American Airlines Flight 742 "flight control system" problems

[bubbers44]

Us old guys just would love you to have the same basics that we did. We are not better than you by any means. We just had different training. We went from J3's to Cessnas to Piper to Lear Jets to Boeings, to MD80's to biplanes and sailplanes effortlessly because they all flew the same. Some of the planes didn't even have a battery installed. Tailwheels were normal and aerobatic flight was effortless. Beach18's with round motors were what we got our multiengine rating in. Then we got to haul freight at night single pilot IFR and loved it. I guess we were the lucky ones. We loved what we did and grew up during the perfect time to fly when everybody knew how to recover from a stall with ease. We had no one to dispatch us, figured our own fuel load and most of the time didn't have to listen to your captains opinion because you were the captain.

We learned in baby steps as we learned basics first then stuck your nose in a little ice just to see what it was like with an easy way out to clear skies. Most of what we learned was self taught. Read a book and go do it. We got the basic minimum instruction to be legal but 90% was reading.

Occasionally you got in a bit over your head but you learned from it.

Most of us started as flight instructors sometimes learning as much as your students in the beginning.

I am so happy United didn't hire me when I was in college when I went through a mini interview with 100 hrs. back in the mid 60s. So much of this experienced would have been missed.

[sevenstrokeroll]

right on bubbers!

[Clandestino]

Originally Posted by bubbers44

It has been a very long time since we broke a tail off a Boeing but not that long ago our A300 lost it's tail because of a little wake turbulence and copilot rudder action that was conveniently blamed on the incident by Airbus. As has been reported before that Airbus A300 had delamination of the vertical stabilizer coming out of the factory and was patched but Airbus denies that had anything to do with it.

And there I was, believing that since AA587 happened on American soil, the report that explicitly stated that the fin failed at load exceeding ultimate design one, caused by enormous sideslip, brought on by divergent yaw oscillation, originating in F/Os completely unnecessary and excessive rudder inputs, was authored by National Transportation Safety Board and certainly not Airbus.

Things we learn on PPRuNe...

Originally Posted by sevenstrokeroll

wasn't there some thought that the plane was overloaded? Also improper use of anit ice?

Yes, there were such thoughts. While not completely unfounded, what would be their point exactly?

Originally Posted by sevenstrokeroll

a crash is a crash

Nice tautology yet I have to observe that CFIT is not LoC.

Originally Posted by sevenstrokeroll

.and if you stall a plane, regardless of manufacturer and you cannot recover, not only did you screw up by letting the stall happen, but not being able to recover is really not earning your pay.

There are thousands of passenger aeroplanes flying right now that don't meet stall recovery requirements and have been demonstrated in practice to be unrecoverable. How about that?

Originally Posted by sevenstrokeroll

I would like to think of Air France as a first class line

Everyone is free to think world is flat plate carried around on the back of the really big turtle but it would be very impractical to use navigational methods based on this notion.

Originally Posted by sevenstrokeroll

how did we get to the point where a stall isn't right up there with concerns of safe flying?

By imagining things. In real world, stall is still major concern.

Originally Posted by bubbers44

I don't mean to put the magenta line pilots down but what do you do when all the lights go out?

If you paid attention just to Avherald, let alone FSF, you would know that overwhelming majority of us flies just fine without all the electronic gizmos when fit hits the shan.

Originally Posted by bubbers44

My era of pilot friends all knew how to handfly any airplane well.

Sadly, I can't find significant gap anywhere in ASN's list of crashes following loss of control that would help me pinpoint the golden age when all pilots knew how to fly.

Originally Posted by deptrai

high altitude stall recovery and unusal attitude recovery training at Air France could have been better.

Could be, but no direct benefit would come from it. CVR and FDR records bear no indication that stall was recognized by anyone in the cockpit so no recovery was attempted. Aeroplane's attitude, while excessive for high altitude cruise, was never what is considered to be UA and upset was strictly man-made.

Originally Posted by PBY

So now, when you finally agree with me that it is of a paramount importance to know that, the info should be in the cockpit, why Airbus does not provide this vital info in the QRH?

