Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
Lena.Kiev
Boeing showed a few pilots how a functioning MCAS operates, and how the trim cutouts work. I assume they did not show AOA disagree, stick shaker and stall warning at the same time? Does anyone feel reassured by this demonstration, given all the issues discussed in this thread?
Boeing showed a few pilots how a functioning MCAS operates, and how the trim cutouts work. I assume they did not show AOA disagree, stick shaker and stall warning at the same time? Does anyone feel reassured by this demonstration, given all the issues discussed in this thread?
Smoke and mirrors alright. A bunch of training Captains who have been briefed and have been researching the scenario for ten days and know it is about to occur landed safely? What a surprise. It’s pretty low to publish it in those words in my mind.
Boeing will now make the disagree light standard in all new 737 Max planes, and will provide the indicator free of charge for customers who want it.
“All primary flight information required to safely and efficiently operate the 737 Max is included on the baseline primary flight display,” Boeing said. “All 737 Max airplanes display this data in a way that is consistent with pilot training and the fundamental instrument scan pattern that pilots are trained to use.”
“All primary flight information required to safely and efficiently operate the 737 Max is included on the baseline primary flight display,” Boeing said. “All 737 Max airplanes display this data in a way that is consistent with pilot training and the fundamental instrument scan pattern that pilots are trained to use.”
And likewise, if all for safety and efficiency was already included, the stockholders of the US airlines who spent not inconsequential sums on buyig these extra options will presumably ask their board why money was "squandered" on extra frippery.
Someone at Seattle really needs to tell the seemingly totally disconnected PR-corporate media managers in Chicago a home truth or two.
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Lena.Kiev
Boeing showed a few pilots how a functioning MCAS operates, and how the trim cutouts work. I assume they did not show AOA disagree, stick shaker and stall warning at the same time? Does anyone feel reassured by this demonstration, given all the issues discussed in this thread?
Boeing showed a few pilots how a functioning MCAS operates, and how the trim cutouts work. I assume they did not show AOA disagree, stick shaker and stall warning at the same time? Does anyone feel reassured by this demonstration, given all the issues discussed in this thread?
i would hope that the simulations that were run included all the failures experienced by Lionair. If not pretty worthless My guess is that they did include all faults. I’ve done loads of these deja vue replication flights and we always look for that sort of unrealistic replication. The pilots from the third party airlines present want a safe outcome and are not going to approve a botched pantomime of a demo. Yes they do know it’s coming up and are ready. So you approach it from the point of view “Things that now lie in the past, once lay in the future” so you try to see it through the eyes of a regular line pilot who might be on day 5 and of average skill.
Hope that helps?
Yanrair
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And of course how else can you test the scenario at headquarters on Boeing Sims without pilots who have studied the crash in minute detail and are fully expecting it?
All pilots world wide are pretty aware by now. It’s like tying to find a clean jury. Actually you can.
You. Introduce the failure on a regular sim session with a crew who think they are doing something completely different and are not training captains. We do it all the time on sim checks. Then you see how they cope.
All pilots world wide are pretty aware by now. It’s like tying to find a clean jury. Actually you can.
You. Introduce the failure on a regular sim session with a crew who think they are doing something completely different and are not training captains. We do it all the time on sim checks. Then you see how they cope.
Boeing is going to hoist itself on its own petard. By previously maintaining that a falsely triggered MCAS event posed no serious risk they pegged out their position. Now they are trotting out well-briefed and coached training pilots to fly their new software and hopefully sing hosannas thereto. A typically venomous tort lawyer will have a field day with the logical disconnect between those two positions.
Either an aircraft is safe when flown by the lowest common denominator crew or it isn’t. And then what?
Either an aircraft is safe when flown by the lowest common denominator crew or it isn’t. And then what?
Introduce the failure on a regular sim session with a crew who think they are doing something completely different and are not training captains. We do it all the time on sim checks. Then you see how they cope.
Looking beyond the technical fix that Boeing say they are close to completing, what interests me is the global reaction to this fix from airworthiness authorities. It seems likely that the FAA will approve the modification – presumably they are very much in the loop – but what about outside the US? We know at least EASA and the Canadian TCCA have said they will want to independently certify the fix, and possibly go deeper? Are other authorities likely to follow suit? Also one wonders when this process would start; immediately after Boeing release the mod, after the preliminary Ethiopian Airlines crash Report or even the final Lion Air and Ethiopian reports?
And then of course there is the timescale for such approvals or certifications to be implemented; how long would it take, not forgetting the pressure that will be on them from the affected Airlines. Assuming the US 737 Max fleet gets the go ahead and embodies the software update would we see 737 Max’s flying there but still grounded outside the US, maybe for months. One can imagine the American public’s unease at flying on the aircraft, knowing it is still grounded elsewhere.
Lastly, and the worst case scenario for Boeing, what if non-US authorities fail to certify the fix. It seems to me very unwise of Boeing/FAA to permit flying to commence in the US, knowing that other airworthiness authorities haven’t completed their own certification.
