Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)
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fergineer - the '10 doesn't have TCAS yet (but will do), the TriShaw is being fleet-fitted, the 130J and C-17 have it already. Don't know about the old 130K (but I doubt it) or the Comet 5.
Remember the guidance on 'state' aircraft and also that some Ar$ecoat call-signs will not have RVSM approval if operating in formation - for example on AAR trails.
I wouldn't be surprised to see EASA telling the military either to fit TCAS or to keep out of RVSM airspace altogether when they come into existence. I can see no reason (cost is no excuse) for such minority airpace users not to comply with normal regulatory mandates!
Remember the guidance on 'state' aircraft and also that some Ar$ecoat call-signs will not have RVSM approval if operating in formation - for example on AAR trails.
I wouldn't be surprised to see EASA telling the military either to fit TCAS or to keep out of RVSM airspace altogether when they come into existence. I can see no reason (cost is no excuse) for such minority airpace users not to comply with normal regulatory mandates!
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Captain Pit Bull, there is still one more scenario possible...something I don't want to think off, it shows that both TCAS systems ordered descent RAs....
It does not change the given facts.
What it did change, and I sincerely hope will do also in the future, is the fact, that plenty of us silently grabbed the (unfortunately too often too flimsy) ACAS documention available to us. Plenty of questions to ask and plenty of "new" findings while re-reading the basic principles of collision avoidance ideas.
Than there is the concerned thought about an aeroplane, equipped with the latest technology, and a crew who simply lacks the fundamental indepth knowledge about these systems and the associated procedures because there was no adequate training available or provided. Something which may be a factor in a lot of our beancounter run operations...
Let's face it, training is the best safety factor we can be provided with, a keypoint in our daily professional work. I for one hope, that this tragedy leads towards more questions and knowledge demands about the fitted systems in our aeroplanes.
It does not change the given facts.
What it did change, and I sincerely hope will do also in the future, is the fact, that plenty of us silently grabbed the (unfortunately too often too flimsy) ACAS documention available to us. Plenty of questions to ask and plenty of "new" findings while re-reading the basic principles of collision avoidance ideas.
Than there is the concerned thought about an aeroplane, equipped with the latest technology, and a crew who simply lacks the fundamental indepth knowledge about these systems and the associated procedures because there was no adequate training available or provided. Something which may be a factor in a lot of our beancounter run operations...
Let's face it, training is the best safety factor we can be provided with, a keypoint in our daily professional work. I for one hope, that this tragedy leads towards more questions and knowledge demands about the fitted systems in our aeroplanes.
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SD
The French administration DGAC has made a CD-rom called RITA (Replay Interface for TCAS Alerts) which is described in the following link http://www.sofreavia.com/pages/articles/pub_08.html
It contains about 16 different situations where TCAS is involved. Contact DGAC-CENA, Division SAS, 7 Avenue Belin, BP4005
31055 Toulouse Cedex France for a copy. It is purely designed for ACAS training of ATCO's containing the controllers view (including STCA etc), the pilot's view including IVSI with auditive alarms, transcripts of the RT and command keys to control or replay certain parts.
Capt PB,
If you receive traffic info about an a/c which is descending to a level above you with a high rate of descent and you have that traffic in sight will you still react to an RA? Concerning the reduced ROC/ROD when approaching a cleared level I would like to add that very often we NEED the a/c to make high ROD/ROC because of the traffic density. I wouldn't like to think of an environment where everybody is reluctant to give a good ROD/ROC when needed.
Bik & Ghost,
My point was that when you have traffic 5 NM apart and one of them makes a wrong turn you immediately lose your separation and you have about 40 secs before they would meet (considering they would travel 8 NM per minute) and hence have an RA at the same time that the ATCO can react.
Garp
The French administration DGAC has made a CD-rom called RITA (Replay Interface for TCAS Alerts) which is described in the following link http://www.sofreavia.com/pages/articles/pub_08.html
It contains about 16 different situations where TCAS is involved. Contact DGAC-CENA, Division SAS, 7 Avenue Belin, BP4005
31055 Toulouse Cedex France for a copy. It is purely designed for ACAS training of ATCO's containing the controllers view (including STCA etc), the pilot's view including IVSI with auditive alarms, transcripts of the RT and command keys to control or replay certain parts.
