Pax sue Boeing in DBX crash
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PDR1 - complacency is the word in many event cases involving automatics as they rarely go wrong these days, assuming in equally many others as why would the automatics not work as expected when commanded, finally lack of airmanship in most cases as the above could be prevented if good airmanship was displayed.
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EK and several other ME/FE Airlines seem to teach by rote/numbers, no common sense or airmanship allowed in the operation.
How many cadets do these airlines recruit? I doubt many. They recruit from already trained, but not widely experienced pilots. I doubt they can de-train pilots so it might suggest that the recruits they choose come from a similar background philosophy and thus fit the mould.
How many cadets do these airlines recruit? I doubt many. They recruit from already trained, but not widely experienced pilots. I doubt they can de-train pilots so it might suggest that the recruits they choose come from a similar background philosophy and thus fit the mould.
If this goes to open court it would be interesting to see how ‘the law’ interprets human behaviour.
The ‘expert’ views in this forum might overlook if it is realistic for a crew to remember every single detail of a system operation, particularly those with caveats only applicable for a limited time scale, small altitude range, and having rare exposure.
Whilst it could be argued that the altitude limit could be interpreted from audio callouts (is this applicable in all aitcraft), these calls are often used subconsciously as part of the landing skill - or only consciously checked as a how goes it if the landing task is difficult.
How capable might crews be able to relate subsystem knowledge with altitude during during high workload landing flare.
The other interaction was from the recently installed runway alerting system, where an unexpected call triggered the need to GA. Had the crew been sufficiently well trained for this situation, had the crew been exposed to the callouts, of was the particular situation sufficiently well defined by the operator who selected the programmable point of alerting.
Did this system introduce conflict, the crew were just about to touchdown, longer than normal, but sufficient for the runway length; they may have judged this as they would have done many times before - it was their norm. Yet a system call out conflicted with this assessment - like a human criticising your judgement. Was the crew’s judgement correct, do they believe their human judgement, or a rarely encountered machine call out, who's validity might not have been established previously - training or real exposure.
What was the effect of policy on using automated call outs - EGPWS always react; the runway alert was part of the EGPWS - same voice, urgency, relevance? Yet the system was marketed as ‘advisory’.
How do humans perform after a surprise, the capacity to change the course of (successful) action. What effect does startle or conflict of perception, reduce the ability of humans perform expected actions, checks, calls, using other sensory input - obvious in hindsight, but unknown at the time.
A standard of human behaviour less than that required is not been tested in court. As for the manufacturer, they could always do better, see the foreseeable and judge the ‘unforeseeable’ ( I don't believe the human could do that) in system design; with or without hindsight. No A vs B argument, but B appears to have its share of AT issues; would previous events with hidden modes of quiescent operation (Asiana) be held against them, particularly where it has been argued that improvement is warranted.
Perhaps with the industry's drift towards automation the gaps in system operation should be closed - reduce the opportunity for error. Particularly if it is judged that with the increasing complexity of systems integration, operational scenarios, and demand for efficient, yet safe operations, place too greater responsibility on pilots in surprising and rarely encountered situations.
Modern pilots may not be a able to gain levels of experience previously seen; whereas those who criticise may have, but then fail to relate this difference.
We cannot be both judge and jury; yet pilots are best placed to put themselves in the situation faced by this crew, never the same because of hindsight bias, but also because of human nature; we love to blame … but would this be a defence for the manufacturer?
The ‘expert’ views in this forum might overlook if it is realistic for a crew to remember every single detail of a system operation, particularly those with caveats only applicable for a limited time scale, small altitude range, and having rare exposure.
Whilst it could be argued that the altitude limit could be interpreted from audio callouts (is this applicable in all aitcraft), these calls are often used subconsciously as part of the landing skill - or only consciously checked as a how goes it if the landing task is difficult.
How capable might crews be able to relate subsystem knowledge with altitude during during high workload landing flare.
The other interaction was from the recently installed runway alerting system, where an unexpected call triggered the need to GA. Had the crew been sufficiently well trained for this situation, had the crew been exposed to the callouts, of was the particular situation sufficiently well defined by the operator who selected the programmable point of alerting.
