Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)
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Can I just reiterate the importance of distinguishing between:
a) Not Following an RA.
b) Manoeuvering Opposite an RA.
The first might be necessary in certain circumstances, but should not be too hazardous in an all TCAS environment.
The second is incredibly dangerous and almost certain to reduce separation.
At this stage, this accident looks likely to have been finalised by two RAs being manouevered against.
CPB
a) Not Following an RA.
b) Manoeuvering Opposite an RA.
The first might be necessary in certain circumstances, but should not be too hazardous in an all TCAS environment.
The second is incredibly dangerous and almost certain to reduce separation.
At this stage, this accident looks likely to have been finalised by two RAs being manouevered against.
CPB
Use of the verb 'should'
There has been some speculation in this thread as to why the conditional verb 'should' appears in guidelines on the use of TCAS, rather than the mandatory 'shall', 'must' or, perhaps, 'will' in US parlance.
Convention has it that guidelines published in advisory circulars, JAA guidance leaflets, AMCs/ACJs and IEMs, civil air publications, etc. do not comprise legally binding regulations, and therefore cannot use 'shall', 'must' or 'will'. Legislation, on the other hand, ought not to use the verb 'should'.
In the case of TCAS, the guidelines (CAP 579 and TGL 11) were written knowing from past experience with GPWS that situations don't always fit the assumptions, and that therefore some leeway must be left to the individual to cater for the unexpected. 'Should' is used to mean, 'It is expected that you will act as described unless there is a compelling reason why you should not do so'.
For example, the most recent issue of 'Flight International' contains an article in which mention is made of the JAL 747-400/DC-10 conflict, when - it states - 'a collision (was) averted when the DC-10 pilot saw what was happening and pulled up, while the 747 crew pushed its aircraft into a steeper dive.' The article had explained that in a compatible RA scenario, the 747 crew had received a 'Climb' RA but had instead descended. Just think what might have happened if the DC-10 pilot hadn't used his initiative at the last moment and reversed his manoeuvre!
Other reasons why 'should' is used is that there can be times when RAs are false, ie they act upon incorrect data and post an RA that ought properly to be ignored. It does happen, albeit infrequently. Also, although TCAS II version 7 includes a much-improved miss-distance filter, RAs can still be posted when an adequate horizontal distance exists between potentially-conflicting aeroplanes.
Some latitude is needed to allow pilots to cope with the unexpected. However, if the continued use of 'should' is unclear, one possible solution might be to draft the sentence using 'shall' followed by 'unless' with a suitable clause. The trouble then is, the sentence tends to become rather long and inclusive. As a pilot, I prefer simple, easy-to-understand instructions!
Convention has it that guidelines published in advisory circulars, JAA guidance leaflets, AMCs/ACJs and IEMs, civil air publications, etc. do not comprise legally binding regulations, and therefore cannot use 'shall', 'must' or 'will'. Legislation, on the other hand, ought not to use the verb 'should'.
In the case of TCAS, the guidelines (CAP 579 and TGL 11) were written knowing from past experience with GPWS that situations don't always fit the assumptions, and that therefore some leeway must be left to the individual to cater for the unexpected. 'Should' is used to mean, 'It is expected that you will act as described unless there is a compelling reason why you should not do so'.
For example, the most recent issue of 'Flight International' contains an article in which mention is made of the JAL 747-400/DC-10 conflict, when - it states - 'a collision (was) averted when the DC-10 pilot saw what was happening and pulled up, while the 747 crew pushed its aircraft into a steeper dive.' The article had explained that in a compatible RA scenario, the 747 crew had received a 'Climb' RA but had instead descended. Just think what might have happened if the DC-10 pilot hadn't used his initiative at the last moment and reversed his manoeuvre!
Other reasons why 'should' is used is that there can be times when RAs are false, ie they act upon incorrect data and post an RA that ought properly to be ignored. It does happen, albeit infrequently. Also, although TCAS II version 7 includes a much-improved miss-distance filter, RAs can still be posted when an adequate horizontal distance exists between potentially-conflicting aeroplanes.
