NTSB update on Asiana 214
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It is not Rocket science. Line up with your runway and land as all pilots are trained to do. Crashing into rocks before the runway means no pilot was in control of the 777, it was just an uncontrolled crash to SFO because nobody knew how to fly an airplane but they thought they could push the right buttons. Kind of sad, isn't it?
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I guess they're flying down the peninsula and then turning back up to the airport, so other traffic inbound from other directions can take 28R without paths crossing
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I've read the whole thread.
Wondering, does anyone really think the pilots are victims here?
I don't.
Now, I don't know how all the people in the cockpit could let one of the most capable airliners of all time get low and slow in perfect flying weather, but I have a contrast to consider.
In the US and many other countries, airline pilots have either come up through the military ranks (and had pretty good training).
Or they came up the civilian ranks and managed to make all of their mistakes in little planes , corrected them and got on with airlines.
A tradition in flying that starts at the bottom and moves up. Not start at near the top and move sideways.
Wondering, does anyone really think the pilots are victims here?
I don't.
Now, I don't know how all the people in the cockpit could let one of the most capable airliners of all time get low and slow in perfect flying weather, but I have a contrast to consider.
In the US and many other countries, airline pilots have either come up through the military ranks (and had pretty good training).
Or they came up the civilian ranks and managed to make all of their mistakes in little planes , corrected them and got on with airlines.
A tradition in flying that starts at the bottom and moves up. Not start at near the top and move sideways.
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glendalegoon
Who says those pilots are victims here?
Everyone knows what happened with Asiana in SFO.
No one here is defending those two pilots.
So why don't you just be quiet and wait for the final report in Summer.
I know there are many pilots who think they are the best.
Good pilots come to this forum to not to criticize the pilots who had accidents.
Good pilots come to this forum to learn from other's mistakes.
You are the kind of pilot that we don't need in this forum.
And don't stir up again with this issue.
Who says those pilots are victims here?
Everyone knows what happened with Asiana in SFO.
No one here is defending those two pilots.
So why don't you just be quiet and wait for the final report in Summer.
I know there are many pilots who think they are the best.
Good pilots come to this forum to not to criticize the pilots who had accidents.
Good pilots come to this forum to learn from other's mistakes.
You are the kind of pilot that we don't need in this forum.
And don't stir up again with this issue.
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jetpilot007
maybe you haven't read the thread closely enough. many have complained about the lack of ILS and other factors.
oh and jetpilot 007, there were three pilots in the cockpit that day, not two.
I'm sorry you don't understand the point I was trying to make.
maybe you haven't read the thread closely enough. many have complained about the lack of ILS and other factors.
oh and jetpilot 007, there were three pilots in the cockpit that day, not two.
I'm sorry you don't understand the point I was trying to make.
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I've read the whole thread.
Yes, the pilots are victims here.
Victims of poor training and a poor safety culture.
They didn't set out to crash the aircraft. They weren't negligent in the sense that they didn't deliberately flout regulations or have a "cowboy" attitude.
They did their best to deal with the situation with the tools they had been given, in the form of their training and company regulations (which includes a "maximum automation" policy)- those tools were manifestly inadequate.
Yes, the situation was there were two (probably three) pilots without the capability to use basic airmanship to correct an error and simply hand fly and visually land an aircraft.
But- HOW DID THEY GET THERE? WHY were they no able to?
I have first hand experience of Asiana and can say from personal experience it is because they would not only have never been trained in something so simple, it would have been actively discouraged.
Yes, the pilots didn't do their job.
The Airline, and the regulator behind that airline, put pilots not CAPABLE of doing the job in that cockpit.
Victims of poor training and a poor safety culture.
They didn't set out to crash the aircraft. They weren't negligent in the sense that they didn't deliberately flout regulations or have a "cowboy" attitude.
They did their best to deal with the situation with the tools they had been given, in the form of their training and company regulations (which includes a "maximum automation" policy)- those tools were manifestly inadequate.
Yes, the situation was there were two (probably three) pilots without the capability to use basic airmanship to correct an error and simply hand fly and visually land an aircraft.
