B-738 Crash in Russia Rostov-on-Don

[anson harris]

So British Airways management in their ultimate wisdom prevents pilots from manually flying the aircraft on the line.

Absolute nonsense.

[PBY]

BA not a good example anymore, for manual handing practice.
Other than the B744, BA Sops on all new types, mandate full time auto throttle when A/P disengaged, and don't allow raw data handling on route flying even in good weather. LH for example allow manual sped control routinely even on A380, A/P off A/ T off..
Ragged speed control etc. exhibited by PF on the unlatched cowl Airbus incident shows lack of practice in manual handling perhaps.
Only practiced every couple of years in the sim.

Anson, read the quote above. You are not allowed raw data flying, unless you are on the experienced B744 fleet, where you still have aviators. Yes you are allowed to fly with flight directors and autothrottle. But for that you do not need pilots. You can train 10 years old to do that. The problem starts, if you loose all these goodies like an autothrottle and flight directors. And next time for the sake of clarification could you write more than just absolute nonsense? If you are BA and not on B744 fleet, when is the last time you enjoyed manual flying with FDs off Autothrust off?

[rainbow gravity]

Originally Posted by silvertate

This accident is strikingly similar to the Tatarstan Airlines Flight 363 B735 that crashed at Kazan, Russia in 2013. This is the graphic of the vertical profile in that accident.

One possible reason for this profile is something I have seen in light aviation training - a confusion between stalling and zero g. If the push results in reduced g or slightly negative g, it can be percieved as the aircraft stalling, and so pic continues to push forwards to 'unstall' the aircraft. And the result is similar to that profile.

To your point, see the "pilot's perceived flight path" in the chart below.
Also disconcerting: The moment shortly before impact when F/O says: "Where are we going?".

[anson harris]

Anson, read the quote above

I'd read it thanks.

You know, not everything people write on PPRuNe is totally accurate. There's little point going into the details as you've obviously made your mind up, but BA allows pilots to be pilots, within the realms of logic and sense, far more than any other airline I've worked for.

[RAT 5]

If airlines, and BA is not the only one, forbid raw data flying, and discourage manual flying entirely, why is a raw data ILS still in the type rating LST? The XAA's deem it a necessary skill. If so then surely they should also encourage its retention. You do one with an LST and then never again in any mandatory test. You are forbidden, by your employer, under approval of the same XAA to retain this required skill. Why bother with the test in the first place if the same XAA does not enforce it throughout your career? Why not, at least, include it in LPC's instead of assuming some airlines will include it in their 'tick in the boxes' 3 yearly RST of flight controls? By doing that the XAA's would take a proactive role in reducing the dilution of piloting skills, if only by a smidgen.

[Old Boeing Driver]

Aterpster

Your presumption would be correct. IMHO

I remember the days of flying a PC check and the only time you would use the auto pilot was when the instructor/check airman was reloading glitches in the simulator.

If you could fly those simulators by hand, you could fly the plane by hand.

It is possible that the guys in this accident had lost some skills by using the automation so much.

Manual go-arounds are probably barely practiced these days in the sim.

Regards,

OBD

[ACMS]

Not true, we do them in our Proficiency check Sim, we alternate manual and automatic each Sim check, usually Engine out. True all Engines would speed things up a bit !!

Recurrent training sims cover raw data and manual flying skills as well.

[Old Boeing Driver]

ACMS

I'm happy that you are able to do this at your airline.

I have been retired awhile, but after seeing a lot of the posts here, I think many rely (and teach reliance) on the automatics too much. Just an opinion.

Regards,

OBD

[Ian W]

PBY said:

May be a pilot error should be called management-pilot error. Because he pilot is usually dead after the accident and there is nothing to improve anymore.
But the systemic management incompetency could be improved upon.
And we would have less management-pilot errors in the future.

This type of error forcing already exists in Human Factors assessments. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) actually puts Organizational Influences first in its 'fault tree' and second is 'Unsafe Supervisions' HFACS, Inc | The HFACS Framework. The problem is not that it is not known, it is more that it is not chased up by the accident investigators as much as a mechanical fault would be. Recommendations by the investigation agencies for an aircraft system fix that is required are almost certain to be carried out. Recommendations from investigation agencies for organizational or supervisory changes are far less likely to be acted on.

[RAT 5]

One wonders if, considering how manual skills are not given priority by some operators, their published Safety Statement is correct in true spirit. Is it a case of words rather than deeds.
I did fly for some whose Ops manual said all the correct things about rostering & fatigue and many other items that seemed you were working in paradise, but the opposite was true.

[Fair_Weather_Flyer]

Thing is though, doing a go around in the 737 needs a mixture of hand flying and automation management skills, combined with mode awareness regarding the auto throttle and autopilot. It needs lots of training in the sim, yet two engine go arounds are very much neglected.

Just because a pilot can (or cannot) fly an ILS raw data or land off an NDB in a 40kt crosswind does not mean that they can fly a good 737 go around. It takes training and practice; pilots are not getting either. All about money at the end of the day.

[The Ancient Geek]

ISTM that some of these pilots need to spend a while in Africa hacking around the game reserves. Assorted wildlife, including pedestrians and bicycles, wandering across the strip is SOP and expected. If you dont go around at least once in a day you start to worry about what fate is storing up for you.

