PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - American Airlines Flight 742 "flight control system" problems
Old 21st Mar 2013, 11:32
  #74 (permalink)  
Clandestino
 
Join Date: Feb 2005
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Originally Posted by bubbers44
They lost AS, AP and AT, pulled up 11 degrees and stalled for no reason
Exactly. Lack of reason was big culprit in it.

Originally Posted by aa73
The NTSB will issue a ruling in order to protect an aircraft manufacturer before a pilot EVERY TIME.
NTSB never issues rulings. Their findings, conclusions and recommendations are always well supported by thorough analysis, open for everyone to see and check. That many an ignoramus is incapable of understanding what is written yet keeps on harping how it's wrong while giving no coherent and plausible argument is just something we have to live with.

Originally Posted by aa73
Had 587 been a Boeing or McD, the accident would never had happened
So, warnings about airframe being capable of breaking in overstress below Va if large and alternating flight control inputs are used, adorning all AOMs, AFMS, FCOMs of western-built transport aeroplaneas are actually superfluous? Of course it wouldn't have happened as it seems that one the pilot that misunderstood AAMP was flying A300 at the time!

Originally Posted by bubbers44
AA73, I went through that training and still wouldn't have used aggresive rudder inputs.
That's because you understood what you were told.

Originally Posted by bubbers44
teaching aerobatics for hundreds of hours makes you know how much rudder is needed.
Does it? On transport category aeroplane that gets into moderate bank after hitting the wake it is exactly zilch.

Originally Posted by bubbers44
Airbus had a weak vertical stabilizer and Airbus knew it because it came out of the factory that way.
It did not. Despite repairs, it exceeded design requirements before failing.

Originally Posted by bubbers44
The vertical stab failed right where they put the clamp fix that didn't work.
Actually reading the report might help us dispose of this nonsense.

Originally Posted by Dozy Wannabe
The procedure outlined in the AAMP programme was designed for the DC-9/MD-80 fleet and was only applicable to those types due to the design aspects of the aircraft.
Actually it was applicable to anything but only in the most extreme circumstances; excessive roll and no control through lateral channel and was certainly not intended to be used for minor roll disturbance.

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
. If that SAM had hit 1m closer to a critical part of the aircraft it would have been a smoking hole in the ground.
It hit in the engine and blown away all hydraulics. Apart form destroying engine, how could it be more critical for IR guided MANPAD?

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
And I'm sure that a 737 in Sully's hands would have resulted in exactly the same outcome.
It couldn't have hit in alpha prot mode, there is no such thing on 737. Actually reading the report....
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