But- HOW DID THEY GET THERE? WHY were they no able to?
I have first hand experience of Asiana and can say from personal experience it is because they would not only have never been trained in something so simple, it would have been actively discouraged.
Yes, the pilots didn't do their job.
The Airline, and the regulator behind that airline, put pilots not CAPABLE of doing the job in that cockpit.
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Glendalegoon
GDG, I sort of see where you are coming from but would suggest that 'experience fade' is far more prevalent than we may think. You just need to look at the various other cock-ups that have happened in the past year (SWA wrong airport, UPS Washington, wheelbarrowing 737 at JFK (?) and BA 747 at Jo'burg). All of these appear to have an airmanship issue.
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hamster wheel running again?
I thought this hamster wheel had mercifully been put to bed, by general agreement, pending any new and noteworthy developments.Ordinarily, I'd bite my tongue and mind by own business, but this particular thread is one many monitor for new developments. Not sure another rehash qualifies (or benefits anyone).
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I have a book, initially published in 1967 an on page 319 (Third edition, April 1990), there is this rather interesting paragraph which reads:
This was written 46 years ago. It appears that exactly the same problem of lack of flying ability in wide-bodied pilots existed then as it does now. But nowadays we should have an advantage by using high fidelity, purpose built training simulators to do this training. But we don't. In 20 years of small aircraft operations (50-100 seater) I've only ever had one dedicated session to recovery from upsets and loss of control scenarios. Over the years I've obviously used odd bits of sim. time to mess about (touch and go on every runway, fastest circuit, low passes etc.), like every other pilot - but I really don't think that's enough. And I say that when I probably do 10 landings per week, many of which are both visual and hand-flown. We should all do more. Failing to do so results in accidents like this.
Finally, a word about basic flying training, instrument flying and recovery from unusual attitudes on limited panel. A number of airlines are now buying small executive jet type aircraft as trainers for their major transport fleets. In these, some attempt is made to make the instrument panel layout resemble the transport aircraft. This is probably the most significant step forward in training programmes for years. It provides a small, comparatively cheap aeroplane on which pilots can practice and exercise their flying skills.
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Failing to do so results in accidents like this.
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But nowadays we should have an advantage by using high fidelity, purpose built training simulators to do this training. But we don't.
Lately i was planned on a brand new sim with state of the art programming. You guessed right, i tried again and realised that it was closer, but still too far away from what reality shoved down my spine as to be able to state, that a sim would be valuable enough to train upsets.
It still is not realistic enough, unfortunately.
The cost cutting by putting almost all the flying training into simulators still has its limits.
Upsets and close to the edge flying is still not covered satisfactorily in synthetic training.
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Upsets and close to the edge flying is still not covered satisfactorily in synthetic training.
What creates this problem, if you see it that way, is that the vast % of training is to try and keep the crew well away from anything that might require this type of training. However, in our real world of a chain of humans of differing skill levels, mother nature, mechanical wear & tear and our good old friend Murphy, there are occasions where these skills are required. Sadly the financial guys have, perhaps, done their risk assessment and persuaded the powers that be, inside and outside their airlines that the costs of the skill training outweigh the resultant benefits. There are not, yet, enough smoking holes in the significant states who could bring influence to bear on this philosophy. A few crashes in the outer reaches of civilisation might to be expected in their eyes eyes. IMHO there have been enough on their own doorstep to cause some deep concern. Are the correct people asking the correct questions and demanding the correct answers? I wonder.
What creates this problem, if you see it that way, is that the vast % of training is to try and keep the crew well away from anything that might require this type of training. However, in our real world of a chain of humans of differing skill levels, mother nature, mechanical wear & tear and our good old friend Murphy, there are occasions where these skills are required. Sadly the financial guys have, perhaps, done their risk assessment and persuaded the powers that be, inside and outside their airlines that the costs of the skill training outweigh the resultant benefits. There are not, yet, enough smoking holes in the significant states who could bring influence to bear on this philosophy. A few crashes in the outer reaches of civilisation might to be expected in their eyes eyes. IMHO there have been enough on their own doorstep to cause some deep concern. Are the correct people asking the correct questions and demanding the correct answers? I wonder.
