Lionair plane down in Bali.
I think tightcircuit's point was that "runway environment" suffices, not "the runway itself." I doubt that would be disagreed by anyone who has flown.
A bit of hair splitting, but a fair enough point. Details matter.
The issue regarding "we saw runway lights" that were not there does NOT mean the runway environment was in sight.
It may mean a number of other things ...
A bit of hair splitting, but a fair enough point. Details matter.
The issue regarding "we saw runway lights" that were not there does NOT mean the runway environment was in sight.
It may mean a number of other things ...
91.175
(c) Operation below DH or MDA. Where a DH or MDA is applicable, no pilot may operate an aircraft, except a military aircraft of Indonesia, at any airport below the authorized MDA or continue an approach below the authorized DH unless
(1) The aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers, and for operations conducted under Part 121 or Part 135 unless that descent rate will allow touchdown to occur within the touchdown zone of the runway of intended landing;
(2) The flight visibility is not less than the visibility prescribed in the standard
instrument approach being used; and
(3) Except for a Category II or Category III approach where any necessary visual reference requirements are specified by the Director, at least one of the following visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:
(i) The approach light system, except that the pilot may not descend below 100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation using the approach lights as a reference unless the red terminating bars or the red side row bars are also distinctly visible and identifiable.
(ii) The threshold.
(iii) The threshold markings.
(iv) The threshold lights.
(v) The runway end identifier lights.
(vi) The visual approach slope indicator.
(vii) The touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings.
(viii) The touchdown zone lights.
(ix) The runway or runway markings.
(x) The runway lights.
It seems like the Captain was handed the controls by the FO because the FO was convinced the Captain had the runway in sight. And if he did, they wouldn't have ended up in the water. A more assertive FO would probably have conducted the go-around anyway, despite what the Captain saw, as it was the FO who was PF.
Indonesian CASR Part 91.175
(e) Missed approach procedures. Each pilot operating an aircraft, except a military aircraft of Indonesia, shall immediately execute an appropriate missed approach procedure when either of the following conditions exist:
(1) Whenever the requirements of Paragraph (c) of this section are not met at either of the following times:
(i) When the aircraft is being operated below MDA; or
(ii) Upon arrival at the missed approach point, including a DH where a DH
is specified and its use is required, and at any time after that until touchdown.
If anyone remembers the Qantas QF1 incident at Bangkok in 1999, this was a similar occurrence where visual reference was lost on short final where the FO who was pilot flying, correctly initiated a go-around, but only to be aborted by the Captain as the wheels touched the runway. The aborted Go-around and subsequent landing resulted in a runway overrun and extensive damage to the aircraft.
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Dear all.
The link to the accident report seems to me to be dead somehow. No matter how many times I try, I get the error "Operation timed out" when following the link provided both here and on Google.
Could someone please point to an alternative location for downloading this report?
It is very interesting to read all your comments and opinions in this matter. Surely the pilots professionality must be questioned, but imho that question must be concerned with the overall safety culture in the entire company - as was the fact with Korean once many moons ago. Loss of face or plain insecurity may be a serious thing, even in Western cockpit culture it seems sometimes (for [only one] reference, the First Air accident in Canada about two years or so ago).
The link to the accident report seems to me to be dead somehow. No matter how many times I try, I get the error "Operation timed out" when following the link provided both here and on Google.
Could someone please point to an alternative location for downloading this report?
It is very interesting to read all your comments and opinions in this matter. Surely the pilots professionality must be questioned, but imho that question must be concerned with the overall safety culture in the entire company - as was the fact with Korean once many moons ago. Loss of face or plain insecurity may be a serious thing, even in Western cockpit culture it seems sometimes (for [only one] reference, the First Air accident in Canada about two years or so ago).
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The link to the accident report seems to me to be dead somehow.
But the site is slow, when I first tried it over 24 hrs ago - it failed.
I doubt there are alternate links.
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I was struck by genius and looked it up on ASN and yes, I could download the report there!
Here is the link, if someone has the same problems as I did.
ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 737-8GP (WL) PK-LKS Denpasar-Ngurah Rai Bali International Airport (DPS)
Back to my regular lurking dim wits now...
Here is the link, if someone has the same problems as I did.
ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 737-8GP (WL) PK-LKS Denpasar-Ngurah Rai Bali International Airport (DPS)
Back to my regular lurking dim wits now...
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Doesn't surprise me.
It's quite common see that mentality in the captains here.
The other day I was climbing out on the R175, a Lion 737 was opposite direction for landing, descending on R190.
They wanted to go direct to the IAF for the approach which is on R120.
They turned first, across our outbound path, then asked ATC for the clearance which was then denied. So they turned back across our path back to their initial radial.
We watched them on TCAS for the initial crossing, the second crossing we had them visual and was at a point considering taking evasive action.
Then today a Sriwijaya Air 737 managed to overrun the airport at a 2500m runway in moderate rain, 1000' cloud base and nil wind.
Wasn't a bad one, just the nose wheel off the end requiring a tug to push them back on... but that's the standard of the captains here in indonesia.
