Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)

[Semaphore Sam]

arcniz said:

"One yardstick for true professionalism in pilots is their ability to show persistent civility to all and have a degree of tolerance for the foibles of others while allowing no compromise in operational matters of real gravity."

The real reason for this 'tolerance for the foibles of others' is the knowledge that 'the foibles of me', if not corrected (hopefully in a tolerant way), could lead to disaster. How many times Captains &, later, F/O's & F/E's have respectfully pointed out my mistakes would fill volumes. If I use insults to point out mistakes, I invite similar treatment, or a petulant (let him stew in his juices); potentially disasterous, either career-wise, or life-wise.

[Fubaar]

Hugmonster, I suspect Wiley had his tongue firmly in his cheek when he said

Seriph, I seem to remember that you have said in earlier posts that you are a current check and training captain of some considerable experience. If that is so, I have to say that you must be an exceptional pilot – I’d go so far as to say unique.

Judging by his posts to date, like you I doubt very much if Seriph has ever set foot in a cockpit as a crewmember.

[Seriph]

Certainly hit the sore spot with you lot haven't we children. So if I were in the profession I would not blame the Rusian crew for deliberately ignoring the TCAS and colliding with another aircraft. They were only following their training, great, lets hope that they don't do it to often then.

[HugMonster]

No sore spot, Seriph. Most professionals dislike having a total outsider blundering around trying to pretend (s)he's an insider, all the time betraying with every breath that they know nothing at all about it, and preaching total nonsense, telling them they know more than the professionals about the industry.

Now run along and play somewhere else.

[7x7]

Seriph, the really sad thing is that you obviously don’t realise how silly you sound with comments like your last post, (where at least you admit you’re not in the Industry).

I have to agree with Hugmonster. By all means surf and ask questions on this site, but do yourself, this site - (and not just this thread) - and your credibility all a huge favour and desist posting ‘knowledgably’ on subjects you quite obviously know little or nothing about.

[Standard_Departure]

WRT Air Traffic Control;

The ATC SYSTEM messed up.

In any ATC system, the controller is only one part of the bigger picture , other factors are (amongst others) equipment, staffing, working hours, conditions, training etc...

WRT the T154 pilot;

It is apparent that there were contradicting instructions simultaneously and also contradicting opinions (between the flight deck crew) as to which they should follow.

WRT the International Aviation System;

If nothing else, this accident will cause all Aviation authorities to consider (or re-consider) their stance wrt to RA responses, so that a globaly uniform attitude can be accepted by all concerned, and training along identical lines can be enforced.

SID

[Capt PPRuNe]

Please leave the moderating to the moderators. Either discuss the topic and counter comments that you don't agree with by supplying something more useful than guesses at the posters background and insults. I can assure you all that Seriph is indeed a current line training captain on Boeing heavy metal. Whilst (s)he has an often condescending tone, the observations and comments are all valid items of debate and I don't need those of you with a sensitive disposition moving this debate off topic!

[patrickal]

You all may find this interesting. I had never heard about this incident, but it again shows what happens when ATC at TCAS give opposite directions to a pilot.

On Jan. 31, 2001, JAL flight 907, a Boeing 747 had departed Tokyo-Haneda for a flight with destination Naha. JAL Flight 958, a DC-10-40 was en route from Pusan to Tokyo-Narita. A trainee controller cleared flight 907 to climb to Flight Lever 390 at 15.46h. Two minutes later JL958 reported at FL370. Both flights were on an intersecting course near the Yaizu NDB. At 15.54 the controller noticed this, but instead of ordering flight 958 to descend, he ordered the Boeing 747 to descend: "Japan air niner zero seven, descend and maintain flight level three five zero, begin descent due to traffic." Immediately after this instruction, the crew of flight 907 were given an aural TCAS Resolution Advisory to climb in order to avoid a collision. At the same time the crew of flight 958 were given an aural TCAS Resolution Advisory to descend. The captain of flight 907 followed the instructions of the air traffic controller by descending. The 747 now approaching close to Flight 958, because the DC-10 captain descended as well, following the advisory of his TCAS. A collision was averted when the pilot of flight 907 then put his Boeing 747 into a nosedive. The 747 missed the DC-10 by 105 to 165 meters in lateral distance and 20 to 60 meters in altitude difference. About 100 crew and passengers on flight 907 sustained injuries due to emergency manoevre, while no one was injured on Flight 958. Flight 958 continued to Narita, while flight 907 returned to Haneda Airport.
PROBABLE CAUSE: The Aircraft and Railway Accident Investigation Commission concluded that air traffic control's error in giving the wrong flight numbers when asking the pilots to change course and the pilots' decision to follow air traffic control instead of the computerized Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) were two of the main causes.
Safety actions :
The commission recommended a.o. that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) put priority on computer orders over instructions from controllers to prevent similar incidents.