Did this system introduce conflict, the crew were just about to touchdown, longer than normal, but sufficient for the runway length; they may have judged this as they would have done many times before - it was their norm. Yet a system call out conflicted with this assessment - like a human criticising your judgement. Was the crew’s judgement correct, do they believe their human judgement, or a rarely encountered machine call out, who's validity might not have been established previously - training or real exposure.
What was the effect of policy on using automated call outs - EGPWS always react; the runway alert was part of the EGPWS - same voice, urgency, relevance? Yet the system was marketed as ‘advisory’.
How do humans perform after a surprise, the capacity to change the course of (successful) action. What effect does startle or conflict of perception, reduce the ability of humans perform expected actions, checks, calls, using other sensory input - obvious in hindsight, but unknown at the time.
A standard of human behaviour less than that required is not been tested in court. As for the manufacturer, they could always do better, see the foreseeable and judge the ‘unforeseeable’ ( I don't believe the human could do that) in system design; with or without hindsight. No A vs B argument, but B appears to have its share of AT issues; would previous events with hidden modes of quiescent operation (Asiana) be held against them, particularly where it has been argued that improvement is warranted.
Perhaps with the industry's drift towards automation the gaps in system operation should be closed - reduce the opportunity for error. Particularly if it is judged that with the increasing complexity of systems integration, operational scenarios, and demand for efficient, yet safe operations, place too greater responsibility on pilots in surprising and rarely encountered situations.
Modern pilots may not be a able to gain levels of experience previously seen; whereas those who criticise may have, but then fail to relate this difference.
We cannot be both judge and jury; yet pilots are best placed to put themselves in the situation faced by this crew, never the same because of hindsight bias, but also because of human nature; we love to blame … but would this be a defence for the manufacturer?
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We cannot be both judge and jury;
This, in my opinion, was an accident waiting to happen. Over reliance on automation causing complacency, lack of training, fear inducing company culture, possibility that the pilots involved were flying fatiguing roster patterns, lack of understanding of the aircraft and its possible pitfalls (as apparently explained in manuals). I know that other companies in the region are now training this exact scenario in the sim, fortunately for them it wasn't their horse that has already bolted!
The fact of the matter is the TOGA switch performed as expected and as Boeing explains in its manuals so I don't think the plaintiffs will get too far.
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This, in my opinion, was an accident waiting to happen. Over reliance on automation causing complacency, lack of training,
In some cases that is proved to be true: however, these were not inexpereinced pilots. They had flown other less automated types.
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No doubt this is how they had been trained on other types, as it is pretty standard, especially with less automated types. The physics haven't changed.
I often wonder why pilots bin their experience from previous days when they are told to 'let the automatics do it for you, stop cross checking': 'follow the FD' etc.etc.
In some cases that is proved to be true: however, these were not inexpereinced pilots. They had flown other less automated types.
Flaps20
CHECK THRUST
Positive rate - gear up.
If you do and say this, you will live.
No doubt this is how they had been trained on other types, as it is pretty standard, especially with less automated types. The physics haven't changed.
I often wonder why pilots bin their experience from previous days when they are told to 'let the automatics do it for you, stop cross checking': 'follow the FD' etc.etc.
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re: why they are suing Boeing - and in Chicago
Probably some key considerations include:
1. Was an international flight. Montreal Convention applies.
2. Montreal Convention contains various limitations on liability. Not as severe as Warsaw Convention, but still no cakewalk. And interpretation of some provisions (such as damages for 'emotional distress') reportedly varies by country.
I will defer on that question to those with greater expertise with Montreal Convention.
3. Unlike the airline, Boeing is not protected by Montreal Convention. Or by sovereign immunity.
4. Cook County - where Boeing is headquartered - is known for large jury awards. As is most of US, compared to other countries.
(Also known as "jury roulette" - spin the wheel and see. You may get nothing, or a dollar, or maybe ten million dollars, or much more).
5. Aviation lawyers in US have plenty of experience suing in Cook County. And most such firms are large enough to shoulder burden of subsidizing case until it is resolved. (Client may pay nothing until then, depending on what arrangements are made).
