NTSB update on Asiana 214
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"thought" that the A/T
Moreover "thinking" is not good enough - the mode of A/T was displayed in front of him and it said HOLD. It means only one thing - A/T throttle is in a 'dormant' mode, don't expect it to work. As a matter of fact everything is displayed for him right in front of his very nose - airspeed, A/T mode, A/P modes, the size of area to look at - about 4 x 4 inches. Pilots are taught to always verify that the automatics are doing what they are thinking they should be doing.
Last edited by porterhouse; 27th Jun 2014 at 21:48.
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The Range:
The modern school house calls it "energy management."
I call it attitude instrument flying.
Either way, grandma was wrong when she said, "Fly low and slow, sonny."
Watch your airspeed
I call it attitude instrument flying.
Either way, grandma was wrong when she said, "Fly low and slow, sonny."
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and if he "thought" that the A/T
In this other accident decades ago a business JetStar was flying from South America to Hawaii, its owner and crew were returning home. After a long 10+ hrs flight they landed in Honolulu to clear the border/customs. What awaited them was a mere 20 min hop to another island, weather was perfect but it was going to be a night flight. Pilots were almost there, why bother with a longer arrival procedure specially in such a magnificent clear weather, they took a shortcut. One of them suddenly spotted something black blocking their view but another remarked .. Ehh, I think it is just a puff of a cloud. It wasn't, there wasn't a single cloud around, it was a rim of a volcano, they hit it with predictable results...
Last edited by olasek; 28th Jun 2014 at 04:31.
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In this other accident decades ago a business JetStar was flying from South America to Hawaii, its owner and crew were returning home. After a long 10+ hrs flight they landed in Honolulu to clear the border/customs. What awaited them was a mere 20 min hop to another island, weather was perfect but it was going to be a night flight. Pilots were almost there, why bother with a longer arrival procedure specially in such a magnificent clear weather, they took a shortcut. One of them suddenly spotted something black blocking their view but another remarked .. Ehh, I think it is just a puff of a cloud. It wasn't, there wasn't a single cloud around, it was a rim of a volcano, they hit it with predictable results...
Those circumstances sound vaguely similar, though it was a Sabreliner rather than a JetStar and it was enroute from Argentina via Maui, rather than Honolulu, to Molokai when it hit a ridge about 3nm from its destination shortly after the CVR recorded the captain asking "That's the clouds, huh?".
Energy ~ Speed ^ 2
Airspeed is the primary reference, but instrument formats have changed in recent years – although not in the lifetime of the 777.
Tape speed-scales do not have the same qualities as dial instruments; although tapes are inferior they have been accepted as satisfactory for speed control, particularly with the availability of auto-thrust. Changes in operations and training resulted in greater use of auto-thrust, perhaps with less attention to the actual airspeed (and difficulty reading it) – vice the selected value. Also, A/T use reduces opportunity to gain experience in energy management using the combination, the interchange between pitch and thrust.
With autopilot control, energy is managed with system modes, this is not always consistent with manual flight techniques, and to a similar extent for manual flight with A/T. Thus the only way to improve understanding and gain experience of the pitch–speed interaction (energy management) is with full manual control of pitch and speed. Many calls for more manual flight overlook this critically important aspect – turn the A/T off.
Also, some A/T systems do not have consistent logic for speed / thrust. Most A/T systems are integrated with the autopilot; A/T speed=pitch on elevator, A/T thrust=speed on elevator. However, the advent of speed protection and additional interactive modes has led to quiescent A/T operation - speed hold / ARM, each with additional complexity and ‘minor’ inconsistencies.
Whilst human behaviour can be inconsistent, automation up to a point should be consistent; where this is not achieved then the human needs greater understanding (training) and additional resource for situation/workload management according to operational scenario.
Thus it is perhaps not surprising that there are more speed (awareness) related incidents; not only with tape displays, but also with dials as the influences of increased A/T use can degrade (change) the basic instrument scans associated with normal operation. Pilots also lack experience of the pitch – speed interaction – the ‘feel’ of manoeuvring the aircraft in manual flight.
Tape speed-scales do not have the same qualities as dial instruments; although tapes are inferior they have been accepted as satisfactory for speed control, particularly with the availability of auto-thrust. Changes in operations and training resulted in greater use of auto-thrust, perhaps with less attention to the actual airspeed (and difficulty reading it) – vice the selected value. Also, A/T use reduces opportunity to gain experience in energy management using the combination, the interchange between pitch and thrust.
With autopilot control, energy is managed with system modes, this is not always consistent with manual flight techniques, and to a similar extent for manual flight with A/T. Thus the only way to improve understanding and gain experience of the pitch–speed interaction (energy management) is with full manual control of pitch and speed. Many calls for more manual flight overlook this critically important aspect – turn the A/T off.
