FAA Grounds 787s

[archae86]

A350 also LiON

As of now, the A350 also uses serious Lithium Ion batteries. Their vendor differs (SAFT, not GS Yuasa).

A few hours ago Airbus CEO Fabrice Bregier said he saw no reason to change "the A350's architecture", apparently meaning not only the use of lithium ion batteries but the charging, safety, power distribution, and other related schemes.

Good luck to them.

[keesje]

Maybe re-engining the A330 into a NEO isn't such a bad idea after all.

[Lemain]

A few hours ago Airbus CEO Fabrice Bregier said he saw no reason to change "the A350's architecture", apparently meaning not only the use of lithium ion batteries but the charging, safety, power distribution, and other related schemes.

But then there haven't (I think?) been even insider rumours that Airbus have a problem? So why would they change the design? The cost would be to the moon...engineering, trials, certifications, spares,.... So why have we a problem with Boeing? Is it the charging system? The rating (Ah vs service duty and average amps in amps out)? Is it located in a bad spot? Surely not, as one ?engineer suggested earlier here a liquid cooling system for a tiddly little APU battery

Seems to me that we need to combine every professional in the business to help sort this problem and reassure the public and press. Press and public, more like.

If the 787 fails to meet market approval the consequences on aviation will be deep and bloody. It'll also open the door to the east. I'd rather keep the EU and US duopoly going.

[archae86]

some don't like lithium

Originally Posted by Lemain

So why would they change the design?

Some (many) posting here have the clear position that no aviation use of Lithium ion batteries is either safe or acceptable.

Those holding that position would not approve of the current Airbus stance.

I, personally, think it is possible to do it right--but don't know whether it, in fact, has been done right. By the way, my background is design engineering--and I am not a pilot.

[RR_NDB]

How long, any guesses?

sb_sfo:

My feeling is that this may be a longer-term action.

A lot of issues to consider:

1) What caused BOS incident? Suppose was the charger and battery associated circuitry (best case scenario)
2) What caused TAK incident? Suppose was the charger and battery associated circuitry (best case scenario)
3) What is wrong with these parts? The Engineering team probably yet know. (best case scenario)
4) What if nothing with these parts? In this case the batteries could be the factor. What to do? (IMO this is the worst case scenario)
5) Options? a) The charger and circuitry for NiCd batteries are DIFFERENT
b) The battery (for the same AH rating is bigger and heavier) has not a direct replacement. So,
6) FAA review
7) Pressure to return ops. (from many players)
8) Risks of further damage to images in a precipitated decision before safety is guaranteed.

To be continued.

How long? In the best case scenario, week(s). In the worst case, month(s).

(This is a risky comment) Your feeling is the same i have. BIG ISSUE.

PS

Just an analogy: If it was needed to replace the batteries of my mobiles and laptops the new volume and new weight would be at least twice.

[RR_NDB]

Replacement to NiCds

Shore Guy:

How much larger/heavier would a NiCad battery have to be to replace the power available from the existing Lithium batteries?

Larger and heavier enough to require a mod to the plane. Will quantify ASAP.

Would the charging/monitoring software have to be modified greatly to accommodate NiCads?

It would require a redesign of the circuitry (i.e. not just SW). I´ve heard of a Diode (in series). With NiCd´s i never heard of that.

So, quite a big deal. The 787 design REQUIRED these batteries. It´s specs mandated. The worst case scenario would be to retrofit to another battery
type. I hope they trace the problems to the charger or associated circuitry.

[RR_NDB]

Kapton nightmare

glad rag:

And I thought the old Kapton [R] videos were scary

Indeed, Kapton was a big problem. A battery with this concerns remember us on the Kapton nightmare. At least is easier to replace than to change the A/C harness.

[RR_NDB]

The battery problem could be of greater significance if ...

PEI_3721:

...this might suggest that either the fix doesn’t work or that the original problem was not sufficiently understood.