here is the URL;
http://aviation-safety.net/database/...20010131-0.htm

[Ignition Override]

What some of you are trying to remind us is that the Swiss controller gave the Russian pilots a clearance to either descend, or climb (I can't remember), which was supposedly a contradiction of what the Tupolev crew needed to do. One person seems to know more about the tragedy's cause(s) than the European investigation team, or simply has a personal bias against all of Eastern Europe. Is there a fair possibility that the Russian plane's TCAS either quickly changed its first Resolution Advisory, or that the Russian pilot at the controls assumed that the controller had better information than what the TCAS indicated?

Is this not what the debate is about?

I've seen TCAS give us contradictory or quickly changing commands (RAs) at least twice, usually on downwind abeam (MSP) or on constant vectors towards a very busy hub airport (DFW), maybe due to aircraft in a turn with VNAV making a last-second level-off, as often happens? A pilot on a different fleet here told me that TCAS probably saved his 757 from a collision in night IMC, and the controller never acknowledged the other, much smaller aircraft around 10,000' near Baltimore, Dulles or DCA. One of our pilots was a KLM Cruise Pilot for two years and had a similar experience, but saw the approaching plane's lights at cruise altitude over a foreign country around 0200-0300: ATC never acknowledged the near-disaster.

[Alpha Leader]

Leaving aside personal culpability for the moment, the fact remains that Skyguide is essentially a "string and cellotape" outfit. And despite the recent tragedy, there is no sign of any internal reflection on spending priorities. We now have the following expenditure planned:

- CHF 130 million required to meet Intl Accounting Standards

- CHF 20 million as provisions for pensions payable to former military ATC personnel whose functions are now integrated into Skyguide's "to do" list

- CHF 40 million required for Skyguide's new centre at Dübendorf (ready in 2007)

So, we have planned expenditure of CHF 190 million of which only CHF 40 million (~20%, equivalent to the investment in a new ATC centre), are going to contribute anything tangible to improved ATC levels; all else is administrative and provident fund expenditure.

All this against a background of a CHF 16 million loss in the last FY and a projected "negative profit" in the same order budgeted for the current year.

Due to political pressure on the home front (the country has, unfortunately, a new flag carrier that's ailing, too), ATC fees are not going to be raised. Instead, it's the taxpayer who is going to be footing yet another Swiss aviation debacle.

[Proceed As Cleared]

Alpha Leader,

If I may ask, what sort of "internal reflection on spending priorities" would you have in mind?

And what should it be that will "contribute anything tangible to improved ATC levels"?


Is your reflection on Skyguide's expenditures in any way relevant?

Do you have an inside knowledge of how ATC works (operational and administrative)?


And most of all, has there been any final report published so far leading to the necessity of tangible improvement of ATC levels and reflection on spending priorities?

[Alpha Leader]

Proceed As Cleared:

I'm sure that if you care to read my previous postings on this thread as well as on the "TCAS altitude information" thread in Tech Log you will find that all your questions will be addressed.

[Proceed As Cleared]

Alpha Leader,

Sorry, not good enough.

You are making allegations and accusations apparently based on hearsay and what you are reading in various sources.

Unless you can tell me what you're background in ATC is (if you have any), I cannot take your opinions concerning Skyguide and ATC in general serious.

You seem to be reluctant to do so for whatever reason.

Maybe I should make the first step by telling you that I used to work for Skyguide, that I used to work with the controller involved and that I therefore have an in depth knowledge of the procedures etc.

Now if you would like to share with us your knowledge of Skyguide and ATC based on experience ...

[HotDog]

You are making allegations and accusations apparently based on hearsay and what you are reading in various sources.

Alpha Leader has proven to be an expert at the above. Pick any subject you like, HKAOA, Australian immigration practices, etc. etc. Not averse to disparaging his own heritage either.

[Alpha Leader]

Proceed As Cleared:

If my response is "not good enough" for you, that's just too bad. The point is that all your questions relating to this thread as well as to my background have been addressed in one form or another in previous postings, so all you would have to do is read them.

If I have posted any item that is patently untrue, not only I but indeed all forum participants would obviously be more than happy to accept your word on your credentials and be reassured by you (and, of course, Skyguide management, whose word - given the recent disinformation campaign about the tragic mid-air collision - might be more suspect) that all is well at Skyguide.

