FAA Grounds 787s
Containment alone is not legal
Please, if you have not already done so, read the eight Special Certification Conditions which were set for use of Li-Ion batteries on the 787 Federal Register, Volume 72 Issue 196 (Thursday, October 11, 2007). Note that the dangers of using Li-Ion are clearly spelled out and prescient.
Note too that pilots (ALPA) were only respondents to NPRM which preceded SCCs. ALPA was adamant that a battery fire was unacceptable; “The intent of our comments submitted to the Docket for question [Special Condition] Number 4 (see below) is to assure that the FAA includes language or makes it clear in the Special Conditions directing the OEM or a potential STC applicant that a fire from these devices, in any situation, is unacceptable. ALPA requests the FAA reiterate that preventing a fire and not reacting to one, if one occurs, is critical”. FAA reassured them; “The FAA shares the commenter's concern over a fire erupting in flight. The regulations and the rigid requirements defined in these special conditions are intended to prevent lithium battery fires on board the aircraft”.
SCCs are not friendly agreements between consenting adults; they are law. 787 cannot fly unless all SCCs are met.
Note too that pilots (ALPA) were only respondents to NPRM which preceded SCCs. ALPA was adamant that a battery fire was unacceptable; “The intent of our comments submitted to the Docket for question [Special Condition] Number 4 (see below) is to assure that the FAA includes language or makes it clear in the Special Conditions directing the OEM or a potential STC applicant that a fire from these devices, in any situation, is unacceptable. ALPA requests the FAA reiterate that preventing a fire and not reacting to one, if one occurs, is critical”. FAA reassured them; “The FAA shares the commenter's concern over a fire erupting in flight. The regulations and the rigid requirements defined in these special conditions are intended to prevent lithium battery fires on board the aircraft”.
SCCs are not friendly agreements between consenting adults; they are law. 787 cannot fly unless all SCCs are met.
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Please forgive me if I am having a senior moment but I see no ruling under the special conditions 1 to 9 stated in the document Federal Register, Volume 72 Issue 196 (Thursday, October 11, 2007) that states there must never be a fire in the Li batteries under any circumstance. There are rulings that state mechanisms to protect against the possibility of a fire and containment rulings in case these protections fail. Sure, is seems the ALPA was adamant that a battery fire is unacceptable under any situation but no where can I see that the FAA accepted this view and included it in the special conditions 1 to 9 stated later in the document. In my opinion the FAA could not regulate that there must never be a battery fire of any degree under any circumstance but if there is in fact such a ruling then I agree, Boeing should ditch the Li batteries.
I am just talking about the "Special Conditions" regulatory requirements here. I do agree that 2 incidents (1 fire and 1 smoke) in the space of 1 week is too frequent. Such occurrences should be very rare. I also agree that the public perception would not be very good if Boeing does not find the root cause.
I am just talking about the "Special Conditions" regulatory requirements here. I do agree that 2 incidents (1 fire and 1 smoke) in the space of 1 week is too frequent. Such occurrences should be very rare. I also agree that the public perception would not be very good if Boeing does not find the root cause.
Last edited by Cool Guys; 19th Feb 2013 at 02:43. Reason: spelling
From FlexibleResponse: "At least Airbus has now demonstrated the strength of their conviction by announcing the decision that they will take the Lithium ion battery out of their A350 and replace it with Ni Cads until Lithium ion technology catches up with the required public transport mandated reliability requirements."
Or Airbus knows when it potentially has a tool to beat its competitor over the head with. Not in an overt way mind you - there will be subtle reminders...
Or Airbus knows when it potentially has a tool to beat its competitor over the head with. Not in an overt way mind you - there will be subtle reminders...
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in reply to Romulus[QUOTE] [the ball being played is the use of hindsight. It's easy to be critical of this decision now, I would suggest Boeing had done their work beforehand but something just hasn't worked as tested. /QUOTE]
The world was presented with a Certified and working airliner. nobody outside the regulatory authorities has any mandate to investigate the financial or engineering decisions behind the product.
I'd suggest that if you bought a TV,certified to meet international environmental and safety standards,then found it kept losing all it's settings,and reports were coming in that these sets were catching fire........your reaction????
Boeing's test procedures were , defacto, intrinsically flawed.OR they avoided testing the "difficult" areas that are KNOWN to exist.
(otherwise the problems with discharged/self-combusting batteries would have been found and dealt with before release.)
I do NOT accept that NOBODY in the whole of Boeing had any doubts about incorporating this "risky" technology.
Eventually, I suspect, a sacked/disaffected dissenter will spill the beans.