Some latitude is needed to allow pilots to cope with the unexpected. However, if the continued use of 'should' is unclear, one possible solution might be to draft the sentence using 'shall' followed by 'unless' with a suitable clause. The trouble then is, the sentence tends to become rather long and inclusive. As a pilot, I prefer simple, easy-to-understand instructions!
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I must have missed something...the BFU website mentions the TU-154 flying against an "climb" RA, but no mention of the 757 flying against it's "descend" RA where is the info posted that refutes or elaborates on this...by the investigators, not newspapers please
on your FM dial
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ironbutt57,
I am guessing that you are referring to Capt Pit Bull’s post.
The best available information from the BFU is that the Boeing followed the “DESCEND DESCEND” and “INCREASE DESCENT” resolution advisories.
The TU-154 descended when it had a “CLIMB CLIMB” resolution advisory, and continued to descend when it received an “INCREASE CLIMB” resolution advisory.
It is the TU-154 that flew contrary to two RAs.
Capt Pit Bull,
I must again express my gratitude for your most expert postings on these pages. Your numerous contributions on this and other threads have assisted me in gaining an enhanced understanding of the philosophy and function of TCAS, and have given an insight into the likely performance of the TCAS systems aboard those two ill-fated airliners.
It behoves all of us to have the highest possible level of knowledge about how this gear works. You have contributed significantly to my level of understanding.
It is a crying shame that most airlines don’t have a proper TCAS training program, electing to brush over it using a minimum-cost approach.
Thanks again.
I am guessing that you are referring to Capt Pit Bull’s post.
The best available information from the BFU is that the Boeing followed the “DESCEND DESCEND” and “INCREASE DESCENT” resolution advisories.
The TU-154 descended when it had a “CLIMB CLIMB” resolution advisory, and continued to descend when it received an “INCREASE CLIMB” resolution advisory.
It is the TU-154 that flew contrary to two RAs.
Capt Pit Bull,
I must again express my gratitude for your most expert postings on these pages. Your numerous contributions on this and other threads have assisted me in gaining an enhanced understanding of the philosophy and function of TCAS, and have given an insight into the likely performance of the TCAS systems aboard those two ill-fated airliners.
It behoves all of us to have the highest possible level of knowledge about how this gear works. You have contributed significantly to my level of understanding.
It is a crying shame that most airlines don’t have a proper TCAS training program, electing to brush over it using a minimum-cost approach.
Thanks again.
Keeping Danny in Sandwiches
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Nuggett
I think that we need 3 crew on the Flight Deck; the 3rd a lawyer to explain when the information we have is guidlines, or legislation and when we can, or cannot ignore it.
I think that we need 3 crew on the Flight Deck; the 3rd a lawyer to explain when the information we have is guidlines, or legislation and when we can, or cannot ignore it.
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Another close call
I see in the latest issue of ‘Flight International’, (23-29 Jul, page 20), JAL had a recent airmiss with ‘strong parallels to collision over Southern Germany’. This incident involved a 747-400 and a DC-10, and the two aircraft came within 10 metres of each other.
JAL are meeting ICAO and want SOPs for response to RAs to be placed into Operations Manuals. The article doesn’t say whether the 747 and the DC-10 were crossing or opposite direction on the same track, but either way, 10 meters – or 33 feet – is too damn close for comfort.
It’s a pity JAL don’t demand ICAO institute 410’s idea of everyone flying offset, so that in the vast majority of cases like the one above, such mistakes would probably just be TAs and the crews wouldn’t even need to hand fly any manoeuvre required to resolve the conflict.
JAL are meeting ICAO and want SOPs for response to RAs to be placed into Operations Manuals. The article doesn’t say whether the 747 and the DC-10 were crossing or opposite direction on the same track, but either way, 10 meters – or 33 feet – is too damn close for comfort.
It’s a pity JAL don’t demand ICAO institute 410’s idea of everyone flying offset, so that in the vast majority of cases like the one above, such mistakes would probably just be TAs and the crews wouldn’t even need to hand fly any manoeuvre required to resolve the conflict.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
They were crossing at about 90 degrees, just like in Germany. The 747 was passing FL369, climbing to FL390 in a left turn to head SW for Okinawa via Yaizu NDB. The DC-10 was flying east FL370 from Kowa VORTAC to Oshima VORTAC. The controller meant to get the DC-10 to descend to FL350 to go below - but passed the instruction to the 747 to descend instead. At which stage all the confusion started to arise prior to the TA/RAs.
