphincter begins to relax the dustbin lid to manageable proportions; then you see the usual huge Boeing ROC and realise the thing is flying as normal and thus the warnings must be false and the laundry-threatening event is all but over. The mere fact you're not mushing along the runway at thirty feet and 20' pitch in ground effect should tell you this. IMMEDIATELY.
So. Imagine for some reason you’ve cocked up the performance calculation and/or entered the wrong weights in the FMC, like EK407, maybe even not as grossly. What are you going to see? Thrust - what you intended, airspeed - as bugged, attitude - somewhere in the takeoff range. Nothing *obviously* wrong? Given differing density altitudes, runway parameters, terrain constraints, variable flap settings, ATM & fixed derates, etc. there is no “one size fits all” measure of performance these days. In a FBW aircraft, any “feel” in the controls will be based on false data.
Then you know the next thing to do is AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE chex. - What else fer chrissakes? WHAT tf ELSE???
If the crew on the BA56 had dismissed the stall warning as false, things would most likely not have gone well from then on. They had no indication that anything was amiss but they respected the stick shaker.

JK5022 is what can happen when you ignore a stall warning at low-level.

If you don't - in the sim - you've just failed that check. Bombed it.
That's why we train these events in the sim, so we learn to recognise them and know better than to repeat them on the line.
I know I won't be thanked for it but it appears to me that these crews hadn't left this lesson behind in the sim.
You could also say that you are training a single response to something that is much more nuanced in reality. Yes, you can pass the sim but fail dramatically in real life...

Last edited by FullWings; 18th Apr 2019 at 09:28.
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 10:19
  #4105 (permalink)  
 
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You could also say that you are training a single response to something that is much more nuanced in reality.
Yes possibly but that single response is a bloody starting point.

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Old 18th Apr 2019, 11:42
  #4106 (permalink)  
 
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Lots of people getting upset at experienced B737 drivers being “ judgmental” and assuming they would have done better.
Well, back to basics.
- Stick shaker on rotation. Do NOT engage the autopilot.
- Commence Airspeed Unreliable Checklist.
Yes you DO reduce thrust to 80% and maintain 10 degrees nose up.
The procedure is specifically designed to keep you flying at a safe speed and rate of climb. Just do it.
Disconnect the auto throttle as per the checklist.
-Fly the aircraft
-DO NOT maintain straight and level with autopilot and autothrottle engaged and allow aircraft to continue to accelerate to VNE while failing to ensure terrain clearance.
-Uncommanded Trim? Complete Runaway Stabilizer checklist as per training and specific Boeing recommendation in AD briefing we have all read ,and presumably understood ,as a result of previous accident.
-DO NOT allow airspeed and trim status to runaway to the extent that recovery becomes difficult or impossible.
Anything so far beyond the wit of a well trained Pilot?
Am I a Boeing troll? No, just an experienced B737 Pilot who still cant understand how you can get an aircraft so out of shape.
What do you think we get paid for?
George Glass

All good but...what you're saying is that in the case of the Birgenair crash,The Captain should have set 80% N1 and 10 degrees instead of......simply handing control to the FO whose ASI was totally functional?
IAS DISAGREE is not UAS.
We dont wish to criticize dead men.We all now know MCAS design was erroneous but that doesnt excuse a pilot from flying the plane does it now?
Some have said that establishing that the stick shaker activation was spurious was not possible and that the crew should have flown the UAS procedure.
This is not correct.
Flaps were set,takeoff power was confirmed,pitch attitude consistent with takeoff(a stable flight regime),no windshear warning,stick shaker active on Captains side only,disagree warnings are seen,FO's ASI agrees with ISFD....all point to a faulty sensor and not a real stall warning.
Its not wrong or dangerous for the Captain to retain control,set 80% N1 and fly 10 degrees but why?Why would you do that ?
In reflection,these 2 accidents are more about airmanship and crew composition than MCAS.
MCAS is stealing the headlines but actually an experienced FO would immediately say "I have control",just as the Birgenair FO should have done 23 years ago.
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 11:54
  #4107 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Icarus2001 View Post
Yes possibly but that single response is a bloody starting point.
Yes. But it might be an ending point as well, if you are doing it for the wrong reasons. Try the UAS drill from *actually* being close to stalled and see how that goes. In the 747 incident I linked above, had they done the UAS drill instead of reducing pitch because of the stick shake, I doubt they’d be around now to talk about it.

