FAA Grounds 787s
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: Choroni, sometimes
Posts: 1,974
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Securaplane, a unit of Britain's Meggitt Plc, first began working on the charger in 2004, but suffered millions of dollars of damages in November 2006 after a lithium-ion battery used in testing exploded and sparked a fire that burned an administrative building to the ground.
787 probe puts spotlight on Arizona battery firm | Reuters
Last edited by hetfield; 21st Jan 2013 at 12:50.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Ireland
Posts: 596
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
HalloweenJack
"The P100 panel sits on the left side of the aft electrical equipment (EE) bay, and is part of a highly-integrated electrical system that receives 235v ac power from the left engine's twin 250 kVA engine generators for distribution throughout the aircraft."
The bay is made up of three sections. The battery is situated to the right of the centre section at 'floor' level.
Hope this helps.
Join Date: Aug 2011
Location: Grassy Valley
Posts: 2,074
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It would be nice if the ZA thread here (PPRuNe) could be accessed, I cannot. There were photographs, and many enlightening posts as to the fire that caused the emergency in Laredo.
There are two myths, or at least two explanations as I recall.
1. The fire started as the result of an itinerant 'tool' left in P100 by a 'workman'.
I call this the "numbskull" theory.....
2. FOD occluded venting, allowing the bay to overheat, and ignite......
This is the "dumb janitor" theory....
There was smoke in the cabin, as I remember.....
There are two myths, or at least two explanations as I recall.
1. The fire started as the result of an itinerant 'tool' left in P100 by a 'workman'.
I call this the "numbskull" theory.....
2. FOD occluded venting, allowing the bay to overheat, and ignite......
This is the "dumb janitor" theory....
There was smoke in the cabin, as I remember.....
Last edited by Lyman; 21st Jan 2013 at 13:55.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This picture is from the article linked to by Jokihokistix and seems to have been taken at the ANA incident.
Does not look like the effects of a properly contained fire to me - and it is also a good thing they put the aircraft on the ground that quickly.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: Choroni, sometimes
Posts: 1,974
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sad, people forget fast....
UPS 1307
http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2007/AAR0707.pdf
UPS 6
http://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublicati...%20Rev%201.pdf
UPS 1307
http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2007/AAR0707.pdf
20. Testing and incident data indicate that lithium batteries can pose a fire hazard.
21. Because many incidents involving lithium batteries are exempt from reporting
requirements, the data regarding such incidents are incomplete, which has prevented
a thorough assessment of the causes of these failures and the risks associated with
transporting lithium batteries.
22. An in-depth analysis of the causes of secondary and primary lithium battery failures
would improve the safe transportation of these batteries.
23. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s August 2007 final rule
regarding the transportation of lithium batteries did not establish sufficient levels of safety for air transportation of small secondary lithium batteries (no more than 8 grams equivalent lithium content).
As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board
makes the following recommendations to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration:
Require aircraft operators to implement measures to reduce the risk of
primary lithium batteries becoming involved in fires on cargo-only aircraft,
such as transporting such batteries in fire resistant containers and/or in
restricted quantities at any single location on the aircraft. (A-07-104)
Until fire suppression systems are required on cargo-only aircraft, as asked
for in Safety Recommendation A-07-99, require that cargo shipments of
secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with
equipment, be transported in crew-accessible locations where portable fire
suppression systems can be used. (A-07-105)
Require aircraft operators that transport hazardous materials to immediately
provide consolidated and specific information about hazardous materials on
board an aircraft, including proper shipping name, hazard class, quantity,
number of packages, and location, to on‑scene emergency responders upon
notification of an accident or incident. (A‑07‑106)
Require commercial cargo and passenger operators to report to the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration all incidents involving
primary and secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or
packed with equipment, that occur either on board or during loading or
unloading operations and retain the failed items for evaluation purposes.