Because folks who need to know it (we call 'em "pilots"), tend to remember it after first couple of approaches?

Originally Posted by PBY

They do say level the wings before the column when out of stall.

They say something else on the very first page of the manual, which is oft happily disregarded on the PPRuNe.

Originally Posted by PBY

The QRH categorically states as the first action

What's the title of the QRH procedure?

[bubbers44]

Clandestine once again shows his arrogance by saying dozens of pilots are wrong but he is right. He must really be a pleasure to fly with if he is real. I know some pilots on here that I trust and are real, I don't know him. Maybe he is making this all up. How would you know?

[Centaurus]

The QRH categorically states as the first action

NOSE DOWN PITCH CONTROL............APPLY
This will reduce angle of attack
Note: In case of lack of pitch down authority, reducing thrust may be necessary

BANK.........................................WINGS LEVEL

.

The intent is this is done simultaneously; meaning within seconds. Not as a one step - stop to think about it - then at leisure roll wings level. It is common to see flying school instructors teaching that recovery from a wing drop at the stall, is to skid the wings level by using full rudder and only when the wings are level by that crazy method (if you haven't already flicked into a spin in the opposite direction to the original wing drop), dare to use the ailerons. That teaching which has been perpetuated for decades is flawed. I wonder how many airline pilots were taught this crazy method during the ab-initio training to PPL and continue to believe this in jets

[Clandestino]

Originally Posted by Centaurus

That teaching which has been perpetuated for decades is flawed. I wonder how many airline pilots were taught this crazy method during the ab-initio training to PPL and continue to believe this in jets

Correct, just to add the method might befit basic trainer with powerful rudder, indifferent ailerons and benign stall characteristics but it is indeed thoughtless to assume that this method is universally applicable.

Originally Posted by sevenstrokeroll

AS to the American Airlines A 300 Crash near KENNEDY Airport, at least one member of the NTSB strongly disagreed with the probably cause. I stand with him.

Originally Posted by NTSB/AAR-04/04, page 165

Member Carol J. Carmody’s Statement, in which Member Richard F. Healing joined:

I support the probable cause language in the original staff draft, which listed
contributing factors as the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program
and characteristics of the A300-600 rudder system. I heard no reason either during the
staff presentations, or in the explanation provided by the Vice Chairman in submitting his
substitute, to reverse this order. To diminish the role of the AAMP in the accident is to
downplay the role it played in the pilot’s actions which caused the accident. One of the
undeniable facts of this accident is the pilot’s inappropriate use of rudder. Staff was
unable to find any example of unusual rudder use by the pilot before his AAMP training.
When questioned by a captain for using the rudder in an earlier incident, the first officer
“insisted that the AAMP directed him to use the rudder pedals in that manner.” To elevate
the characteristics of the A300-600 rudder system in the hierarchy of contributing factors
ignores the fact that this system had not been an issue in some 16 million hours of testing
and operator experience—until the AAMP trained pilot flew it. The justification for the
change was that the Board must address the future and, therefore, must give more
attention to the aircraft rudder characteristics. That is what our recommendations are
designed to do, and our recommendations do address the design issues. The probable
cause should reflect accurately what the investigation and the report demonstrate; the
substitute probable cause does not do that.

So you agree that AAMP is bigger culprit than A300 rudder design?

Originally Posted by sevenstrokeroll

AS to any flying out of the envelope, like being over loaded or flying too high for a particular weight,temp etc, or not using anti ice properly, that is just poor flying.

Aeroplane was not structurally overloaded but it was too heavy for the altitude crew tried to reach. AF447, Pinnacle 3701, West Carribean 708 and Pulkovo 612 were crashes primarily stemming from crew's inability to understand aeroplane's performance. All the manual flying skills can't help you to force aeroplane to go where she is just incapable of going.

[bubbers44]

AF447 had no performance problem. They knew they were not able to climb at their weight so elected to not do so. When the autopilot and AT failed with the UAS they pulled back for some reason and stalled causing the crash. We have covered this a dozen times but performance was not the problem, inducing an unnecessary stall was.