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But isn't the intention of the synthetic training to make sure that the edge of the envelope always remains out of reach? That actions are taken so that stalls and upsets just don't happen?
If they do, then a simulator certainly can't wander beyond the edge of the gathered test flight data to reproduce them. If a large part of the aircraft falls off, or it enters a stall, then the simulator won't be able to reproduce the experience unless the model contains data as extreme as that event.
Aerobatic training might be very interesting, but would it have helped AF447 or Colgan whatever in Buffalo? I don't really think so. Wasn't it some exotic maneuvering training at American that could have contributed to the actions leading to the Queens NY Airbus crash in 2001?
If they do, then a simulator certainly can't wander beyond the edge of the gathered test flight data to reproduce them. If a large part of the aircraft falls off, or it enters a stall, then the simulator won't be able to reproduce the experience unless the model contains data as extreme as that event.
Aerobatic training might be very interesting, but would it have helped AF447 or Colgan whatever in Buffalo? I don't really think so. Wasn't it some exotic maneuvering training at American that could have contributed to the actions leading to the Queens NY Airbus crash in 2001?
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But isn't the intention of the synthetic training to make sure that the edge of the envelope always remains out of reach?
I think you'll find that the modern airline pilot has absolutely no idea where the edge of the envelope is, or how close of far away from it they are at any given time. The box of most a/c is quite large. The SOP box of most airlines is extremely small. The buffer margin is enormous. This ignorance can cause problems when events conspire to move you out of your comfort zone. As a young F/O my comfort zone was small. It was experience/knowledge based. As I flew the line with the old farts in/out of old age low tech airports my experience/knowledge base grew and so my comfort zone expanded until I felt it large enough for me to cross over and feel comfortable with handling what the environment could throw at me.
Today that apprenticeship is no more. Commands are given away in half the time. Stringent trained monkey SOP's are a straight-jacket to knowledge of the a/c. Many captain's comfort zone is likely smaller than mine was 1/2 way through my F/O apprenticeship: and it will likely stay that way. Thus think what little knowledge is passed on, and then think how tiny the comfort zone will be of the following generation. Hardly the progression we might wish for. I am an advocate of SOP's, but when the SOP is maximum use of automatics at all times; full procedural approaches even in VMC etc. I wonder if there in lies the answer to having a tiny comfort zone.
I think you'll find that the modern airline pilot has absolutely no idea where the edge of the envelope is, or how close of far away from it they are at any given time. The box of most a/c is quite large. The SOP box of most airlines is extremely small. The buffer margin is enormous. This ignorance can cause problems when events conspire to move you out of your comfort zone. As a young F/O my comfort zone was small. It was experience/knowledge based. As I flew the line with the old farts in/out of old age low tech airports my experience/knowledge base grew and so my comfort zone expanded until I felt it large enough for me to cross over and feel comfortable with handling what the environment could throw at me.
Today that apprenticeship is no more. Commands are given away in half the time. Stringent trained monkey SOP's are a straight-jacket to knowledge of the a/c. Many captain's comfort zone is likely smaller than mine was 1/2 way through my F/O apprenticeship: and it will likely stay that way. Thus think what little knowledge is passed on, and then think how tiny the comfort zone will be of the following generation. Hardly the progression we might wish for. I am an advocate of SOP's, but when the SOP is maximum use of automatics at all times; full procedural approaches even in VMC etc. I wonder if there in lies the answer to having a tiny comfort zone.
Last edited by RAT 5; 15th Feb 2014 at 16:14.
When I did my B707 conversion training in 1971 we did dutch roll recovery, high mach "tuck" and emergency descent on the aircraft because the simulator didn't have the fidelity to do same.
That said, of course, we shouldn't forget that the odd accident happened on the real aircraft when practising the training which we now routinely conduct in the simulator.
