FAA Grounds 787s
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: flyover country USA
Age: 82
Posts: 4,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Turbine D:
I had some minor contact with Harry - enough to learn that he had little knowledge of aviation culture and slang/euphemisms. But despite this he was quite a salesman (and not just selling airplanes or engines 
).
Stonecipher ... VP of Commercial Engine Sales. He left GE and went to Sundstrand, then to McDonnell Douglas and then to Boeing. He was somewhat more of a bean-counter than an engineer.
).
Stonecipher came with the McDonnell Douglas purchase, having presided over the sales of their commercial types having fallen off a cliff in their final years leading to the demise of the company, a fact which the appointing board of directors at Boeing somehow seem to have missed. Remember what the market has thought of those final McDD products, the MD-11 and the MD-90 ? He didn't last too long at Boeing's helm but certainly set the style for his successors that knowledgeable engineers are bad/expensive, competent aerospace professionals promoted to top management are worse, and marketing gloss is the way to go. Predecessor Phil Condit was seemingly derided for being a longstanding PPL and having his own light aircraft for weekends, let along for being a Boeing lifer. The fact that the 777 programme that he had been in in charge of smashed Stonecipher's MD-11 commercially in the final years of McDD didn't go un-noticed.
McNerney seems of the same mould. I can't imagine how he is still there after seven years in charge, totally responsible during the multiple 787 fiascos with billions of stockholders money down the drain. Again, what are the board of directors thinking of. I don't believe we would be where we are with the 787 mess today if Phil Condit or Alan Mulally, or those of comaprable ability and understanding, were in charge.
McNerney seems of the same mould. I can't imagine how he is still there after seven years in charge, totally responsible during the multiple 787 fiascos with billions of stockholders money down the drain. Again, what are the board of directors thinking of. I don't believe we would be where we are with the 787 mess today if Phil Condit or Alan Mulally, or those of comaprable ability and understanding, were in charge.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I think the biggest factor was that they gave the MD-11 project the green light without performing due diligence on the effect ETOPS would have on the market that they were intending to sell the MD-11 into. Failing to notice that this would accelerate the dwindling numbers of tri-jets on long-haul routes was a massive error in business strategy.
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: engineer at large
Posts: 1,409
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
When I worked at Boeing on 747, one company slogan was "quality is king". To which we added "but the schedule is God". Another slogan was "pride in excellence".
Join Date: Dec 2010
Location: Middle America
Age: 84
Posts: 1,167
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
barit1,
Good observation, I did as well, at GE, MD and Boeing. At MD, besides the commercial side of the business, the DOD folks were all over him for the way parts were being designed and manufactured that added cost into military aircraft rather than taking cost out and he asked for some help. At Boeing, he saw some things that could be changed along the same lines and asked for help again. IMO, his problem was the lack of tact in getting changes made in cultures that were unlike the culture he grew up in which wasn't Engineering.
WHBM,
Exactly. He was not at GE Aviation as President very long. IMO, he was put into that position, running a business he didn't know much about (one of the three candidates to succeed Jack Welch as GE's CEO) to see how he would perform. When he wasn't selected, he left and became CEO of 3M Corp. There, he just about dismantled the Innovation and R&D areas which were key in their thousands of unique products developed over the years and business growth diminished significantly. He is not an engineer, a Harvard MBA type. Why Boeing, an aeronautical and technical engineering design and build company selected him is not clear to me at all.
Dozy,
Correct. Not only did the 777s do in the MD-11s, eventually they did in the A-340s as well for more or less the same reason.
I had some minor contact with Harry - enough to learn that he had little knowledge of aviation culture and slang/euphemisms.
WHBM,
McNerney seems of the same mould. I can't imagine how he is still there after seven years in charge, totally responsible during the multiple 787 fiascos with billions of stockholders money down the drain. Again, what are the board of directors thinking of.
Dozy,
I think the biggest factor was that they gave the MD-11 project the green light without performing due diligence on the effect ETOPS would have on the market that they were intending to sell the MD-11 into.
He is not an engineer, a Harvard MBA type
Which is why the 777 succeeded. The engineering design and implementation was spot on (well, apart from the noise back in the cabin).
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: engineer at large
Posts: 1,409
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Boeing shifted from Engineering to sales.
With an engineered product, one barely needs a sales department, as the product sells itself on the engineering.