(A‑07-107)
Analyze the causes of all thermal failures and fires involving secondary
and primary lithium batteries and, based on this analysis, take appropriate
action to mitigate any risks determined to be posed by transporting lithium
batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, on board
cargo and passenger aircraft as cargo; checked baggage; or carry-on items.
(A‑07‑108)
Eliminate regulatory exemptions for the packaging, marking, and labeling
of cargo shipments of small secondary lithium batteries (no more than
8 grams equivalent lithium content) until the analysis of the failures
and the implementation of risk‑based requirements asked for in Safety
Recommendation A-07-108 are completed. (A-07-109)
21. Because many incidents involving lithium batteries are exempt from reporting
requirements, the data regarding such incidents are incomplete, which has prevented
a thorough assessment of the causes of these failures and the risks associated with
transporting lithium batteries.
22. An in-depth analysis of the causes of secondary and primary lithium battery failures
would improve the safe transportation of these batteries.
23. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s August 2007 final rule
regarding the transportation of lithium batteries did not establish sufficient levels of safety for air transportation of small secondary lithium batteries (no more than 8 grams equivalent lithium content).
As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board
makes the following recommendations to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration:
Require aircraft operators to implement measures to reduce the risk of
primary lithium batteries becoming involved in fires on cargo-only aircraft,
such as transporting such batteries in fire resistant containers and/or in
restricted quantities at any single location on the aircraft. (A-07-104)
Until fire suppression systems are required on cargo-only aircraft, as asked
for in Safety Recommendation A-07-99, require that cargo shipments of
secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with
equipment, be transported in crew-accessible locations where portable fire
suppression systems can be used. (A-07-105)
Require aircraft operators that transport hazardous materials to immediately
provide consolidated and specific information about hazardous materials on
board an aircraft, including proper shipping name, hazard class, quantity,
number of packages, and location, to on‑scene emergency responders upon
notification of an accident or incident. (A‑07‑106)
Require commercial cargo and passenger operators to report to the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration all incidents involving
primary and secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or
packed with equipment, that occur either on board or during loading or
unloading operations and retain the failed items for evaluation purposes.
(A‑07-107)
Analyze the causes of all thermal failures and fires involving secondary
and primary lithium batteries and, based on this analysis, take appropriate
action to mitigate any risks determined to be posed by transporting lithium
batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, on board
cargo and passenger aircraft as cargo; checked baggage; or carry-on items.
(A‑07‑108)
Eliminate regulatory exemptions for the packaging, marking, and labeling
of cargo shipments of small secondary lithium batteries (no more than
8 grams equivalent lithium content) until the analysis of the failures
and the implementation of risk‑based requirements asked for in Safety
Recommendation A-07-108 are completed. (A-07-109)
http://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublicati...%20Rev%201.pdf
History of Lithium Battery Accidents in the Aviation Industry
Since the UPS Flight 1307 onboard fire occurred in February 7, 2006 [NTSB Report No. AAR‐07‐07]
there have been 34 battery and battery‐powered devices aviation incidents reported to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) involving batteries that involved smoke, fire, extreme heat or
explosion. Approximately 22 of these aviation incidents involved lithium‐ion batteries, with 14 of
these incidents having resulted in an actual fire. The remaining 12 aviation incidents involved lithium‐metal batteries, with eight of these incidents having resulted in an actual fire....The investigation is focusing on several possible ignition sources, primarily the location in the cargo of lithium and lithium derivative batteries that were onboard. ....
Lithium batteries transported in commerce are regulated by both the Department of Transportation
(DOT) Hazardous Material Regulations (HMR) and International Civil Aviation Organization Technical
Instructions (ICAO TI). Both sets of regulations classify most lithium batteries as DOT Class 9
hazardous materials; however the regulations do except certain shipments of lithium batteries from
being shipped as dangerous goods. These exceptions allow some shipments of lithium batteries to
be offered for transport without shipping papers, and not subject them to marking and most
labeling requirements.