Weather gets slightly iffy and landings are dangerous.
It's quite common see that mentality in the captains here.
The other day I was climbing out on the R175, a Lion 737 was opposite direction for landing, descending on R190.
They wanted to go direct to the IAF for the approach which is on R120.
They turned first, across our outbound path, then asked ATC for the clearance which was then denied. So they turned back across our path back to their initial radial.
We watched them on TCAS for the initial crossing, the second crossing we had them visual and was at a point considering taking evasive action.
Then today a Sriwijaya Air 737 managed to overrun the airport at a 2500m runway in moderate rain, 1000' cloud base and nil wind.
Wasn't a bad one, just the nose wheel off the end requiring a tug to push them back on... but that's the standard of the captains here in indonesia.
Weather gets slightly iffy and landings are dangerous.
smiling monkey:
Thank you.
olasek:
The runway environment certainly includes those items mentioned by smiling monkey,
but your point is taken, thank you also, in terms of how regs and rules are written.
Thank you.
olasek:
The runway environment certainly includes those items mentioned by smiling monkey,
at least one of the following visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:
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Lionair plane down in Bali.
Smilingmonkey, as your own post 91.175 (c) (3) .. "at least ONE of the following visual references for the INTENDED runway is distinctly VISIBLE and IDENTIFIABLE to the pilot"
and runway is just one of them (references).
and runway is just one of them (references).
Originally Posted by arba
oh come on! to go below MDA you don't have to have RUNWAY! the CASR 91.175 (c) (3) says so.
My point being the captain stated (on the CVR) that he had the approach lights in sight and advised the FO to continue the approach. Runway 09 at Denpasar does not have approach lights. In order to continue, he needed to have those other items listed in 91.175 (C) in sight.
He may have had some other runway identifier visual at the MDA (there wasn't a call at the MDA to say they were visual, but if he later lost visual contact with any of the items listed in 91.175 (C), then any professional pilot should know what to do in that case.
End result is the aircraft ended up in the water. Why did that happen? You tell me.
He may have had some other runway identifier visual at the MDA (there wasn't a call at the MDA to say they were visual, but if he later lost visual contact with any of the items listed in 91.175 (C), then any professional pilot should know what to do in that case.
End result is the aircraft ended up in the water. Why did that happen? You tell me.
In this case you should have been able to see the rwy. From the chart MaPt is 1.5 NM to 09THR. (=2.7km) Required Vis is 2.8km. So yes, you did need it for this particular runway/approach.
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Arba
A pathetic attempt to split hairs and reduce the blame.
(i) The approach light system, except that the pilot may not descend below 100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation using the approach lights as a reference unless the red terminating bars or the red side row bars are also distinctly visible and identifiable.
(ii) The threshold. Part of the runway!
(iii) The threshold markings. Part of the runway!
(iv) The threshold lights. At the start of the runway!
(v) The runway end identifier lights. Part of the runway!
(vi) The visual approach slope indicator. Beside the runway!
(vii) The touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings. Part of the runway!
(viii) The touchdown zone lights. Part of the runway!
(ix) The runway or runway markings. The RUNWAY
(x) The runway lights. Part of the runway!
A pathetic attempt to split hairs and reduce the blame.
(i) The approach light system, except that the pilot may not descend below 100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation using the approach lights as a reference unless the red terminating bars or the red side row bars are also distinctly visible and identifiable.
(ii) The threshold. Part of the runway!
(iii) The threshold markings. Part of the runway!
(iv) The threshold lights. At the start of the runway!
(v) The runway end identifier lights. Part of the runway!
(vi) The visual approach slope indicator. Beside the runway!
(vii) The touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings. Part of the runway!
(viii) The touchdown zone lights. Part of the runway!
(ix) The runway or runway markings. The RUNWAY
(x) The runway lights. Part of the runway!
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I can not remember what kind of approach this was, but it was an NPA. I assume the autopilot was in CMD. I assume they were on a stable and correct vertical path during the approach down to 300' ago. If they did nothing then the a/c should have impacted with the runway around 1000' after the threshold. I assume they were using VNAVPTH & LNAV.
However, they landed well short. Why? Ah! The V/S was 1100fpm. There's a clue. So either a pilot disengaged VNAVPTH and engaged V/S or some muppet disconnected the autopilot when not visual and lowered the nose. Which was it? Who was it? The FDR will tell which control column gave input. Both silly things to do. I can't believe this was a manually flown NPA. Surely not.
Does anyone have the answer about what happened at 300' to increase the V/S. Like I said; if they had left well alone they might have pan-caked onto the runway instead of the beach.
However, they landed well short. Why? Ah! The V/S was 1100fpm. There's a clue. So either a pilot disengaged VNAVPTH and engaged V/S or some muppet disconnected the autopilot when not visual and lowered the nose. Which was it? Who was it? The FDR will tell which control column gave input. Both silly things to do. I can't believe this was a manually flown NPA. Surely not.
Does anyone have the answer about what happened at 300' to increase the V/S. Like I said; if they had left well alone they might have pan-caked onto the runway instead of the beach.