[Clandestino]

AF447 had no performance problem.

By itself, it did not. If aroplane is too heavy or air is too warm for the altitude you want to fly at, you simply fly lower and that's it.

When the autopilot and AT failed with the UAS they pulled back for some reason and stalled causing the crash.

We are not discussing Corsair, Super Stinker, Marganski Swift or Phantom, fine machines that can be flicked but airliners and they can't be. When stable and not very maneuverable aeroplane stalls, it more often than not is performance related i.e. running out of speed. AF447 was no exemption. They tried to pull her where she was just incapable of going. Like 727 at Stony point or 757 at Puerto plata.

Anyway, did the incident we're discussing here happen at all? I can't find anything except ASNwiki and strangely, Avherald lists completely unrelated incident for the registration and date.

[bubbers44]

Yes, we all know that. They were at the right altitude for the temp and weight. Performance was not the problem. Pulling up over 3,000 ft and stalling was the problem. They lost AS, AP and AT, pulled up 11 degrees and stalled for no reason.

[aa73]

The NTSB will issue a ruling in order to protect an aircraft manufacturer before a pilot EVERY TIME. AA587 was no exception.

Had 587 been a Boeing or McD, the accident would never had happened.

And no, I'm not making excuses for the F/O either: yes, it was documented that he made the rudder inputs, based on AA's fighter-oriented AAMP training program back then. But that should have never torn off the tail.

[bubbers44]

AA73, I went through that training and still wouldn't have used aggresive rudder inputs. I would have coordinaed my control response to what was needed. teaching aerobatics for hundreds of hours makes you know how much rudder is needed. Our Airbus had a weak vertical stabilizer and Airbus knew it because it came out of the factory that way. Blaming the FO for rudder inputs got Airbus out cheap. The vertical stab failed right where they put the clamp fix that didn't work.

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by aa73

Had 587 been a Boeing or McD, the accident would never had happened.

What do you base that assertion on?

...But that should have never torn off the tail.

But that's precisely what *will* happen in a conventional empennage design where the rudder runs the full height of the vertical stab and those inputs are made during that phase of flight. Doesn't matter if we're talking A300, B757, B767 - composite, aluminium or whatever. If you exceed "Ultimate Design Loading", that stab is coming off.

The procedure outlined in the AAMP programme was designed for the DC-9/MD-80 fleet and was only applicable to those types due to the design aspects of the aircraft.

A lot of aspersions were cast about the strength of construction of Airbus types at the time, but the fact is that the A300 is and remains the only commercial airliner type to make a successful landing following a direct hit from a SAM, not to mention the fact that the A320 on the Hudson held together well enough and for long enough to get everyone off safely.

@bubbers44 - That supposedly "weak" vertical stab held on for significantly longer and under significantly more load than it was designed to handle under optimum conditions - how can it therefore be called "weak"?

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by Dozy

A lot of aspersions were cast about the strength of construction of Airbus types at the time, but the fact is that the A300 is and remains the only commercial airliner type to make a successful landing following a direct hit from a SAM, not to mention the fact that the A320 on the Hudson held together well enough and for long enough to get everyone off safely.

Pure luck; got nothing to do with the strength of Airbus. If that SAM had hit 1m closer to a critical part of the aircraft it would have been a smoking hole in the ground. And I'm sure that a 737 in Sully's hands would have resulted in exactly the same outcome.

[Clandestino]

Originally Posted by bubbers44

They lost AS, AP and AT, pulled up 11 degrees and stalled for no reason

Exactly. Lack of reason was big culprit in it.

Originally Posted by aa73

The NTSB will issue a ruling in order to protect an aircraft manufacturer before a pilot EVERY TIME.

NTSB never issues rulings. Their findings, conclusions and recommendations are always well supported by thorough analysis, open for everyone to see and check. That many an ignoramus is incapable of understanding what is written yet keeps on harping how it's wrong while giving no coherent and plausible argument is just something we have to live with.

