SQ006 final report out 26/4/02
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Murrelet well said and most of those facts are well known alreadey, but I suggest you live and work in both countrys for a while to catch the drift on that paragraph of mine you quoted.
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May I suggest that those interested in the subject matters , at least take the trouble of reading up the 2 reports ........
It just dawned on me from comments on extracts of the reports that some has not taken the trouble of understanding the whole sequence of events and its details ......... and started commmenting or give their views on the reports!
To me it appeared to be a very unprofessional approach to this disussion!!
Just my 2 cents worth!
Cheers
It just dawned on me from comments on extracts of the reports that some has not taken the trouble of understanding the whole sequence of events and its details ......... and started commmenting or give their views on the reports!
To me it appeared to be a very unprofessional approach to this disussion!!
Just my 2 cents worth!
Cheers
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Slasher,
Thanks!!
That is exactly what I meant, The summary of Murrelet are all contained within the executive summary of the ASC reports.
And to think that I have been talking to people, that have not even read at least the executive summary of the report, and start blasting away their personal opinion of the accident , the comapny and the country!
What a waste of time!!
Cheers!!
Thanks!!
That is exactly what I meant, The summary of Murrelet are all contained within the executive summary of the ASC reports.
And to think that I have been talking to people, that have not even read at least the executive summary of the report, and start blasting away their personal opinion of the accident , the comapny and the country!
What a waste of time!!
Cheers!!
Last edited by hawkeye18; 4th May 2002 at 07:30.
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sorry for not reading the 2 reports but still giving my 2 cents worth.
IMHO all parties involved with the investigation were satisfied with the factual part of the report. I believe even the S'pore team commented that it was a job well done. Even on contentious items such as status of the 05R edge lights many 'facts' were gathered which i believe were not disputed.
The problem as i understand it was the analysis part. As we can see, from the same facts, they can come to different conclusions regarding the status of the edgelights (although both sides did temper their conclusion with 'probably').
Also another main point of contention was the listing of probable causes attributing 7 of them to the pilots and 1 to weather, while airport deficiencies were listed as risks. IMHO this appears to be apportioning 'blame'. Although later on, ASC did come out to clarify that as stated earlier by them the report did not apportion blame to any parties. And that 'relief' shouldn't be the reaction from CKS airport authorities for it was not what the report intended. ASC also pointed out that the number of 'risk' factors listed were more than 'probable causes' and that this was not inconsequential.
All these reactions after the report was made public, imho stems from the choice of words and style of presentation (see hawkeye 18's 1st posting on pg 1). What is ASC's report really saying (or implying)? Leave it to the media and you have 'one sided' reports coming out (which is natural though not desirable and imho, NOT intentional 'brain washing').
With respect to SQ006, i think the wrong turn into 05R is not the BIG issue here. One can make a wrong turn (and i think this not as uncommon as one would have liked?) without the same disastrous outcome. eg:
i) realize the mistake and turn out again, or
ii)dont realize the mistake but still take off from the wrong but operational runway ..... (safely!?).
The big issue is taking off from a CLOSED runway. Some would insist that it was a PARTIALLY closed runway and therefore not technically 'CLOSED'. How is one supposed to make that distinction if the difference is only 'apparent' when you are passed 'V1'. Some would counter that the centre lights were not white and there were no touch-down lights and that the edge lights "were almost certainly off" that this was not a runway but a taxiway. Some will say that the PVD "had not unshuttered" hence this was a wrong runway. Then how come "all 3 pilots thought they saw a ‘normal runway scene’ " and thought they were on the correct runway?
Will the courts have the last say?
IMHO all parties involved with the investigation were satisfied with the factual part of the report. I believe even the S'pore team commented that it was a job well done. Even on contentious items such as status of the 05R edge lights many 'facts' were gathered which i believe were not disputed.
The problem as i understand it was the analysis part. As we can see, from the same facts, they can come to different conclusions regarding the status of the edgelights (although both sides did temper their conclusion with 'probably').
