Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

[Ian W]

Originally Posted by Denti

How exactly would you do that without the FDR? One can only make some assumptions, but don't know for sure which mode was used.

For those pilots who are unaware how much their aircraft tells ATC it may be interesting to read this document. This is how the investigators were certain that it was CFIT and not an emergency issue.

http://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/def...art12-v2.2.pdf

It is a little technical but search on MCP or Vertical and you will see what is in the ADS-B standard as implemented by EUROCONTROL.

[safelife]

In an airline of considerable size not knowing the other pilot is more the norm than an exception. Actually specifically Lufthansa has a philosophy not to have pilots getting familiar with one another in order to maintain cockpit discipline or so I'm told.

[Denti]

It is a little technical but search on MCP or Vertical and you will see what is in the ADS-B standard as implemented by EUROCONTROL.

Actually, it is a technical specification, but even that does not support selected mode (V/S, open descent, managed/VNAV and so on). And secondly ADS-B is not implemented in europe yet, not certified and not required. However, Mode-S Enhanced Surveillance is, which doesn't support vertical mode either. Both of course transmit altitude target, which is the value that FR24 decoded in the datastream as well.

And even though a 25 year old aircraft had to be retrofittet to conform with Mode S EHS, it is doubtful it would be retrofittet a couple years later to conform with a 2014 non backward compatible specification that is not even required yet.

[silverstrata]

Centaur.

Young cadet pilots are far more vulnerable to the actions of irritable and impatient captains; much more so than experienced first officers.

Do you still fly Centaur? Over the last decade or so, CRM has ensured that the guy in charge normally sits in the right-hand seat - as Lubitz's laconic and disinterested replies demonstrate.

[NigelOnDraft]

And as someone said above “90% of the time I get in a plane with a stranger”
Is that the norm? Or a one off? And if it’s true I find It a bit shocking

Was me. With >500 Capts and >500 FOs on the fleet, and doing, say 100 "trips" a year (trip varies from 1 to 5 days), you might see the issue

[ams6110]

Murder by Fire Axe has appeared again. And why not - it is almost the ideal weapon for a single handed assailant. So why carry it? Has anyone ever needed one? Remove it and be happier at having CC as second person when needed.

It seems to me you either trust the cabin crew to have access to the flight deck, or you don't. Cabin crew bring food, coffee, tea to the pilots, which could easily be drugged or poisoned.

[Denti]

It seems to me you either trust the cabin crew to have access to the flight deck, or you don't. Cabin crew bring food, coffee, tea to the pilots, which could easily be drugged or poisoned

Actually, that is a good point. And then i thought back and guess what. I do drink only bottled water on board and bring my own food. It is much healthier than the packaged stuff we get on board anyway. And then, trust is a two way street, and currently the point is that pilots are not trusted anymore.

[ericsson16]

Flight crew age

What chances of the flight crew upper age limits applications being increased after this terrible event ?

[Kerosene]

Was me. With >500 Capts and >500 FOs on the fleet, and doing, say 100 "trips" a year (trip varies from 1 to 5 days), you might see the issue

Wondering if any airline ever came up with the idea of forming small teams within their crew pools who fly regularly together. Human beings work best in groups of up to 30 people - part of our evolutionary heritage.

Not knowing your colleagues in the cockpit may be seen as advantageous or at least convenient by the airlines, but I don't think it leads to a high level of well-being among the crews. You'll probably find that your conversations with your colleagues don't go much beyond the basic introductions, as does your familiarity with each other.

[flyawaybird]

Centaurus
Your write-up on the above topic is not only educative but also beneficial, if all airlines of the world would adopt it in their Work Core Values, then we would have a more harmonious and relaxed Cockpits. As a matter of fact it should be applicable to other work sectors as well.

[eezeegeebee]

Too Early

Equally however, some crimes is so heinous [sic] that it is irresponsible and unreasonable to not release the information as soon as criminal investigators are clear what happened. They don't know all the fine details, and their investigation is ongoing. But they know the big picture. They wouldn't be releasing this information on the world stage if it was just one possible explanation - or even if it was just the most likely explanation. They are quite certain of the explanation.

I read the measured statement from IFALPA with a sense of relief and gratitude that the voice of reason is still to be heard above a cacophony of hysterical speculation, much of which, sadly, is to be found in these pages. However this appalling disaster occurred, the proven and highly-developed processes of accident investigation must still be conducted until all the information can be presented cogently, causes established, errors identified and recommendations and mandates issued to responsible parties. To think otherwise is to think along the lines of the poster I have quoted (and there are plenty to choose from). This is a juror who doesn’t need to sit through the entire hearing, who needs no evidence above the sly whisper heard outside the court-house to the effect that “’e done it, and no mistake”.