Fullwings are you a pilot?
Are you?

All I’m doing is pointing out that in a scenario which may have multiple causes and multiple recovery (or not) options, a hasty reflex action may not always work as expected. A situation with warnings, some possibly true, some possibly false is difficult to evaluate when the data you are using to make that evaluation may itself be compromised. This is just to balance the assertions that it was an “easy” recovery for the two lost 737s.
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 12:27
  #4108 (permalink)  
 
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Fly the Aircraft....

Originally Posted by FullWings View Post
Yes. But it might be an ending point as well, if you are doing it for the wrong reasons.
I think what some of us are trying to say is that if you are in tune with your aircraft, it becomes apparent very quickly what kind of situation you are dealing with. Initial rotation is approximately 10 degrees. No matter what alarms are going off, if the aircraft rises into the air as it normally does then it is almost certain that you are not approaching a stall. Maintain takeoff power setting, continue rotation to 15 degrees and get some space between you and the ground. At some point later, according to preference, execute the Airspeed Unreliable procedures.

On the other hand, if the aircraft acts mushy and hovers in ground effect, then respect the stick shaker. Gingerly apply full power, carefully manage the pitch, accelerate and climb.

If a pilot puts the aircraft into the proper rotation attitude and the PIC can't tell the difference between these two situations within seconds, then, quite frankly, they are not qualified to be in that seat. People's lives are literally hanging in the balance as to whether the Captain can make this distinction.

Let me stress, however, the crew's actions in either of the MAX accidents are not necessarily because they were "bad" pilots. I do not have any personal experience with the training and operational cultures at either Ethiopian or Lion Air. If these crews were simply responding according to their training, then the scrutiny should be placed there.

I strongly suspect that there is a mismatch between the proficiency standard implicit in the aircraft design and the actual training and experience level in the field. Sadly, I think Boeing, the airlines and the certificate authorities are all aware of this mismatch, but fail to either 1) insist the aircraft design be sufficiently fault tolerant, or 2) emphasize the need for better training and deeper experience.

Last edited by 737 Driver; 18th Apr 2019 at 16:14. Reason: added additional comments
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 13:14
  #4109 (permalink)  
 
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Icarus
"Fullwings are you a pilot?"
I have to observe, having trawled these forums for over 20 years (and knowing 'FullWings' for most of those ), that your response is typical of those who flee into a batcave when people do not seem to agree with them/worship their utterances/genuflect before them. They find, scrawled on the wall of the cave, in ancient hieroglyphics, the words 'Is u a pilut' which they then copy and paste (with spellchecker, of course) into their next post.

I can assure you that
a) 'Fullwings' is indeed a pilot
b) 'Fullwings' is very experienced in jet transport operation
c) 'Fullwings' is indeed capable of measured and logical thought processes.


Which, if any of the above, do you fit?
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 13:56
  #4110 (permalink)  
 
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Great, well not why not just answer the question? I also fly jet transport category aircraft. Now, the reason I asked is that there seems to be a rough split, in that actual pilots seem to be more likely to be critical of the crews actions whereas the non pilots, indeed non aviation posters, seem to be blaming Boeing more. I find this interesting.
Settle down 42g all good, I just asked a question.

ps. I meant to write"...a bloody good starting point" but finger on phone trouble.

Last edited by Icarus2001; 18th Apr 2019 at 14:03. Reason: Ps added
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 14:43
  #4111 (permalink)  
 
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Now hang on a minute. Nowhere in any Boeing document does it say that stick shaker alone is necessarily Airspeed Unreliable.

Here is the text from the Boeing QRH for items that may be evidence of Airspeed Unreliable:

Speed/altitude information not consistent with pitch attitude and thrust setting
•Airspeed or Mach failure flags
•PFD current airspeed box amber
•An amber line through one or more PFD flight mode annunciations
•Blank or fluctuating airspeed display
•Variation between captain and first officer airspeed displays
•Radome damage or loss
•Overspeed warning
Simultaneous overspeed and stall warnings

If the stick shaker activates after lift off and power, pitch, flap position, aircraft performance and primary and secondary Airspeed indications are normal the decision whether or not to perform QRH Airspeed Unreliable actions is purely discretionary.The whole point of the checklist is to determine which, if any, ASI is reliable. Even engaging the autopilot is not prohibited and I would say that by the time it was engaged there would have been time to assess that the stick shaker was spurious and no hazard would result from engaging it, given that it could be immediately disconnected.

