FAA Grounds 787s
NTSB briefing says and shows Cobalt
Originally Posted by Turin
Well, I am confused.
The info I have is dated January 2012, Boeing official training material. It clearly states Lithium-Manganese. Odd.
The info I have is dated January 2012, Boeing official training material. It clearly states Lithium-Manganese. Odd.
If you skip to time 9:06, there is a graphic on-screen depicting the electrode composition. Both the graphic and the spoken text clearly specify lithium cobalt dioxide. I'd hope they have this point correct.
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NTSB with current status of investigation and lots of infos about the batteries: http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2...87_1-24-13.pdf
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Another interesting article mentions cobalt v alternatives..
Faulty Lithium-Ion Batteries Ground Boeing's Dreamliner: Should EV Drivers Be Concerned? - Translogic
Faulty Lithium-Ion Batteries Ground Boeing's Dreamliner: Should EV Drivers Be Concerned? - Translogic
..it's worth noting that the Dreamliner's lithium-ion batteries use different cathode materials than the batteries found on most electric cars. According to Green Car Reports, the cobalt oxide (CoO2) battery chemistry found on the Dreamliner "has the highest energy content, but it is also the most susceptible to overheating that can produce 'thermal events' (which is to say, fires)." The report goes on to note that the only other electric car to use cobalt oxide battery chemistry is the Tesla Roadster, which is no longer for sale.
Boeing's battery problem can be traced back to 2005, when Dreamliner engineering stages were still ongoing. At the time, only lithium-ion cells made of cobalt oxide (CoO2) were deemed air-worthy. Since then, the FAA has approved additional cathodes, including the safer lithium iron phosphate compound (LiFePO4). LiFePO4 batteries are being used by some EV manufacturers like Chinese automaker BYD, who claim their Fe batteries offer "excellent safety performance" because of the material.
Using cobalt oxide (CoO2) as a cathode material has begun to fall out of favor, as lithium iron phosphate, nickel, manganese and other metals have been found to be safer, although cannot offer the same capacity. In all types of battery design, safety is a top priority. Lithium-ion batteries contain safety devices to prevent overheating, but if contaminants enter during production, the safety systems fail.
Boeing's battery problem can be traced back to 2005, when Dreamliner engineering stages were still ongoing. At the time, only lithium-ion cells made of cobalt oxide (CoO2) were deemed air-worthy. Since then, the FAA has approved additional cathodes, including the safer lithium iron phosphate compound (LiFePO4). LiFePO4 batteries are being used by some EV manufacturers like Chinese automaker BYD, who claim their Fe batteries offer "excellent safety performance" because of the material.
Using cobalt oxide (CoO2) as a cathode material has begun to fall out of favor, as lithium iron phosphate, nickel, manganese and other metals have been found to be safer, although cannot offer the same capacity. In all types of battery design, safety is a top priority. Lithium-ion batteries contain safety devices to prevent overheating, but if contaminants enter during production, the safety systems fail.
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Another change in the fast (haste makes waste) development of the nightmareliner?
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syseng68k
Quote:
Boeing demonstrated no need for the Lithium Battery (sorry, my quote)
And, they would not have. If FAA requires a performance level that cannot be met with current technology, then they have gone into the design business. And Boeing would not design an aircraft that could not be built under current regs. Would they build a bird that was dependent on concurrent rule change? No, the rule predated the design...
If that is the case, the Dreamliner is dead. It is at least cemented in concrete to Lithium....because without back up electric, no current a/c can be airworthy. And if 787 won't certify with anything but Lithium.....
The Lithium choice has got to have been discretionary for Boeing. If mandatory, then a huge problem exists.
"Demonstrate the safety of the system....".....AD
That gives credence to Boeing asking FAA to provide a design for compliance....
"We're Stuck.....what do we do now?"
Maybe the bridge back to NickelMH burned in the EEbay?
Trouble ahead....
Quote:
Boeing demonstrated no need for the Lithium Battery (sorry, my quote)
And, they would not have. If FAA requires a performance level that cannot be met with current technology, then they have gone into the design business. And Boeing would not design an aircraft that could not be built under current regs. Would they build a bird that was dependent on concurrent rule change? No, the rule predated the design...
If that is the case, the Dreamliner is dead. It is at least cemented in concrete to Lithium....because without back up electric, no current a/c can be airworthy. And if 787 won't certify with anything but Lithium.....
The Lithium choice has got to have been discretionary for Boeing. If mandatory, then a huge problem exists.