However, if you wish to hold an informed debate on Skyguide's investment and other priorities (and leaving aside trivial details such as a phone system with only one back-up line), let's start with the following two points:

- Exactly when will Skyguide have full primary radar coverage in place?

- Why is there such high priority placed by Skyguide on full integration of civil and military ATC? Is there any technical and safety benefit to be derived from this (beyond, of course, the political benefit of having thrown a spanner in the works of a proposed pan-European civil ATC)?

[Don't Look Now]

As someone closely involved with aforementioned company, I would say that Alpha Leaders comments were particularly pertinent. In response to your questions AL;

a) Never (too costly)

b) Easy way to articially boost controller numbers without too much investment (ie less costly)

[Proceed As Cleared]

given the recent disinformation campaign about the tragic mid-air collision

Now you start talking cr@p, Alpha Leader.

The first press conference that had been held by Skyguide was based on information they had at the time (a few hours after the collision).

It remains questionable in the aftermath, if it had been wiser to inform at a later stage with more accurate information.
But then again you possibly would have suggested that they were trying to hide something...

Bashing Skyguide entirely over the whole affair with out-of-context posts like yours about various expenditures is neither fair nor objective.
There have been already too many indifferent, speculative and subjective "contributions" in various newspapers (with the exception of the NZZ), which do not help the matter at all.

May I remind you of the following findings, published by the german BFU (accident investigation authority):

1. The DHL crew didn't inform the controller about their TCAS descent until after 23 secs of commencing the descent (requirement: immediately).

2. Within those 23 secs the controller cleared the TU for decsent twice.
Had the controller known about the action taken by the DHL crew immediately, it is fair to say, that he would have not cleared the TU for descent.

3. The TU crew did not follow the RA to climb.
It remains to be seen if there is an ICAO regulation existing concerning following an RA or an ATC instruction.
If there is none, then ICAO would have to explain a few things as well...
(patrickals post in this respect is very revealing).


It is not my intention to put any blame away from Skyguide and on the pilots entirely. But there is more than one cause which led to this accident and it will be up to the authorities in charge to determine those causes and to weigh them.

Until the final report will be released we should stick to the facts and refrain from speculating.

And let me reiterate: It could have happened anywhere, anytime, and it has been very close many times previously (again refer to patrickals post).

The guys and girls at Skyguide are doing a great job in a very busy environment, with small airspace to work with and a lot of traffic.

It is unfortunate that good work is hardly being appreciated, but that incidents and accidents find their way quickly into the public.
But this is a fate ATCOs have to put up with.
And it would make it easier to put up with, if journalists and other "experts" would stick to the facts rather than speculate, accuse, blame and, most of all, if they had the required knowledge of the matter.

[Don't Look Now]

Proceed as Cleared,

I think that the conflicting information initially published was evidence of non existant (or badly thought of) critical incident management policies. The management was clearly overwhelmed and under prepared for such an eventuality.

This sad event has perhaps made a lot of ATS providers rethink their reactions in such an event.

Very many ATS providers are understaffed and struggling to modernise ancient working practices, equipment etc on a shaky financial basis. Events like these will obviously highlight their shortfalls.

[Proceed As Cleared]

The management was clearly overwhelmed and under prepared for such an eventuality

I agree with you on that, and I think you can't really blame them for that since such an event is the absolute nightmare for everyone directly or indirectly involved.

And I can imagine that it was also the sheer pressure of having to inform the public in order not to get blamed for trying to hide anything.
But having dealt with certain managers involved in the information process I can honestly state, that their integrity is beyond reproach and therefore I do not believe that it was their intention to misinform the public.

Understaffing is a widely common problem for ATC providers (with only a few exceptions...yet), caused too often by insufficient personnel planning in the past.

And ATC providers in general will have to revise working practices like single manned operations (very common).

Getting distracted can happen easily and must not be underestimated even with little traffic to handle.

However, as I've stated above, there appear to be other factors involved which led to the collision, apart from what Skyguide allegedly contributed.
And it would only be fair to acknowledge that.

[Carruthers]

Mistakes are made daily by pilots and controllers, they are of course usually sorted without harmful effect. It is not on to pillary this controller or the ATC agency who are only part of the tragic course of events, if the Rusian crew had responded to the TCAS then we would have had a near miss and we have those not infrequently. Simple fact is that TCAS has prevented a significant number of conflicts it hasn't caused any and most of those it avoided were the result of human error, world wide.