[Otto Throttle]

If the monthly ASR publication is anything to go by, FZ are reasonably well practiced at missed approaches, with several each month. As there are no corresponding ASRs to say that the engine fell off, logically these can be assumed to have been completed with both engines operating. Until now, no one had managed to crash, unless of course these are all the work of one insanely gifted pilot, or the FDM failed to register the corresponding aerobatics that we are led to believe accompany this difficult manoeuvre.

[Paranoid]

Seem to remember on my 14yrs on the BA777 many visual approaches in the Caribbean, Africa, TLV etc.Visual approach = no Flight Director.
Autotrottle on a FBW is very good, but was quite often manually 'assisted' when required.
Personally I tried to ensure 50% of my approaches (subject to sensible WX/ Fatigue limitations) were manually flown albeit most times with FD/AT.
Overall this fitted in with the BA policy at the time, and I feel enabled an an adequate standard of operation.
ATPL 20000hrs IRE/TRE.Retired.

[aox]

Originally Posted by VC10Tail

From the video originally posted by Scadi I reckon the second a/c image emerged at a point in space behind the first.Could it gave looped on its back as Shaggy sheep suggested somewhere on page 25?Upset recovery gone wrong with not enough altitude to recover coupled with disorientaion due to the rapud g force transitions and somatography?

I didn't think o, and I don't think it's safe assumption.

The camera is several miles upwind from the airport, and I don't think you get any impression of depth of field of view.

The landing light brightness changes a bit, notably a bit less bright as it pitches up at the start of the climb. Then as it emerges from cloud again it also isn't as bright, but I'd assume that's just because it's so nose down, rather than further away.

[Alycidon]

so, from a low energy situation, landing flap, gear down, speed around 140-150kts, this B737-800 pulls up into a loop?

Nope, laws of physics apply.

[bsieker]

Originally Posted by Toshirozero

[...] i.e., the MAK will publish the final report.

Originally Posted by aterpster

Toshirozero:

Don't those ICAO requirements require the final report to be either in English or French?

ICAO Annex 13 stipulates that the Final Report shall be sent to:

• the State that instituted the investigation;
• the State of the Operator;
• the State of Design;
• the State of Manufacture;
• any State having suffered fatalities or serious injuries to its citizens; and
• any State that provided relevant information, significant facilities or experts.

It does not say anything about publication. It is customary that the report is published, but not required.

As to the language, there is also no requirement, only a recommendation, which is not binding, that the report be in one of the ICAO working languages; these are English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish.


Bernd

[aox]

Originally Posted by VC10Tail

I urge you to look at that video more closely.Refer to the serues of vertical lines on the light coloured building in front of the camera.

I'm afraid I don't understand the point you're making.

The aircraft is moving very slightly across the screen as it climbs, from left to right, angling towards the bottom of the 1 in the superimposed date caption. This suggests the viewpoint is slightly to the north of the aircraft track, not surprising when you look at the map. Then it emerges below the 9 of the date, crashing directly below the 9.

So two things have happened. The fact its downward path is not crossing the screen on the descent suggests it's now on a track altered slightly to the north, its right, of what it was.

But also, though this is rather less certain, if it had gone away from the viewer by doing a loop in cloud it would be more likely to emerge out a bit more to the left again wrt the reference of the date caption. But admittedly that assumption is less safe as a loop doesn't necessarily have to be perfectly wings level.

It just didn't occur to me, and I still don't view it that way.

Post 1085 Flight Path analysis might help you.

But that is a different matter. That is not about explaining how a loop happened, but instead it's about how the human balance system and brain can be tricked into misinterpreting the sensations and coming to the wrong conclusion that it was looping.

They've drawn instantaneously sensed gravity vectors on the real path that combine the effect of vertical gravity with the acceleration or retardation of the aircraft, then redrawn a hypothetical looping course that the body might be tricked into misbelieving when recalibrated by the assumption from most of non-flying life that gravity is vertical.

A while ago someone talked about some students under instruction being found to be very sensitive to negative or reduced g. They might mistake dropping feelings in turbulence for a stall, and then push the stick toward, then the reduced g increases the falling feeling, and they push harder, and might freeze. In some aircraft if their arm is then straight it can be tricky for the instructor to overcome them. I know someone slapped the pupil on the side of the head, and this made him let go.

Those sort of disorientating ffects are being explained for that accident, and what some people are suspecting for this one. Pushed too much, not pulled too much.

[vovachan]

Bottom line from the quick investigation update posted earlier is the HS went into a dive at 900 m. They don't know if this was deliberate or uncommanded.

[Alycidon]

Where did you get these low speeds from and landing flaps were they??It would be Flap 15 if already established in the Go Around and gear pissibly retracted and olane accelerating..very fast cobsidering the light weight they were at.And talk of physics laws..they apply to meteorology too and heard of chaos theory?Let the recorders explain those laws.You and I are just guessing our way through this riddle.

Most airlines insist on "stable approach" criteria being met at various points on the approach, the gear and flap would be selected accordingly.

Flap 15 by the way is listed as a landing flap option in the FMC, either way, stable approach criteria being the target, the aircraft would be in a low energy situation, I think I've only ever seen military fast jets transitioning from low energy to vertical flight, I would think a loop flown by a passenger jet off an approach rather unlikely.

The pitch down is the more probable scenario due both to somatographic illusion and the requirement to trim forward as the aircraft accelerates away from the low energy approach config.

Yes, you could say guesswork, but I base it on many thousands of hours flying the NG. As regards "chaos theory" I don't remember anything about it in ATPL meteorology.