Offset would not have been a factor in the circumstances.
Full article in AW&ST (If you subscribe):
AW&ST
Offset would not have been a factor in the circumstances.
Full article in AW&ST (If you subscribe):
AW&ST
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FWIW the following appeared in Usenet (no source given).
Q. Would not a visual at -3.8 seconds have been enough to escape ?
Q. Would not a visual at -3.8 seconds have been enough to escape ?
50 Sec: (Time remaining to collision) Tu-154 TCAS: "Traffic, traffic". (TCAS - the warning system of midair collision on Tu-154 informs the crew about the conflicting aircraft)
45 Sec: Zurich-south: "VTS29E ... Descend, flight level 350, expedite, traffic." (Controller gives the command to our crew to descend to FL350, and explains that the course of the Tu-154 intersects the course of another aircraft. VTS29E is the Tu-154 call sign. Dots designate unintelligible words or parts of phrases.)
40 Sec: Tu-154 cockpit area mike: "Begin descent." (obvious that crew on the Tu-154 understood the command. It is most probable that this phrase in Russian belongs to the craft commander.)
38 Sec: Boeing TCAS: "Descend, descend!" (TCAS system is recommending to the crew of the Boeing to descend. Boeing begins descent.)
35 Sec: Tu-154 TCAS: "Climb, climb!" (TCAS system is recommending to the crew of the Tu-154 to climb)
34 Sec: Tu-154 cockpit area mike: "Climb!, it says" (one of the crew members Tu-154 (most likely, copilot) repeats the instruction from TCAS. It is clear that they recognized the awkwardness of situation.)
32 Sec: Tu-154 cockpit area mike: "Descend, b..." (this is the comment of one of the senior pilots: Not your concern, descend. Could be the aircraft commander or the check pilot, who was also present aboard, it is said with confidence - it is more important to listen to the instructions of the controller.)
30 Sec: Zurich-south: "VTS29E, descend to flight level 350, expedite descent." (Controller repeats his instruction.)
25 Sec: Tu-154 "VTS29E expediting to flight level 350, VTS29E." (Crew on Tu-154 confirms instruction, repeats flight level - according to the rules of radio traffic, indicates accuracy. Tu-154 begins descent.)
20 Sec: Zurich-south: "Yes, you have traffic, two o'clock, now at 360. (Controller provides the crew of the Tu-154 information for possible visual identification - the heading between the nose of the aircraft and the direction to the other aircraft. In the West it is common to issue course position, as the center of a clock dial tying object to the position of the numbers of the dial. "two o'clock" means: object is located to the right at an angle of 60 degrees from the nose of your aircraft. With this instruction, the controller told the crew of the Tu-154 to look forward, to the right. But in reality, the Boeing was located to the left - at an angle of 300 degrees, i.e., 10 o'clock! The controller should have directed this instruction to the Boeing. Apparently, he intended to do this, but mixed it up.)
19 Sec: Boeing: Sound of audible indicator. (Sound reflects some action with the equipment on board the Boeing.)
13,3 Sec: Boeing: "611, TCAS-descent." (crew of Boeing tells controller that they are descending on command of the TCAS system. Pilot used his call sign without the letters, just the three numbers. Means, situation calm.)
11 Sec: Tu-154 cockpit area mike: "B... d', where is it? (crew of the Tu-154 looked to the right for several seconds, searching for the intersecting aircraft, but can't find it. Captain is irritated.)
9,5 Sec: Tu-154 TCAS: "Increase climb!, increase climb!" (TCAS systems directs crew Tu-154 to increase their rate of climb.)
5,3 Sec: Tu-154 cockpit area mike: "Climb!, it says" (the same member of the crew, which the first time drew the attention of the Captain to the indication of the TCAS, again brings it to his attention.)
