NTSB update on Asiana 214
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The NTSB files submitted today from Assiana, the Pilot's Union and Boeing are on pages 12 & 13 -
Accident ID DCA13MA120 Mode Aviation occurred on July 06, 2013 in San Francisco, CA United States Last Modified on March 31, 2014 13:03 Public Released on December 11, 2013 08:12 Total 183 document items
76 Mar 31, 2014 Air Cruisers Submission
177 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Airlines Accident Investigation Submissions
178 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Airlines Submission Appendix A
179 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Airlines Submission Appendix B
180 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Airlines Submission Appendix C
181 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Pilots Union Submission
182 Mar 31, 2014 Boeing Submission
183 Mar 31, 2014 Letter from KARAIB
Accident ID DCA13MA120 Mode Aviation occurred on July 06, 2013 in San Francisco, CA United States Last Modified on March 31, 2014 13:03 Public Released on December 11, 2013 08:12 Total 183 document items
76 Mar 31, 2014 Air Cruisers Submission
177 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Airlines Accident Investigation Submissions
178 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Airlines Submission Appendix A
179 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Airlines Submission Appendix B
180 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Airlines Submission Appendix C
181 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Pilots Union Submission
182 Mar 31, 2014 Boeing Submission
183 Mar 31, 2014 Letter from KARAIB
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Originally Posted by Feathered
Finally, "air traffic control instructions and procedures led to an excessive pilot workload during the final approach."
A really weak assertion by Asiana.
Last edited by ThreeThreeMike; 1st Apr 2014 at 00:59.
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Here's the N Y Times report on this:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/us...re.html?ref=us
I think bottom line this is about money and the legal system, not about logic.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/us...re.html?ref=us
I think bottom line this is about money and the legal system, not about logic.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/us...re.html?ref=us
Boeing's shirking. "Modern" jets cannot be crashed (via ever-reducing airpseed until the stall) in "normal law". It's about time Boeing modded the 777. And not having the feature in the 787 is just being bloody-minded. Cars have got every conceivable safety feature (and some); aeroplanes not. Why not?
The Asiana pilots stuffed it, but they weren't helped by the design.
Boeing's shirking. "Modern" jets cannot be crashed (via ever-reducing airpseed until the stall) in "normal law". It's about time Boeing modded the 777. And not having the feature in the 787 is just being bloody-minded. Cars have got every conceivable safety feature (and some); aeroplanes not. Why not?
The Asiana pilots stuffed it, but they weren't helped by the design.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/us...re.html?ref=us
Boeing's shirking. "Modern" jets cannot be crashed (via ever-reducing airpseed until the stall) in "normal law". It's about time Boeing modded the 777. And not having the feature in the 787 is just being bloody-minded. Cars have got every conceivable safety feature (and some); aeroplanes not. Why not?
The Asiana pilots stuffed it, but they weren't helped by the design.
Boeing's shirking. "Modern" jets cannot be crashed (via ever-reducing airpseed until the stall) in "normal law". It's about time Boeing modded the 777. And not having the feature in the 787 is just being bloody-minded. Cars have got every conceivable safety feature (and some); aeroplanes not. Why not?
The Asiana pilots stuffed it, but they weren't helped by the design.
Totally agree with Lonewolf_50's post above.
It's not the aircraft's fault if 3 pilots in a cockpit cannot monitor the airspeed on an approach, especially in the conditions they were flying in that day.
It's not the aircraft's fault if 3 pilots in a cockpit cannot monitor the airspeed on an approach, especially in the conditions they were flying in that day.
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Holy cow.
Trimmed for approach, engines stuck at idle, IAS decreasing...
...so nose-high the crew can't see PAPI...
...Yoke force approaching 100# >>>>
How many clues do you need?
Trimmed for approach, engines stuck at idle, IAS decreasing...
...so nose-high the crew can't see PAPI...
...Yoke force approaching 100# >>>>
How many clues do you need?
Crew miss-programs autothrottle such that it commands a climb. Crew doesn't want to climb and so overrides and disconnects the autothrottle. Crew then expects the disconnected autothrottle to maintain airspeed during final.
And somehow that's the fault of the autothrottle?
And somehow that's the fault of the autothrottle?
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Crew miss-programs autothrottle such that it commands a climb. Crew doesn't want to climb and so overrides and disconnects the autothrottle. Crew then expects the disconnected autothrottle to maintain airspeed during final.
And somehow that's the fault of the autothrottle?
And somehow that's the fault of the autothrottle?