Let´s hope such is not the case. If so, i have no words to comment. Just

[ozaub]

FAA Special Conditions

The incidents that led to the grounding of the B787 look suspiciously like the potential dangers of adopting L/I batteries that were spelt out by FAA in Special Certification Conditions at Federal Register, Volume 72 Issue 196 (Thursday, October 11, 2007)

Namely:
In lieu of the requirements of 14 CFR 25.1353(c)(1) through (c)(4),
the following special conditions apply. Lithium ion batteries on the
Boeing Model 787-8 airplane must be designed and installed as follows:
(1) Safe cell temperatures and pressures must be maintained during
any foreseeable charging or discharging condition and during any
failure of the charging or battery monitoring system not shown to be
extremely remote. The lithium ion battery installation must preclude
explosion in the event of those failures.
(2) Design of the lithium ion batteries must preclude the
occurrence of self-sustaining, uncontrolled increases in temperature or
pressure.
(3) No explosive or toxic gases emitted by any lithium ion battery
in normal operation, or as the result of any failure of the battery
charging system, monitoring system, or battery installation not shown
to be extremely remote, may accumulate in hazardous quantities within
the airplane.
(4) Installations of lithium ion batteries must meet the
requirements of 14 CFR 25.863(a) through (d).
(5) No corrosive fluids or gases that may escape from any lithium
ion battery may damage surrounding structure or any adjacent systems,
equipment, or electrical wiring of the airplane in such a way as to
cause a major or more severe failure condition, in accordance with 14
CFR 25.1309(b) and applicable regulatory guidance.
(6) Each lithium ion battery installation must have provisions to
prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems caused
by the maximum amount of heat the battery can generate during a short
circuit of the battery or of its individual cells.
(7) Lithium ion battery installations must have a system to control
the charging rate of the battery automatically, so as to prevent
battery overheating or overcharging, and,
(i) A battery temperature sensing and over-temperature warning
system with a means for automatically disconnecting the battery from
its charging source in the event of an over-temperature condition, or,
(ii) A battery failure sensing and warning system with a means for
automatically disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the
event of battery failure.
(8) Any lithium ion battery installation whose function is required
for safe operation of the airplane must incorporate a monitoring and
warning feature that will provide an indication to the appropriate
flight crewmembers whenever the state-of-charge of the batteries has
fallen below levels considered acceptable for dispatch of the airplane.
(9) The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness required by 14 CFR
25.1529 must contain maintenance requirements for measurements of
battery capacity at appropriate intervals to ensure that batteries
whose function is required for safe operation of the airplane will
perform their intended function as long as the battery is installed in
the airplane. The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness must also
contain procedures for the maintenance of lithium ion batteries in
spares storage to prevent the replacement of batteries whose function
is required for safe operation of the airplane with batteries that have
experienced degraded charge retention ability or other damage due to
prolonged storage at a low state of charge.

Evidently Boeing failed to meet these special conditions and FAA failed to detect the failure

[RR_NDB]

Tesla car used 18650 type (laptop cell like)

TURIN:

...Tesla car and (i think) it has a liquid refridgerant cooling system.

Tesla car used smaller cells in large numbers. (Thousands)

Different approach, (to put cells inside liquid) Sounds good.

But there are problems.

[sb_sfo]

Had a chance to talk to a guy from Tesla, and he was saying that they were working on a system to totally recharge in 30 minutes. I recall he threw out the figure of 400 amps to do it. While his job was picking up the bodies when they were shipped into SFO and he didn't strike me as an engineer, that figure scared the crap out of me. I think I'd want to be motoring down the road at full speed after a charge like that just to get some airflow across the cells!

[RR_NDB]

ScareBatt and ScareCharger

sb_sfo:

I think I'd want to be motoring down the road at full speed after a charge like that just to get some airflow across the cells!