A poor decision was made to put all their eggs in one very fragile basket which failed virtually immediately
These batteries were changed-out at ludicrously low service intervals and still no warning-bells?
IMHO there would have been plenty of engineers who were well aware that the battery/charger/plane combination was sadly lacking.
I would point the finger at "suits" who were desperate to bring a much-hyped, much-delayed project to market.
Nothing to do with "hindsight" I do not accept that the system worked perfectly before release....the Kludge of putting it in a tin box didn't work.so let's make a bigger, stronger Kludge.....FFS...what sort of third-world "engineering" is that???
The world was presented with a Certified and working airliner. nobody outside the regulatory authorities has any mandate to investigate the financial or engineering decisions behind the product.
I'd suggest that if you bought a TV,certified to meet international environmental and safety standards,then found it kept losing all it's settings,and reports were coming in that these sets were catching fire........your reaction????
Boeing's test procedures were , defacto, intrinsically flawed.OR they avoided testing the "difficult" areas that are KNOWN to exist.
(otherwise the problems with discharged/self-combusting batteries would have been found and dealt with before release.)
I do NOT accept that NOBODY in the whole of Boeing had any doubts about incorporating this "risky" technology.
Eventually, I suspect, a sacked/disaffected dissenter will spill the beans.
A poor decision was made to put all their eggs in one very fragile basket which failed virtually immediately
These batteries were changed-out at ludicrously low service intervals and still no warning-bells?
IMHO there would have been plenty of engineers who were well aware that the battery/charger/plane combination was sadly lacking.
I would point the finger at "suits" who were desperate to bring a much-hyped, much-delayed project to market.
Nothing to do with "hindsight" I do not accept that the system worked perfectly before release....the Kludge of putting it in a tin box didn't work.so let's make a bigger, stronger Kludge.....FFS...what sort of third-world "engineering" is that???
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So Boeings answer to the fire risk is to surround the battery with a fire proof case. One small problem, the main a/c battery is on board for a purpose, to provide power to various systems when all else fails.. If the battery ends up as a molten mass then that protection is lost. All sorts of systems come off the Hot battery bus. I guess the APU battery could be less of a problem, but it certainly would effect ETOPS.
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Originally Posted by cockney
I'd suggest that if you bought a TV,certified to meet international environmental and safety standards,then found it kept losing all it's settings,and reports were coming in that these sets were catching fire........your reaction????
I sure wouldn't be carrying on like a pork chop about how obvious the flaw is that was missed based on my brilliant use of hindsight.
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"And it's probably a lot easier and faster to prove that a titanium box can contain a battery fire than it is to prove a battery won't burn. So the box may be the fastest way to get flying."
Are you serious???
Before the 787, when was the last time an aircraft battery caught fire? Nope? I can't remember one either.
Two scenario's here, either the design and implementation process is flawed or the battery technology is insufficiently proven in an aviation environment.
Boeing need a solution but redneck engineering isn't it, you might get the planes flying but you then have to convince your business partners, who then have to convince their passengers.
787F anyone?
Are you serious???
Before the 787, when was the last time an aircraft battery caught fire? Nope? I can't remember one either.
Two scenario's here, either the design and implementation process is flawed or the battery technology is insufficiently proven in an aviation environment.
Boeing need a solution but redneck engineering isn't it, you might get the planes flying but you then have to convince your business partners, who then have to convince their passengers.
787F anyone?
More bang for your buck
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Boeing need a solution but redneck engineering isn't it, you might get the planes flying but you then have to convince your business partners, who then have to convince their passengers.
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Flying 787
So shortly, if you are living under the flight path of a dream liner, and see a burning streak in the sky, it said not a meteor. It is just a dream liner ejecting a battery. Sad to see Boeing come to this solution.
Another swell battery
Swelling Found In Second ANA 787 Battery
I have to think that, were all the 787 batteries (failed or not) returned and disassembled for inspection, the cause of these failures would reveal itself in short (no pun intended) order.
I have to think that, were all the 787 batteries (failed or not) returned and disassembled for inspection, the cause of these failures would reveal itself in short (no pun intended) order.
You’re right Cool Guys (#893), in certification we never say “never’. Instead SCCs refer to “extremely remote” possibility. FAA Advisory Circular 25-1309 defines that as “not expected during entire operational life of all airplanes of the type”.
Or as I wrote in an article referenced earlier; “Put simply, batteries must not burn, except possibly once or twice during the lifetime of the entire 787 fleet. If batteries do overheat or burn, any fire must be safely contained within the battery enclosure and any harmful fumes must be vented overboard”.