3,8 Sec: Boeing cockpit area mike: <Expletive> (Crew on Boeing saw other aircraft, pulls back on yoke.)
1,8 Sec: Tu-154 cockpit area mike: <Expletive> (on Tu-154 they saw the Boeing. Crew pulls back on yoke.)
00 Sec: - 1 hour 35 min 55 s. Moscow time. IMPACT.
45 Sec: Zurich-south: "VTS29E ... Descend, flight level 350, expedite, traffic." (Controller gives the command to our crew to descend to FL350, and explains that the course of the Tu-154 intersects the course of another aircraft. VTS29E is the Tu-154 call sign. Dots designate unintelligible words or parts of phrases.)
40 Sec: Tu-154 cockpit area mike: "Begin descent." (obvious that crew on the Tu-154 understood the command. It is most probable that this phrase in Russian belongs to the craft commander.)
38 Sec: Boeing TCAS: "Descend, descend!" (TCAS system is recommending to the crew of the Boeing to descend. Boeing begins descent.)
35 Sec: Tu-154 TCAS: "Climb, climb!" (TCAS system is recommending to the crew of the Tu-154 to climb)
34 Sec: Tu-154 cockpit area mike: "Climb!, it says" (one of the crew members Tu-154 (most likely, copilot) repeats the instruction from TCAS. It is clear that they recognized the awkwardness of situation.)
32 Sec: Tu-154 cockpit area mike: "Descend, b..." (this is the comment of one of the senior pilots: Not your concern, descend. Could be the aircraft commander or the check pilot, who was also present aboard, it is said with confidence - it is more important to listen to the instructions of the controller.)
30 Sec: Zurich-south: "VTS29E, descend to flight level 350, expedite descent." (Controller repeats his instruction.)
25 Sec: Tu-154 "VTS29E expediting to flight level 350, VTS29E." (Crew on Tu-154 confirms instruction, repeats flight level - according to the rules of radio traffic, indicates accuracy. Tu-154 begins descent.)
20 Sec: Zurich-south: "Yes, you have traffic, two o'clock, now at 360. (Controller provides the crew of the Tu-154 information for possible visual identification - the heading between the nose of the aircraft and the direction to the other aircraft. In the West it is common to issue course position, as the center of a clock dial tying object to the position of the numbers of the dial. "two o'clock" means: object is located to the right at an angle of 60 degrees from the nose of your aircraft. With this instruction, the controller told the crew of the Tu-154 to look forward, to the right. But in reality, the Boeing was located to the left - at an angle of 300 degrees, i.e., 10 o'clock! The controller should have directed this instruction to the Boeing. Apparently, he intended to do this, but mixed it up.)
19 Sec: Boeing: Sound of audible indicator. (Sound reflects some action with the equipment on board the Boeing.)
13,3 Sec: Boeing: "611, TCAS-descent." (crew of Boeing tells controller that they are descending on command of the TCAS system. Pilot used his call sign without the letters, just the three numbers. Means, situation calm.)
11 Sec: Tu-154 cockpit area mike: "B... d', where is it? (crew of the Tu-154 looked to the right for several seconds, searching for the intersecting aircraft, but can't find it. Captain is irritated.)
9,5 Sec: Tu-154 TCAS: "Increase climb!, increase climb!" (TCAS systems directs crew Tu-154 to increase their rate of climb.)
5,3 Sec: Tu-154 cockpit area mike: "Climb!, it says" (the same member of the crew, which the first time drew the attention of the Captain to the indication of the TCAS, again brings it to his attention.)
3,8 Sec: Boeing cockpit area mike: <Expletive> (Crew on Boeing saw other aircraft, pulls back on yoke.)
1,8 Sec: Tu-154 cockpit area mike: <Expletive> (on Tu-154 they saw the Boeing. Crew pulls back on yoke.)
00 Sec: - 1 hour 35 min 55 s. Moscow time. IMPACT.
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...german news agency dpa is reporting from moscow that the atc mixed up the two machines when he gave the final instructions before the crash (from german yahoo! news)...