And then of course there is the timescale for such approvals or certifications to be implemented; how long would it take, not forgetting the pressure that will be on them from the affected Airlines. Assuming the US 737 Max fleet gets the go ahead and embodies the software update would we see 737 Max’s flying there but still grounded outside the US, maybe for months. One can imagine the American public’s unease at flying on the aircraft, knowing it is still grounded elsewhere.
Lastly, and the worst case scenario for Boeing, what if non-US authorities fail to certify the fix. It seems to me very unwise of Boeing/FAA to permit flying to commence in the US, knowing that other airworthiness authorities haven’t completed their own certification.
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Lena.Kiev
Boeing showed a few pilots how a functioning MCAS operates, and how the trim cutouts work. I assume they did not show AOA disagree, stick shaker and stall warning at the same time? Does anyone feel reassured by this demonstration, given all the issues discussed in this thread?
Boeing showed a few pilots how a functioning MCAS operates, and how the trim cutouts work. I assume they did not show AOA disagree, stick shaker and stall warning at the same time? Does anyone feel reassured by this demonstration, given all the issues discussed in this thread?
At the gathering, pilots from the three American carriers, plus two smaller non-US airlines, ran simulated flights designed to mimic the situation that brought down the Lion Air flight in Indonesia last year, using the current and updated software, according to the person briefed on the session.
They have a lot of confidence rebuilding to do. It would seem there is a lot of hostility too.
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Introduce the failure on a regular sim session with a crew who think they are doing something completely different and are not training captains. We do it all the time on sim checks. Then you see how they cope.
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Two crashes bad. Third crash - jail time for all involved. And I would mean top to bottom at Boeing and the FAA.
So lemme see. Boeing rushed some software in in a rush, in a couple of years due to the NEO threat. Now they've rushed some more software in, in a few months, and this is somehow better? Have they even started to write test plans for all the interactions with other systems? Started to look at the AD converters? Perhaps the Boeing board would like to spend next week strapped in a MAX cabin doing high speed touch and go's in Africa with the greenest crew from Ethiopian Airlines/Lionair, people with 50 hours each on type and a messed up sleep pattern on a plane fixed by the greenest mechanics going with airline bosses yelling to keep the schedule going regardless? Is the USAF/USN letting this new software go onto their 737 derivatives?
G
So lemme see. Boeing rushed some software in in a rush, in a couple of years due to the NEO threat. Now they've rushed some more software in, in a few months, and this is somehow better? Have they even started to write test plans for all the interactions with other systems? Started to look at the AD converters? Perhaps the Boeing board would like to spend next week strapped in a MAX cabin doing high speed touch and go's in Africa with the greenest crew from Ethiopian Airlines/Lionair, people with 50 hours each on type and a messed up sleep pattern on a plane fixed by the greenest mechanics going with airline bosses yelling to keep the schedule going regardless? Is the USAF/USN letting this new software go onto their 737 derivatives?
G
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Started to look at the AD converters?
With such an error lurking, it won't matter how many AoA vanes are replaced, or how gently the fault now manifests itself. It will still be a fault.
I'm worrying about nothing. Boeing can't be that blinkered . . . can they?
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Fairly obviously, it will be very difficult for the FAA to certify a fix without first having a review of the FDR of the Ethiopian flight. Further difficulties are likely because other authorities may not approve certification without independent assessments of the "fixes". The only solution will be considerably more transparency from the FAA and the Boeing. Public opinion is the final arbiter for the future of the the MAX aircraft and perhaps even Boeing itself.
Having read the contributions, there is still considerable controversy about how the AOA/MCAS/Automation systems actually operates in ALL circumstances. While it seems the intention that MCAS is triggered in manual flight without flaps; it is not absolutely clear what are all the circumstances that it may maintain authority. Certainly, autopilot would appear to be disabled, and even if it were not, it may be affected by AOA errors. It is also not clear that a flap condition totally disables MCAS in all circumstances. There are also discrepancies over the left/right authority and the left and right seat controls and feedback. Above all it is fairly clear that the automated controls are inappropriately attempting to force a nose down condition that must be "rescued" by pilots. It is also not clear that there is enough time available to pilots to rescue that erroneous condition.
Having read the contributions, there is still considerable controversy about how the AOA/MCAS/Automation systems actually operates in ALL circumstances. While it seems the intention that MCAS is triggered in manual flight without flaps; it is not absolutely clear what are all the circumstances that it may maintain authority. Certainly, autopilot would appear to be disabled, and even if it were not, it may be affected by AOA errors. It is also not clear that a flap condition totally disables MCAS in all circumstances. There are also discrepancies over the left/right authority and the left and right seat controls and feedback. Above all it is fairly clear that the automated controls are inappropriately attempting to force a nose down condition that must be "rescued" by pilots. It is also not clear that there is enough time available to pilots to rescue that erroneous condition.
