Plane down near Almaty
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There are new discussions in Kazakhstan press:
1. Document of MAK leaks to media. Medical specialist of MAK claims that there was a undiscovered heart disease of captain. In the moment of impact, he reportedly didn't hold controls - was he conscious?
2. There exist calculations that it is not sure that plane carried enough fuel to Shimkent divert. May be, but there are nearer airports, for example in Taraz in half a way to Shimkent.
3. CRJ are not ideal planes for local conditions. Too sensitive for icing (-40°C is common temperature in winter), pollutions and imperfections of leading edge in conditions of low energy GA. In CIS countries the CRJs are wide used by both regional and big companies now.
http://ratel.su/papka/papka2/1391759...0%97%D0%90.jpg
Ratel.su - ????????????? ????????-??????
Ratel.su - ????????????? ????????-??????
1. Document of MAK leaks to media. Medical specialist of MAK claims that there was a undiscovered heart disease of captain. In the moment of impact, he reportedly didn't hold controls - was he conscious?
2. There exist calculations that it is not sure that plane carried enough fuel to Shimkent divert. May be, but there are nearer airports, for example in Taraz in half a way to Shimkent.
3. CRJ are not ideal planes for local conditions. Too sensitive for icing (-40°C is common temperature in winter), pollutions and imperfections of leading edge in conditions of low energy GA. In CIS countries the CRJs are wide used by both regional and big companies now.
http://ratel.su/papka/papka2/1391759...0%97%D0%90.jpg
Ratel.su - ????????????? ????????-??????
Ratel.su - ????????????? ????????-??????
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Link below shows rescue vehicles parked close to displaced VOR/DME array and some soot marks on the foreground of the photo. Aircraft crashed 1.4k from threshold. I wonder whether they were established on the ILS.
Crash: Scat CRJ2 at Almaty on Jan 29th 2013, impacted ground near airport
Crash: Scat CRJ2 at Almaty on Jan 29th 2013, impacted ground near airport
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I wonder whether they were established on the ILS.
When we suppose GS of CRJ slightly smaller 150knots, we can calculate that in the moment of initiating GA they were at altitude 600feet (180m) and in distance 1.9nm (3.5km) from TDZ. It is in good accordance with PF's statement (I am going to fly to 500 a then GA). It seems to indicate, that their attempt to land was rather pro forma, vertical visibility was 40m and there was zero chance to see RWY lights. Until this point, everything was OK.
In fatal last 15 seconds, after TOGA, they:
- waited for motor spinning up for maybe 2s - is it enough? Hard to say, it depends on action with controls
- omitted gears up (spoilers?)
- set flaps to 8
From the initiating GA to the impact, the average angle of descent was 7° and GS increased to average 210knots (390km/h).
It looks like full real, possible scenario and this is the reason why I believe, that they were probably well established on ILS. This scenario can give answer for questions what and when, but not for why.
Last edited by Karel_x; 17th Feb 2014 at 12:46.
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We often discuss about lack of legal actions for increasing an air safety in CIS. In Kazakhstan 2013:
?????? «???????» / ??????? ? ? ???????
- suspended COA for 112 aircrafts (now total 471 registrated)
- suspended or cancelled AOC for companies: Jet One, Asia Continental Avialines, MEGA, D.E.L.T.A., Samal Air, Asia Continental, Irtysh-Air, Almaty Aviation, Luk Aero
- limitation of AOC for Semeyavia, Jet Airlines
- cancelled licence for air transport for: Euroasia Air Intl, Kaz Air West, Delta-C
?????? «???????» / ??????? ? ? ???????
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From Avherald....
Crash: Scat CRJ2 at Almaty on Jan 29th 2013, impacted ground near airport
On Mar 2nd 2015 the Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) released their final report in Russian concluding the probable causes of the crash were:
The crash of the CRJ-200 occurred after the crew initiated a missed approach in instrument meteorologic conditions, that became necessary due to lack of visual references visible on the ground (vertical visibility in fog did not exceed 40 meters), the missed approach became necessary due to actual weather conditions being below minima required for the approach. During the missed approach the elevator was deflected to lower the nose instead of rising the nose resulting in a steep dive and impact with ground. The investigation was unable to determine the cause of the elevator movement to pitch down. The investigation did not find evidence of any system malfunction or evidence of external influences like icing, windshear or wake turbulence while the aircraft attempted the go-around.
The most likely scenario to cause the reversed pitch commands was:
- a partial incapacitation of the pilot flying (captain)
- insufficient cockpit resource management resulting in the first officer diverting attention to radio communication instead of following the principle aviate, navigate, communicate, which resulted in the lack of monitoring of flight parameters
- lack of response to EGPWS alerts
- somatogravic illusion causing perceiption of a pitch up
- increased emotional stress by crew associated with the failed expectation of improving weather conditions at the time of approach
- failure to comply with requirements to medically assess flight crew, which led to the captain being assigned to the flight without needed rehabilitation and assessment following a surgery
The MAK reported the captain (56, ATPL, 18,194 hours total, 1,010 hours on type as commander) was pilot flying, the first officer (44,CPL, 3,507 hours total, 132 hours on type) was pilot monitoring, a pilot (700 hours on AN-24, theoretical examination on CRJ-200 passed) occupied the observer's seat.