Also, some A/T systems do not have consistent logic for speed / thrust. Most A/T systems are integrated with the autopilot; A/T speed=pitch on elevator, A/T thrust=speed on elevator. However, the advent of speed protection and additional interactive modes has led to quiescent A/T operation - speed hold / ARM, each with additional complexity and ‘minor’ inconsistencies.
Whilst human behaviour can be inconsistent, automation up to a point should be consistent; where this is not achieved then the human needs greater understanding (training) and additional resource for situation/workload management according to operational scenario.
Thus it is perhaps not surprising that there are more speed (awareness) related incidents; not only with tape displays, but also with dials as the influences of increased A/T use can degrade (change) the basic instrument scans associated with normal operation. Pilots also lack experience of the pitch – speed interaction – the ‘feel’ of manoeuvring the aircraft in manual flight.
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Tape speed-scales do not have the same qualities as dial instruments;
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf
it raises the question of why that Company remains in business.
@Safetypee
Excellent analysis of how low respect of pedagogy rules and decreasing standardisation but increasing number of modes are working
safetypee says: Pilots also lack experience of the pitch – speed interaction – the ‘feel’ of manoeuvring the aircraft in manual flight.
It seems to me that about two thirds of the people posting in this thread are searching for excuses; i.e. what quirk of the aircraft could possibly be to blame.
The other third have it right. Bottom line: These guys can't fly. The pilot flying, at least, proved that he didn't have a understanding of how to fly an airplane at the very basic level. In addition, he proved didn't have an understanding of how the sophisticated auto flight system of his airplane worked.
And none of the guys in the cockpit had an appreciation of the relationship between cultural idiosyncrasies and their basic responsibility to keep from killing their passengers. Shame on them.
If your premise is correct, someone should have told the pilot something most of know, "Pull back and you go up. Pull further back and you go down".
When work load is high and things get out of hand. How many pilots have found they fixated on something to the detriment of something more important. More than the perceived experts here methinks. However whatever it still comes down to pilot error, but to coin a phrase. Those that throw the 1st stone!
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When work load is high and things get out of hand. How many pilots have found they fixated on something to the detriment of something more important. More than the perceived experts here methinks.
Where did the high workload come from?
IMO, they just weren't ready to fly outside the little box that they trained for.
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The really sad thing is there are turboprop pilots all over the world who could have sat in that seat and flown a perfect visual approach with no training on the aircraft at all. Just tell them the speed and hand over control.
The question that really needs answering is why the crew on that flight, who many years previously could probably have done it too, no longer have the skills. Where do they go and why?
My outfit doesn't discourage hand flying, they just say you shouldn't mix, if you disengage the autopilot, disengage the auto throttle too.
You'd think it was rocket science from some people. It's just an airplane. The Wish panel is where you push the buttons, and the FMA is where it tells you what it's doing. In nice big clear letters.
The question that really needs answering is why the crew on that flight, who many years previously could probably have done it too, no longer have the skills. Where do they go and why?
My outfit doesn't discourage hand flying, they just say you shouldn't mix, if you disengage the autopilot, disengage the auto throttle too.
You'd think it was rocket science from some people. It's just an airplane. The Wish panel is where you push the buttons, and the FMA is where it tells you what it's doing. In nice big clear letters.
If they had observed the modern industry-standard stable approach criteria, then they would have gone around at both 1000' and failing that 500'.
I see the failure to go around off an unstable approach as the primary cause, because it is a fundamental mistake, it is the first mistake and it would have arrested all the subsequent mistakes.
After that, it is clear that the PF was flying it as if he were in an Airbus (static levers, a/t on), when he in fact had the a/t off. A poor Airbus pilot has poor speed monitoring, because the standard way to fly a visual is with a/t on, and the a/t does an exceptionally good and reliable job.
Therefore he was not monitoring speed, and the levers were doing "as expected" (ie as per the Airbus - nothing).
But that's all irrelevant - he flew a criminally bad intermediate approach, and neither pilot observed the stable approach criteria. The real answer to why this happened, is why did they not go around at either 1000' or 500'? Training, company culture, negligence, recriminations, SOPs, something else...
Qualification: I have gone between Airbus and Boeing several times in my career.
I see the failure to go around off an unstable approach as the primary cause, because it is a fundamental mistake, it is the first mistake and it would have arrested all the subsequent mistakes.
After that, it is clear that the PF was flying it as if he were in an Airbus (static levers, a/t on), when he in fact had the a/t off. A poor Airbus pilot has poor speed monitoring, because the standard way to fly a visual is with a/t on, and the a/t does an exceptionally good and reliable job.
Therefore he was not monitoring speed, and the levers were doing "as expected" (ie as per the Airbus - nothing).
But that's all irrelevant - he flew a criminally bad intermediate approach, and neither pilot observed the stable approach criteria. The real answer to why this happened, is why did they not go around at either 1000' or 500'? Training, company culture, negligence, recriminations, SOPs, something else...
