Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
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Thanks Mic Dundee
Great post Mic. Your post is one of the true gems of insight in one of the casual factors that make up this accident, out of the last 60 pages of waffle and uninformed amateur ego driven "analysis".
Your experience somewhat mirrors what I've been reading elsewhere on PPRUNE for months prior about working for Korean carriers.
Your experience somewhat mirrors what I've been reading elsewhere on PPRUNE for months prior about working for Korean carriers.
TD:
FWIW, if the go arounds during test were made "on speed" (or near to proper approach speed for a given day) it would be quite a different result than if one is 10, 20, or 30 knots slow when the Go Around command/action is initiated.
I suspect some interesting sim sessions could be made showing a go around decision late, low and slow, versus "in a timely fashion" for the benefit of pilots wondering how long it takes to go from falling near the ground to getting away from the ground if the Go Around decision is delayed, or too late.
FWIW, if the go arounds during test were made "on speed" (or near to proper approach speed for a given day) it would be quite a different result than if one is 10, 20, or 30 knots slow when the Go Around command/action is initiated.
I suspect some interesting sim sessions could be made showing a go around decision late, low and slow, versus "in a timely fashion" for the benefit of pilots wondering how long it takes to go from falling near the ground to getting away from the ground if the Go Around decision is delayed, or too late.
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td, what about the 'spool up' required on final?
Yes LW, the GA in the sim, or even when flight testing, rely on a 'fling' effect, being at or above speed, not below speed.
Yes LW, the GA in the sim, or even when flight testing, rely on a 'fling' effect, being at or above speed, not below speed.
Last edited by UAVop; 9th Jul 2013 at 21:53.
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Easy Street:
Yes you are right in thinking this and on many, many occasions this fact has been demonstrated. Its just that you never read about them because the outcome is that the aircraft lands at an airport (maybe not the intended one) and everyone goes home.
What is being said about the absence of the G/S is that it removed a safety barrier. Put it another way, if you consider the (fictitious) predicate:
An accident is likely if the crew are not that skilled in visual approaches AND are new on type AND there are CRM issues AND the PM is distracted AND a steep descent is required to get on the glidepath AND vertical guidance is not available.
If any condition is removed the accident becomes significantly less likely.
Note: this is a gross simplification, just to illustrate a point
Am I right in thinking that the most commonly-quoted reasons for retention of pilots, despite advances in automation, are that only a human can think flexibly enough to react to any unforeseen circumstance, and that only a human can continue to fly the aircraft when critical elements of automation fail?
What is being said about the absence of the G/S is that it removed a safety barrier. Put it another way, if you consider the (fictitious) predicate:
An accident is likely if the crew are not that skilled in visual approaches AND are new on type AND there are CRM issues AND the PM is distracted AND a steep descent is required to get on the glidepath AND vertical guidance is not available.
If any condition is removed the accident becomes significantly less likely.
Note: this is a gross simplification, just to illustrate a point
framer says:
Quote:
"So what do we need to change about the environment they were operating in? If you can answer that question you actually make an impact on flight safety rather than just on your own ego."
...ensure that pilots can actually fly 100% manually, and have no aversion in disconnecting A/P & A/T at any time to maintain desired flight path profile.
Quote:
"So what do we need to change about the environment they were operating in? If you can answer that question you actually make an impact on flight safety rather than just on your own ego."
...ensure that pilots can actually fly 100% manually, and have no aversion in disconnecting A/P & A/T at any time to maintain desired flight path profile.
So now try and convince the people running the Airlines ( accountants, lawyers etc) that we must increase our type rating sims from 6 sessions to 12 and that we must allow our pilots to fly manually on the line and that our recurrent sim sessions must involve hand flown visual approaches and circuits. Good luck.
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Not clear if Foreign ops crews are subject to drug /alcohol tests
from my SLF point of view, this seems bizarre.
If the plane is in the US, the crew should be subject to the same post crash checks as a US based crew.
I don't recall any road users getting exemptions after crashing a company car, just cos their company was based elsewhere.
Odd. The US gets to throw it's weight around on so many things, and yet in this which would seem to be a no brainer, it's not clear?
Not that I suspect alcohol or drugs were a factor in this case, but I think it's a loophole that needs fixing.
If the plane is in the US, the crew should be subject to the same post crash checks as a US based crew.
I don't recall any road users getting exemptions after crashing a company car, just cos their company was based elsewhere.
Odd. The US gets to throw it's weight around on so many things, and yet in this which would seem to be a no brainer, it's not clear?
Not that I suspect alcohol or drugs were a factor in this case, but I think it's a loophole that needs fixing.
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Interesting that she also made a point of saying that the "Instructor Pilot" (PNF) asserted that he was the PIC. However it is clear that the PF had longer service (years) with Asiana (so was in some sense more senior) but was the only one of the three that didnt come to Asiana through an Korean Airforce route - he did his training in Florida (so in some senses was less regarded presumably).
Interesting in that they are exploring the relationships between the three flight deck crew.
Interesting in that they are exploring the relationships between the three flight deck crew.
Last edited by Pinkman; 9th Jul 2013 at 22:50.
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Thanks NZ, I assume there were 2 pilots landing the plane in the cockpit, and 4 in total on board somewhere. All I'm saying is that in Korea, South or North, you go with the majority view and are not encouraged to make decisions, outside of consensus, even if consensus is incorrect. Similar in many regions north of Australia. ps Olympus Corporation Scandal is a prime example in Japan. It mostly works for them as a society but where individual decisions are needed as in this crash, it all falls down.
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MikeNYC wrote:
Here's the FlightAware data:
Flight Track Log ? AAR214 ? 06-Jul-2013 ? RKSI / ICN - KSFO ? FlightAware
Here's the FlightAware data:
Flight Track Log ? AAR214 ? 06-Jul-2013 ? RKSI / ICN - KSFO ? FlightAware
Last edited by Feathered; 10th Jul 2013 at 14:57.
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I wonder why she mentioned specially about the lack of alcohol / drugs testing post-crash? She implied that this was the responsibility of the Korean authorities, and that the NTSB don't know why it wasn't carried out. Do they have suspicions about incapacitation?
I also thought she said that the PAPIs were 3 red, one white.
And two cabin crew were ejected through the hole at the back. Horrible.
I also thought she said that the PAPIs were 3 red, one white.
And two cabin crew were ejected through the hole at the back. Horrible.
RetiredF4
What is the special difficulty about that visual approach?
Speed on short final was the problem looks like, what has it to do with the VAP?
What is the special difficulty about that visual approach?
Speed on short final was the problem looks like, what has it to do with the VAP?
1. If the approach is not in the database. Then figure out how to build it.
2. Decide what mode to use - LNAV/VNAV then IAN ? All LNAV/VNAV ? Look out the window ?
3. The recommended 1900' altitude at the bridge leaves the aircraft about 300 feet high on a 3 degree glide slope. Close to the runway. Were they hurrying to get down ?