Also another main point of contention was the listing of probable causes attributing 7 of them to the pilots and 1 to weather, while airport deficiencies were listed as risks. IMHO this appears to be apportioning 'blame'. Although later on, ASC did come out to clarify that as stated earlier by them the report did not apportion blame to any parties. And that 'relief' shouldn't be the reaction from CKS airport authorities for it was not what the report intended. ASC also pointed out that the number of 'risk' factors listed were more than 'probable causes' and that this was not inconsequential.
All these reactions after the report was made public, imho stems from the choice of words and style of presentation (see hawkeye 18's 1st posting on pg 1). What is ASC's report really saying (or implying)? Leave it to the media and you have 'one sided' reports coming out (which is natural though not desirable and imho, NOT intentional 'brain washing').
With respect to SQ006, i think the wrong turn into 05R is not the BIG issue here. One can make a wrong turn (and i think this not as uncommon as one would have liked?) without the same disastrous outcome. eg:
i) realize the mistake and turn out again, or
ii)dont realize the mistake but still take off from the wrong but operational runway ..... (safely!?).
The big issue is taking off from a CLOSED runway. Some would insist that it was a PARTIALLY closed runway and therefore not technically 'CLOSED'. How is one supposed to make that distinction if the difference is only 'apparent' when you are passed 'V1'. Some would counter that the centre lights were not white and there were no touch-down lights and that the edge lights "were almost certainly off" that this was not a runway but a taxiway. Some will say that the PVD "had not unshuttered" hence this was a wrong runway. Then how come "all 3 pilots thought they saw a ‘normal runway scene’ " and thought they were on the correct runway?
Will the courts have the last say?
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NC1701
Your second to last paragraph asks the much avoided chilling question. With all those inconsistencies, how come 3 pilots thought it was the correct view? It seems unbelievable if those facts mentioned are true, but then a China Airlines A340 recently departed Anchorage in an even more unbelievable scenario and no doubt they too THOUGHT they were in the correct place, even though it was a taxiway almost perpendicular to the intended departure runway! There were three pilots on that flight deck too.
Your second to last paragraph asks the much avoided chilling question. With all those inconsistencies, how come 3 pilots thought it was the correct view? It seems unbelievable if those facts mentioned are true, but then a China Airlines A340 recently departed Anchorage in an even more unbelievable scenario and no doubt they too THOUGHT they were in the correct place, even though it was a taxiway almost perpendicular to the intended departure runway! There were three pilots on that flight deck too.
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Aha, gladioli, you've raised your ugly head again. Like a hungry hyena hanging around SQ postings, with all your usual negativity and bitterness. Seems you have very little constructive intelligent comment on ANY postings. Get over it, take a viagra, go and take your wife out for a nice meal, and enrol on a yoga class.
Would like to hear your view on the China Airlines incident in Anchorage, to see if you can enlighten us with your wisdom and knowledge from that part of the world, thats if you have anything constructive to add to the forum.
Would like to hear your view on the China Airlines incident in Anchorage, to see if you can enlighten us with your wisdom and knowledge from that part of the world, thats if you have anything constructive to add to the forum.
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Murrelet mentioned something interesting about the timing of the takeoff clearance.
"Co-pilot Latiff also confirmed that the timing of the takeoff clearance gave him the impression that everything was in order."
However,if you look at the report,the elapsed time between clearance and start of the roll is relatively considerable..in the order of 80 seconds.Partly explained by the 5 kts taxi speed I know.But if their "ready" call was premature(clearly debatable),then ATC´s natural response to offer clearance(no traffic-they cant see them anyway) whilst still on NP might have induced the pilot to readily accept the picture he saw at N1/05R intersection,given the time elapsed between the two.The longer the time elapse is,the more willing he becomes to accept the notion that he is indeed on the correct runway.
If the takeoff clearance had just been issued (on the turn into N1),the pressure to accept those compelling green lights might have been less.
Perhaps an ATC can say if there is a finite time limit on a takeoff clearance?
"Co-pilot Latiff also confirmed that the timing of the takeoff clearance gave him the impression that everything was in order."