6. How much might be awarded in UAE (if pax could and did sue Boeing or Emirates there)? And who decides how much to award? My guess is it wouldn't be jury roulette as in US.
Weren't many passengers coming from India, perhaps including laborers, domestic help? What would they be valued at in a UAE court?
Those suing are from US, Europe, plus Turkey and UAE. Again, how much would UAE be inclined to award them?
7. Welcome any aviation law experts who (despite their occupation) care to share their insights.
1. Was an international flight. Montreal Convention applies.
2. Montreal Convention contains various limitations on liability. Not as severe as Warsaw Convention, but still no cakewalk. And interpretation of some provisions (such as damages for 'emotional distress') reportedly varies by country.
I will defer on that question to those with greater expertise with Montreal Convention.
3. Unlike the airline, Boeing is not protected by Montreal Convention. Or by sovereign immunity.
4. Cook County - where Boeing is headquartered - is known for large jury awards. As is most of US, compared to other countries.
(Also known as "jury roulette" - spin the wheel and see. You may get nothing, or a dollar, or maybe ten million dollars, or much more).
5. Aviation lawyers in US have plenty of experience suing in Cook County. And most such firms are large enough to shoulder burden of subsidizing case until it is resolved. (Client may pay nothing until then, depending on what arrangements are made).
6. How much might be awarded in UAE (if pax could and did sue Boeing or Emirates there)? And who decides how much to award? My guess is it wouldn't be jury roulette as in US.
Weren't many passengers coming from India, perhaps including laborers, domestic help? What would they be valued at in a UAE court?
Those suing are from US, Europe, plus Turkey and UAE. Again, how much would UAE be inclined to award them?
7. Welcome any aviation law experts who (despite their occupation) care to share their insights.
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Touch down 1100 meters from threshold at 162 kts ! I would say Boeing deserve to be applauded rather than sued for having designed an intelligent machine against human stupidity. What could have happened without the RAAS does not bear thinking about.
320goat, I will rise to the challenge, ‘it was an accident waiting to happen’. #25.
If so then why wasn’t this identified beforehand and avoided.
Being entitled to have an opinion is no longer true. You are only entitled to what you can argue for, and in safety terms what you do about your 'opinion'.
RAT, “if you do and say this, you will live” #26, but in circumstances like this what we do is not always what we say (vice versa), or what we think we see, nor understand why.
Why do pilots bin previous experience; good point, ‘first taught best remembered’. Perhaps current training requirements expect operators to train-out experience; focus on SOPs … all circumstances will be covered. But who saw this one coming.
If so then why wasn’t this identified beforehand and avoided.
Being entitled to have an opinion is no longer true. You are only entitled to what you can argue for, and in safety terms what you do about your 'opinion'.
RAT, “if you do and say this, you will live” #26, but in circumstances like this what we do is not always what we say (vice versa), or what we think we see, nor understand why.
Why do pilots bin previous experience; good point, ‘first taught best remembered’. Perhaps current training requirements expect operators to train-out experience; focus on SOPs … all circumstances will be covered. But who saw this one coming.
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Quote safetypee : "But who saw this one coming."
The answer must be, the old wise instructor who once said " one of the most useless things is the rwy behind you".
The answer must be, the old wise instructor who once said " one of the most useless things is the rwy behind you".
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They would have done a long, but safe landing.
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Not if you understand it's limitations. Landing 1100 m down a 4500 m runway is not smart, but it's not a problem.
I bet the EK manual says you have to abort the landing if a warning occurs. If you don't obey = a trip to the boss and possibly a warning letter.
You add the two together and if the manouvre is not performed the way it should, and you get one 777 written off.
I bet the EK manual says you have to abort the landing if a warning occurs. If you don't obey = a trip to the boss and possibly a warning letter.
You add the two together and if the manouvre is not performed the way it should, and you get one 777 written off.
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Basics, basics, basics......