So let’s not start making opinion fact and tarnishing those who aren’t around to defend themselves.
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 14:50
  #4112 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Icarus2001 View Post
Now, the reason I asked is that there seems to be a rough split, in that actual pilots seem to be more likely to be critical of the crews actions whereas the non pilots, indeed non aviation posters, seem to be blaming Boeing more. I find this interesting.
I will also make the observation that much of the critical commentary toward the crew's action is focusing on their initial response to the event (stick shaker at rotation) before they ever got to the point where MCAS activated (flaps retracted). Up to that point, there was no significant difference between how a MAX responds vs an NG, so you can't really pin their initial response on Boeing's hash job with MCAS. The fact that these crews were struggling with basics of airmanship and compliance with a well known procedure is suggestive of an overall human factors issue.

Last edited by 737 Driver; 18th Apr 2019 at 16:08. Reason: typo
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 15:10
  #4113 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Icarus2001 View Post
Great, well not why not just answer the question? I also fly jet transport category aircraft. Now, the reason I asked is that there seems to be a rough split, in that actual pilots seem to be more likely to be critical of the crews actions whereas the non pilots, indeed non aviation posters, seem to be blaming Boeing more. I find this interesting.

I am not a pilot, but having followed this thread (and others) very carefully, there seems to be not just a simple split, but a culture-gulf spanning a broad spectrum. Excuse the bluntness, but it may help emphasize the polarisation:
1. Anything that happened was entirely the fault of the 3rd world pilots, and our glorious Boeing is perfect (the "Trump" option).
2. Boeing made a boo-boo, but any half-competent pilot could easily have recovered the situation, and this would never have happened to my airline.
3. Boeing made a very serious error, but the pilots should have done better, and could have recovered the situation.
4. There is a chain of errors, from Boeing, the FAA , the documentation and pilots training, all of which need remediation.
5. Boeing is a criminal enterprise, and entirely responsible (the "Ralph Nader" option).

Fortunately in most posts on this informed but open forum, the extreme options do not come up. However, it is sometimes hard to distinguish the nuances between the remaining human-factors arguments, without lengthy examination of the whole decision making tree.
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 15:21
  #4114 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by HPSOV L View Post
If the stick shaker activates after lift off and power, pitch, flap position, aircraft performance and primary and secondary Airspeed indications are normal the decision whether or not to perform QRH Airspeed Unreliable actions is purely discretionary.
If you look at the DFDR data, the indicated airspeeds were already diverging from liftoff, so no, they were not "normal".

The preliminary accident report contains a synopsis of the discussion between the Captain and the First Officer. At 400', the FO selected VNAV and the Captain called for "Command", but the A/P did not engage. The Captain called out for "Command" again. The A/P did not engage. He asked the FO to change to a new ATC frequency. The FO checked in with radar, received an ATC instruction, and responded. The Captain called for flap retraction, and the FO responded. The Captain asked the FO to request runway heading from ATC. The FO did so.

What is conspicuously absent from the dialogue is any attempt to confirm that their airspeeds were indeed "normal". They were not. Despite having multiple warnings that are explicitly stated in AD 2018-23-51 (the 737 AD published post Lion Air), this crew made no apparent attempt to determine this crucial fact. If they had done so, then performance of the Airspeed Unreliable non-normal would have been anything but discretionary.

Last edited by 737 Driver; 18th Apr 2019 at 15:25. Reason: typo
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 15:56
  #4115 (permalink)  
 
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Thumbs up

Originally Posted by 42go View Post
Icarus
"Fullwings are you a pilot?"

I can assure you that
a) 'Fullwings' is indeed a pilot
b) 'Fullwings' is very experienced in jet transport operation
c) 'Fullwings' is indeed capable of measured and logical thought processes.
Yes, to often that isn't the case any more. I think it would be clear to anyone that actually did read Fullwings post(very mature post in terms of how a preconceived problem identification could kill you) that he is a experienced thinking pilot.