Net result: ScareDesign

[LiveryMan]

Originally Posted by Ye Olde Pilot

Let's face it the 787 Dreamliner programme began as a response to the A380 and Boeing have come unstuck. They've also been hit by a reduction in US military spending.

They skimped on the R and D and the birds are coming home to roost.

Boeing also made a fortune out of the 747/737 line and never thought Airbus
could be a real challenge.

Let's face it, you are talking out of your rear end.

The 787 and A380 are completely different aircraft for completely different markets and are constructed with completely different methods. The only similarity they share is the fact they are aircraft.

The 787 is a natural replacement for the large worldwide fleet of 767s and older A330s. Boeing have long foreseen a point to point system being gradually preferred over hub to hub. Airbus bet the bank on Hub to Hub remaining dominant and required huge fleets of A380s to make it work without the need for more slots.

Boeing has publicly stated on many occasions that they do not see a large enough market to warrant a 1 to 1 competitor to the A380 (in line with their point to point philosophy) So far, they have been proven right.
The 747-8 could be seen as a "reaction" to the A380. But then, the Freighter was launched and introduced first for a reason. How many A380Fs are on order?

But we digress from the topic here.

If the only reason the 787 has been grounded is over issues with the batteries, won't this be a relatively easy fix?

[LiveryMan]

Originally Posted by keesje

Maybe re-engining the A330 into a NEO isn't such a bad idea after all.

Go back to Airliners.net keesje. Or are you still banned for your blatant flamebaiting?

[DaveReidUK]

The 787 design REQUIRED these batteries.

Strange statement.

Presumably you mean that the 787 design specified these batteries, for commercial and/or engineering reasons. There certainly was/is no regulatory or safety-related requirement to use them, as will be demonstrated when the electrical system is redesigned to replace them with a different technology.

[Innaflap]

It seems this particular battery chemistry is known to have ignition problems.

Grounded Boeing 787 Dreamliners Use Batteries Prone to Overheating | MIT Technology Review

[Golf-Sierra]

The incidents that led to the grounding of the B787 look suspiciously like the potential dangers of adopting L/I batteries that were spelt out by FAA in Special Certification Conditions at Federal Register, Volume 72 Issue 196 (Thursday, October 11, 2007)

...

And in addition to all that the batteries are meant to solely power the aircraft in the event of a total failure of all other electrical sources - which does happen now and again, even on a four (not two) engine 747.

Not sure I want to see all those protections kicking in when the plane is just a few miles short of the threshold in an emergency situation. Or when the APU needs to be started up in the air.

Did the engineers foresee such circumstances?

[Lemain]

It seems this particular battery chemistry is known to have ignition problems.

Is there a battery technology that is risk-free? You have two risks. Chemicals (or gasses in fault conditions) when the case is compromised (heat, mechanical or pressure-relief valve). Heat, if the charger is over-delivering to a charged battery or if the battery is discharged too fast. One would prefer not to have batteries. It is do-able with fuel cells or micro APUs running, say, on ethanol. I don't mean run the existing APUs off ethanol, but replace the APU's service battery by a fuel cell or baby motor. It's all interesting from a technical pov and speculation, but the time needed to incorporate the technology into a civilian airliner is ten years. Would be faster in wartime. Six months.

[shonandai]

TAK incident battery

[nerd317]

And in addition to all that the batteries are meant to solely power the aircraft in the event of a total failure of all other electrical sources - which does happen now and again, even on a four (not two) engine 747.

Not sure I want to see all those protections kicking in when the plane is just a few miles short of the threshold in an emergency situation. Or when the APU needs to be started up in the air.

That seems a valid concern given some 'solutions' seem to only be concerned with managing the fire rather than any effect caused by the failure of the battery.

Overall, it seems to be a fairly well understood problem in a discrete component of the plane. It's not like "wing failure" or a wiring problem with 8000 miles of cables. It's serious in terms of individual aircraft and the current fleet, but maybe not serious in terms of the future of the dreamliner project.