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Update From WSJ this morning:
Ethiopian Airlines’ chief executive said a stall-prevention system on Boeing’s 737 MAX appears to have been activated on a jet that crashed earlier this month—the first time an aviation official familiar with the flight has specifically said that the system could have been switched on during the accident.
Mr. Gebremariam didn’t detail how he had made his determination about MCAS. He doesn’t have access to the precise detail from the data and voice recording devices, but he has listened to recorded radio communications between the cockpit of the flight and the tower at Addis Ababa airport, from which the flight departed on March 10.
“To the best of our knowledge,” MCAS was activated on the flight, Mr. Gebremariam said in the interview, adding though that he wanted to wait for the investigation for conclusive evidence.
Ethiopian Airlines’ chief executive said a stall-prevention system on Boeing’s 737 MAX appears to have been activated on a jet that crashed earlier this month—the first time an aviation official familiar with the flight has specifically said that the system could have been switched on during the accident.
Mr. Gebremariam didn’t detail how he had made his determination about MCAS. He doesn’t have access to the precise detail from the data and voice recording devices, but he has listened to recorded radio communications between the cockpit of the flight and the tower at Addis Ababa airport, from which the flight departed on March 10.
“To the best of our knowledge,” MCAS was activated on the flight, Mr. Gebremariam said in the interview, adding though that he wanted to wait for the investigation for conclusive evidence.
“yanrair”
you know that many companies roster more than 5 days, don’t you.
and
you have the answer right there
regular line pilot who might be on day 5 and of average skill.
and
multiple warnings
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And of course how else can you test the scenario at headquarters on Boeing Sims without pilots who have studied the crash in minute detail and are fully expecting it?
All pilots world wide are pretty aware by now. It’s like tying to find a clean jury. Actually you can.
You. Introduce the failure on a regular sim session with a crew who think they are doing something completely different and are not training captains. We do it all the time on sim checks. Then you see how they cope.
All pilots world wide are pretty aware by now. It’s like tying to find a clean jury. Actually you can.
You. Introduce the failure on a regular sim session with a crew who think they are doing something completely different and are not training captains. We do it all the time on sim checks. Then you see how they cope.
This would match what Lion air pilots were faced with, before MCAS was 'discovered' behaviour was claimed to match 737NG.
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That has got to be one of the most lame PR exercises that I have ever seen and betrays a lack of an engineering mindset at America's premiere aerospace company. Congratulations, Boeing, you have proven that any competent pilot could have flown your faulty aircraft before the fix, any competent pilot can fly your aircraft after the fix, so Joe Passenger should have no worries at all about pilot skill and pay when boarding Economy Airlines -- who happen to be your target customer for the Max!
If you can't reproduce the problem, then you don't know what the problem is. I would feel more comfortable if the story were that these elite pilots had a really hard time recovering the aircraft before the fix, and after the fix all was good.
If you can't reproduce the problem, then you don't know what the problem is. I would feel more comfortable if the story were that these elite pilots had a really hard time recovering the aircraft before the fix, and after the fix all was good.
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Two crashes bad. Third crash - jail time for all involved. And I would mean top to bottom at Boeing and the FAA.
So lemme see. Boeing rushed some software in in a rush, in a couple of years due to the NEO threat. Now they've rushed some more software in, in a few months, and this is somehow better? Have they even started to write test plans for all the interactions with other systems? Started to look at the AD converters? Perhaps the Boeing board would like to spend next week strapped in a MAX cabin doing high speed touch and go's in Africa with the greenest crew from Ethiopian Airlines/Lionair, people with 50 hours each on type and a messed up sleep pattern on a plane fixed by the greenest mechanics going with airline bosses yelling to keep the schedule going regardless? Is the USAF/USN letting this new software go onto their 737 derivatives?
G
So lemme see. Boeing rushed some software in in a rush, in a couple of years due to the NEO threat. Now they've rushed some more software in, in a few months, and this is somehow better? Have they even started to write test plans for all the interactions with other systems? Started to look at the AD converters? Perhaps the Boeing board would like to spend next week strapped in a MAX cabin doing high speed touch and go's in Africa with the greenest crew from Ethiopian Airlines/Lionair, people with 50 hours each on type and a messed up sleep pattern on a plane fixed by the greenest mechanics going with airline bosses yelling to keep the schedule going regardless? Is the USAF/USN letting this new software go onto their 737 derivatives?
G
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Perhaps the Boeing board would like to spend next week strapped in a MAX cabin doing high speed touch and go's in Africa with the greenest crew from Ethiopian Airlines/Lionair, people with 50 hours each on type and a messed up sleep pattern on a plane fixed by the greenest mechanics going with airline bosses yelling to keep the schedule going regardless?
, but if only half of what we read here turns out to be correct , they might have to do something like this to restore confidence in the flying public..
At present there are very few sims capable of demonstrating MCAS.
A CAA might justifiably require MAX8 crews be presented Lion and/or Ethiopian scenarios on an MCAS capable sim.
A CAA might justifiably require MAX8 crews be presented Lion and/or Ethiopian scenarios on an MCAS capable sim.