However,if you look at the report,the elapsed time between clearance and start of the roll is relatively considerable..in the order of 80 seconds.Partly explained by the 5 kts taxi speed I know.But if their "ready" call was premature(clearly debatable),then ATC´s natural response to offer clearance(no traffic-they cant see them anyway) whilst still on NP might have induced the pilot to readily accept the picture he saw at N1/05R intersection,given the time elapsed between the two.The longer the time elapse is,the more willing he becomes to accept the notion that he is indeed on the correct runway.
If the takeoff clearance had just been issued (on the turn into N1),the pressure to accept those compelling green lights might have been less.
Perhaps an ATC can say if there is a finite time limit on a takeoff clearance?
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Holden,
Not sure if there is some sort of time constraint. However, as the tower could not see their whereabouts, and may have thought they were much closer to 05L, it was not unreasonable to be given a clearance to depart as soon as they reported ready considering there was no other traffic around.
We have, many a time, been given a take off clearance when switching from ground to the tower WELL before reaching the runway,similarly been cleared to land 8 or 9 miles out when there is plenty of other traffic around.
Not sure if there is some sort of time constraint. However, as the tower could not see their whereabouts, and may have thought they were much closer to 05L, it was not unreasonable to be given a clearance to depart as soon as they reported ready considering there was no other traffic around.
We have, many a time, been given a take off clearance when switching from ground to the tower WELL before reaching the runway,similarly been cleared to land 8 or 9 miles out when there is plenty of other traffic around.
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Singapore bashing, blah, blah, blah, ugly head, call it whatever you like.
Both first officers of SQ006 having had their ATPL was pure luck for SIA, and I mean pure luck. The facts remain documented, dozens more SIA B747-400 first officers on line did not at the time of SQ006 accident.
Therefore, once again we are at the same place, SIA's flight operations in breach of ICAO minimum safety standards at the time of SQ006 accident.
The facts are not in favor of Singapore and SIA, therefore viewed as bashing. Sometimes the truth does that.
As I always have in the past, I come armed with both internal and external numbered SIA documents. All challenges to prove me otherwise are welcome.
Both first officers of SQ006 having had their ATPL was pure luck for SIA, and I mean pure luck. The facts remain documented, dozens more SIA B747-400 first officers on line did not at the time of SQ006 accident.
Therefore, once again we are at the same place, SIA's flight operations in breach of ICAO minimum safety standards at the time of SQ006 accident.
The facts are not in favor of Singapore and SIA, therefore viewed as bashing. Sometimes the truth does that.
As I always have in the past, I come armed with both internal and external numbered SIA documents. All challenges to prove me otherwise are welcome.
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Gladiator, your attitude is slightly less than helpful to establishing the numerous factors which contributed to this tragedy.
It is universally accepted that SIA are not perfect. How far from perfect they are is a matter of debate and opinion.
But as long as people on either side are prepared to say "There - look there - it's HIS fault" and dismiss other factors because they put the "blame" elsewhere, there is little hope of learning from the accident and making changes to the entire system that will prevent a recurrence.
There is never a single cause of an accident. I assume you are familiar with the "Swiss Cheese" model? It is not enough to plug one hole. We need to plug all holes that are shown up by the investigation.
It is universally accepted that SIA are not perfect. How far from perfect they are is a matter of debate and opinion.
But as long as people on either side are prepared to say "There - look there - it's HIS fault" and dismiss other factors because they put the "blame" elsewhere, there is little hope of learning from the accident and making changes to the entire system that will prevent a recurrence.
There is never a single cause of an accident. I assume you are familiar with the "Swiss Cheese" model? It is not enough to plug one hole. We need to plug all holes that are shown up by the investigation.
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Apologies folks for littering the thread, but liar and purveyor of semi-truth and false information need to be exposed/curtailed to maintain professionalism in PRRuNe.
............................................................ .............................................
To Gladiator,
"As I always have in the past, I come armed with both internal and external numbered SIA documents. All challenges to prove me otherwise are welcome."
Are these so called documents,current or past records? If it is not current then they are history and please do specify so when u wave them at us.
You also claimed to have won a court case with SIA (1st May 2002 05:08 Hrs):
"Not too long ago (it is all in the PPRuNe archives) when I fought SIA in the United States Federal court over SIA's unsafe flight operations (First officer in the Captain's seat without proper training and license as required by ICAO annexes),
Outcome of the case, they had to stop this practice.