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Old 18th Apr 2019, 18:35
  #4116 (permalink)  
 
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Fly the damn airplane...

Originally Posted by GordonR_Cape View Post

I am not a pilot, but having followed this thread (and others) very carefully, there seems to be not just a simple split, but a culture-gulf spanning a broad spectrum. Excuse the bluntness, but it may help emphasize the polarisation:
1. Anything that happened was entirely the fault of the 3rd world pilots, and our glorious Boeing is perfect (the "Trump" option).
2. Boeing made a boo-boo, but any half-competent pilot could easily have recovered the situation, and this would never have happened to my airline.
3. Boeing made a very serious error, but the pilots should have done better, and could have recovered the situation.
4. There is a chain of errors, from Boeing, the FAA , the documentation and pilots training, all of which need remediation.
5. Boeing is a criminal enterprise, and entirely responsible (the "Ralph Nader" option).

Fortunately in most posts on this informed but open forum, the extreme options do not come up. However, it is sometimes hard to distinguish the nuances between the remaining human-factors arguments, without lengthy examination of the whole decision making tree.
I think your analysis and continuum of blaming the pilots/Boeing and everyone else harmless to blame Boeing and everyone else/pilots harmless is a nice summary.

I will tell you where I sit on this, based upon 36 years of professional flying (31 airline, 5 military), type rated on B737-200/767/777/787 and Airbus A330/A340, and a Professional Engineer.

First, aircraft are amazing and complex machines. Aircraft do what man was never intended to do naturally so there is an inherent risk in that alone. But even the best designed and best maintained aircraft have components that break and the human onboard is the last line of defense in many of those instances. Hydraulic systems, electrical systems, pressurization systems, propulsion systems (engines) all fail and often there is not double or triple redundancy due to weight issues, cost issues, probability of failure and the impact of a failure. As an example, there is no level of redundancy that will offset an engine failure no matter how many engines the aircraft has; the adverse yaw, the reduced performance, etc cannot be compensated for by having more engines, although the more engines an aircraft has, the less effect a single engine failure has. Aircraft manufacturers, at the urging of their airline customers, like two engine aircraft for the economics (one engine versus two, reduced fuel, reduced weight, etc). So we accept that fact that an engine failure on a two engine aircraft will have big affect when one fails, more than a single engine failure on an eight engine aircraft.

So when an engine (or hydraulic, or electric, or pressurization) system fails a pilot is in the loop to manage the situation. That is why we are highly trained and, hopefully, well compensated financially for that knowledge and judgement. The level of training lies with the individual knowing their stuff including their emergencies, particularly emergencies that are memory items - that is a personal responsibility of any professional pilot. The airline and country CAA is responsible too for insuring that the pilots charged with responsibility for that aircraft and those lives in the aircraft are also trained properly initially and on a recurrent basis.

Where do I sit on your continuum? Somewhere between 2 and 3. MCAS is a required stall protection however it needs to be toned down a bit as it can move the stabilizer trim to very large aircraft nose down angles. Should pilots be aware of MCAS in their technical training on the MAX; sure, but it would not have affected the outcome regardless as, I will describe shortly, MCAS failure presents characteristics identical to a stabilizer trim runaway, an emergency checklist item that has been around since the original B737 fifty years ago.

I would expect that any pilot with a type rating for a Boeing 737, MAX included, should be able to identify an Unreliable Airspeed (UAS). That is basic stuff, stick shaker when the aircraft if flying normally, disparity between the indicated airspeeds, etc. Any professional pilot should be able to recognize this regardless of what aircraft they are flying as every aircraft in the world is subject to this problem.