Since the UPS Flight 1307 onboard fire occurred in February 7, 2006 [NTSB Report No. AAR‐07‐07]
there have been 34 battery and battery‐powered devices aviation incidents reported to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) involving batteries that involved smoke, fire, extreme heat or
explosion. Approximately 22 of these aviation incidents involved lithium‐ion batteries, with 14 of
these incidents having resulted in an actual fire. The remaining 12 aviation incidents involved lithium‐metal batteries, with eight of these incidents having resulted in an actual fire....The investigation is focusing on several possible ignition sources, primarily the location in the cargo of lithium and lithium derivative batteries that were onboard. ....
Lithium batteries transported in commerce are regulated by both the Department of Transportation
(DOT) Hazardous Material Regulations (HMR) and International Civil Aviation Organization Technical
Instructions (ICAO TI). Both sets of regulations classify most lithium batteries as DOT Class 9
hazardous materials; however the regulations do except certain shipments of lithium batteries from
being shipped as dangerous goods. These exceptions allow some shipments of lithium batteries to
be offered for transport without shipping papers, and not subject them to marking and most
labeling requirements.
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Cork, Ireland
Age: 55
Posts: 54
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Some observations
Some observations
1) Lithium Batteries do sometimes catch fire, but Boeing has had two battery fires with fewer than 50 units shipped. This points to a design flaw somewhere, be it in the battery itself, charging circuit, monitoring software etc. Such a flaw can be found and it can be fixed.
2) Lithium-ion batteries catch fire more often than other kinds. I have no doubt that Boeing's woes will spur innovation to make them safer, but on a timescale that is too long for the current model 787. It may not be possible to make them as safe as other battery technologies. In the medium term, we may need to accept a higher risk that batteries occasionally catch fire, perhaps in the same way that we accept that engines do.
3) Boeing really can't move to another battery technology without unraveling other parts of the design, it is just not feasible. Other technologies have about 1/2 the energy density. I suspect that it would be similarly too late to make a change for the A350 without incurring major delays.
4) Boeing won't lose any orders as a result. New sales may be deferred, but there should be no net loss. There are no other alternatives for a company looking for new aircraft in this class. Moving the to the A350 is not an option for those in the queue for the 787. Not only is the queue nearly as long for the A350, the product is not even shipping yet and is likely to be subject to delays, as the 787 was.
I expect a flaw will be found, but even when fixed, the batteries will be at higher risk of failure than other kinds. The question is whether this higher risk will be admitted and accepted by the FAA and other regulatory bodies.
1) Lithium Batteries do sometimes catch fire, but Boeing has had two battery fires with fewer than 50 units shipped. This points to a design flaw somewhere, be it in the battery itself, charging circuit, monitoring software etc. Such a flaw can be found and it can be fixed.
2) Lithium-ion batteries catch fire more often than other kinds. I have no doubt that Boeing's woes will spur innovation to make them safer, but on a timescale that is too long for the current model 787. It may not be possible to make them as safe as other battery technologies. In the medium term, we may need to accept a higher risk that batteries occasionally catch fire, perhaps in the same way that we accept that engines do.
3) Boeing really can't move to another battery technology without unraveling other parts of the design, it is just not feasible. Other technologies have about 1/2 the energy density. I suspect that it would be similarly too late to make a change for the A350 without incurring major delays.
4) Boeing won't lose any orders as a result. New sales may be deferred, but there should be no net loss. There are no other alternatives for a company looking for new aircraft in this class. Moving the to the A350 is not an option for those in the queue for the 787. Not only is the queue nearly as long for the A350, the product is not even shipping yet and is likely to be subject to delays, as the 787 was.
I expect a flaw will be found, but even when fixed, the batteries will be at higher risk of failure than other kinds. The question is whether this higher risk will be admitted and accepted by the FAA and other regulatory bodies.
