FAA Grounds 787s

[peter we]

The final straw for LOT, apparently they are paying around $300k per month each for their 787's

PLL LOT to transfer its assets to Eurolot?

22nd January 2013

According to Rzeczpospolita, the Polish government will soon decide to transfer all assets in national airline PLL LOT to smaller state-owned airline Eurolot. “Restructuring the airline by transferring everything that is left in it to Eurolot is the only way to save the Polish carrier,” an unnamed official told Rzeczpospolita.

LOT currently doesn't have many assets to transfer. It only owns its logo and airport slots (a time window for planes to take off and land). The LOT planes are rented and its headquarters has been sold, and carrier only leases it.

According to the newspaper, the government has obtained unofficial information from the European Commission that it disapproves of public financial aid for the airline.

PLL LOT to transfer its assets to Eurolot? - Warsaw Business Journal - Online Portal - wbj.pl

[sb_sfo]

LOT

it was rather inconsiderate for the rest of the world to rain on LOT's inaugural service to Chicago last Wednesday. As I understand it, they sent the airplane to ORD, and there it sits, grounded.

[gas path]

B787 APU does suffer from shaft bow. (The problem will be modded out sooner rather than later).
It does not require a 25 minute 'cooldown'. IIRC any limitation is for a restart after it has been shutdown
B777 APU is also capable of being started at altitude.

[RR_NDB]

"Conditioning critical batteries"

bsieker:

So, yes, problems with charge/discharge control seems the best bet right now.

I smell software.

It´s possible to implement an electronic discharge control. The adoption of higher voltage (32 V) allows. I don´t know if it is being used. We will learn.

The traditional batteries are quite "fault tolerant" (charger included in this comment).

It´s possible to implement this in the "analog world" but i also don´t think these approach is being used. May be should be considered to save the "wonderful but dangerous batteries" (When abused expel hot spray and even fire) Like a furious dragon

[sb_sfo]

Classic DOT doublespeak

DOT chief pledges total transparency in 787 review | ATWOnline

Responding to media criticisms about how DOT and FAA publicly handled the 787 issues after the Japan Airlines 787 incident, LaHood said, “We did what we did, we did the right thing … on the day we announced the planes were safe, they were.”

And then, they weren't

[lomapaseo]

Responding to media criticisms about how DOT and FAA publicly handled the 787 issues after the Japan Airlines 787 incident, LaHood said, “We did what we did, we did the right thing … on the day we announced the planes were safe, they were.”

Makes sense

safety is a state of mind prediction of the future based on the data at hand.

Just because something has broken doesn't mean that it is now unsafe.

[RR_NDB]

Boeing were so lucky

toffeez:

Your # 259

Agree!



Mac

[RR_NDB]

Nightmare on a dream

WHBM:

There was an old adage that the best airliner would be designed by Lockheed, built by Boeing, and with Sales & Marketing by McDonnell Douglas.

One day I trust that Boeing will fully wake up to this.

[RR_NDB]

Sad

SaturnV:

Still, safeguards for lithium-ion batteries have progressed to the point that a fire on an airplane should never have happened, said Sanjeev Mukerjee, a chemistry professor at Northeastern University and an expert on batteries.

“If a battery of that size catches fire, then a whole bunch of mechanisms didn’t work,” Mr. Mukerjee said. “Whoever is making that battery is doing a really bad job.”

I agree! (Battery system)

[RatherBeFlying]

LiFePO4 batteries seem to have been developed too late to get into the 787 design, but something tells me retrofit may be getting serious consideration

[jcjeant]

Hi,

EADS (Airbus) don't like more security !

EADS, Airbus' parent company, fears that the damage that ground 787 Boeing delays obtaining the certificate of airworthiness of the A350, its trump card to break into the market for long-haul

.
EADS craint que les problèmes du 787 retardent l'A350 d'Airbus | La-Croix.com
Google*Traduction

He feared they reinforce accordingly test procedures and certification of new aircraft, and therefore that of the A350.

[peter we]

Define what you mean by "risk"

I have yet to see what evidence applies in this case to the level of risk (either regulated by statue or to somebody's concept of safety).

Makes sense

safety is a state of mind prediction of the future based on the data at hand.

Just because something has broken doesn't mean that it is now unsafe.

You really believe in the 'I don't know anything about it, so it doesn't exist' approach to safety, don't you?

Fortunately the FAA (who have a clear definition of risk, BTW) is going to have to persuade the Japanese and European's - as well as Congress- with scientific method not bull****.

but something tells me retrofit may be getting serious consideration

Airbus stated it would take them 3-4 months to change the battery in the a350, its not something they would consider doing if they didn't have to.

Identifying what went wrong with the battery will probably take a long time. Even if its a manufacturing fault you will have to determine that the fault could not occur again and you can detect it. It was already supposed to be the most reliable technology available.