Only 2 of the 3 non-US MCAS incidents saw the pilots recognize the UAS and do something about it. This was long before MCAS reared its ugly head so that begs the question: Why? Training and experience would be my answer. And, as it turned out, the crew that did execute the UAS drill were the ones that ultimately saved the aircraft. Bear in mind that UAS is a memory drill. To me, there is no excuse why this was not done as it was a textbook UAS; to me also, in the Ethiopian case, engaging the autopilot at 400 ft is a definite faux pas as it is contrary to the memory UAS drill and, if the aircraft was indeed stalled, another definite faux pas as one does not recover from a stall with the autopilot. This points to a training/experience issue too but it also points to an over reliance on the use of the autopilot at the expense of hand flying an airplane. This too is likely an airline/CAA issue as well as an individual pilot issue. And, not to imply that this is a "third world" country issue as I am seeing this more and more with the FO's I fly with; they are terrified to hand fly the aircraft and hence their hand flying skills begin to decline.

When all of these crews experienced MCAS, 0 of 3 were able to recognize a classic stab trim runaway; while manually flying the aircraft, the nose pitches down all by itself. You simply can't miss it, with or without seeing the stab trim wheel moving. In the Lion Air case where the aircraft was saved, it took a third pilot from a different airline to tell the crew what to do; in the case of the fatal Lion Air accident, the Captain handed control to the First Officer so he could go hunting through the checklist for something to do - this is a memory drill! I fault the individual pilots for not knowing their memory emergencies - harsh as that may sound, that is what we are paid for. (Personally, I do a study of the memory emergencies regularly as the memory isn't what it used to be and I like to think that most professionals pilots do the same).

I am not going to rehash the rest of the issues (flying to destination with this problem, not controlling the aircraft speed in the Ethiopian case, etc) as that would be covering old ground but there are lots of basic airmanship issues that are highly questionable.

In conclusion, all of these MCAS issues were recoverable situations by a trained and competent crew. I do not blame the individuals entirely as the airline, their training, their hand flying policies as well as the CAA overseeing them deserve scrutiny too however. Let me repeat that: These MCAS accidents were all recoverable. Boeing's mistake, in addition to what I noted earlier, is assuming that B737 type rated pilots would be able to do even the most basic, memory emergency drills. This, however, begs the question: If pilots cannot even do a simple UAS emergency, what hope do they have for a more complex one such as an engine failure at rotation or an engine failure followed by a cabin depressurization which that Southwest crew handled masterfully?

What this MCAS situation points to, in my estimation, is that the aviation industry has been "whistling past the graveyard" for a little too long and that the underlying problems quickly manifest themselves with even the slightest irregularity - the Turkish B737 accident at Schipol, the Korean 777 in SFO, etc.. A complete rethink of pilot training, basic flying skills and airmanship are in order as there is a finite limit to what Boeing, Airbus, Embraer or any other aircraft manufacture can do to design and build airplanes without human intervention being required a certain times by competent aviators.

Last edited by L39 Guy; 18th Apr 2019 at 18:45.
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 21:34
  #4117 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by L39 Guy View Post
I think your analysis and continuum of blaming the pilots/Boeing and everyone else harmless to blame Boeing and everyone else/pilots harmless is a nice summary.

I will tell you where I sit on this, based upon 36 years of professional flying (31 airline, 5 military), type rated on B737-200/767/777/787 and Airbus A330/A340, and a Professional Engineer.

First, aircraft are amazing and complex machines. Aircraft do what man was never intended to do naturally so there is an inherent risk in that alone. But even the best designed and best maintained aircraft have components that break and the human onboard is the last line of defense in many of those instances. Hydraulic systems, electrical systems, pressurization systems, propulsion systems (engines) all fail and often there is not double or triple redundancy due to weight issues, cost issues, probability of failure and the impact of a failure. As an example, there is no level of redundancy that will offset an engine failure no matter how many engines the aircraft has; the adverse yaw, the reduced performance, etc cannot be compensated for by having more engines, although the more engines an aircraft has, the less effect a single engine failure has. Aircraft manufacturers, at the urging of their airline customers, like two engine aircraft for the economics (one engine versus two, reduced fuel, reduced weight, etc). So we accept that fact that an engine failure on a two engine aircraft will have big affect when one fails, more than a single engine failure on an eight engine aircraft.

So when an engine (or hydraulic, or electric, or pressurization) system fails a pilot is in the loop to manage the situation. That is why we are highly trained and, hopefully, well compensated financially for that knowledge and judgement. The level of training lies with the individual knowing their stuff including their emergencies, particularly emergencies that are memory items - that is a personal responsibility of any professional pilot. The airline and country CAA is responsible too for insuring that the pilots charged with responsibility for that aircraft and those lives in the aircraft are also trained properly initially and on a recurrent basis.