If u claimed you have won the case, then how come:"The facts remain documented, dozens more SIA B747-400 first officers on line did not at the time of SQ006 accident. " ???
Don't u think You are contradicting Yourself on the above ???!!!
............................................................ ............................................
As far as I am concerned, the facts has proven you wrong, and that u shot off your hips but instead had shot your own feet!!
For whatever your are worth , I rekon you are one that quote "false facts" from your own agenda ,and does not face up to facts.....current and recorded one that is !!
You are entitiled to your opinion in any case, [B]and continue to lug your baggages and live in the past, but facts speaks louder than you!!!!!!![B]
for the record:
Gladiator:
Ax to grind or not I am still a former insider with certain information. In reference to ICAO and SQ006, let me inform you that the crewmember configuration on the ill fated flight or other SIA flights did not meet ICAO minimum standards.
SQ006 had a three crewmember configuration. One captain and two first officers. One or both of the first officers may or may not have met this standard, and even if those two particular first officers did, SIA's other B747-400 flights did not.
Hawkeye 18 :
Obviously u are not that well informed on the crewing of SQ006 after all .... and I take it that your utterance "of the other flights not meeting ICAO minimum standards is also a pure conjecture on your part.
This is from the ASC report :
CM1 The Captain was issued an ATPL on Jan 3 1993
CM2 The First Officer was issued an ATPL on August 6,1999
CM3 The Relief Pilot was issued an ATPL on January 7,1997
There is a great difference between an insider and a use-to-be insider!
I rest my case !! On facts and nonsense!!
And now these!!!!!:
Gladiator:"Both first officers of SQ006 having had their ATPL was pure luck for SIA, and I mean pure luck. The facts remain documented, dozens more SIA B747-400 first officers on line did not at the time of SQ006 accident. "
Judge Yourself folks!!!
............................................................ .............................................
To Gladiator,
"As I always have in the past, I come armed with both internal and external numbered SIA documents. All challenges to prove me otherwise are welcome."
Are these so called documents,current or past records? If it is not current then they are history and please do specify so when u wave them at us.
You also claimed to have won a court case with SIA (1st May 2002 05:08 Hrs):
"Not too long ago (it is all in the PPRuNe archives) when I fought SIA in the United States Federal court over SIA's unsafe flight operations (First officer in the Captain's seat without proper training and license as required by ICAO annexes),
Outcome of the case, they had to stop this practice.
If u claimed you have won the case, then how come:"The facts remain documented, dozens more SIA B747-400 first officers on line did not at the time of SQ006 accident. " ???
Don't u think You are contradicting Yourself on the above ???!!!
............................................................ ............................................
As far as I am concerned, the facts has proven you wrong, and that u shot off your hips but instead had shot your own feet!!
For whatever your are worth , I rekon you are one that quote "false facts" from your own agenda ,and does not face up to facts.....current and recorded one that is !!
You are entitiled to your opinion in any case, [B]and continue to lug your baggages and live in the past, but facts speaks louder than you!!!!!!![B]
for the record:
Gladiator:
Ax to grind or not I am still a former insider with certain information. In reference to ICAO and SQ006, let me inform you that the crewmember configuration on the ill fated flight or other SIA flights did not meet ICAO minimum standards.
SQ006 had a three crewmember configuration. One captain and two first officers. One or both of the first officers may or may not have met this standard, and even if those two particular first officers did, SIA's other B747-400 flights did not.
Hawkeye 18 :
Obviously u are not that well informed on the crewing of SQ006 after all .... and I take it that your utterance "of the other flights not meeting ICAO minimum standards is also a pure conjecture on your part.
This is from the ASC report :
CM1 The Captain was issued an ATPL on Jan 3 1993
CM2 The First Officer was issued an ATPL on August 6,1999
CM3 The Relief Pilot was issued an ATPL on January 7,1997
There is a great difference between an insider and a use-to-be insider!
I rest my case !! On facts and nonsense!!
