Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
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RE IanW's stack of manuals: I attended a local emergency planning meeting, with fire department, and city, county, and state officialdom. The city manual was 50 pages long. The mayor and I were the only ones who had read it. The manual was all about who is in charge.
I have a very pedestrian 13 ton truck, one you see hundreds of on the road. It won't start. The local motor guru who can in 35 seconds diagnose 95% of all problems of pre-1985 light duty vehicles, plus HIS diesel guru still don't know whats going on after a week and, like a more monetarily restrained version of the truck dealer, have begun throwing dollars at it in hopes something will work. Someone somewhere knows all the troubleshooting SOPs. They don't live here.
I've used simple examples here because complex examples too often become a pack of dogs chasing their tails. If there are no ongoing, systemically encouraged conversations between those who have great knowledge and those who have great experience what you get in the group mind is advancing Alzheimers, in other words, increased relational complexity. Every pilot knows (or should) that all you need to guarantee an accident is too many complexities in too short a time. Eliminating complexities is automation's promise. But the issue here is when automation increases complexity. There aren't any pilots, no matter their training, knowledge, or experience, who are not vulnerable to overwhelm. Some of the arguments that more training would solve everything seem be made by people who haven't yet had the whee squeezed out of them and now know beyond a shadow of a doubt they were saved only because of luck. I have, so I know I don't know everything. That makes me skeptical of arguments like "If you knew what I know", and "If you knew more", unless I know for a fact that that the person had a whee squeezing event where serendipitous luck and not his own abilities clearly saved his bacon.
I have a very pedestrian 13 ton truck, one you see hundreds of on the road. It won't start. The local motor guru who can in 35 seconds diagnose 95% of all problems of pre-1985 light duty vehicles, plus HIS diesel guru still don't know whats going on after a week and, like a more monetarily restrained version of the truck dealer, have begun throwing dollars at it in hopes something will work. Someone somewhere knows all the troubleshooting SOPs. They don't live here.
I've used simple examples here because complex examples too often become a pack of dogs chasing their tails. If there are no ongoing, systemically encouraged conversations between those who have great knowledge and those who have great experience what you get in the group mind is advancing Alzheimers, in other words, increased relational complexity. Every pilot knows (or should) that all you need to guarantee an accident is too many complexities in too short a time. Eliminating complexities is automation's promise. But the issue here is when automation increases complexity. There aren't any pilots, no matter their training, knowledge, or experience, who are not vulnerable to overwhelm. Some of the arguments that more training would solve everything seem be made by people who haven't yet had the whee squeezed out of them and now know beyond a shadow of a doubt they were saved only because of luck. I have, so I know I don't know everything. That makes me skeptical of arguments like "If you knew what I know", and "If you knew more", unless I know for a fact that that the person had a whee squeezing event where serendipitous luck and not his own abilities clearly saved his bacon.
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Leightman.
As one of those who advocates more stall training in the sim, I think I should reply. The point I was making was that the recovery from a fully developed stall, especially at very high altitude is quite the opposite of what is taught to airline crews, with monotonous regularity, for the avoidance of an impending stall at low level. The crew must be able to recognise when stall prevention gives way to stall recovery and this has to be instinctive and mustn't be delayed. If necessary the recovery attitude (and power) needs to be applied for a protracted period of time and with a large loss of altitude. The resulting trajectory has to be accepted even if it takes the aircraft into a CB or terrain. Until the aircraft is unstalled and flying again, nothing else matters. Just hope you've got enough airspace.
When I read details of the various reports of aircraft upsets, I always wonder if I could have coped as well as the guys who survived or any better than those who didn't.
Yes, I've also had many lucky escapes.
As one of those who advocates more stall training in the sim, I think I should reply. The point I was making was that the recovery from a fully developed stall, especially at very high altitude is quite the opposite of what is taught to airline crews, with monotonous regularity, for the avoidance of an impending stall at low level. The crew must be able to recognise when stall prevention gives way to stall recovery and this has to be instinctive and mustn't be delayed. If necessary the recovery attitude (and power) needs to be applied for a protracted period of time and with a large loss of altitude. The resulting trajectory has to be accepted even if it takes the aircraft into a CB or terrain. Until the aircraft is unstalled and flying again, nothing else matters. Just hope you've got enough airspace.
When I read details of the various reports of aircraft upsets, I always wonder if I could have coped as well as the guys who survived or any better than those who didn't.
Yes, I've also had many lucky escapes.
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ISO 9000
Ian, I don't believe that ISO quality and management systems are really too applicable to pilots, perhaps more to aircraft maintenance, etc.