Capt PB,
If you receive traffic info about an a/c which is descending to a level above you with a high rate of descent and you have that traffic in sight will you still react to an RA? Concerning the reduced ROC/ROD when approaching a cleared level I would like to add that very often we NEED the a/c to make high ROD/ROC because of the traffic density. I wouldn't like to think of an environment where everybody is reluctant to give a good ROD/ROC when needed.
Bik & Ghost,
My point was that when you have traffic 5 NM apart and one of them makes a wrong turn you immediately lose your separation and you have about 40 secs before they would meet (considering they would travel 8 NM per minute) and hence have an RA at the same time that the ATCO can react.
Garp
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Very interesting, the implications of the above discussion. Assuming another generation of TCAS improvement, including lateral maneuvering & long-range forcasting, might the logic of this tragic incident lead to:
After having exited airport traffic zones (and other Very High Traffic Areas, TCA's etc, where very rapid situational changes can only be predicted by Tower and Approach/Departure Control personnel), aircraft might fly random (destination direct?) tracks AND flight levels, and let TCAS provide ALL ATC, so that conflicts such as recently occurred are resolved by one, AND ONLY ONE, authority? Granted, TCAS needs a lot of improvement, but the recent accident might lead to this conclusion (especially with potential long-range improved forecasting abilities of TCAS). Having flown for over 30 years trusting ATC implicitly, my very fibre rebels at the thought, but logically, it IS a big sky, and organized airways & Flight Levels just funnel aircraft into each other. Right offsets (another thread here) are an attempt to de-funnelize the sky; might random flight levels also help? Sounds weird, but logical.
After having exited airport traffic zones (and other Very High Traffic Areas, TCA's etc, where very rapid situational changes can only be predicted by Tower and Approach/Departure Control personnel), aircraft might fly random (destination direct?) tracks AND flight levels, and let TCAS provide ALL ATC, so that conflicts such as recently occurred are resolved by one, AND ONLY ONE, authority? Granted, TCAS needs a lot of improvement, but the recent accident might lead to this conclusion (especially with potential long-range improved forecasting abilities of TCAS). Having flown for over 30 years trusting ATC implicitly, my very fibre rebels at the thought, but logically, it IS a big sky, and organized airways & Flight Levels just funnel aircraft into each other. Right offsets (another thread here) are an attempt to de-funnelize the sky; might random flight levels also help? Sounds weird, but logical.
on your FM dial
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Capt Pit Bull,
Yeah fair enough. I was attempting to portray the scenario where both aircraft were cleared by ATC to safe levels 1000 feet apart, as appears to have been the case in the recent UK regional airline event.
I understand that there are TWO ways to get a "crossing RA".
(1) High rates of climb and/or descent with no ATC screw up.
(2) Any rate of descent with an ATC screw up.
Yeah fair enough. I was attempting to portray the scenario where both aircraft were cleared by ATC to safe levels 1000 feet apart, as appears to have been the case in the recent UK regional airline event.
I understand that there are TWO ways to get a "crossing RA".
(1) High rates of climb and/or descent with no ATC screw up.
(2) Any rate of descent with an ATC screw up.
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Just been on Sky News that the Tupelov was given a TCAS climb , just prior to the controller issuing a "Dive!" instruction.
Unfortunately for all involved it would seem he took the descent.
Now, as an ATCO, I am very interested as to what other pilots would do, given a situation of conflicting instructions like this......
Unfortunately for all involved it would seem he took the descent.
Now, as an ATCO, I am very interested as to what other pilots would do, given a situation of conflicting instructions like this......
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stupendous man :
Pilots are trained to react to RA´s and follow it´s commands without delay.The system (Tcas) is very reliable and must have priority over ATC,in the same way GPWS does.
The tragic events of last week seem to confirm this idea.