Originally Posted by aa73

Had 587 been a Boeing or McD, the accident would never had happened

So, warnings about airframe being capable of breaking in overstress below Va if large and alternating flight control inputs are used, adorning all AOMs, AFMS, FCOMs of western-built transport aeroplaneas are actually superfluous? Of course it wouldn't have happened as it seems that one the pilot that misunderstood AAMP was flying A300 at the time!

Originally Posted by bubbers44

AA73, I went through that training and still wouldn't have used aggresive rudder inputs.

That's because you understood what you were told.

Originally Posted by bubbers44

teaching aerobatics for hundreds of hours makes you know how much rudder is needed.

Does it? On transport category aeroplane that gets into moderate bank after hitting the wake it is exactly zilch.

Originally Posted by bubbers44

Airbus had a weak vertical stabilizer and Airbus knew it because it came out of the factory that way.

It did not. Despite repairs, it exceeded design requirements before failing.

Originally Posted by bubbers44

The vertical stab failed right where they put the clamp fix that didn't work.

Actually reading the report might help us dispose of this nonsense.

Originally Posted by Dozy Wannabe

The procedure outlined in the AAMP programme was designed for the DC-9/MD-80 fleet and was only applicable to those types due to the design aspects of the aircraft.

Actually it was applicable to anything but only in the most extreme circumstances; excessive roll and no control through lateral channel and was certainly not intended to be used for minor roll disturbance.

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

. If that SAM had hit 1m closer to a critical part of the aircraft it would have been a smoking hole in the ground.

It hit in the engine and blown away all hydraulics. Apart form destroying engine, how could it be more critical for IR guided MANPAD?

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

And I'm sure that a 737 in Sully's hands would have resulted in exactly the same outcome.

It couldn't have hit in alpha prot mode, there is no such thing on 737. Actually reading the report....

[CONF iture]

Originally Posted by Clandestino

It couldn't have hit in alpha prot mode, there is no such thing on 737.

Then he could have flared at his liking.

[Owain Glyndwr]

Confiture

Quote:
Originally Posted by Clandestino
It couldn't have hit in alpha prot mode, there is no such thing on 737.

Then he could have flared at his liking.

So are you now suggesting that alpha prot mode was a factor in limiting Capt. Sullenberger's ability to flare?

[CONF iture]

Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr

So are you now suggesting that alpha prot mode was a factor in limiting Capt. Sullenberger's ability to flare?

Always have been.

[sevenstrokeroll]

First off...the American Airlines A300: crash could have been avoided in three ways.

1. Stronger Rudder
2. Rudder Limiter
3. Placcard onInstrument Panel: DO NOT USE FULL RUDDER above 200 knots (sic)

It would not have happened on a Douglas with a rudder limiter for example.

--

Sully and his splash. A few things could have helped sully flare more...lack of alpha protection would be one.

If the engines had not had limiters/computer control would they have run long enough for a landing on airport .

If the engines had been mounted on the tail like an MD80, would both have been hit ?

If the engines were pratt and whitney JT8d's, would they have kept running?

and my favorite...if sully/skiles had banked the airplane even 20 degrees would one engine have been above the birds, one below?

some speculation, some educated guess...oh and if sully had turned immediately for runway 13 at LGA...he might have made it...some sim experiments indicate this.

now...clandestino...why no limiter/placcard on the 300? I've seen placcards like that on the sabreliner, and limiters on many jets.

[bubbers44]

SSR is right. Too much automation restricted how Sully could control his Airbus. He couldn't flare exactly the way he wanted to, he couldn't coax the engines to have enough thrust to make an airport and he might have felt he had enough thrust to return and land downwind.

[bubbers44]

Also looking out the window helps. I have avoided thousands of turkey buzzards flying into TGU Honduras flying between flocks, missing indivicual birds and looking for them early, not when they are right in front of you. It isn't very hard to do. I did it for 6 years and only hit one that we tried to dodge two times but he kept going with us. No damage but a 4 lb bird makes a big thump and we stayed at low altitude in case we popped some rivets.