Normally ISO systems work well, such as in factories, where it is important that the employees do exactly what their job is every time. Of course, there are many ways within that system that employees can initiate changes and improvements to their particular processes, but only after review that is not instantaneous. But day in, day out, what works best is that they do what is written in their SOP's for that job.
However, seems to this non-pilot that while pilots have to have guidelines, checklists, etc., their qualifications and training has to be at a high enough level that they can handle the emergencies that can arise and may not be covered in a manual or a procedure.
Normally ISO systems work well, such as in factories, where it is important that the employees do exactly what their job is every time. Of course, there are many ways within that system that employees can initiate changes and improvements to their particular processes, but only after review that is not instantaneous. But day in, day out, what works best is that they do what is written in their SOP's for that job.
However, seems to this non-pilot that while pilots have to have guidelines, checklists, etc., their qualifications and training has to be at a high enough level that they can handle the emergencies that can arise and may not be covered in a manual or a procedure.
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Investigating-the-"investigator"
Question posed:
Investigative approach ... KNKT/NTSC ?
Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
at slot #3182 (permalink), dated 10Feb
See discussion in http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ml#post8861604
Investigative approach ... KNKT/NTSC ?
Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
at slot #3182 (permalink), dated 10Feb
See discussion in http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ml#post8861604
I've been quite surprised to see a number of posts along these lines recently, basically criticising CRM for empowering whipper-snappers to challenge wise old greybeards. I thought that Tenerife (and numerous accidents before and since) had demonstrated that "years of hard earned experience" do not necessarily equate to correct judgement in any given situation, and that a far greater risk is the FO cowered into silence by the higher status of their more experienced captain? It might be irritating to have your judgement regularly queried by a relative novice, but haven't we all (in whatever field) had the experience at one time or another of being challenged and thinking "damn, the kid's right"?
The issue is that new pilots (through no fault of their own - they have been trained that way) are good at complying with SOPS etc but lack the hands on skills which given the current level of automation can leave them lacking when things don't go according to plan.
The fact is that oldies that have done lots of flying on older generation types are "hard wired" neurologically for manual flying (they may be a bit rusty but they can confidently hand fly). New pilots do not have those skills to fall back on.
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What I would like to understand is the huge difference between how the AirAsia and the latest TransAsia accidents are treated by the respective national authorities (both acting under ICAO Rules).
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They are certainly taking a while to go from the initial ( & probably ill-advised) revelations, to coming up with some tentative explanation of WTHIH (old readers of Flight International will know that one. . .What the Hell is happening )
Perhaps they too, are slightly "unclear" of what/how/why an Airbus performs its "Magic" . . . . . .
Perhaps they too, are slightly "unclear" of what/how/why an Airbus performs its "Magic" . . . . . .
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FireFlyBob
The fact is that oldies that have done lots of flying on older generation types are "hard wired" neurologically for manual flying (they may be a bit rusty but they can confidently hand fly). New pilots do not have those skills to fall back on.
The fact is that oldies that have done lots of flying on older generation types are "hard wired" neurologically for manual flying (they may be a bit rusty but they can confidently hand fly). New pilots do not have those skills to fall back on.
Apparently 20'000 hours did not help in this incident:
AirAsia
Captain (53)
Air Force veteran, was very experienced, with around 20,000 flying hours under his belt including 6,000 on AirAsia's A320.
FO (46)
2,000+ hours with the carrier.
AF447
Captain (58)
Experience:
total: 10,988 flying hours, of which 6,258 as Captain
hours on type: 1,747 all as Captain
FO1
total: 6,547 flying hours
on type: 4,479 flying hours
FO2
total: 2,936 flying hours
on type: 807 flying hours
Glider pilot
How do you define "oldies"?
Apparently 20'000 hours did not help in this incident:
Apparently 20'000 hours did not help in this incident:
In the case of AF447 the Commander was not on the flight deck and/or at the controls when the event started to materialise.
In the case of AirAsia it would be interesting to know how much of that 20,000 hours was done on large jet transports with round dials, basic autopilot with no auto throttle and no FMC etc.
Perhaps "oldies" was an inappropriate term to use but the point I am making is that those who have done a lot of hand flying basic jets with minimal automation (even if a bit out of practice) are in a better position to maintain safe control when the automation decides to be not available.
Years ago we would think nothing about despatching with an inoperative autopilot because we knew we could competently hand fly at cruise levels.
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fireflybob
"Years ago we would think nothing about despatching with an inoperative autopilot because we knew we could competently hand fly at cruise levels."
Exactly! Character building stuff and it kept us awake. Well most of us anyway, in remote areas. South Atlantic comes to mind. Pre RVSM of course.
If you can hand fly at cruise accurately, you can normally do what you needed to do with the a/c hand flying. Got quite good on raw information too as the FD wasn't all that helpful in pitch at cruise altitude, IIRC.