Where do I sit on your continuum? Somewhere between 2 and 3. MCAS is a required stall protection however it needs to be toned down a bit as it can move the stabilizer trim to very large aircraft nose down angles. Should pilots be aware of MCAS in their technical training on the MAX; sure, but it would not have affected the outcome regardless as, I will describe shortly, MCAS failure presents characteristics identical to a stabilizer trim runaway, an emergency checklist item that has been around since the original B737 fifty years ago.

I would expect that any pilot with a type rating for a Boeing 737, MAX included, should be able to identify an Unreliable Airspeed (UAS). That is basic stuff, stick shaker when the aircraft if flying normally, disparity between the indicated airspeeds, etc. Any professional pilot should be able to recognize this regardless of what aircraft they are flying as every aircraft in the world is subject to this problem.

Only 2 of the 3 non-US MCAS incidents saw the pilots recognize the UAS and do something about it. This was long before MCAS reared its ugly head so that begs the question: Why? Training and experience would be my answer. And, as it turned out, the crew that did execute the UAS drill were the ones that ultimately saved the aircraft. Bear in mind that UAS is a memory drill. To me, there is no excuse why this was not done as it was a textbook UAS; to me also, in the Ethiopian case, engaging the autopilot at 400 ft is a definite faux pas as it is contrary to the memory UAS drill and, if the aircraft was indeed stalled, another definite faux pas as one does not recover from a stall with the autopilot. This points to a training/experience issue too but it also points to an over reliance on the use of the autopilot at the expense of hand flying an airplane. This too is likely an airline/CAA issue as well as an individual pilot issue. And, not to imply that this is a "third world" country issue as I am seeing this more and more with the FO's I fly with; they are terrified to hand fly the aircraft and hence their hand flying skills begin to decline.

When all of these crews experienced MCAS, 0 of 3 were able to recognize a classic stab trim runaway; while manually flying the aircraft, the nose pitches down all by itself. You simply can't miss it, with or without seeing the stab trim wheel moving. In the Lion Air case where the aircraft was saved, it took a third pilot from a different airline to tell the crew what to do; in the case of the fatal Lion Air accident, the Captain handed control to the First Officer so he could go hunting through the checklist for something to do - this is a memory drill! I fault the individual pilots for not knowing their memory emergencies - harsh as that may sound, that is what we are paid for. (Personally, I do a study of the memory emergencies regularly as the memory isn't what it used to be and I like to think that most professionals pilots do the same).

I am not going to rehash the rest of the issues (flying to destination with this problem, not controlling the aircraft speed in the Ethiopian case, etc) as that would be covering old ground but there are lots of basic airmanship issues that are highly questionable.

In conclusion, all of these MCAS issues were recoverable situations by a trained and competent crew. I do not blame the individuals entirely as the airline, their training, their hand flying policies as well as the CAA overseeing them deserve scrutiny too however. Let me repeat that: These MCAS accidents were all recoverable. Boeing's mistake, in addition to what I noted earlier, is assuming that B737 type rated pilots would be able to do even the most basic, memory emergency drills. This, however, begs the question: If pilots cannot even do a simple UAS emergency, what hope do they have for a more complex one such as an engine failure at rotation or an engine failure followed by a cabin depressurization which that Southwest crew handled masterfully?

What this MCAS situation points to, in my estimation, is that the aviation industry has been "whistling past the graveyard" for a little too long and that the underlying problems quickly manifest themselves with even the slightest irregularity - the Turkish B737 accident at Schipol, the Korean 777 in SFO, etc.. A complete rethink of pilot training, basic flying skills and airmanship are in order as there is a finite limit to what Boeing, Airbus, Embraer or any other aircraft manufacture can do to design and build airplanes without human intervention being required a certain times by competent aviators.
A really great post but the conclusion that the answer lies only in training cannot be other than seriously debatable.

You led off with experience for a very good reason. Experience is profoundly important.

Training doesn't provide experience. It's only the entry point.

Automation denies experience.

As an overall improvement we need either reduced reliance on automation enabling greater experience, or improved automation.