Pilots are trained to react to RA´s and follow it´s commands without delay.The system (Tcas) is very reliable and must have priority over ATC,in the same way GPWS does.
The tragic events of last week seem to confirm this idea.
CPB - flexibility to use appropriate descent rates and high rates of climb outside RVSM airspace may be needed at times. TCAS is not an universal panacea - but I would hope that most crews would avoid extreme rates unless operationally essential.
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As far as rates(climb/descent) are concerned pilots must follow the display on their verical speed indicators until "clear of conflict"sounds.I don´t think there is room for much flexibility when you have to deal with an RA !
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Bik. My Bad. Misuderstood your previous.
Garp.
Ditto the RITA information. I looked at this package when putting our course together. Some of the events shown are classic 'how not to use TCAS' examples. Just a key observation though - the version I saw had examples where the TCAS version was 6.04, rather than the current 7.0 standard. This changes the presentation of some of the alerts, and also (critically) the logic with which TCAS deal with coordinating RAs.
As far as vertical speeds go, I'm sorry, but as far as I'm concerned, if you need me at greater than 1500 fpm within 1,000 of my level then something sounds like its on the verge of going wrong. I have no problem with high rates, its high rates close to cleared levels that cause this problem.
Personally, in the scenario you've given I'd follow the RA, and turn unless I could see a reasonable horizontal miss was happening. Its a no-brainer as far as I'm concerned, and should be for any pilot.
Let me make a general point to all readers.
If you fly a TCAS equipped aircraft, ask yourself this question:
"Have I, in calm consideration, on the safety of the ground, mentally prepared my self so that under no circumstances whatsoever will I ever intentionally manoeuvre opposite to an RA?"
If you can not truthfully, unequivocally, answer this question as "yes" then do the following:
Fly with your TCAS in TA only mode.
That way the rest of us can get out of your way, without TCAS to TCAS coordination reducing our escape options.
Back to Garp
If you tell me to expedite, I'll do so. But in my experience, you don't get cleared to a level and told to expedite to it - its always expedite through a level. E.G. Descend FL80 expedite through FL100.
If you told me to expedite all the way to a specific level, I'd still do it. BUT I'd be prearmed to avoid 1,000 foot level off RAs. So lets say I'm at FL95 descending FL80, at 3000 fpm (at which point the it would be nearly time to start levelling off anyway with that ROD). I'd look at the TD for traffic at -25 (i.e. FL70). If I got TRAFFIC TRAFFIC on that blip I'd already know I'd be looking at a likely RA in 15 seconds if I don't reduce ROD, so I would do.
Nightrider
Well, I never like to say impossible, but knowing how the data link works it just isn't going to happen. If the system were capable of such an error, given that thousands of real RAs have occured, it would have happened before...
The rest of your post however is spot on. My TCAS training program was nearly still born - had to fight hard to get a half day in the classroom - I feel like a lone voice in the wilderness sometimes....
CPB
Garp.
Ditto the RITA information. I looked at this package when putting our course together. Some of the events shown are classic 'how not to use TCAS' examples. Just a key observation though - the version I saw had examples where the TCAS version was 6.04, rather than the current 7.0 standard. This changes the presentation of some of the alerts, and also (critically) the logic with which TCAS deal with coordinating RAs.
As far as vertical speeds go, I'm sorry, but as far as I'm concerned, if you need me at greater than 1500 fpm within 1,000 of my level then something sounds like its on the verge of going wrong. I have no problem with high rates, its high rates close to cleared levels that cause this problem.
Personally, in the scenario you've given I'd follow the RA, and turn unless I could see a reasonable horizontal miss was happening. Its a no-brainer as far as I'm concerned, and should be for any pilot.
Let me make a general point to all readers.
If you fly a TCAS equipped aircraft, ask yourself this question:
"Have I, in calm consideration, on the safety of the ground, mentally prepared my self so that under no circumstances whatsoever will I ever intentionally manoeuvre opposite to an RA?"