[cockney steve]

As RR NDB has stated, It's NOT just the voltage that's critical, but the current as well .
Maybe you thought (previous post) I was talking about "Toy" helicopters?....

Think about a 90 cm rotor-disc (six foot in old money), that can,and has caused fatal injuries, and you'll appreciate that these people are pushing Lithium batteries to their limits.
Motors get so hot,the field-magnets actually demagnetise.!!!! Battery-packs commonly give 5-15 minutes of intensive aerobatic flight, their life is limited to ~100 cycles in this very demanding application.

Battery self-destruct is an accepted risk ,simply because of the high energy-density and massive discharge-rate capability.

These batteries [B]need[B] individual cell-monitoring on both charge and discharge..they are now well-enough understood andthe monitoring technology well enough established, that thousands, if not millions of serious hobbyists are willing to put a month's wages in the air, powered by Lithium technology.

Direct connection to a bus is NOT an option...charge/discharge MUST be through appropriate monitoring -regulators.

Perhaps it's a problem with getting approval for an unorthodox connection-interface?

Total demand is irrelevant, the total capacity of ALL the battery-reserves on the 787 is only a few minutes of full demand.

I'm sure that properly monitored and conservatively rated, these batteries could become acceptably safe....effective controllers will keep them fully charged and prevent an unsafe discharge regime.

I strongly suspect the control interface (charge/discharge) is the primary culprit.
Agree with LYMAN. dendrites destroying a cell are probably caused by defective cell/battery management.

[hetfield]

Dr. Olaf Wollersheim:

»Im Moment bin ich mir nicht sicher, ob die Lithium-Kobalt-Dioxid-Technik für Flugzeuge überhaupt geeignet ist. Ich würde derzeit nicht in ein Flugzeug einsteigen, in dem solche Batterien arbeiten.«

»Den Schaden zu beheben, könnte lange dauern« – elektroniknet

Basicly he is saying, he is not sure if Li-Cobalt batteries are appropiate for airplanes and (up to now) he wouldn't enter an airplane with this kind of batteries.

[cldrvr]

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board is looking at issues raised by more than one whistleblower as it investigates battery failures that have grounded the global fleet of 50 Boeing Co. 787 Dreamliners for a week.

Michael Leon, one of the whistleblowers, said he spoke with an NTSB investigator this week and gave him extensive materials about his claim that he was fired around six years ago for raising safety concerns about Securaplane Technologies Inc., an Arizona company that makes chargers for the highly flammable lithium-ion batteries at the heart of the probe.

In an interview with Reuters on Wednesday and in earlier court papers, Leon said Securaplane was rushing to ship chargers that by his assessment did not conform to specifications and could have malfunctioned.

A federal administrative judge later dismissed Leon's complaints after concluding he was fired for repeated misconduct, according to court documents. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) concluded that the pieces of equipment he complained about were never installed in the aircraft, as they were prototypes.

Leon appealed the federal court's ruling in 2011, but no decision has been reached.

Now the NTSB is taking a closer look at some safety concerns people have previously raised as part of a widening investigation by U.S., Japanese and French authorities into two 787 battery failures this month. One involved a fire on a parked 787 at Boston airport, the other forced a second 787 to make an emergency landing in Japan.

Kelly Nantel, NTSB director of public affairs, confirmed the NTSB was pursuing information provided by "more than one" whistleblower, but declined comment on any specific cases.

"We have been notified about whistleblowers and are pursuing that information where warranted," Nantel told Reuters, adding it was "not uncommon" for individuals to come forward with information during such investigations. The number and identity of other possible whistleblowers being interviewed in the 787 case remained unclear.


Boeing whistleblower: NTSB talking to fired Boeing worker - chicagotribune.com

[lomapaseo]

Fortunately the FAA (who have a clear definition of risk, BTW)

of course they do ... but the data has not been presented in front of us for analysis and a clear understanding of the likely time frame to bring the product back into compliance.

As an investor I damn well need to have a feel for this.

As a passenger I don't give a damn since I know that neither Boring, its Operators nor the regulator will fly it in a high risk condition as defined by regulations governing Continued Airworthness

The only thing on the viewing table so far in this regard are minor issues like a battery failure to perform and a lot of hand wringing after that minor failure condition.

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by bsieker

The way the A320's computers were developed is not the same as what we mean here by diversity. In the stricter sense this means identical functionality, fulfilling the same requirements is implemented by different teams of developers.

Oh, I'm sure it wasn't in the strictest sense, as such concepts were bleeding-edge back in 1982. Certain aspects were certainly used, however.

In large parts already for the A320, and more so for later models, automatic code generation was used from formal specifications.

Correct, and in line with what I was taught.

Still not sure about different teams for command and monitor channel.

Well, that's what Prof. Mellor taught us.

Anyway, back to the thread topic at hand!

[Machaca]

The NTSB held a press briefing today.