Basic flying skills would obviously have saved the day but how often are commercial pilots applying these basic skills on a day to day basis. Restrictions on when A/P can be taken out, A/T must be used at all times, ILS must be flown if available, blame culture.......to name but a few reasons why you see folks put the A/P in at 200' and take it out again at 500'. Unless you fly for fun in your spare time your skills are being eroded.
I agree this scenario should not cause any problem whatsoever, but the fact is it did and has brought many things to light. Friends on the Boeing have suggested that they could well have been caught out and I applaud them for their honesty, it is too convenient to just say there were a couple of numpties up front that day and it will never happen again. I know some colleagues have now changed the way they brief missed approaches and include balked landings as a way to mitigate against the same mistake happening again (or at least run through it quietly).
If they had pressed the TOGA switch in the flare we would not be having this discussion but the fact is it happened after touch down. How many of us have thrown away landings after touch down? I know I haven't, the closest I got was around 5' to 10' on one occasion on a short runway in Greece. On this occasion it appears TOGA did not perform as PF expected. Should he have advanced the thrust levers?.........of course, was he in a habit of not doing so?..........who knows.......was there deficiency in training in Emirates?.......I don't know. I would be interested to know if many other Boeing pilots out there started to wonder whether they were physically advancing thrust levers or just pressing TOGA.
As an industry we were lucky that there were not many more deaths that day and hopefully those of us that needed an attitude adjustment towards basic skills and automation have learnt a valuable lesson. Those of you who are perfect.....move on nothing to see here.
Safe flying
Basic flying skills would obviously have saved the day but how often are commercial pilots applying these basic skills on a day to day basis. Restrictions on when A/P can be taken out, A/T must be used at all times, ILS must be flown if available, blame culture.......to name but a few reasons why you see folks put the A/P in at 200' and take it out again at 500'. Unless you fly for fun in your spare time your skills are being eroded.
I agree this scenario should not cause any problem whatsoever, but the fact is it did and has brought many things to light. Friends on the Boeing have suggested that they could well have been caught out and I applaud them for their honesty, it is too convenient to just say there were a couple of numpties up front that day and it will never happen again. I know some colleagues have now changed the way they brief missed approaches and include balked landings as a way to mitigate against the same mistake happening again (or at least run through it quietly).
If they had pressed the TOGA switch in the flare we would not be having this discussion but the fact is it happened after touch down. How many of us have thrown away landings after touch down? I know I haven't, the closest I got was around 5' to 10' on one occasion on a short runway in Greece. On this occasion it appears TOGA did not perform as PF expected. Should he have advanced the thrust levers?.........of course, was he in a habit of not doing so?..........who knows.......was there deficiency in training in Emirates?.......I don't know. I would be interested to know if many other Boeing pilots out there started to wonder whether they were physically advancing thrust levers or just pressing TOGA.
As an industry we were lucky that there were not many more deaths that day and hopefully those of us that needed an attitude adjustment towards basic skills and automation have learnt a valuable lesson. Those of you who are perfect.....move on nothing to see here.
Safe flying
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Originally Posted by ManaAdaSystem
They would have done a long, but safe landing.
Which translates to RAAS compromises safety. Best tell Honeywell.
This reminds me of the discussion about the A380 division from MAN to LHR. Human judgement seemed superior to computer judgement, but the commander could not take the risk to over-ride the computer. He had a cast-iron alibi, diverted, and the company picked up the bill and the disgruntled pax had to put up wth it.
Have we really progressed? The days of pilot redundancy are drawing closer. We'll never disappear for PR reasons, but our authority, influence and interjection will be further diluted. Will safety improve? Ask me later.
One wonders if the amount of money spent on technical back-ups to be pilot replacement aids, or back-up systems to prevent pilot screw-ups, or systems to alert pilots that they are screwing up, or systems to............had rather been spent on training to ensure pilots did their daily job properly, we might have prevented all the accidents that required all the back-up systems to prevent pilot screw ups in the first place.
Somehow we are inventing accidents so that we need to invent preventions. The checking process is so outdated and addresses problems that are not relevant. Accidents are happening for other reasons than V1-cuts.