If you can not truthfully, unequivocally, answer this question as "yes" then do the following:
Fly with your TCAS in TA only mode.
That way the rest of us can get out of your way, without TCAS to TCAS coordination reducing our escape options.
Back to Garp
If you tell me to expedite, I'll do so. But in my experience, you don't get cleared to a level and told to expedite to it - its always expedite through a level. E.G. Descend FL80 expedite through FL100.
If you told me to expedite all the way to a specific level, I'd still do it. BUT I'd be prearmed to avoid 1,000 foot level off RAs. So lets say I'm at FL95 descending FL80, at 3000 fpm (at which point the it would be nearly time to start levelling off anyway with that ROD). I'd look at the TD for traffic at -25 (i.e. FL70). If I got TRAFFIC TRAFFIC on that blip I'd already know I'd be looking at a likely RA in 15 seconds if I don't reduce ROD, so I would do.
Nightrider
Well, I never like to say impossible, but knowing how the data link works it just isn't going to happen. If the system were capable of such an error, given that thousands of real RAs have occured, it would have happened before...
The rest of your post however is spot on. My TCAS training program was nearly still born - had to fight hard to get a half day in the classroom - I feel like a lone voice in the wilderness sometimes....
CPB
Last edited by Capt Pit Bull; 9th Jul 2002 at 09:22.
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Well...it looks like that Capt Pit Bull comes close to what has happened....and now the question is, did the Russian Crew know how to react to a TCAS RA.....
And the rest of us needs to follow the words just typed a couple of minutes before...
Training...when will we ever understand that training is the only way to acchieve what we want? And than...who is going to convince the beancounters?
And the rest of us needs to follow the words just typed a couple of minutes before...
"Have I, in calm consideration, on the safety of the ground, mentally prepared my self so that under no circumstances whatsoever will I ever intentionally manoeuvre opposite to an RA?"
ATC takes priority over TCAS in Russia
According to my local paper in Russian pilot given contradictory orders
So who are the "Russian aviation officials"?
With the help of Altavista web page translation, I dug around www.izvestia.ru and found this article: They attempted to warn dispatchers 7.7.2002, 16:33 It begins with the Karlsruhe controller trying to contact ZRH, discusses the climb RA received by the Tu-154 and concludes with :
Russian aviation officials said the pilot correctly gave precedence to the control tower before the July 1 crash, but western aviation experts said pilots are trained to give precedence to the cockpit warning.
With the help of Altavista web page translation, I dug around www.izvestia.ru and found this article: They attempted to warn dispatchers 7.7.2002, 16:33 It begins with the Karlsruhe controller trying to contact ZRH, discusses the climb RA received by the Tu-154 and concludes with :
However, obviously, the command of air-traffic controller for the pilots is priority.
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in case of a RA it may not be a good idea to climb and turn unless the software caters for it (not yet in the market) on thrust limited
aircraft you may run out of vertical speed.
aircraft you may run out of vertical speed.
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Re "high RoD / RoC"
I think it is for ATC and TCAS reasons that in the USA, rates expected by ATC are specified. Don't have it to hand, but something like >1000fpm until 1000 to go, then average of 500fpm.
My experience of TCAS TAs / RAs is that high performance twins in the climb are usually the problem, and more and more crews are using VS in busy areas to reduce the RoC - as we leave LHR in the morning on an "early" departure in a 757E4, its a but unfair on those arriving LH crews from the USA who have been awake all night, to keep pinging off their TCAS!
Re this incident, I would be interested to know the relative volumes, to the pilot, of the ATC instruction v TCAS. I personally have experienced a GPWS "pull up" leaving ZRH that was almost inaudible due ATC chatter and noise reducing headsets. It might not be as simple as the crew clearly understanding the 2 instructions, and having to decide between them...
Finally, for those saying "TCAS RA overrides ATC" - bear in mind that is your (and my) company's / state's SOP / rule. Has anyone established that for the Russian crew this is so?
NoD
I think it is for ATC and TCAS reasons that in the USA, rates expected by ATC are specified. Don't have it to hand, but something like >1000fpm until 1000 to go, then average of 500fpm.