And now these!!!!!:
Gladiator:"Both first officers of SQ006 having had their ATPL was pure luck for SIA, and I mean pure luck. The facts remain documented, dozens more SIA B747-400 first officers on line did not at the time of SQ006 accident. "
Judge Yourself folks!!!
Last edited by hawkeye18; 4th May 2002 at 10:03.
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NC 1701,
By asserting that the big issue is taking off from a non-operational runway, not making the wrong turn, it seems to me you're treading on really dangerous ground. I don't see how you can separate the two actions and deem one to be more serious than the other. The wrong turn brought SQ006 onto a runway that, for their purposes, was CLOSED PERIOD but not easily recognizable as such (that it might have been officially only partially closed is immaterial). You're in effect saying to a pilot, don't worry about taking a wrong turn during taxi, if you wind up in the wrong place you'll be able to sort things out.
It seems to me that maintaining situational awareness AT ALL TIMES is, for an airman, paramount.
By asserting that the big issue is taking off from a non-operational runway, not making the wrong turn, it seems to me you're treading on really dangerous ground. I don't see how you can separate the two actions and deem one to be more serious than the other. The wrong turn brought SQ006 onto a runway that, for their purposes, was CLOSED PERIOD but not easily recognizable as such (that it might have been officially only partially closed is immaterial). You're in effect saying to a pilot, don't worry about taking a wrong turn during taxi, if you wind up in the wrong place you'll be able to sort things out.
It seems to me that maintaining situational awareness AT ALL TIMES is, for an airman, paramount.
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Here we go again, the disgrunteled employee drill.
May you would like to explain the reason for this internal note from CAAS to SIA, Pay close attention to the date of SQ006 accident and the date of this memo.
B747-412 Flight Staff Instruction
No: 00-14
Date: Nov, 7, 2000
To: All 744 Crew
From: Vice President/Chief Pilot 744
Subject: 3-pilot crew operation
Reason: To comply with CAAS requirement
The Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore has withdrawn the approval for the 3rd pilot of a 3-pilot crew to occupy the left-hand seat while the commander is taking in-flight relief during cruise.
The FAM will be amended in due course. Please be guided accordingly.
Captain Axx Cxx
For Vice President/ Chief Pilot B744
It does not take much to figure out someone was trying to cover their A55. Even after this memo the violation continued, for how long I do not know. As far as I know it could still be going on.
Care to challenge me on the contents of this memo and the reason for it. How come it was OK to do it for many years and all of a sudden it was not?
I am not discussing the reasons for the SQ006 accident. Back to the same issue again. SIA B747-400 operations were not in compliance with ICAO minimum safety standards at the time of SQ006 accident.
May you would like to explain the reason for this internal note from CAAS to SIA, Pay close attention to the date of SQ006 accident and the date of this memo.
B747-412 Flight Staff Instruction
No: 00-14
Date: Nov, 7, 2000
To: All 744 Crew
From: Vice President/Chief Pilot 744
Subject: 3-pilot crew operation
Reason: To comply with CAAS requirement
The Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore has withdrawn the approval for the 3rd pilot of a 3-pilot crew to occupy the left-hand seat while the commander is taking in-flight relief during cruise.
The FAM will be amended in due course. Please be guided accordingly.
Captain Axx Cxx
For Vice President/ Chief Pilot B744
It does not take much to figure out someone was trying to cover their A55. Even after this memo the violation continued, for how long I do not know. As far as I know it could still be going on.
Care to challenge me on the contents of this memo and the reason for it. How come it was OK to do it for many years and all of a sudden it was not?
I am not discussing the reasons for the SQ006 accident. Back to the same issue again. SIA B747-400 operations were not in compliance with ICAO minimum safety standards at the time of SQ006 accident.
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Gladiator ,
The challenge was on this statement of yours:
"Ax to grind or not I am still a former insider with certain information. In reference to ICAO and SQ006, " let me inform you that the crewmember configuration on the ill fated flight or other SIA flights did not meet ICAO minimum standards."
And the answer was this:
Extracted from the Taiwanese ASC report :
CM1 The Captain was issued an ATPL on Jan 3 1993
CM2 The First Officer was issued an ATPL on August 6,1999
CM3 The Relief Pilot was issued an ATPL on January 7,1997
FULL STOP !