The MAK reported that the captain had accumulated hours first on an Antonov 2, AN-24, IL-76 and YAK-42. In 2010 the captain converted to a Boeing 737-500 and became CAT II approved. After 1227 hours on the 737 the captain converted to the CRJ-200 in October/November 2011 and was checked out as commander with CAT I approval. In 2012 the captain also added the type rating for the CRJ-700 and was assigned flight instructor for the CRJ-200, in 2013 the captain was appointed flight examiner on the CRJ-200.
The captain had been in hospital from Nov 28th 2012 to Dec 4th 2012, where he underwent surgery for varicose veins. He was to undergo a rehabilitation period of three months following discharge from hospital.
The MAK annotated that the captain's records of the last quarterly medical examination were missing from his documentation as were the records of the examination after the sick leave that lasted for more than 30 days.
The first officer had started his flying career on Antonov 2 and AN-24s, then converted to the Yak-42 before converting to the CRJ-200 in 2012 being checked out as first officer with CAT I approval.
The MAK reported that the aircraft contacted ground first about 1600 meters short of the threshold runway 23R with a pitch attitude of 20 degrees nose down, wings level. At that time the flaps were between 15 and 10 degrees and the stabilizer trim was at -3.5 degrees. Debris of the aircraft spread until 1408 meters before the runway threshold over an area of 192 meters along the extended runway center line.
The MAK summarized medical forensic examination reporting that the captain was in his seat and in an active working position, feet on the pedals, hands on the yoke, at the time of the crash, however, there was no active participation in the aircraft control. His right hand showed injuries inconsistent with activity on the control yoke indicative that the right hand perhaps was involved in activity not associated with the control of the aircraft (the MAK suggests the seat position may have been adjusted around that time). The captain showed extensive injuries to his chest consistent with impact with the control column suggesting that his shoulder harness was not tight.
The autopsy also revealed that the captain had suffered from chronic coronary heart disease, which could result in sudden cardiac death, angina, myocardial infarct, heart rythm disturbance or heart failure. The MAK therefore analysed that a sudden partial incapacitation of the captain appears possible as result of the heart disease.
The MAK reported, that the first officer was also found in working position with his hands on the control yoke and his feet on the rudder pedals.
The MAK analysed that the flight was uneventful until the aircraft reached decision height of 185 meters, at which point the commander called "go-around" due to lack of visual reference, there was no violation of flight rules. The first officer confirmed "go", the captain instructed the flaps to be retracted to position 8. The autopilot gets disconnected, the engines accelerate for go-around, the flaps start retracting, the stabilizer trim remained in its position at -3.5 degrees, the elevator remained in its position initially but about 4 seconds after the autopilot was disconnected began to deflect commanding the nose down. At that time the first officer radioed ATC about the go-around, there was no action to arrest the descent. The EGPWS sounded "Sink Rate" and "TERRAIN", however, despite the alarms the first officer continued the radio transmissions.
The aircraft impacted ground 15 seconds after the autopilot was disconnected.
The MAK analysed that the last audio received from the captain was when he commanded the flaps to 8 degrees while initiating the go-around.
Crash: Scat CRJ2 at Almaty on Jan 29th 2013, impacted ground near airport
On Mar 2nd 2015 the Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) released their final report in Russian concluding the probable causes of the crash were:
The crash of the CRJ-200 occurred after the crew initiated a missed approach in instrument meteorologic conditions, that became necessary due to lack of visual references visible on the ground (vertical visibility in fog did not exceed 40 meters), the missed approach became necessary due to actual weather conditions being below minima required for the approach. During the missed approach the elevator was deflected to lower the nose instead of rising the nose resulting in a steep dive and impact with ground. The investigation was unable to determine the cause of the elevator movement to pitch down. The investigation did not find evidence of any system malfunction or evidence of external influences like icing, windshear or wake turbulence while the aircraft attempted the go-around.
The most likely scenario to cause the reversed pitch commands was:
- a partial incapacitation of the pilot flying (captain)
- insufficient cockpit resource management resulting in the first officer diverting attention to radio communication instead of following the principle aviate, navigate, communicate, which resulted in the lack of monitoring of flight parameters
- lack of response to EGPWS alerts
- somatogravic illusion causing perceiption of a pitch up
- increased emotional stress by crew associated with the failed expectation of improving weather conditions at the time of approach
- failure to comply with requirements to medically assess flight crew, which led to the captain being assigned to the flight without needed rehabilitation and assessment following a surgery
The MAK reported the captain (56, ATPL, 18,194 hours total, 1,010 hours on type as commander) was pilot flying, the first officer (44,CPL, 3,507 hours total, 132 hours on type) was pilot monitoring, a pilot (700 hours on AN-24, theoretical examination on CRJ-200 passed) occupied the observer's seat.