Qualification: I have gone between Airbus and Boeing several times in my career.
Work load includes being watched assessed etc. whilst no excuse for not looking out of the window & monitoring speed. I have seen many a pilot getting themselves into similar situations, hence me saying about throwing stones.
(Some pilots have a very short memory of their mistakes e.g me hearing a check airman saying to a f/o under training that he'd never done a rushed approach! I resisted the urge to butt in & say is that apart from the one you did with me when you were an f/o)
(Some pilots have a very short memory of their mistakes e.g me hearing a check airman saying to a f/o under training that he'd never done a rushed approach! I resisted the urge to butt in & say is that apart from the one you did with me when you were an f/o)
porterhouse, there are often many views, but the interesting aspects are generally in understanding why they differ. You suggest a comparison with older equipment, but is this with greater experience with the old than the new, has A/T been considered, and in what situations.
My view is based on research texts, but applied to airspeed displays, and a comparison of a high quality ASI e.g. 3ATI MD80 with modern EFIS. I am 'old school', but with experience of military speed tapes and total immersion in early civil EFIS development.
The significant features I relate to are the range of speed in view – dial max to min, EFIS +- 30 kts, and the speed value in relation to an extreme; additionally the dial has an angular relationship to the speed range and rate-of-change of speed.
Speed rate is interesting as many people would cite an EFIS trend vector as useful – but who looks at it when the workload is high. The early history of trend vectors ranges that they were there because the parameter could be computed, or were needed to support the ‘deficient’ airspeed tape in this area.
Mozella, I use ‘experience’ as something above the basic requirements of being qualified, these are the abilities more often required specific situations and of being 'safe':-
Re "Pull back and you go up. Pull further back and you go down". But do we tell pilots that pulling back results in reducing airspeed (unless energy is managed) or without managing pulling up further that the aircraft may stall. Do we teach how to manage - plane, path, people?
Education and understanding reinforced by experience and the willingness to improve are among many factors which enable pilots to manage energy, the aircraft, the situation, and themselves.
And even when we have taught pilots, is the information always recalled or applied as we might judge with hindsight?
My view is based on research texts, but applied to airspeed displays, and a comparison of a high quality ASI e.g. 3ATI MD80 with modern EFIS. I am 'old school', but with experience of military speed tapes and total immersion in early civil EFIS development.
The significant features I relate to are the range of speed in view – dial max to min, EFIS +- 30 kts, and the speed value in relation to an extreme; additionally the dial has an angular relationship to the speed range and rate-of-change of speed.
Speed rate is interesting as many people would cite an EFIS trend vector as useful – but who looks at it when the workload is high. The early history of trend vectors ranges that they were there because the parameter could be computed, or were needed to support the ‘deficient’ airspeed tape in this area.
Mozella, I use ‘experience’ as something above the basic requirements of being qualified, these are the abilities more often required specific situations and of being 'safe':-
Re "Pull back and you go up. Pull further back and you go down". But do we tell pilots that pulling back results in reducing airspeed (unless energy is managed) or without managing pulling up further that the aircraft may stall. Do we teach how to manage - plane, path, people?
Education and understanding reinforced by experience and the willingness to improve are among many factors which enable pilots to manage energy, the aircraft, the situation, and themselves.
And even when we have taught pilots, is the information always recalled or applied as we might judge with hindsight?
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Basics
I have said this many times about this particular crash. "I would expect better from a post solo student pilot!" This is not rocket science and we all know it. A visual approach an a clear day, come on. I would never have believed that such a simple approach would have such disastrous results, but I guess I was wrong.
As far as what was doing what when, Auto Thrust Vs Thrust lever position, who cares. I'm normally looking out the window. Keep the same sight picture in the window, again we all know that works to.
So lets keep the blue side up.
Basics
As far as what was doing what when, Auto Thrust Vs Thrust lever position, who cares. I'm normally looking out the window. Keep the same sight picture in the window, again we all know that works to.
So lets keep the blue side up.
Basics
Do we teach how to manage - plane, path, people?
Education and understanding reinforced by experience and the willingness to improve are among many factors which enable pilots to manage energy, the aircraft, the situation, and themselves.
And even when we have taught pilots, is the information always recalled or applied as we might judge with hindsight?
Education and understanding reinforced by experience and the willingness to improve are among many factors which enable pilots to manage energy, the aircraft, the situation, and themselves.
And even when we have taught pilots, is the information always recalled or applied as we might judge with hindsight?
Is it true that some airliners are piloted by crews with just enough skill to not crash until some unanticipated circumstance pops up? Perhaps so.
Are you saying they couldn't help it because they didn't know what they were doing since the training they received was so poor? Is it possible to find airline pilots with a big metal tube full of innocent and unsuspecting people riding along behind them while they don't have a basic understanding of how the flight controls work? It might be so in this case.
But that doesn't make it OK by me.