According to the original NY Times article on March 25 the initial source of the CVR leak was a “senior French military official” who “requested anonymity because the investigation was continuing”. The means by which the original information came into the public domain will, quite rightly, be the subject of its own enquiry in due course and one can only hope that, in turn, the relentless process of effective justice will grind out another truth there: establish the causes, identify the errors, &c, &c. Boring, slow, methodical? Yes – and unapologetically so. But these are the methods we must use.

Indirectly, this disclosure led to a press release in which the Marseille public prosecutor, Brice Robin, then elaborated on some of the contents of the CVR. M. Robin is not trained in air accident investigation – he is merely a prosecutor, a person whose speciality is to identify someone to accuse of a crime and then prosecute through the legal system. His premature public appearance has contributed nothing to the air accident investigation being conducted by BEA and has served only to feed the insatiable appetites of the global media monster that lives amongst us.

There are very few hard facts around which to formulate a working hypothesis – let alone a provable one – and yet the world has seemingly already made up its mind on the cause, basing this on a single un-attributed leak and the accusatorial conclusions of a man lacking any apparent aviation expertise. But before we completely re-design the world of air transportation, let’s take time out to review the evidence which has been presented so far to the court of public opinion. This might enable us to stay on track but, more importantly, create a platform for the defence to show why this case is far from proven.

Our first witness appears anonymously, but describes him/herself as a "senior French military official". Naturally this witness has refused to swear any form of oath. M. SFMO, what can you tell the court about this case?
“There was a very smooth, very cool conversation between the pilots. Then one of the pilots left the cockpit and could not re-enter. The guy outside is knocking lightly on the door, and there is no answer, and then he hits the door stronger, and no answer. There is never an answer. You can hear he is trying to smash the door down. We don’t know yet the reason why one of the guys went out. But what is sure is that at the very end of the flight, the other pilot is alone and does not open the door.”

The next witness is Remi Jouty from the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile. M. Jouty, what do you know of this incident?
“er we just succeeded in getting er an audio file which contains er useable er sounds and voices er we have not yet er fully er understood and worked on it to be able to say ok this is starting at this precise point in flight this is ending at this precise point in flight and er we hear such persons saying that etcetera this is an ongoing work which for which we will we hope to have a first rough ideas in mmm matter of days and having a full understanding of it in conjunction with other information er coming in particular from other recorded parameters er will take weeks and even months”

Finally, the court calls Marseilles public prosecutor Brice Robin. What can you tell the court, M. Robin?
"We could hear human breathing inside the cabin and that sound of breathing can be heard until the impact. That means that the co-pilot was alive. You then hear contacts from the Marseilles control tower on several occasions, but no answer from the co-pilot. The air traffic controllers then asked for the transponder code - 7700 - and there was no response, which means that this plane had now become a priority over all other planes for a potential emergency landing. The control tower even asked other planes to contact this Airbus by radio, and there was also no response. The alarms were activated to alert the aircraft of its proximity to the ground. At this moment we hear strong, violent knocks, almost as if to force the door open. I remind you that this is an armoured door, according to international norms, to protect against potential terrorist actions. These alarms, meant to alert the aircraft, were activated. Just until the final impact, we could hear the noise of a first impact on a slope. I remind you that the plane glided over a slope before it crashed at 700 km/hr on the mountain. I also remind you that there was no distress or emergency message - like a "mayday, mayday, mayday" - received by the air traffic controllers. The most plausible and probable interpretation for us is that the co-pilot, by a voluntary abstention, by voluntary abstention, refused to open the door to the cockpit to the flight captain and activated the button to start descent. So he activated this button to initiate loss of altitude for a reason that we are completely unaware of today but that can be analyzed as an intention to destroy the aircraft."

That is the entire case for the prosecution.

For the sake of argument now imagine that an event occurred during this flight, an unusual event certainly, but one that still has to be trained for by all commercial pilots and one for which specialised equipment has been installed at great cost on all aircraft. It is an event which will lead to death of all on board an aircraft at high altitude unless it is identified promptly by the pilots who must then deal with it quickly and professionally by the execution of a precise drill - the steps of which cannot be varied. Done by two pilots this drill is complex and demanding – done by an experienced pilot acting alone it becomes even harder. But when it must be executed by a single pilot who has no practical experience of it, minimal practise of it in a simulated environment and no experience whatsoever of having to do any form of non-normal or emergency procedure on his or her own in a real aircraft, it could lead to certain disaster. Miss any step in this drill, reverse or confuse the order of the first few steps and it is an assured fact that all on board the affected aircraft will perish. This event has killed before and it is one of the greatest certainties of flying commercial jets that it will kill again.