More recently NTSB quantified the risk; “Boeing .....determined that the likelihood of a smoke emission event from a 787 battery would occur less than once in every 10 million flight hours”. In real life “there have been two critical battery events on the 787 fleet with fewer than 100,000 flight hours”.
BTW only 8 SCCs are necessary for certification. #9 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness can be developed progressively after certification.
I agree with KK, switch back to NiCads and avoid the SCCs completely.
Or as I wrote in an article referenced earlier; “Put simply, batteries must not burn, except possibly once or twice during the lifetime of the entire 787 fleet. If batteries do overheat or burn, any fire must be safely contained within the battery enclosure and any harmful fumes must be vented overboard”.
More recently NTSB quantified the risk; “Boeing .....determined that the likelihood of a smoke emission event from a 787 battery would occur less than once in every 10 million flight hours”. In real life “there have been two critical battery events on the 787 fleet with fewer than 100,000 flight hours”.
BTW only 8 SCCs are necessary for certification. #9 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness can be developed progressively after certification.
I agree with KK, switch back to NiCads and avoid the SCCs completely.
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If you've ever been around this kind of failure investigation before, the question of examining all the in service units you "think" are fine to see if they really are does jump out at you. We'll see if a "deviant" condition discovered in the "believed good" APU battery from the ANA aircarft leads to that. I've Googled and find no evidence to suggest they've been down that path. Yet.
Not like taking all these batteries out of the fleet will keep these aircraft from going anywhere...
One issue with this is that some of these conditions--dendrites in particular--can be very hard to find. The act of looking tends to destroy the evidence that they were there in the first place.
Not like taking all these batteries out of the fleet will keep these aircraft from going anywhere...
One issue with this is that some of these conditions--dendrites in particular--can be very hard to find. The act of looking tends to destroy the evidence that they were there in the first place.
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And the production line rolls on.
With no sign of of restoration to flying status in the immediate future, when will Boeing run out of parking places for aircraft coming off the production line, and where will they carry out remedial work when a solution is finally approved ?
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Any replacement battery needs to be capable of braking the airplane to a stop (under extreme weight and speed conditions, if they were honest in the specs).
People who know batteries (that's not me) have been posting and will enlighten us, but I don't think the discharge characteristics of any lesser chemistry will do that (without huge increase in weight/volume).
People who know batteries (that's not me) have been posting and will enlighten us, but I don't think the discharge characteristics of any lesser chemistry will do that (without huge increase in weight/volume).
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If, as is inferred above, there has been a progressive marginalization of engineers from decision making at Boeing, then, BEWARE! It has happened before, with catastrophic results. From a perceptive observer of how the Shuttle O-ring disaster developed:
Feynman's account reveals a disconnect between NASA's engineers and executives that was far more striking than he expected. His interviews of NASA's high-ranking managers revealed startling misunderstandings of elementary concepts. For instance, NASA managers claimed that there was a 1 in 100,000 chance of a catastrophic failure aboard the shuttle, but Feynman discovered that NASA's own engineers estimated the chance of a catastrophe at closer to 1 in 100. He concluded that the space shuttle reliability estimate by NASA management was fantastically unrealistic, and he was particularly angered that NASA used these figures to recruit Christa McAuliffe into the Teacher-in-Space program. He warned in his appendix to the commission's report (which was included only after he threatened not to sign the report), "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."
Notice, that when the Rogers Commission made its findings known, it took the threat of withholding agreement to get his findings published. The bean counters fight like pit bulls to get dissent stifled...Sam
Feynman's account reveals a disconnect between NASA's engineers and executives that was far more striking than he expected. His interviews of NASA's high-ranking managers revealed startling misunderstandings of elementary concepts. For instance, NASA managers claimed that there was a 1 in 100,000 chance of a catastrophic failure aboard the shuttle, but Feynman discovered that NASA's own engineers estimated the chance of a catastrophe at closer to 1 in 100. He concluded that the space shuttle reliability estimate by NASA management was fantastically unrealistic, and he was particularly angered that NASA used these figures to recruit Christa McAuliffe into the Teacher-in-Space program. He warned in his appendix to the commission's report (which was included only after he threatened not to sign the report), "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."
Notice, that when the Rogers Commission made its findings known, it took the threat of withholding agreement to get his findings published. The bean counters fight like pit bulls to get dissent stifled...Sam
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Any replacement battery needs to be capable of braking the airplane to a stop (under extreme weight and speed conditions, if they were honest in the specs).