All one hears about is sales, discounts, and especially numbers...
Does anyone in the flow diagram care about sales numbers (other than the accountants) (ie, the aircraft is better because more have been sold?)
The segway into Ford Motor is telling, moving from hocking aircraft to hocking cars...
THAT is the major problem.
(ps..its not working...great engineering WORKS!)
With an engineered product, one barely needs a sales department, as the product sells itself on the engineering.
All one hears about is sales, discounts, and especially numbers...
Does anyone in the flow diagram care about sales numbers (other than the accountants) (ie, the aircraft is better because more have been sold?)
The segway into Ford Motor is telling, moving from hocking aircraft to hocking cars...
THAT is the major problem.
(ps..its not working...great engineering WORKS!)
I have to wonder if the stupid move to Chicago hasn't had its effects. Senior management, however unoriented to engineering realities they are, being 2,000 miles away cannot have helped.
For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature will not be fooled
Richard Feynmann
For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature will not be fooled
Richard Feynmann
Last edited by galaxy flyer; 5th Mar 2013 at 01:51.
According to the London Financial Times, Ray Connor, the head of Boeing's commercial aircraft division, has been defending Boeing's refusal to ditch Li-ion, even though to do so might might have returned the aircraft more quickly to flight.
He also confirms more details about what they are actually going to do.
Boeing defends refusal to abandon 787 battery - FT.com
He also confirms more details about what they are actually going to do.
Boeing defends refusal to abandon 787 battery - FT.com
Join Date: Oct 2012
Location: toofaraway
Posts: 224
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
FlightPathOBN
"With an engineered product, one barely needs a sales department, as the product sells itself on the engineering."
How I wish that were true. In reality the airlines set up a competition between Fleet A and Fleet B both of which can do the job, of course.
Engineers may advise the beancounters, but they're not at the table when the winning deal is thrashed out late at night.
Contract negotiators earn more than engineers because they can very visibly earn (or lose) their employer millions.
How I wish that were true. In reality the airlines set up a competition between Fleet A and Fleet B both of which can do the job, of course.
Engineers may advise the beancounters, but they're not at the table when the winning deal is thrashed out late at night.
Contract negotiators earn more than engineers because they can very visibly earn (or lose) their employer millions.
Last edited by toffeez; 5th Mar 2013 at 09:05.
Join Date: Sep 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 1,948
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That BBC report also quotes
I thought that Boeing had considerably more orders than that.
A further 473 Dreamliners have been ordered by at least 44 different airlines around the world.
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: England
Age: 65
Posts: 303
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Read the article and it's not plausible, still got patch written all over it.
Article quotes Connor as saying the cells will have enhanced spacing, in a box which will vent to outside the aircraft. Fine so far but he then says that the batteries will be in an oxygen free environment to prevent fire.
Thermal runaway with Li-Ion generates it's own oxygen as part of the process or are they using 'special' batteries.
Article also quotes Connor as saying Airbus have made the right decision to revert to Ni-Cd at this stage, while defending Boeing's commitment to Li-Ion; Read as "We can't do that because it would take too long".
This re-affirms my belief that Boeing are out on a limb with the 'Electric plane' concept and are committed to the Li-Ion solution.
Article quotes Connor as saying the cells will have enhanced spacing, in a box which will vent to outside the aircraft. Fine so far but he then says that the batteries will be in an oxygen free environment to prevent fire.
Thermal runaway with Li-Ion generates it's own oxygen as part of the process or are they using 'special' batteries.
Article also quotes Connor as saying Airbus have made the right decision to revert to Ni-Cd at this stage, while defending Boeing's commitment to Li-Ion; Read as "We can't do that because it would take too long".
This re-affirms my belief that Boeing are out on a limb with the 'Electric plane' concept and are committed to the Li-Ion solution.
With hindsight, these events suggest a failure of risk management.
Apparently Boeing did not have a preplanned strategy of what to do if the ‘risky’ choice of battery turned out to be an error – something which could have occurred up to the point of certification … and beyond. Perhaps they did not think ‘what if’, nor project sufficiently into the future – continued airworthiness.
There was no plan B, or alternatively that plan B was implemented as a solution for the flight test fire incident. This could suggest that the cause of the flight test incident was misidentified, or that the solution (plan B) was insufficient.
We have opportunity to learn from this.
“We take a risk. We can decide the return is worth it.