Last edited by glenbrook; 21st Jan 2013 at 14:23.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Seoul
Posts: 105
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SLF question,
On long flights I often plug in my laptop as the battery is not good for more than say 5 hours tops. If the charging of Li-ion batteries is a significant risk factor, why am I allowed to plug in my laptop in flight? Surely a discharging battery is safer than one that is floating? Has the attidude to Li-ion batteries in flight thus been a bit too commercial driven (reduce weight / make us SLF happy) than safety driven?
On long flights I often plug in my laptop as the battery is not good for more than say 5 hours tops. If the charging of Li-ion batteries is a significant risk factor, why am I allowed to plug in my laptop in flight? Surely a discharging battery is safer than one that is floating? Has the attidude to Li-ion batteries in flight thus been a bit too commercial driven (reduce weight / make us SLF happy) than safety driven?
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Ireland
Posts: 596
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Teach Me
The charging/maintenance set-up for a laptop battery is tried and tested technology.
Even when Sony recalled the batteries for the old Apple Powerbook, there had only been two of them known to catch fire in use, out of something like 22 million of them installed.
(and thanks to BOAC for that link)
Even when Sony recalled the batteries for the old Apple Powerbook, there had only been two of them known to catch fire in use, out of something like 22 million of them installed.
(and thanks to BOAC for that link)
Join Date: Aug 2011
Location: Grassy Valley
Posts: 2,074
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Howdy glenbrook....
you write....
In the medium term, we may need to accept a higher risk that batteries occasionally catch fire, perhaps in the same way that we accept that engines do.
That ship has sailed, in the form of what was essentially a "waiver" of the concern you discuss, in the form of consideration for allowing the LiIon technology aboard in the first place....
The list of special considerations has been posted elsewhere, and shows that most of the defining limits of the waiver were exceeded (violated) in the first incident JAL.
In allowing the technology, FAA has also restricted its use, there is no possibility this new technology will ever be allowed to attain the waiver given, say, A modern TURBOFAN, which in including its use on modern aircraft, assumes that an "UNCONTAINED EVENT" need not be demonstrated to be mitigable...
There are other technologies, that make the continuing use of LITHIUM ION not exclusive....
The waiver by FAA in itself cannot be discarded, to do so is to admit that LiION is exclusive, the only way to provide standby power, and that is not the case.
Your comment is thought provoking, in that if Boeing can demonstrate that LiION is critical for the Dreamliner, a special waiver can be granted, the basis for such a determination would end up being perhaps an economic one, even a survival one for the airframer.
That is what the FAA did, whether the waiver is type specific or becomes the new standard is not known. Boeing have painted everyone into a corner.
Will it come down to "NOTICE of proposed rulemaking"? That will be an interesting PUBLIC HEARING......
imo
you write....
In the medium term, we may need to accept a higher risk that batteries occasionally catch fire, perhaps in the same way that we accept that engines do.
That ship has sailed, in the form of what was essentially a "waiver" of the concern you discuss, in the form of consideration for allowing the LiIon technology aboard in the first place....
The list of special considerations has been posted elsewhere, and shows that most of the defining limits of the waiver were exceeded (violated) in the first incident JAL.
In allowing the technology, FAA has also restricted its use, there is no possibility this new technology will ever be allowed to attain the waiver given, say, A modern TURBOFAN, which in including its use on modern aircraft, assumes that an "UNCONTAINED EVENT" need not be demonstrated to be mitigable...
There are other technologies, that make the continuing use of LITHIUM ION not exclusive....
The waiver by FAA in itself cannot be discarded, to do so is to admit that LiION is exclusive, the only way to provide standby power, and that is not the case.
Your comment is thought provoking, in that if Boeing can demonstrate that LiION is critical for the Dreamliner, a special waiver can be granted, the basis for such a determination would end up being perhaps an economic one, even a survival one for the airframer.