"Years ago we would think nothing about despatching with an inoperative autopilot because we knew we could competently hand fly at cruise levels."
Exactly! Character building stuff and it kept us awake. Well most of us anyway, in remote areas. South Atlantic comes to mind. Pre RVSM of course.
If you can hand fly at cruise accurately, you can normally do what you needed to do with the a/c hand flying. Got quite good on raw information too as the FD wasn't all that helpful in pitch at cruise altitude, IIRC.
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Arée, a next post that will get deleted.
I am a pilot.
Flew light to medium, even have a BFM (Basic Fighter Man) hr in an F-16B, and yes we pulled the whole 9G's a couple of times.
No, all those "Thousands of hrs" airline pilots do not need a single extra hr in a simm. NOT a single hr.
They need "REAL" seat time in a Cessna 152, a Pitts, or a Cap10.
They "need" some "REAL" and "DIE HARD" stalls to cope with, not in any simm at all, but in real life.
Where their bottoms come loose from the seat.
Where the break drops the nose deep and the wings fall ways from you.
I'v had "real" pilots turn white as paper.
I'v had guys shouting and screaming; sweating and strugling.
All they ever did was; "Stay away, stay away, recover before the stall."
Well, I fear the results speak for themselves.
And then do a full deep stall in a twin.
And teach them to cartwheel out of the stall. Full rudder and Full power on one, chop the power on the second, and cartwheel overhead out of the stall.
Then you will have pilots that start to understand stalls.
You might see some pilots turned WHITE, but you"ll have better pilots.
You can put them in a simm for weeks, nothing will ever change.
Flew light to medium, even have a BFM (Basic Fighter Man) hr in an F-16B, and yes we pulled the whole 9G's a couple of times.
No, all those "Thousands of hrs" airline pilots do not need a single extra hr in a simm. NOT a single hr.
They need "REAL" seat time in a Cessna 152, a Pitts, or a Cap10.
They "need" some "REAL" and "DIE HARD" stalls to cope with, not in any simm at all, but in real life.
Where their bottoms come loose from the seat.
Where the break drops the nose deep and the wings fall ways from you.
I'v had "real" pilots turn white as paper.
I'v had guys shouting and screaming; sweating and strugling.
All they ever did was; "Stay away, stay away, recover before the stall."
Well, I fear the results speak for themselves.
And then do a full deep stall in a twin.
And teach them to cartwheel out of the stall. Full rudder and Full power on one, chop the power on the second, and cartwheel overhead out of the stall.
Then you will have pilots that start to understand stalls.
You might see some pilots turned WHITE, but you"ll have better pilots.
You can put them in a simm for weeks, nothing will ever change.
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You all may want to have a look at this. It ain't pretty to watch but this is what can happen. Look and let's learn. Borrowed from another thread.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-hb...ature=youtu.be
Apologizes to those who have seen it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-hb...ature=youtu.be
Apologizes to those who have seen it.
Last edited by Sop_Monkey; 10th Feb 2015 at 23:13.
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In the case of AF447 the Commander was not on the flight deck and/or at the controls when the event started to materialise.
I still can't accept that an ex-airforce fighter pilot has 20,000 hours. What age did he join the airline and how many hours did he have when he left the airforce? My point being he may not have been as experienced as others are suggesting. If he did have that many hours at age 53 after an airforce career then he was flying a lot of hours every year.
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The engines are under the wing, under the center of mass and under the center of lift. Pushing the power up creates a momentum that pushes the nose up.
Pushing power up pushes the nose up, and at the same time you have to push nose down to break the stall. Result?? Nothing changes. The engine power pushes nose up and you push nose down. => You stay in the deep stall.
Chopping the power to idle creates the opposite momentum and drops the nose, helping the stick nose down momentum around the center of mass and the center of lift.
Lowering the gear adds drag below the center of mass and center of lift, and lowers the nose.
ALL tools are good tools to drop the nose.
Banking yes, helping the bank with power on one side, yes.
On realy large planes carefull with rudder, as the fuselage and tail are not build for torsional loads.
Pushing power up pushes the nose up, and at the same time you have to push nose down to break the stall. Result?? Nothing changes. The engine power pushes nose up and you push nose down. => You stay in the deep stall.
Chopping the power to idle creates the opposite momentum and drops the nose, helping the stick nose down momentum around the center of mass and the center of lift.
Lowering the gear adds drag below the center of mass and center of lift, and lowers the nose.
ALL tools are good tools to drop the nose.
Banking yes, helping the bank with power on one side, yes.
On realy large planes carefull with rudder, as the fuselage and tail are not build for torsional loads.