Nothing in the evidence from France can rule out the fact that this event occurred on board the Germanwings A320 on March 24th 2015. My learned colleagues will appreciate why the evidence of breathing noises being heard on the CVR right up to the moment of impact actually makes it more, not less, likely that this event occurred on this flight.

It’s time to back off and wait for the French investigative authorities do their job. There is nothing like enough evidence to predict the outcome of this enquiry, despite what the French public prosecutor would like to believe.

Just saying.

[evansb]

Given what has been released about this incident, I thought this thread would have concluded 24 hours ago...

[cactusbusdrvr]

There is a lot of stupidity on this thread.

I've been flying for over 35 years, I have over 25,000 hours. In the last 22 years I've spent 16 years as an Airbus captain with over 600 different F/Os to fly with. There is no issue flying with someone you don't know. We are all trained and checked to the same standards. We fly under the same procedures, SOPs, and we are checked to see that we stay standardized.

Inevitably there will be someone you don't care for that you are paired with. It doesn't matter, you just fly the trip and go on with your life. No one at this level of flying will be allowed to go beyond the limit that their personal beliefs or quirks will affect safety. If there is such a breach of protocol either pilot can call the chief pilots office and get themselves or the other crew member removed. The union professional standards committee will also be involved.

In the USA we don't have cadets flying large transport catagory aircraft. You spend some years working your way up the aviation ladder. If you have a questionable reputation you will not make it to a major airline. Even in the US aviation is still a small world. Your bad reputation will make itself known. I am not saying that this F/O would have been caught out earlier butI think this is where the cadet system breaks down. Issues in the US are usually caught long before they rise to the major airline level.

[Wader2]

Having read ezgb' s, how do we KNOW the captain left the flight deck?

How do we know it was the captain hammering on the door?

Apparently the passengers remained calm, it it possible they were hypoxic until at lower levels?

[wings folded]

Indirectly, this disclosure led to a press release in which the Marseille public prosecutor, Brice Robin, then elaborated on some of the contents of the CVR. M. Robin is not trained in air accident investigation – he is merely a prosecutor, a person whose speciality is to identify someone to accuse of a crime and then prosecute through the legal system. His premature public appearance has contributed nothing to the air accident investigation being conducted by BEA and has served only to feed the insatiable appetites of the global media monster that lives amongst us.

You display total ignorance of French legal procedure.

Monsieur Robin is indeed not an air accident investigator.

He is a "Procureur de la République".

Contrary to your inflammatory remark, totally unfounded, especially the use of "merely" as follows:

he is merely a prosecutor, a person whose speciality is to identify someone to accuse of a crime and then prosecute through the legal system.

you are completely and utterly wrong.

The Code Penal and the Code Civil in France requires that a procedure be opened when a loss of life occurs. It is called "instruction judiciaire".

The BEA carry out their investigations entirely independently.

If a plane went down with only the pilot on board,, no damage or loss of life on the ground, BEA would investigate on the one hand and an "instruction" would be opened at the same time. It has happened countless times. The purpose is to establish the cause of the death(s).

Under some different systems, a coroner would carry out the same function

A Procureur has a duty like any public servant, to be open and inform the public of what is known.

Do not be confused into thinking that the intervention of a Procureur means that criminal actions are considered or envisaged or even contemplated. It is simply a matter of procedure according to the laws of France. When you are better informed about the "speciality" of the role of a Procureur we could hold a further conversation.

There is nothing like enough evidence to predict the outcome of this enquiry, despite what the French public prosecutor would like to believe.

He has opened an "instruction" and has reserved his right to amend the heading of the enquiry.

He has performed his public duty correctly and, contrary to your ill-informed prejudice, appears to hold no beliefs.

The Pontoise trial concerning Concorde revealed a staggering lack of awareness of French procedure from many contributors. Go and take a look. You might emerge more aware.

[TheInquisitor]

eezeegeebee,

You seem to have conveniently left out a few details in presenting your case - important details. Such as the (independently confirmed) act of deliberately selecting 100ft on the MCP and commencing a descent.

What we have are a series of confirmed (to beyond reasonable doubt) events, for which there is only one plausible explanation - Which is why the conclusions already reached hold up, and have been made public. I appreciate this is slightly different to concrete proof, but air accident investigations quite frequently fall short of the 'concrete proof' standard and settle in the realms of 'no other plausible explanation' or 'most likely explanation'.

There persists a lot of unreasonable (IMHO) doubts being raised here.

Hypoxia has been ruled out (beyond reasonable doubt).

Incapacitation has been ruled out (beyond reasonable doubt).

Who was were and who took which actions have been established (beyond reasonable doubt).

...all from combinations of CVR and Mode-S ES data.

I don't believe the FDR will add much, if anything, to these conclusions.