Somehow it use to be easier in the steam driven days. It was a harder work-load, navigation, yes, but we were more 'on top of it'. I enjoyed moving from steam driven to EFIS & EICAS. I thought it was wonderful. It reduced the work load so that I could manage, plan, control and manipulate the flight, during all it phases, in a more relaxed and accurate manner; both manually and via automatics. It was superb; because the old skills were not tossed in the rubbish bin, but kept and alive and kicking and sat there in the back-ground watching over the operation. Airmanship, aeronautical physics have not changed and been over taken by technology. The basics still apply and need to be taught and respected. That teaching has disappeared and will come back to haunt those advocates who allowed it to happen.
Back to the future!
They would have done a long, but safe landing.
Which translates to RAAS compromises safety. Best tell Honeywell.
This reminds me of the discussion about the A380 division from MAN to LHR. Human judgement seemed superior to computer judgement, but the commander could not take the risk to over-ride the computer. He had a cast-iron alibi, diverted, and the company picked up the bill and the disgruntled pax had to put up wth it.
Have we really progressed? The days of pilot redundancy are drawing closer. We'll never disappear for PR reasons, but our authority, influence and interjection will be further diluted. Will safety improve? Ask me later.
One wonders if the amount of money spent on technical back-ups to be pilot replacement aids, or back-up systems to prevent pilot screw-ups, or systems to alert pilots that they are screwing up, or systems to............had rather been spent on training to ensure pilots did their daily job properly, we might have prevented all the accidents that required all the back-up systems to prevent pilot screw ups in the first place.
Somehow we are inventing accidents so that we need to invent preventions. The checking process is so outdated and addresses problems that are not relevant. Accidents are happening for other reasons than V1-cuts.
Somehow it use to be easier in the steam driven days. It was a harder work-load, navigation, yes, but we were more 'on top of it'. I enjoyed moving from steam driven to EFIS & EICAS. I thought it was wonderful. It reduced the work load so that I could manage, plan, control and manipulate the flight, during all it phases, in a more relaxed and accurate manner; both manually and via automatics. It was superb; because the old skills were not tossed in the rubbish bin, but kept and alive and kicking and sat there in the back-ground watching over the operation. Airmanship, aeronautical physics have not changed and been over taken by technology. The basics still apply and need to be taught and respected. That teaching has disappeared and will come back to haunt those advocates who allowed it to happen.
Back to the future!
Last edited by RAT 5; 17th Aug 2017 at 21:02.
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Dubai G/A (not)
Airmanship seems to have been thrown out of the window. Who on earth would command a G/A and not monitor the thrust levers (by feel if nothing else)? Further B’s training demands checking the FMA’s (G/A G/A/ G/A) as the flaps retract and you rotate. If you really cannot – or feel that you dare not do that for some reason – then clear off and leave aeroplanes alone. The other thread which mystifies me is the taxiway line up at LAX. If I was waiting for departure on that taxiway and heard an aircraft query the runway, I would have at least looked up if I had not already been doing so and, though I was not there, I am pretty sure I would have come to the conclusion that the aircraft on finals was heading straight for me. Just one quick flick of the nosewheel light would have ended the problem. What is happening to people? 
Prober
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Controversial, moi?
Forgive my ignorance, but is it not required/necessary to have one hand placed on the throttle levers during a critical phase of flight?
On the wider subject of training and standards I have been involved in some training for Emirates of experienced, but new to Emirates, co-pilots. Without exception those who I had any dealings with were all very competent, diligent and keen. Emirates training is also comprehensive, thorough and the standards set are high.
With an airline of their size and with the number of pilots employed it is inevitable, as with any airline, that someone somewhere will make a mistake. In this case the mistake really should not have happened but that can be said of many aircraft accidents.
The landing was deep but in Emirates a 'Long Landing' warning from the RAAS is a compulsory go-around. Without the RAAS system the landing would probably have continued, there was ample distance to stop easily.
How about we design all our wonderful modern computerised aircraft and our operating SOPs and our training around what comes most naturally to a pilot?
Just advance the thrust levers!
Caveat - advice follows upon evening in pub with old pilots.
Just advance the thrust levers!
Caveat - advice follows upon evening in pub with old pilots.