We run a risk. We can become victims if things go wrong.
When analysing risks you have to consider the whole range, from decisions to operate (behave) in certain ways, to decisions to act in certain ways.
When inspecting you have to examine the context, including yourself.
What happens to companies that run risks? The best make profits, the worst go bankrupt”. (P. Hudson)
Apparently Boeing did not have a preplanned strategy of what to do if the ‘risky’ choice of battery turned out to be an error – something which could have occurred up to the point of certification … and beyond. Perhaps they did not think ‘what if’, nor project sufficiently into the future – continued airworthiness.
There was no plan B, or alternatively that plan B was implemented as a solution for the flight test fire incident. This could suggest that the cause of the flight test incident was misidentified, or that the solution (plan B) was insufficient.
We have opportunity to learn from this.
“We take a risk. We can decide the return is worth it.
We run a risk. We can become victims if things go wrong.
When analysing risks you have to consider the whole range, from decisions to operate (behave) in certain ways, to decisions to act in certain ways.
When inspecting you have to examine the context, including yourself.
What happens to companies that run risks? The best make profits, the worst go bankrupt”. (P. Hudson)
Join Date: Aug 2008
Location: Moscow, Russia
Posts: 10
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes, it looks like they are redesigning the battery itelf. And it sounds to me that the redesign targets mostly the goal to prevent fire/smoke at all costs, rather than the goal to find out the cause for that extreme overheating. Which may mean, I think, that it is again a temporary solution to win some time to put the hardware back into the skies as quick as possible and then develop more effective and reliable solution when the pressure is over.
Join Date: Nov 2009
Location: flying by night
Posts: 500
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
from the FT article
honest statement 
and if they also can convincingly demonstrate that the 787 fix is safe, everything will be allright.
The company had also learnt the lessons of the severe delays and other problems with the 787, the first of which was delivered three years late. He held up the Boeing 737 Max – the latest version of the successful short-haul jet – as an example of how the company was no longer taking the same risks it took with the Dreamliner.
“We took on some of that risk knowingly and we’re not doing that again,” Mr Conner said of the Dreamliner.
“We took on some of that risk knowingly and we’re not doing that again,” Mr Conner said of the Dreamliner.
and if they also can convincingly demonstrate that the 787 fix is safe, everything will be allright.
Last edited by deptrai; 5th Mar 2013 at 16:07.
Join Date: Dec 2010
Location: Middle America
Age: 84
Posts: 1,167
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
GF,
Funny you should bring this up. When he was at GE Aircraft Engines, he moved his office to the far end of the complex, as far away from the action as one could get,, but close to the sales marketing folks. I don't think many of the worker bees ever saw him walk the factory floor or visit the Engineering folks, reclusive is a good word description. At Boeing, video conferencing from Chicago doesn't hack it.
BTW I read this in a financial magazine (bolding is mine),
Nothing like getting rewarded for delivering 787 aircraft 3 years late to your airline customers.
PEI_3721,
It isn't hindsight at all, it's like the risk management wasn't in the deck of cards, starting with the fuselage mating and fastener problems leading to the three year delay in delivery.
t.g.r.,
Probably is the only thing they can do in the short run if the FAA approves. I don't know why they don't stick the thing in a sturdy sealed, heat resistant box filled with argon or nitrogen, e.g., no fire and no smoke without oxygen.
I have to wonder if the stupid move to Chicago hasn't had its effects. Senior management, however unoriented to engineering realities they are, being 2,000 miles away cannot have helped.
BTW I read this in a financial magazine (bolding is mine),
Boeing boosts 2011 pay 34 percent to $18.4 million for CEO Jim McNerney
Boeing CEO Jim McNerney’s compensation jumped 34 percent last year as the board of the big airplane maker rewarded him for delivering the new 787 and winning a huge Air Force order for refueling tankers.
Boeing revenue rose 6.9 percent last year, to $68.74 billion
Boeing CEO Jim McNerney’s compensation jumped 34 percent last year as the board of the big airplane maker rewarded him for delivering the new 787 and winning a huge Air Force order for refueling tankers.
Boeing revenue rose 6.9 percent last year, to $68.74 billion
PEI_3721,
With hindsight, these events suggest a failure of risk management.
t.g.r.,
Yes, it looks like they are redesigning the battery itelf. And it sounds to me that the redesign targets mostly the goal to prevent fire/smoke at all costs