Last edited by sflaperons; 1st Apr 2014 at 15:25. Reason: typo
Plastic PPRuNer
I've has noticed that a large number of accidents recently have been caused by mis-assumptions about autotrim and autothrottle.
I'm sure these reduce pilot load but uncertainty about when these are active and what happens when they disconnect pervades these reports.
I'm sure these reduce pilot load but uncertainty about when these are active and what happens when they disconnect pervades these reports.
sflaperons:
a. How well does one know one's aircraft?
b. What would you expect of a professional pilot, in terms of knowing his aircraft when other people's lives are on the line?
c. How many of us would have passed a check ride, in any aircraft, if we were 20 knots slow on final? (No less the 30+ in this case).
a. How well does one know one's aircraft?
b. What would you expect of a professional pilot, in terms of knowing his aircraft when other people's lives are on the line?
c. How many of us would have passed a check ride, in any aircraft, if we were 20 knots slow on final? (No less the 30+ in this case).
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It doesn't seem unreasonable to you that they don't know how the throttles work? Or that uhm, they didn't notice that the airspeed thingamajig was going down? Surely I'm misreading this. April Fools, maybe? Which airline do you work for, anyway?
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I remember reading about a Korean cargo B747 that nosedived into a field somewhere in the UK. Apparently the Capt's instrument had failed - or if he had vertigo, or both - so he didn't realise their dangerous attitude. But the FO had working instruments and didn't say a single word even though he knew he would die. I find this accident very tragic[/COLOR] and indeed, Asiana 214 could have been a disastrous repeat of it.
1. Inbound, captain's ADI written up as U/S in normal mode - worked in STBY. Mechanic on board signed it off.
2. Outbound, same ADI problem. Captain did not switch to STBY.
3. Attitude monitor alerted 20+ times.
4. Heading changed 120 degrees.
5. Engineer actually verbalized, "Captain, bank angle" on two occasions.
6. F/O and STBY ADI both indicating 90 degrees of bank.
And this is a culture problem?
1. Inbound, captain's ADI written up as U/S in normal mode - worked in STBY. Mechanic on board signed it off.
2. Outbound, same ADI problem. Captain did not switch to STBY.
3. Attitude monitor alerted 20+ times.
4. Heading changed 120 degrees.
5. Engineer actually verbalized, "Captain, bank angle" on two occasions.
6. F/O and STBY ADI both indicating 90 degrees of bank.
And this is a culture problem?
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It doesn't seem unreasonable to you that they don't know how the throttles work?
To me at least, it is not instinctive that disconnecting the AP without turning off the autothrottle would cause you to lose airspeed protection. I think you would need to be trained on that point, which the crew claims it wasn't. It still doesn't excuse not monitoring airspeed, of course. But I wasn't trying to make excuses. Just to say that in an of itself the assumption does not strike me as unreasonable (leaving to the side the inevitable rejoinder than any assumptions are unreasonable by virtue of being assumptions).
It still doesn't excuse not monitoring airspeed, of course
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A point in time arrives where the pilot has to fly the aircraft first, and make sense of why it did, or did not do as expected at a more appropriate time..obviously Asiana doesn't understand this... so they blame Boeing...
Last edited by ironbutt57; 1st Apr 2014 at 17:48. Reason: spelling
A guy I worked with used to have this sign over his desk:
"I didn't say it was your fault, I said I was going to blame you."
(This was in reference to an old boss, and a bit of an office inside joke).
Seems to be Asiana's position, at best.
"I didn't say it was your fault, I said I was going to blame you."
(This was in reference to an old boss, and a bit of an office inside joke).
Seems to be Asiana's position, at best.
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I think you would need to be trained on that point, which the crew claims it wasn't
But on the flip side did somebody train them that pulling 80 lbs on a yoke during the final stages of approach was OK?
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If that isn't in the upgrade syllabus, or the type qual syllabus, who is on the hook? The airline? What are the odds they'd admit that they didn't do a satisfactory systems course?
I am highly suspicious of such claim, sounds to me like ABC of systems knowledge in 777. But it would be very easy to check, they probably went through some standardized 777 training course when they were type rated.
Submissions available here:
Accident ID DCA13MA120 Mode Aviation occurred on July 06, 2013 in San Francisco, CA United States Last Modified on March 31, 2014 13:03 Public Released on December 11, 2013 08:12 Total 183 document items
Just to be sure, I'm not seeking to defend what happened. And I'm certainly not criticizing Boeing's AP / AT logic.
I guess my thought is more that a professional crew with 20,000 hours appears to have assumed (with reasonable logic, I would say) something very basic about the autothrottle that is very much not true. From a safety recommendations perspective, how that happened seems worth talking about.