I have no wish to listen to your sob stories and conflicts with SIA.... u are on my ignore list!
Regards and Best of Luck!
The challenge was on this statement of yours:
"Ax to grind or not I am still a former insider with certain information. In reference to ICAO and SQ006, " let me inform you that the crewmember configuration on the ill fated flight or other SIA flights did not meet ICAO minimum standards."
And the answer was this:
Extracted from the Taiwanese ASC report :
CM1 The Captain was issued an ATPL on Jan 3 1993
CM2 The First Officer was issued an ATPL on August 6,1999
CM3 The Relief Pilot was issued an ATPL on January 7,1997
FULL STOP !
I have no wish to listen to your sob stories and conflicts with SIA.... u are on my ignore list!
Regards and Best of Luck!
Last edited by hawkeye18; 5th May 2002 at 05:29.
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NC1701 & ROCKHOUND,
Turning onto the wrong runway was the cause of the accident and the main issue here !
The what and how that led the pilots into turning onto the wrong runway is what I think need to be scrutinised , to derive the causual factors that led them into the mistake, so as to preclude another similar accident from occurring.
from what I can see, the following are the main areas/factors:
The inclement weather,
The night enviroment,
Signages, lightings and markings of the taxiway and 05R Runway
Air Traffic controls : in bad weather taxy monitoring and takeoff clearance.
Take off procedures of SIA: in confirmation of correct runway.
The reports by ASC and MOT are very thorough and left no stones unturned on the above areas, and lots of lesson and actions have been taken by both CKS and SIA and to rectify the shortcomings .
Both approaches in investigations are correct .
But what alarmed me was the formating of the Final Analysis of ASC which classified the Casual Factors as:
"(1)“findings related to probable causes” which identify elements that have been shown to operate or almost certainly have operated in the accident; ( please note the operative word: operated.)
In short the investigation of the causal factors relating to the accident, will be entirely focused on the Pilot and the weather, and deficiencies of airport system and other contributing factors were delegated to Risks.
As a result the concluding "Probable causes" will , for all intents and purposes, always be on the weather and the pilot even before the ASC started its analysis of the Probable causes "
Though Dr Yong Kay the chairman has qualified subsequently that Risk Factor's play an equal and critical role as causal factors in the accident. Whether we like it or not, it is only natural for both sides to adopt a "self- protection" mode in this investigation.
At the end of the day, I hope the aviation communities will learn and benefit from these 2 excellent reports.
The Civil court will have to decide in the apportioning of liabilities and blames. !
Regards!!
Hawkeye
Turning onto the wrong runway was the cause of the accident and the main issue here !
The what and how that led the pilots into turning onto the wrong runway is what I think need to be scrutinised , to derive the causual factors that led them into the mistake, so as to preclude another similar accident from occurring.
from what I can see, the following are the main areas/factors:
The inclement weather,
The night enviroment,
Signages, lightings and markings of the taxiway and 05R Runway
Air Traffic controls : in bad weather taxy monitoring and takeoff clearance.
Take off procedures of SIA: in confirmation of correct runway.
The reports by ASC and MOT are very thorough and left no stones unturned on the above areas, and lots of lesson and actions have been taken by both CKS and SIA and to rectify the shortcomings .
Both approaches in investigations are correct .
But what alarmed me was the formating of the Final Analysis of ASC which classified the Casual Factors as:
"(1)“findings related to probable causes” which identify elements that have been shown to operate or almost certainly have operated in the accident; ( please note the operative word: operated.)
In short the investigation of the causal factors relating to the accident, will be entirely focused on the Pilot and the weather, and deficiencies of airport system and other contributing factors were delegated to Risks.
As a result the concluding "Probable causes" will , for all intents and purposes, always be on the weather and the pilot even before the ASC started its analysis of the Probable causes "
Though Dr Yong Kay the chairman has qualified subsequently that Risk Factor's play an equal and critical role as causal factors in the accident. Whether we like it or not, it is only natural for both sides to adopt a "self- protection" mode in this investigation.
At the end of the day, I hope the aviation communities will learn and benefit from these 2 excellent reports.