"Demonstrate the safety of the system....".....AD
That gives credence to Boeing asking FAA to provide a design for compliance....
"We're Stuck.....what do we do now?"
Maybe the bridge back to NickelMH burned in the EEbay?
Trouble ahead....
Last edited by Lyman; 27th Jan 2013 at 22:14.
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NTSB Update on JAL Boeing 787 Battery Fire Investigation
January 27
WASHINGTON - The National Transportation Safety Board today released a fourth update on its investigation into the Jan. 7 fire aboard a Japan Airlines Boeing 787 at Logan International Airport in Boston. The fire occurred after the airplane had landed and no passengers or crew were onboard.
The event airplane, JA829J was delivered to JAL on December 20, 2012. At the time of the battery fire, the aircraft had logged 169 flight hours with 22 cycles. The auxiliary power unit battery was manufactured by GS Yuasa in September 2012.
NTSB investigators have continued disassembling the internal components of the APU battery in its Materials Laboratory in Washington, and disassembly of the last of eight cells has begun. Examinations of the cell elements with a scanning-electron microscope and energy-dispersive spectroscopy are ongoing.
A cursory comparative exam has been conducted on the undamaged main battery. No obvious anomalies were found. More detailed examination will be conducted as the main battery undergoes a thorough tear down and test sequence series of non-destructive examinations.
In addition to the activities at the NTSB lab, members of the investigative team continue working in Seattle and Japan and have completed work in Arizona. Their activities are detailed below.
ARIZONA
The airworthiness group completed testing of the APU start power unit at Securaplane in Tucson and the APU controller at UTC Aerospace Systems in Phoenix. Both units operated normally with no significant findings.
SEATTLE
Two additional NTSB investigators were sent to Seattle to take part in FAA's comprehensive review. One of the investigators will focus on testing efforts associated with Boeing's root cause corrective action efforts, which FAA is helping to lead. The other will take part in the FAA's ongoing review of the battery and battery system special conditions compliance documentation.
JAPAN
The NTSB-led team completed component examination of the JAL APU battery monitoring unit at Kanto Aircraft Instrument Company, Ltd., in Fujisawa, Kanagawa, Japan. The team cleaned and examined both battery monitoring unit circuit boards, which were housed in the APU battery case. The circuit boards were damaged, which limited the information that could be obtained from tests, however the team found no significant discoveries.
Additional information on the NTSB's investigation of the Japan Airlines B-787 battery fire in Boston can be found at Accident Investigations - Boeing 787.
The NTSB will provide another factual update on Tuesday, Jan. 29, or earlier if developments warrant. To be alerted to any updates or developments, follow the NTSB on Tw!tter at www.twitter.com/ntsb.
WASHINGTON - The National Transportation Safety Board today released a fourth update on its investigation into the Jan. 7 fire aboard a Japan Airlines Boeing 787 at Logan International Airport in Boston. The fire occurred after the airplane had landed and no passengers or crew were onboard.
The event airplane, JA829J was delivered to JAL on December 20, 2012. At the time of the battery fire, the aircraft had logged 169 flight hours with 22 cycles. The auxiliary power unit battery was manufactured by GS Yuasa in September 2012.
NTSB investigators have continued disassembling the internal components of the APU battery in its Materials Laboratory in Washington, and disassembly of the last of eight cells has begun. Examinations of the cell elements with a scanning-electron microscope and energy-dispersive spectroscopy are ongoing.
A cursory comparative exam has been conducted on the undamaged main battery. No obvious anomalies were found. More detailed examination will be conducted as the main battery undergoes a thorough tear down and test sequence series of non-destructive examinations.
In addition to the activities at the NTSB lab, members of the investigative team continue working in Seattle and Japan and have completed work in Arizona. Their activities are detailed below.
ARIZONA
The airworthiness group completed testing of the APU start power unit at Securaplane in Tucson and the APU controller at UTC Aerospace Systems in Phoenix. Both units operated normally with no significant findings.
SEATTLE
Two additional NTSB investigators were sent to Seattle to take part in FAA's comprehensive review. One of the investigators will focus on testing efforts associated with Boeing's root cause corrective action efforts, which FAA is helping to lead. The other will take part in the FAA's ongoing review of the battery and battery system special conditions compliance documentation.
JAPAN
The NTSB-led team completed component examination of the JAL APU battery monitoring unit at Kanto Aircraft Instrument Company, Ltd., in Fujisawa, Kanagawa, Japan. The team cleaned and examined both battery monitoring unit circuit boards, which were housed in the APU battery case. The circuit boards were damaged, which limited the information that could be obtained from tests, however the team found no significant discoveries.
