barit1,
I had some minor contact with Harry - enough to learn that he had little knowledge of aviation culture and slang/euphemisms.
Good observation, I did as well, at GE, MD and Boeing. At MD, besides the commercial side of the business, the DOD folks were all over him for the way parts were being designed and manufactured that added cost into military aircraft rather than taking cost out and he asked for some help. At Boeing, he saw some things that could be changed along the same lines and asked for help again. IMO, his problem was the lack of tact in getting changes made in cultures that were unlike the culture he grew up in which wasn't Engineering.
WHBM,
McNerney seems of the same mould. I can't imagine how he is still there after seven years in charge, totally responsible during the multiple 787 fiascos with billions of stockholders money down the drain. Again, what are the board of directors thinking of.
Exactly. He was not at GE Aviation as President very long. IMO, he was put into that position, running a business he didn't know much about (one of the three candidates to succeed Jack Welch as GE's CEO) to see how he would perform. When he wasn't selected, he left and became CEO of 3M Corp. There, he just about dismantled the Innovation and R&D areas which were key in their thousands of unique products developed over the years and business growth diminished significantly. He is not an engineer, a Harvard MBA type. Why Boeing, an aeronautical and technical engineering design and build company selected him is not clear to me at all.
Dozy,
I think the biggest factor was that they gave the MD-11 project the green light without performing due diligence on the effect ETOPS would have on the market that they were intending to sell the MD-11 into.
Correct. Not only did the 777s do in the MD-11s, eventually they did in the A-340s as well for more or less the same reason.