My experience of TCAS TAs / RAs is that high performance twins in the climb are usually the problem, and more and more crews are using VS in busy areas to reduce the RoC - as we leave LHR in the morning on an "early" departure in a 757E4, its a but unfair on those arriving LH crews from the USA who have been awake all night, to keep pinging off their TCAS!
Re this incident, I would be interested to know the relative volumes, to the pilot, of the ATC instruction v TCAS. I personally have experienced a GPWS "pull up" leaving ZRH that was almost inaudible due ATC chatter and noise reducing headsets. It might not be as simple as the crew clearly understanding the 2 instructions, and having to decide between them...
Finally, for those saying "TCAS RA overrides ATC" - bear in mind that is your (and my) company's / state's SOP / rule. Has anyone established that for the Russian crew this is so?
NoD
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Pilots....
What are your thoughts on TCAS auto-coupling to Auto-pilot ?
So that the Autopilot will follow the TCAS (GPWS/Wind Shear) RA, giving the pilot time to try and establish visual contact with the intruder and voice contact with ATC?
What are your thoughts on TCAS auto-coupling to Auto-pilot ?
So that the Autopilot will follow the TCAS (GPWS/Wind Shear) RA, giving the pilot time to try and establish visual contact with the intruder and voice contact with ATC?
ex-Tanker
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Stupendous man was right - Source here is the NZZ newspaper in Zuerich today:
According CVR analysis the Tupolev pilot got a Climb RA just about one minute before the crash - one second later the controller told him to descend 1000ft and expedite. His level was expected to be lower for the remainder of the flight to Spain by the way, so the controller chose him, rather than the Boeing, for descent.
Soon after this the controller again ordered the descent - in the meantime the Boeing pilot, following TCAS RA started his descent and correctly called his action.
The reporter thinks that the controller presumed that the Tupolev was holding altitude and so accepted the Boeing descent. Unfortunately the Tupolev, following a short period of indecision decided to follow the ATC command and descended too, with the disasterous results known.
We are here to learn, not to apportion blame and what we can all learn is that TCAS works but that it MUST be followed unquestioningly. This, as has been pointed out, is in most company SOPs. Spare a thought for the Tupolev crew, however, who had already received the TA (Traffic) and were in the picture, got the RA (Climb) and immediately an order to descend expeditiously. This situation should become a simulator 'must' for the future.
According CVR analysis the Tupolev pilot got a Climb RA just about one minute before the crash - one second later the controller told him to descend 1000ft and expedite. His level was expected to be lower for the remainder of the flight to Spain by the way, so the controller chose him, rather than the Boeing, for descent.
Soon after this the controller again ordered the descent - in the meantime the Boeing pilot, following TCAS RA started his descent and correctly called his action.
The reporter thinks that the controller presumed that the Tupolev was holding altitude and so accepted the Boeing descent. Unfortunately the Tupolev, following a short period of indecision decided to follow the ATC command and descended too, with the disasterous results known.
We are here to learn, not to apportion blame and what we can all learn is that TCAS works but that it MUST be followed unquestioningly. This, as has been pointed out, is in most company SOPs. Spare a thought for the Tupolev crew, however, who had already received the TA (Traffic) and were in the picture, got the RA (Climb) and immediately an order to descend expeditiously. This situation should become a simulator 'must' for the future.
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Purr,
Good point. In my earlier posts I haven't covered all the guidance I give to crew, but one point is that the RA is the priority but if performance limiting then sacrifice the turn rather than the RA.
There are counter arguements though - if you are having trouble climbing, anything is better than nothing. Even no climb is still likely to be safe - because if you've got climb, the other a/c has got descent, so it won't have a performance issue. I.E. TCAS alerting itmes and threasholds are designed around one aircraft getting out the way of another that doesn't manoeuvre. If the other guy is alaso TCAS and helps get out of the way, thats a bonus.
As a supplementary point, TCAS performance inhibitions are only approximate anyway, it can't possibly be aware of all the variables, so crew always need to protect the flight envelope manually.