Additional information on the NTSB's investigation of the Japan Airlines B-787 battery fire in Boston can be found at Accident Investigations - Boeing 787.
The NTSB will provide another factual update on Tuesday, Jan. 29, or earlier if developments warrant. To be alerted to any updates or developments, follow the NTSB on Tw!tter at www.twitter.com/ntsb.
"SEATTLE
Two additional NTSB investigators were sent to Seattle to take part in FAA's comprehensive review. One of the investigators will focus on testing efforts associated with Boeing's root cause corrective action efforts, which FAA is helping to lead. The other will take part in the FAA's ongoing review of the battery and battery system special conditions compliance documentation."
Good, now we'll get honest scrutiny of the extent to which Boeing self-certificated battery installation under the relatively new "Organization Designation Authorization" procedures. If self-regulation worked, God would have given Moses 10 guidelines!
Two additional NTSB investigators were sent to Seattle to take part in FAA's comprehensive review. One of the investigators will focus on testing efforts associated with Boeing's root cause corrective action efforts, which FAA is helping to lead. The other will take part in the FAA's ongoing review of the battery and battery system special conditions compliance documentation."
Good, now we'll get honest scrutiny of the extent to which Boeing self-certificated battery installation under the relatively new "Organization Designation Authorization" procedures. If self-regulation worked, God would have given Moses 10 guidelines!
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(Reuters) - Japan's government stepped in to give Boeing Co's now-grounded 787 Dreamliner and its made-in-Japan technology a boost in 2008 by easing safety regulations, fast-tracking the rollout of the groundbreaking jet for Japan's biggest airlines, according to records and participants in the process.
The concessions by an advisory panel to Japan's transport ministry reflected pressure from All Nippon Airways (ANA) and Japan Airlines (JAL) and a push to support Japanese firms that supply 35 percent of the 787 from the carbon-fiber in its wings to sophisticated electrical systems and batteries used to save fuel, people involved in the deliberations told Reuters.
The concessions by an advisory panel to Japan's transport ministry reflected pressure from All Nippon Airways (ANA) and Japan Airlines (JAL) and a push to support Japanese firms that supply 35 percent of the 787 from the carbon-fiber in its wings to sophisticated electrical systems and batteries used to save fuel, people involved in the deliberations told Reuters.
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Just to keep it balanced for those who won't read the whole story:
...and...
Bold mine.
"We have not brought down our standards in comparison to other countries. This was a pragmatic revision," Tatsuyuki Shimazu, Chief Air Worthiness Engineer at the Civil Aviation Bureau, said.
QUICKER TURNAROUNDS
Changes endorsed by the aviation group, including 40 revised safety guidelines, were presented as an effort to bring Japan into line with the framework of regulations in other markets, including the United States. At least five recommendations in the advisory report benefited the 787. Four mentioned support for the Dreamliner directly.
Three of the rule changes dealt with abbreviated testing and approval of pilots who had been cleared to fly the Boeing 777 and were preparing to switch to the 787. "It (787) is highly innovative and its safety is also advanced, but it's also very similar in design to the 777," said Kinya Fujiishi, an aviation journalist who sat on the panel. "This is why we thought it would be fine to revise the rule."
Changes endorsed by the aviation group, including 40 revised safety guidelines, were presented as an effort to bring Japan into line with the framework of regulations in other markets, including the United States. At least five recommendations in the advisory report benefited the 787. Four mentioned support for the Dreamliner directly.
Three of the rule changes dealt with abbreviated testing and approval of pilots who had been cleared to fly the Boeing 777 and were preparing to switch to the 787. "It (787) is highly innovative and its safety is also advanced, but it's also very similar in design to the 777," said Kinya Fujiishi, an aviation journalist who sat on the panel. "This is why we thought it would be fine to revise the rule."
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Just throwing a thought out there...
If I am reading this correctly and the main battery IS supposed to be the last chance saloon if all other electrical power fails on-board, could the battery circuit design have been 'compromised' to allow the battery to be able to deliver 100% power in that particular scenario and be able operate outside the 'safe' operating limits ?
Or put another way, could the charging/conditioning/regulating circuits that are required to keep these batteries operating safely within their exacting operating environment, hinder the ability to allow the battery to provide the higher sustained current that is required in such a critical situation?