That is what the FAA did, whether the waiver is type specific or becomes the new standard is not known. Boeing have painted everyone into a corner.
Will it come down to "NOTICE of proposed rulemaking"? That will be an interesting PUBLIC HEARING......
imo
Last edited by Lyman; 21st Jan 2013 at 14:52.
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: Cumbria
Posts: 170
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
So.... you are suggesting that they'll change the rules?
That's a bit unlikely isn;t it?
oh ... wait... who got the rules changed so that twins could operate where previously only quads could go...
silly me!
That's a bit unlikely isn;t it?
oh ... wait... who got the rules changed so that twins could operate where previously only quads could go...
silly me!
Join Date: May 2010
Location: europe
Age: 67
Posts: 645
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm sure that when these batteries were first mentioned, or even considered for the aircraft at the drawing board stage, eyebrows will have risen. It would be interesting to read the paper chain that then followed, those for and against, and either from the FAA, designers, battery makers etc etc.
I'll bet the farm that someone is already saying "I warned you," and I bet they have the email to prove it. I feel sorry for the recipient/s.
I'll bet the farm that someone is already saying "I warned you," and I bet they have the email to prove it. I feel sorry for the recipient/s.
Join Date: Oct 2012
Location: toofaraway
Posts: 224
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Boeing were so lucky
I don't believe Boeing will go for a technically weak fix, one which will only pass the FAA after a few more free lunches.
They often appear dumb and clumsy, but behind the scenes they know they were very lucky to have these events now.
It's one thing to have an accident no-one could foresee, but losing a plane after these clear warnings would be unforgivable.
They will find a robust fix even if it costs a hundred or so kgs. And thank their lucky fairies they're not now searching the Pacific.
deefer, add ALPA to your list. They made a lot of (published) comments when the FAA's Special Conditions were being formulated.
They often appear dumb and clumsy, but behind the scenes they know they were very lucky to have these events now.
It's one thing to have an accident no-one could foresee, but losing a plane after these clear warnings would be unforgivable.
They will find a robust fix even if it costs a hundred or so kgs. And thank their lucky fairies they're not now searching the Pacific.
deefer, add ALPA to your list. They made a lot of (published) comments when the FAA's Special Conditions were being formulated.
Last edited by toffeez; 21st Jan 2013 at 15:48.
Join Date: Jan 2013
Location: EDDF
Posts: 11
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@TU.114: The marks at the fuselage seems to come out of a valve/vent, good to see in this picture, direct under the first "7" of JA804A: http://img.planespotters.net/photo/2...Net_247964.jpg
At the 1st look I also thought about a burnt through fuselage.
At the 1st look I also thought about a burnt through fuselage.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Ireland
Posts: 596
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'll bet the farm that someone is already saying "I warned you," and I bet they have the email to prove it. I feel sorry for the recipient/s.
She is convinced that one day there will be a proper audit of what happened and she has copies of 15,000+ e-mails on a hard drive somewhere just in case.
Some of these e-mails actually say "You do know that what you are proposing is actually illegal, don't you?"
SoS
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: My Stringy Brane
Posts: 377
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The photo of the forward EE bay venturi vent port taped up with plastic is confusing. The battery is not adjacent to the port, and no damage to the hull occurred. Here's a shot that shows the port worked as designed:
Adding some images to help understand locations:
The forward EE rack is centered in the barrel just aft of the nose gear support structure, and upon completion is walled off from the cargo hold.
Adding some images to help understand locations:
The forward EE rack is centered in the barrel just aft of the nose gear support structure, and upon completion is walled off from the cargo hold.
Last edited by Machaca; 21st Jan 2013 at 20:31.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: My Stringy Brane
Posts: 377
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Pedantic comparisons between inexpensive mass produced batteries (over 2 billion mobile devices, laptops and tablets sold in 2012) and the 787 batteries is as foolish as equating the map application on your smartphone to the Honeywell navigation package on the 787.