The MAK reported that the captain had accumulated hours first on an Antonov 2, AN-24, IL-76 and YAK-42. In 2010 the captain converted to a Boeing 737-500 and became CAT II approved. After 1227 hours on the 737 the captain converted to the CRJ-200 in October/November 2011 and was checked out as commander with CAT I approval. In 2012 the captain also added the type rating for the CRJ-700 and was assigned flight instructor for the CRJ-200, in 2013 the captain was appointed flight examiner on the CRJ-200.
The captain had been in hospital from Nov 28th 2012 to Dec 4th 2012, where he underwent surgery for varicose veins. He was to undergo a rehabilitation period of three months following discharge from hospital.
The MAK annotated that the captain's records of the last quarterly medical examination were missing from his documentation as were the records of the examination after the sick leave that lasted for more than 30 days.
The first officer had started his flying career on Antonov 2 and AN-24s, then converted to the Yak-42 before converting to the CRJ-200 in 2012 being checked out as first officer with CAT I approval.
The MAK reported that the aircraft contacted ground first about 1600 meters short of the threshold runway 23R with a pitch attitude of 20 degrees nose down, wings level. At that time the flaps were between 15 and 10 degrees and the stabilizer trim was at -3.5 degrees. Debris of the aircraft spread until 1408 meters before the runway threshold over an area of 192 meters along the extended runway center line.
The MAK summarized medical forensic examination reporting that the captain was in his seat and in an active working position, feet on the pedals, hands on the yoke, at the time of the crash, however, there was no active participation in the aircraft control. His right hand showed injuries inconsistent with activity on the control yoke indicative that the right hand perhaps was involved in activity not associated with the control of the aircraft (the MAK suggests the seat position may have been adjusted around that time). The captain showed extensive injuries to his chest consistent with impact with the control column suggesting that his shoulder harness was not tight.
The autopsy also revealed that the captain had suffered from chronic coronary heart disease, which could result in sudden cardiac death, angina, myocardial infarct, heart rythm disturbance or heart failure. The MAK therefore analysed that a sudden partial incapacitation of the captain appears possible as result of the heart disease.
The MAK reported, that the first officer was also found in working position with his hands on the control yoke and his feet on the rudder pedals.
The MAK analysed that the flight was uneventful until the aircraft reached decision height of 185 meters, at which point the commander called "go-around" due to lack of visual reference, there was no violation of flight rules. The first officer confirmed "go", the captain instructed the flaps to be retracted to position 8. The autopilot gets disconnected, the engines accelerate for go-around, the flaps start retracting, the stabilizer trim remained in its position at -3.5 degrees, the elevator remained in its position initially but about 4 seconds after the autopilot was disconnected began to deflect commanding the nose down. At that time the first officer radioed ATC about the go-around, there was no action to arrest the descent. The EGPWS sounded "Sink Rate" and "TERRAIN", however, despite the alarms the first officer continued the radio transmissions.
The aircraft impacted ground 15 seconds after the autopilot was disconnected.
The MAK analysed that the last audio received from the captain was when he commanded the flaps to 8 degrees while initiating the go-around.
During the missed approach the elevator was deflected to lower the nose instead of rising the nose resulting in a steep dive and impact with ground. The investigation was unable to determine the cause of the elevator movement to pitch down. The investigation did not find evidence of any system malfunction or evidence of external influences like icing, windshear or wake turbulence while the aircraft attempted the go-around.
Although not a CRJ200 specialist I am pretty sure the both pilots yoke inputs are recorded by the FDR. As such it should be pretty clear to know who did what (or not, from the sentence it is not 100% clear that the deflection was pilot induced). Given that the elevator movement was the core cause of the crash I am really surprised by this.
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Not for all CRJ200, I believe. Earlier aircraft had only the control surface positions recorded, then intermediate age aircraft recorded control wheel/column positions, and the final standard recorded both crew positions and forces. The recent report into the accident in Sweden, to serial 7010 (one of the oldest aircraft) makes no reference to anything other than control surface positions, for example.
This aircraft was 7413, which means it might or might not be "early" or "intermediate" in terms of FDR capability, i don't know.
This aircraft was 7413, which means it might or might not be "early" or "intermediate" in terms of FDR capability, i don't know.
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It is NOW but the FDR requirements have evolved (grown) over the years as a combination of both a perceived need for more data 9from the investigators mainly) and the increased capability of newer systems.
We used to get 8 parameters in a strip of foil ... now if you pull a QAR from something like an A380 you get thousands of parameters over many many hours. (I know a QAR isn't a FDR, but even FDRs record hundreds of parameters these days)
We used to get 8 parameters in a strip of foil ... now if you pull a QAR from something like an A380 you get thousands of parameters over many many hours. (I know a QAR isn't a FDR, but even FDRs record hundreds of parameters these days)