Here's a running synopsis compiled by Leeham News & Comment on Deborah Hersman's (Chair of NTSB) remarks:

• Expectation in aviation is never experience a fire on an aircraft. In two weeks time saw two battery events and groundings.
• Significance of these events can’t be overstated.
• Been working since Jan. 7 to understand what happened and why Lithium ion battery experienced thermal runaway, short circuits and a fire.
• Still trying to find out why.
• 10:49 to 12:15 fire fighters fought the JAL blaze.
• Fire confined to an area within 20 inches on the battery.
• The batteries are unique to the Boeing 787.
• The main battery is the final power source should all other power fail.
• Minor faults found, not unusual following damage. Trying to determine the significance.
• Still trying to gather data.
• Boeing, FAA conducting more activities. NTSB is participating as well.
• Evaluating failure modes, manufacturing records for potential issues or trends, supplier audits.
• Tremendous amount of work going on around the world and around the clock.
• Still trying to analyze failure modes.
• [NTSB will post its PPT presentation on its website later today.]
• [Going through slides right now of components of battery construction]
• Independent examination in DC area for NTSB has been conducted.
• Examining electrodes individually and a number of other methods looking for contaminates or defects.
• We’ve done CT scan of the entire battery.
• We’re looking for signs of thermal runaway (uncontrolled runaway), short circuits, manufacturing defects that could be foreign materials or material defects.
• We have found some short circuits.
• There is bulging present, signs of thermal runaway and short circuiting.
• Still have lab testing on damaged battery and will do testing on an exemplar battery.
• We’ll look at airworthiness, design components, to evaluate the safety of the systems that are integral to the battery.
• FAA and Boeing are parties to investigation, Japan JTSB, GS Yuasa, Japan Airlines, France’s BEA, Thales
• Naval Surface Warfare also assisting; have used lithium ion batteries for decades
• JTSB in Japan is leading investigation on ANA 787 incident.
• Japan ATC did see smoke around ANA aircraft.
• We have to understand why there was a fire when there were so many protections built into the system.
• Not yet determining the cause of the event; just sharing characteristics right now.

Q&A:

• Would not answer a question if the plane would be safe to fly based on information known today. Deferred to FAA’s authority on this.
• It’s very hard to tell how long investigation will take. Working hard to understand failure mode and the solution.
• Grounding is unprecedented and we are very concerned. We don’t expect to see fire on an aircraft.
• We are seeing symptoms right now but have to determine whether these are cause or effect. We need to understand why and how and what came first. Haven’t identified this.
• We are working with JTSB to determine if there is a common cause between JAL and ANA. NTSB is a bit ahead because JAL happened a week earlier, but as yet not enough data to know if there is a common thread.
• Does not answer question if Boeing thought grounding was an over-reaction, again deferring to FAA.
• This JAL airplane had been in the air less than 100 hours and would not expect to see a fire.
• We do not have any data to suggest the battery over-charged beyond design limit.
• Still unsure if there are internal defects to the battery. This is why we are tearing down the batteries.
• It is still open question if this is only the battery or if other components are involved.
• We don’t know if it is possible for one cell to overcharge but the battery overall is not overcharged.
• The ANA event has not been called a fire event, it’s a smoke event.
• We are looking at certification standards, whether they were adhered to and whether they were appropriate. What we have seen in these two events do not comport with any design to protect against the battery events. Those systems did not work as intended. We need to understand why.
• We are still evaluating all failure scenarios.
• [NTSB expert]: damaged cell, short circuits could result in thermal runaway.
• [NTSB chairman]: Testing exemplar batteries and how long it will take: this is interesting technology and are looking for other expertise to assist us. It can take a week to do one of the tests. This is not something we expect to be solved overnight. If we have a breakthrough, and find something that will point to a cause, we’ll get that out. But prepared to be methodical.
• Our investigation will certainly look at the certification process and if we find there are vulnerability we will make recommendations. In past focused on aircraft type but could be global if safety of flight issue.
• We’re looking to see if batteries were from the same batch. Looking at flight data recorders from ANA and JAL events.
• We don’t know if short came first or thermal runaway came first. Have not identified sequence of events. Trying to establish why the events occurred and the sequence.

[SaturnV]

New York Times article on NTSB briefing.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/bu...mliner.html?hp

This particular battery was built specifically for the 787 and, according to the safety board on Thursday, used an aluminum strip coated in lithium cobalt oxide in its positive electrode. That is an older technology and is more prone to thermal runaway; it also generates oxygen as it heats, making combustion more likely.

[BARKINGMAD]

Prophetic terminology

Aha! Now I know what they meant in ground skule when discussing "hot battery bus" and "switched hot battery bus".

As mentioned frequently in B737 variants' tech manuals.

I hope the NGs current Ni-Cads don't follow this trend...............

"There has been an alarming increase in the number of things I know nothing about?!" Ashleigh Brilliant quote.