As shocking / unbelievable / unpalatable these conclusions may be, they are supported by the evidence, with no other plausible or likely explanation. It's time to move the discussion on.

[eezeegeebee]

you are completely and utterly wrong.

The Code Penal and the Code Civil in France requires that a procedure be opened when a loss of life occurs. It is called "instruction judiciaire".

The BEA carry out their investigations entirely independently.

If a plane went down with only the pilot on board,, no damage or loss of life on the ground, BEA would investigate on the one hand and an "instruction" would be opened at the same time. It has happened countless times. The purpose is to establish the cause of the death(s).

Under some different systems, a coroner would carry out the same function

A Procureur has a duty like any public servant, to be open and inform the public of what is known.

Do not be confused into thinking that the intervention of a Procureur means that criminal actions are considered or envisaged or even contemplated. It is simply a matter of procedure according to the laws of France. When you are better informed about the "speciality" of the role of a Procureur we could hold a further conversation.

The most plausible and probable interpretation for us is that the co-pilot, by a voluntary abstention, by voluntary abstention, refused to open the door to the cockpit to the flight captain and activated the button to start descent. So he activated this button to initiate loss of altitude for a reason that we are completely unaware of today but that can be analyzed as an intention to destroy the aircraft.

The niceties of the french legal system notwithstanding, this chap looks like he's already made his mind up about the incident. You can appreciate why one might be confused, n'est-ce que pas?

[Rushed Approach]

The most plausible and probable interpretation for us is that the co-pilot, by a voluntary abstention, by voluntary abstention, refused to open the door to the cockpit to the flight captain and activated the button to start descent. So he activated this button to initiate loss of altitude for a reason that we are completely unaware of today but that can be analyzed as an intention to destroy the aircraft

M. Robin may well have a public duty to report the facts but the above is subjective speculation on his part. It is not for him to comment on what may or may not be the "most plausible" explanation - at this stage this can only be based on what little evidence he knows now. He says the action of reducing the altitude can be "analysed" as an intention to destroy the aircraft - but it could equally well be "analysed" as an intention to get the aircraft down quickly (e.g. cockpit fire and many other scenarios that could leave no CVR trace). It's possible he wound the altitude down to 100 ft (the lowest it will go) initially when initiating an emergency descent thinking he would adjust it later, and for whatever reason he got distracted or was unable to adjust it because of subsequent events such as choking on smoke/heart attack/stroke.

The point is that there is no such thing as "reasonable doubt" when you are talking about a one in several million flights possibility. If he did indeed kill 149 people deliberately, then that would be an incredibly rare event in aviation history. If you are considering it as such, then you have to consider other very unlikely scenarios as possibilities if you are doing your job properly as an investigator, otherwise there can be no credibility to the process.

[Alain67]

Unfortunately , the media does influence the politics of the decision makers .

The medias are - as their name suggests - a link between politicians and citizens who, fortunately, can and may influence the decisions in a democracy.

[Mooneyboy]

Reading post by Centaurus and Pace highlights a few misunderstandings and generalisations about lo co world of flying the airbus.

I also believe some of the recent posts seem to be going towards the bashing of cadet FO's where really I think in this tragic german wings event 'the holes in the Swiss cheese' lined up in a very individual case.

Firstly to Pace, The A320 is an automated aircraft but shockingly can be flown manually without an AP FD and A/THR and I think you will be surprised at how often that does happen. Obviously there is a time and a place so a remote greek island ndb approach with strong gusts might be one of those times to leave it all in. I did a raw data approach manually done 20 miles out autothrust out and on the next homeward leg the FO turned round and asked if he do the same as me. Looking at this 22year old 1 direction lookalike who must definatley did not look very piloty to me with 400hrs TT I thought to myself will if he mucks it up at least it will give me more practice. He then preceded to do the most accurate and precisely flown manual raw data approach I have ever seen. Few months later let a very experienced FO fly a raw data approach fully manually. He had not taken into account the extent of the tailwind ( which on the airliners can be a big problem as there is a lot of energy to slow down something the GA guys and small biz jet superpilots probably won't know much about). If it wasn't for some prompting for the gear from me I we would have flown the ILS twice.

Centaurus

I have done a Boeing type rating and Airbus type rating in the last 10 years. Both included a fair bit of manual flying but most focus is on the failure of aircraft systems. Also both times I did line training (they were both as an FO and when I got cmd on the Airbus) you had to do raw data manual thrust no AP. Manual handling is becoming an increasing part of the recurrent sims.

Every pilot is an individual and needs to treated that way. You get FO's flown for mutiple airlnes in their 40's but will definitely get the hump if you point something out or guys with plenty of life experience before they got into flying who won't take banter its not just young cadets who fall to those faults.