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IMHO preliminary CVR shows that ATC totally mixed up, confusing crew of Tupolev made them looking for conflicting traffic at 2 o’clock position while has indicating on TCAS display conflicting traffic approaching from the 9 o’clock and finally giving radar advise that conflicting traffic is at FL360 just before DHL leaves following their own RA! And my feelings that actually Tupolev crew was really considering follow RA but supervisor pilot has gave an order to follow ATC
What a damn things could happen, unbelievable
What a damn things could happen, unbelievable
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So the controller made a mistake and who doesn't, we recognise that humans err that is why we have GPWS etc and of course TCAS, if eastern block crews can't operate to the required standards they should not be allowed into RVSM airspace. This accident was avoidable and there are no excuses.
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Seriph, the point here is that several mistakes were made. It is very far from being as simple as you would appear to want it.
Eastern block aircrew are just as professional and competent as their European colleagues. Their training is just as rigorous.
Furthermore, nobody is trying to make excuses.
What the authorities are trying to do is to establish what factors led to this incident and prevent them happening again.
Remember - there is never, ever, a single cause of any accident.
If you are interested in learning a little more about the industry and how safety is managed and regulated, you can write to the CAA Library and ask for a copy of their catalogue.
Eastern block aircrew are just as professional and competent as their European colleagues. Their training is just as rigorous.
Furthermore, nobody is trying to make excuses.
What the authorities are trying to do is to establish what factors led to this incident and prevent them happening again.
Remember - there is never, ever, a single cause of any accident.
If you are interested in learning a little more about the industry and how safety is managed and regulated, you can write to the CAA Library and ask for a copy of their catalogue.
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Seriph, maybe it is because you display no understanding whatsoever of the industry, how people work, how accidents evolve, how they are investigated, how they are prevented.
Sure, if they had followed the TCAS there would have been no accident.
Had the Swiss controller not left it too late there would have been no accident.
Had the 757 not followed their TCAS there would have been no accident.
Had the Swiss controller just shut up and let TCAS handle it all there would have been no accident.
So, until you know more about aviation than you learnt in your "I-Spy Planes" book, shut up and stop bothering the grownups.
Sure, if they had followed the TCAS there would have been no accident.
Had the Swiss controller not left it too late there would have been no accident.
Had the 757 not followed their TCAS there would have been no accident.
Had the Swiss controller just shut up and let TCAS handle it all there would have been no accident.
So, until you know more about aviation than you learnt in your "I-Spy Planes" book, shut up and stop bothering the grownups.
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Hear Hear Hugmonster - was about to post a similar response but you beat me to it
Seriph admits that both ATC and Pilot made mistakes but for some reason holds the Pilot totally responsible for the accident.
"This accident was avoidable and there are no excuses." - what an immensely dumb thing to say - all accidents are avoidable - they wouldn't be accidents if they weren't
Seriph admits that both ATC and Pilot made mistakes but for some reason holds the Pilot totally responsible for the accident.
"This accident was avoidable and there are no excuses." - what an immensely dumb thing to say - all accidents are avoidable - they wouldn't be accidents if they weren't
Last edited by btmtdi; 7th Aug 2002 at 10:21.
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I echo HugMonster's comment.
Managing to put two aircraft in the same place in an otherwise (virtually) empty night sky takes some doing. By the time TCAS RAs came into the picture the game was almost up.
Managing to put two aircraft in the same place in an otherwise (virtually) empty night sky takes some doing. By the time TCAS RAs came into the picture the game was almost up.
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Seriph, I seem to remember that you have said in earlier posts that you are a current check and training captain of some considerable experience. If that is so, I have to say that you must be an exceptional pilot – I’d go so far as to say unique. You must be so incredibly – unbelievably – excellent in everything you do that, unlike the rest of us, (that’s 99.9999% of us, I think), you don’t seem to have encountered sufficient humbling incidents while achieving your extensive experience to illustrate that human beings – all the rest of us – make mistakes, and nothing in this business is as starkly black and white as it appears to be to you.
As has been said already on this thread, this terrible accident has brought home one of the real shortcomings of TCAS – its reliance in an RA that both (or all) pilots concerned react immediately and absolutely correctly in what will almost certainly be a very confusing and time-critical situation.