With a more direct (high current) connection from the batteries to the DCbuses in these emergency/failsafe situations, it now lacks the finesse needed to keep these batteries operating within safe working limits. Or due to the connection, the control circuitry isn't up to protecting the batteries from the higher running voltages that are present on the buses when the aircraft is powered up? I know someone further back has mentioned a blocking diode in one of the 787 threads – can’t remember if something similar is fitted or not
As Lyman mentions above, could the certification tick box requirements by playing some part ?
If I am reading this correctly and the main battery IS supposed to be the last chance saloon if all other electrical power fails on-board, could the battery circuit design have been 'compromised' to allow the battery to be able to deliver 100% power in that particular scenario and be able operate outside the 'safe' operating limits ?
Or put another way, could the charging/conditioning/regulating circuits that are required to keep these batteries operating safely within their exacting operating environment, hinder the ability to allow the battery to provide the higher sustained current that is required in such a critical situation?
With a more direct (high current) connection from the batteries to the DCbuses in these emergency/failsafe situations, it now lacks the finesse needed to keep these batteries operating within safe working limits. Or due to the connection, the control circuitry isn't up to protecting the batteries from the higher running voltages that are present on the buses when the aircraft is powered up? I know someone further back has mentioned a blocking diode in one of the 787 threads – can’t remember if something similar is fitted or not
As Lyman mentions above, could the certification tick box requirements by playing some part ?
Last edited by E_S_P; 28th Jan 2013 at 14:52. Reason: FatFingers
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That is the nub...
It is either a "backup Battery" or it is in use in normal flight. If in use, and recharging takes even a few minutes, it is not legal per the regulations.
It can be designed to be, but that opens up the squishy part of "BackUp".
In scuba, if you routinely dip into your back up air, you will get caught out. Likewise in fueling , if you get to using up reserves, you have no reserves.
It strikes me that utilizing a back up battery for mundane power defeats the concept, hence the "Emergency Select" switch I assume is on board.
As with the United Airlines emergency diversion to New Orleans, a loss of a generator caused a distribution problem, blank areas of the panel, etc. What was the state of charge of the two emergency batteries?
Likewise ANA. Did they Take off while charging?
Was the Battery at full charge? Both of them? Did APUBATT start the APU?
Keeping a regulated level of charge (FULL?) throughout the flight means the system is incorporating a safety system into normal flight.
I think the investigation will go in this direction. Lithium actually does look promising as a back up system, but in day to day, not so much.
Service life, maintenance and charging seem to be a weakness in
It is either a "backup Battery" or it is in use in normal flight. If in use, and recharging takes even a few minutes, it is not legal per the regulations.
It can be designed to be, but that opens up the squishy part of "BackUp".
In scuba, if you routinely dip into your back up air, you will get caught out. Likewise in fueling , if you get to using up reserves, you have no reserves.
It strikes me that utilizing a back up battery for mundane power defeats the concept, hence the "Emergency Select" switch I assume is on board.
As with the United Airlines emergency diversion to New Orleans, a loss of a generator caused a distribution problem, blank areas of the panel, etc. What was the state of charge of the two emergency batteries?
Likewise ANA. Did they Take off while charging?
Was the Battery at full charge? Both of them? Did APUBATT start the APU?
Keeping a regulated level of charge (FULL?) throughout the flight means the system is incorporating a safety system into normal flight.
I think the investigation will go in this direction. Lithium actually does look promising as a back up system, but in day to day, not so much.
Service life, maintenance and charging seem to be a weakness in
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Interesting little infographic here:
Lithium Battery Failures
Essentially says that an excursion in any direction outside voltage and temperature limits on a Li-ion cell will lead to problems of one sort or another, any of which could lead to a cell fire if the electrolyte ignites subsequently due to further abuse.
Lithium Battery Failures
Essentially says that an excursion in any direction outside voltage and temperature limits on a Li-ion cell will lead to problems of one sort or another, any of which could lead to a cell fire if the electrolyte ignites subsequently due to further abuse.
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syseng68k - It's very unlikely the battery/charger doesn't have monitoring of the type you suggest. Earlier they said there was no evidence the battery had been overcharged so presumably some data is available. I'd be looking at the data in other grounded aircraft to see if there is any evidence that battery operation gets close to any limits.
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syseng, how do you set the thresholds to decide that (presumably) the battery needs to be put off-line and replaced ASAP? How are the data collected during normal ops. used to refine the automatic monitoring? How often are the data downloaded and analyzed by a real person?