That said, of course, we shouldn't forget that the odd accident happened on the real aircraft when practising the training which we now routinely conduct in the simulator.
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Originally Posted by fireflybob
That said, of course, we shouldn't forget that the odd accident happened on the real aircraft when practising the training which we now routinely conduct in the simulator.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the inappropriate control inputs applied by the flying pilot during a stall recovery attempt, the failure of the nonflying pilot-in-command to recognize, address, and correct these inappropriate control inputs, and the failure of ABX to establish a formal functional evaluation flight program that included adequate program guidelines, requirements and pilot training for performance of these flights.
Contributing to the causes of the accident were the inoperative stick shaker stall warning system and the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator’s inadequate fidelity in reproducing the airplane’s stall characteristics.
Contributing to the causes of the accident were the inoperative stick shaker stall warning system and the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator’s inadequate fidelity in reproducing the airplane’s stall characteristics.
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RAT 5 
I fully agree. The problem starts with today's training syllabi, like Multi-Crew-Licence-shorttracks and national-pride-ab-initio-direct-to-widebody careers (arabic countries) are flawed from the beginning due to lack of training of simple and basic skills and basic experience.
When the earlier generation started training, they did many hours on single, then twin, then turboprops. As students and then as young CFIs, as low-paid night mailshifters or even cropdusters. During these hours we had the "opportunity" to "almost screw-up" many times, to get close to the limits, we flew alone or together in non-blackbox-surveyed small equipment.
Many of such close encounters sharpened our senses, developed our early warning instincts and showed us our own limits and weaknesses. Similar experience was achieved in the Air-forces.
Every now and then someone paid the price, yes, but it was rarely with SLF!
Todays typical airline cadet and new FO has gone through the loops and hoops in record time, many logging unrealistic hours and the genuine ones with tight sops and 99% on autopilot or assisting the skippers. They know maybe three types of aircraft (another 20 in the MFS). Never given the chance to get close to any limits, their instincts are non existent, their early warning system digitally imprinted on the magenta cross on the PFD.
That is simply not enough for Murphys law, for some badly designed airline philosophy or some cheap maintenance and training.
Basic training should be just that: Basic training and not synthetic shortcuts.
It will never be possible to regain any lack of airmen-ship in a synthetic trainer, they can never be programmed realistically enough and without sound basic skills no program in the world can install professional skill into a human pilot.
It's as simple as that.
I fully agree. The problem starts with today's training syllabi, like Multi-Crew-Licence-shorttracks and national-pride-ab-initio-direct-to-widebody careers (arabic countries) are flawed from the beginning due to lack of training of simple and basic skills and basic experience.
When the earlier generation started training, they did many hours on single, then twin, then turboprops. As students and then as young CFIs, as low-paid night mailshifters or even cropdusters. During these hours we had the "opportunity" to "almost screw-up" many times, to get close to the limits, we flew alone or together in non-blackbox-surveyed small equipment.
Many of such close encounters sharpened our senses, developed our early warning instincts and showed us our own limits and weaknesses. Similar experience was achieved in the Air-forces.
Every now and then someone paid the price, yes, but it was rarely with SLF!
Todays typical airline cadet and new FO has gone through the loops and hoops in record time, many logging unrealistic hours and the genuine ones with tight sops and 99% on autopilot or assisting the skippers. They know maybe three types of aircraft (another 20 in the MFS). Never given the chance to get close to any limits, their instincts are non existent, their early warning system digitally imprinted on the magenta cross on the PFD.
That is simply not enough for Murphys law, for some badly designed airline philosophy or some cheap maintenance and training.
Basic training should be just that: Basic training and not synthetic shortcuts.
It will never be possible to regain any lack of airmen-ship in a synthetic trainer, they can never be programmed realistically enough and without sound basic skills no program in the world can install professional skill into a human pilot.
It's as simple as that.
gretchenfrage, you are totally wrong. Well according to the accountants. Cheap labour is a risk worth taking.
Actually I agree with every word of your post. Well said
Actually I agree with every word of your post. Well said