No one mistake ever causes an accident like this. It was a classic ‘error chain’ event. There were a half dozen chances in the minutes leading up t the collision where the error chain might have been broken. In 99.9% of cases like this, one of those chances breaks the chain and disaster is averted. In this case, very unusually, that vital break didn’t occur. The Russian pilots reacted as they were trained to do. You can’t blame them for the accident any more than you can blame the supervisor who decided that the maintenance on the ground-based traffic warning equipment should be done on that particular night. You might as well charge the person who made the cup of coffee the missing controller drank that caused his bladder to require relief at that particular time – or the person who happened to be on the phone that blocked the controller’s attempted co-ordination call. Or any one of the half dozen or more other people, any one of whom, had he or she done one small thing differently, might have broken the error chain, (as happens hundreds of times every day).
As has been said already on this thread, this terrible accident has brought home one of the real shortcomings of TCAS – its reliance in an RA that both (or all) pilots concerned react immediately and absolutely correctly in what will almost certainly be a very confusing and time-critical situation.
No one mistake ever causes an accident like this. It was a classic ‘error chain’ event. There were a half dozen chances in the minutes leading up t the collision where the error chain might have been broken. In 99.9% of cases like this, one of those chances breaks the chain and disaster is averted. In this case, very unusually, that vital break didn’t occur. The Russian pilots reacted as they were trained to do. You can’t blame them for the accident any more than you can blame the supervisor who decided that the maintenance on the ground-based traffic warning equipment should be done on that particular night. You might as well charge the person who made the cup of coffee the missing controller drank that caused his bladder to require relief at that particular time – or the person who happened to be on the phone that blocked the controller’s attempted co-ordination call. Or any one of the half dozen or more other people, any one of whom, had he or she done one small thing differently, might have broken the error chain, (as happens hundreds of times every day).
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Wiley, Seriph isn't a pilot. (S)he isn't even in the industry. (S)he is a wannabe, who thinks (s)he knows lots about the industry, but in fact knows nothing and understands even less. (S)he may be quite proficient at MSFS and wants everyone here to think (s)he is a high flier.
Quite sad, really.
Quite sad, really.
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HugMonster - I share your criticism of Seriph. The biggest tip-off is attitude - Seriph seems to want to pick a fight with everybody in sight. Tactless and 'frequently wrong' is not a good combination.
I have often marveled at the large proportion of even-tempered people involved in sailing, even though many still manage to be opinionated and 'colorful'. One explanation is that a Darwinian selection takes place, since many opportunities exist for the disagreeable ones to go over the side, far from land, and heaven help them if a hand does not reach out to haul them back aboard.
Aviation is similar - at least in regard to the need for getting along with one's fellows in cramped spaces on long and sometimes stressful tours, with plenty of chance for boredom and friction along the way. Many selections occur on the long march from cub to captain. One yardstick for true professionalism in pilots is their ability to show persistent civility to all and have a degree of tolerance for the foibles of others while allowing no compromise in operational matters of real gravity.
I have often marveled at the large proportion of even-tempered people involved in sailing, even though many still manage to be opinionated and 'colorful'. One explanation is that a Darwinian selection takes place, since many opportunities exist for the disagreeable ones to go over the side, far from land, and heaven help them if a hand does not reach out to haul them back aboard.
Aviation is similar - at least in regard to the need for getting along with one's fellows in cramped spaces on long and sometimes stressful tours, with plenty of chance for boredom and friction along the way. Many selections occur on the long march from cub to captain. One yardstick for true professionalism in pilots is their ability to show persistent civility to all and have a degree of tolerance for the foibles of others while allowing no compromise in operational matters of real gravity.
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Some very good points there, arcniz. I shall attempt to take them on board! 
Of course, there is another possibility, which is often demonstrated here - that the insults are not meant for real, and that (s)he is just trying to stir things up a little? I know of several posters who reserve different characteristics for different noms-de-plume.
Of course, there is another possibility, which is often demonstrated here - that the insults are not meant for real, and that (s)he is just trying to stir things up a little? I know of several posters who reserve different characteristics for different noms-de-plume.