We both know which one of those is more likely.

Last edited by Turbine70; 18th Apr 2019 at 23:56.
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 23:35
  #4118 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by L39 Guy View Post

MCAS is a required stall protection however it needs to be toned down a bit as it can move the stabilizer trim to very large aircraft nose down angles.
.
34 years aircraft maintenance.

Good post L39 - but MCAS is far from a stall protection (system). MCAS is a system that supplies an a feel to the control column, and the aircraft can fly perfectly without it.

But without MCAS the 737 MAX could not meet the certification requirements for Grandfather rights. Without the Grandfather rights the 737 MAX requires more certification and pilots will require extra training - this would make the MAX less desirable/competitive.

So the task was to incorporate a new system without calling it "new" and retain Grandfather rights. It seems to me that the priority was the "extra training" being minimal between the MAX and other 737's (you heavily touched training in your reply) and the result was a few hours of slides on an iPad that included nothing on the new system.

If the Grandfathering certification allowed for MCAS as a new system, and it was designed and implemented as a stand alone system with dedicated on/off switches and proper training - I doubt we would have had the crashes.

Even now MCAS seems to be strange! (I do not recall exact numbers) but MCAS was said to have a limit of 0.6 in certification. From memory that was not enough so it was increased to 2.5 to get the required "feel" to pass the test. Yet the "software update" will reduce this to either 0.6 or 0.9 ( I do not recall) so how then can it pass the test when 2.5 was required?

There also still seems to be far too much effort, to not have this aircraft require "extra" training, particularly in the sim. My view is that this "fix" will have put the "feel" somewhat less than what the original MAX had, this feel was to give the pilot an aid to prevent pulling back too far preventing a stall. So I believe that simulator training should be carried out on the MAX around the stall area in the parameters that MCAS is enabled. Obviously this training should be with and without MCAS engaged as there is included in the fix more ways the MCAS can be disengaged, and pilots left with a soft stick around the stall zone.

Further more, given it seems decisions at Boeing have been made heavily for financial reasons on the MAX project - I would hope a full review of the certification is/has been made external of Boeing.

Training - FAA and Boeing seem against it other than an iPad slide show, a few more craters till that changes.

The faults in the US reported of altitude change when AP selected - has this problem been identified and rectified?
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Old 18th Apr 2019, 23:36
  #4119 (permalink)  
 
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What is conspicuously absent from the dialogue is any attempt to confirm that their airspeeds were indeed "normal". They were not. Despite having multiple warnings that are explicitly stated in AD 2018-23-51 (the 737 AD published post Lion Air), this crew made no apparent attempt to determine this crucial fact. If they had done so, then performance of the Airspeed Unreliable non-normal would have been anything but discretionary.
AD 2018-23-51 does not address Airspeed Unreliable. It is concerned with identifying a Runaway Stabilizer condition. It merely mentions symptoms that may indicate this condition. It does not direct pilots to perform Airspeed Unreliable actions in the event of stick shaker.
Yes, there was a slight difference between ASIs during climb out but at that stage was in the order of a few knots and practically speaking would probably be unnoticed in the dynamic period after liftoff, particularly in the absence of any alerts.
you are retrospectively creating a process based on assumptions that involve hindsight.

Last edited by HPSOV L; 19th Apr 2019 at 05:52.
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Old 19th Apr 2019, 00:01
  #4120 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by HPSOV L View Post
Yes, there was a slight difference between ASIs during climb out but at that stage was in the order of a few knots and practically speaking would probably be unnoticed in the dynamic period after liftoff, particularly in the absence of any alerts.


I'm not sure what you mean by "absence of any alerts." The stick shaker was activated. Is that an "alert"? They had a Master Caution associated with the alpha vane right after rotation. Was that an "alert"? The IAS Disagree annunciation appears on the PFD's when there is greater than a 5 knot difference for more than 5 seconds. That criteria was met in this case, so I'm fairly confident that this "alert" was also present. Despite these indications, there was no apparent attempt to cross check airspeeds even with an active stick shaker.

I'm not really sure what you are looking for here, because it doesn't get any more basic than this. The signs were there. We all agree they were unnoticed. Why those signs were unnoticed clearly points to a human factors issue.

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