The Civil court will have to decide in the apportioning of liabilities and blames. !
Regards!!
Hawkeye
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hawkeye, the cause of the accident was that the runway from which they tried to take off was obstructed. Turning onto the wrong runway was not the cause of the accident - many people have done that and survived - just by turning round again and taxying to the correct runway.
The problem was that their error was not spotted - by the pilots or by ATC, who did not have GM Radar, and the signage, far from indicating that this runway was not in use, actively led them to it and away from the active runway.
I agree with you that the wording of the report is very worrying. Neither Taipei's nor SIA's defensive attitudes will aid future safety, nor will this placatory answer.
The problem was that their error was not spotted - by the pilots or by ATC, who did not have GM Radar, and the signage, far from indicating that this runway was not in use, actively led them to it and away from the active runway.
I agree with you that the wording of the report is very worrying. Neither Taipei's nor SIA's defensive attitudes will aid future safety, nor will this placatory answer.
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Thanks ! Captain Stable,
For the comments to my statement , to make it complete , it should be :
Turning onto the wrong runway( and took off from the obstructed runway ) was the cause of the accident and the main issue here !
Warmest Regards!!
Hawkeye.
PS:
Rockhound ,
The parentheses was meant to indicate that it was a subsequent add-on to make the statement more complete.
For the comments to my statement , to make it complete , it should be :
Turning onto the wrong runway( and took off from the obstructed runway ) was the cause of the accident and the main issue here !
Warmest Regards!!
Hawkeye.
PS:
Rockhound ,
The parentheses was meant to indicate that it was a subsequent add-on to make the statement more complete.
Last edited by hawkeye18; 5th May 2002 at 17:57.
Join Date: Apr 2001
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Gladioli
Your sad nagging continues to the extent that I'm getting almost as bored replying to them as I am reading them. However, as your statements are SO sad, they always merit a comment from one of the more realistic and forward thinking amongst us. Your reference to the B744 circular and the CAAS statements on f/o's sitting in the left seat shows how inconsequential many of your ramblings are.
In a 2 man operation, if the captain goes to the toilet, one f/o is left in the right hand seat as the sole occupier of the flight deck. In a 3 man operation, if the capt left, there would be 2 f/o's in the flight deck, one in the right seat as the designated command f/o and the other POSSIBLY in the left seat, but not manipulating controls. Tat the CAAS then said that the "spare" f/o CANNOT sit in the left seat was hardly a major change operationally for any of us who FULLY UNDERSTOOD the correct practice of a 3 man crew in the first place. I suggest you think about your own obvious misunderstanding and unprofessional operation when part of a 3 man crew in the past. At the end of the day, the requirement, though not realised by yourself, has ALWAYS been that there is an f/o in the right seat, the only change was that the support f/o no longer has the option to sit in the left seat.
Do us ALL a favour and stop wasting the time of people with relevent and constructive things to say.
Sorry to all else if this went off the subject of the posting for a while.
Your sad nagging continues to the extent that I'm getting almost as bored replying to them as I am reading them. However, as your statements are SO sad, they always merit a comment from one of the more realistic and forward thinking amongst us. Your reference to the B744 circular and the CAAS statements on f/o's sitting in the left seat shows how inconsequential many of your ramblings are.
In a 2 man operation, if the captain goes to the toilet, one f/o is left in the right hand seat as the sole occupier of the flight deck. In a 3 man operation, if the capt left, there would be 2 f/o's in the flight deck, one in the right seat as the designated command f/o and the other POSSIBLY in the left seat, but not manipulating controls. Tat the CAAS then said that the "spare" f/o CANNOT sit in the left seat was hardly a major change operationally for any of us who FULLY UNDERSTOOD the correct practice of a 3 man crew in the first place. I suggest you think about your own obvious misunderstanding and unprofessional operation when part of a 3 man crew in the past. At the end of the day, the requirement, though not realised by yourself, has ALWAYS been that there is an f/o in the right seat, the only change was that the support f/o no longer has the option to sit in the left seat.
Do us ALL a favour and stop wasting the time of people with relevent and constructive things to say.
Sorry to all else if this went off the subject of the posting for a while.