Finally, most RAs only involve changing your flight path by a few hundred feet. Even in the top altitude band, TCAS only tries to generate a 700 foot miss. So, thats 350 by you, 350 by the other a/c. As such it doesn't even need to be a sustainable climb. Go to MCT or Take off thrust - even a little increase in thrust (given that ROC is based on Excess power) can make quite a differerence Flying a low performing Turboprop? Back at minimum speed struggling up at 500fpm and receive a climb RA? Pop out a stage of flap, then zoom climb back to that minimum speed - that'll give you a few hundred feet which will be enough.
NigelOnDraft.
Using VS mode on departure. - Great Idea, Great Airmanship. In my quadrapuff its quite perverse that on most sids you get cleaned up and accelerated to 250 often just as you reach a thousand or so to go to the first block level. Till then you get maybe 800 fpm. From then on, all the excess power now goes to ROC and left to its own devices the a/c will hit 3,000 fpm or more easily. Intervention from Level Change to Vert Speed is highly sensible.
Standard_Departure
Because of the timescales involved, responses to RAs must be prompt - particularly updated RAs. Most A/Ps just aren't capable of reacting fast enough. Certainly, my a/c wouldn't have a chance without a major a/p revision, at which point you'd be into design compromises with what ever factors made the engineers design it the way it is at the moment.
This, combined with the need to make sure that an autopilot mode change doesn't inadvertantly cause a manoeuvre opposite to an RA, is why A/P must be out for ALL RAs - not just correctives.
CPB
Good point. In my earlier posts I haven't covered all the guidance I give to crew, but one point is that the RA is the priority but if performance limiting then sacrifice the turn rather than the RA.
There are counter arguements though - if you are having trouble climbing, anything is better than nothing. Even no climb is still likely to be safe - because if you've got climb, the other a/c has got descent, so it won't have a performance issue. I.E. TCAS alerting itmes and threasholds are designed around one aircraft getting out the way of another that doesn't manoeuvre. If the other guy is alaso TCAS and helps get out of the way, thats a bonus.
As a supplementary point, TCAS performance inhibitions are only approximate anyway, it can't possibly be aware of all the variables, so crew always need to protect the flight envelope manually.
Finally, most RAs only involve changing your flight path by a few hundred feet. Even in the top altitude band, TCAS only tries to generate a 700 foot miss. So, thats 350 by you, 350 by the other a/c. As such it doesn't even need to be a sustainable climb. Go to MCT or Take off thrust - even a little increase in thrust (given that ROC is based on Excess power) can make quite a differerence Flying a low performing Turboprop? Back at minimum speed struggling up at 500fpm and receive a climb RA? Pop out a stage of flap, then zoom climb back to that minimum speed - that'll give you a few hundred feet which will be enough.
NigelOnDraft.
Using VS mode on departure. - Great Idea, Great Airmanship. In my quadrapuff its quite perverse that on most sids you get cleaned up and accelerated to 250 often just as you reach a thousand or so to go to the first block level. Till then you get maybe 800 fpm. From then on, all the excess power now goes to ROC and left to its own devices the a/c will hit 3,000 fpm or more easily. Intervention from Level Change to Vert Speed is highly sensible.
Standard_Departure
Because of the timescales involved, responses to RAs must be prompt - particularly updated RAs. Most A/Ps just aren't capable of reacting fast enough. Certainly, my a/c wouldn't have a chance without a major a/p revision, at which point you'd be into design compromises with what ever factors made the engineers design it the way it is at the moment.
This, combined with the need to make sure that an autopilot mode change doesn't inadvertantly cause a manoeuvre opposite to an RA, is why A/P must be out for ALL RAs - not just correctives.
CPB
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Capt Pitt Bull;
Thanks for the response, that makes sense.
Few Cloudy;
When I read
I just go to the next article. Not getting at what you posted, I am talking about the reporter...
SID
Thanks for the response, that makes sense.
Few Cloudy;
When I read
The reporter thinks that the controller presumed
SID