Helicopter Crash Central London

[uniformtango]

The crane...

...had been notamed since last October.

[mary meagher]

Certain things are becoming clear about this accident. The pilot was highly skilled and experienced and regarded by other helicopter pilots as one of the best in the UK. The helicopter was twin engined and state of the art. As a twin engine copter can maintain altitude if one engine goes U/S, they are permitted to fly over London without following the river as is required for single engine helicopters. Because Heathrow controls most of the airspace over central London, any aircraft that needed to climb into such airspace to achieve a safety altitude would need permission to do so.

Freezing fog can be treacherous, with two weather systems colliding the cold air will push under the warm air, which can cause the fog which might have been lurking at one level to surprise anyone who had relied on a weather observation of only a short time before.

But to turn off the warning lights at daybreak on a spindly crane would render it just about as easy to see as power cables strung across a valley; that is, invisible until too late. It must be possible to require these structures to be made more conspicuous at any time of day. Large orange plastic balls are strung on wires to make them easier to see. Strobe lighting is used on aircraft to call attention to their approach. Anything that sticks up that high over London and is inadequately lighted in our gloomy winter weather, is asking for trouble.

[golfyankeesierra]

Notams..

..had been notamed since last October.

Come on, when you've finished the last one, you've forgotten about the first one. Especially enroute notams, they are written so just that nobody will ever remember them. Let's be practical...

[Tankertrashnav]

I can add nothing of any value to the discussion about the crash, but the comment about the subsequent difficulty in selling or letting property in this building caught my eye.

I rather doubt the the owners of the Empire State Building ever had any difficulty in shifting apartments/offices, in spite of the fact that a B25 embedded itself in the 79th Floor in 1945!

[zz9]

It seems to me that the 'media' seems to making this some sort of benchmark, as if METPOL helo's are some form of air gods and if they don't fly no one else should.
My general but limited knowledge of police helo work is generally in response to operational needs i.e. chasing the bad guys, and if vis is low and operating in a more 'random' fashion across built up areas as opposed to flying heli routes would make their decision making process very different from normal commercial ops wouldn't it?

The MET are AFAIK the only Police helicopter unit that patrols, that is they take off and loiter waiting to be called, or listen to the ground radio traffic and offer to assist in situations where they think they could help.

I flew with them one evening, back when they still had the 222s, and we took off and spent the first twenty minutes bimbling around waiting for something to happen.

But I would imagine that their criteria is different to most traffic. Seeing the ground is what they do, so they may well have grounded themselves far sooner than called for for purely safety reasons.

[Pace]

Mary

I agree with what your saying to have Cranes sticking so high and unlighted is ridiculous.
The main body of the Crane would have been visible the even thinner arm would not.

The argument that you cannot see lighting in the day is ridiculous. Land at any airport early morning with RVR minima and cloud bases without high intensity approach and runway lights and then claim lighting is a waste of time in the day! that is what some here are claiming.

Strobe type lighting is very visible even in mist.

Yet the politicians will no doubt blame the pilot and put ever more restrictions on where aircraft can go. While I will heap a large portion of blame on the Crane and its lack of visibility to a Visual pilot trying to remain visual in minimal conditions.

[RatherBeFlying]

I listened to As It Happens on the CBC as they interviewed a landscape contractor working on site.

He said that pieces were coming out of the clouds.

[Fitter2]

He said that pieces were coming out of the clouds.

While another eye-witnes described seeing the 109 hit the jib, and then the operator's cab.

Eye witnesses are known to 'see' what they thought they saw.

[fdr]

Operation over/around a city has inherent risk. As a society we accept this risk for the convenience and utility that the capability provides; HEMS/NGS/SAR/CHTR/FIRE/POLAIR etc. The competency of the crews and the design and equipment of the aircraft are evident in the low level of adverse events that occur, even in the eyebrow raising US HEMS incident rate at present. Overall, society benefits from the utility offered. Occasionally, even with evidently well experienced, well trained and well equipped aircraft, operating in these conditions ends badly, as in this case. Adverse weather operation in the low level environment with obstructions (lit or otherwise...) is demanding; workload and weather variation can transpire to make minor deviations critical.

This case highlights the fact that the task of the helicopter pilot at low level is one that is uncompromising. If viewed as a ARMS SIRA event, the potential risk in this case is much higher than has eventuated, and as an industry the operation around metro areas should have additional crew training for reinforcement of risk reduction strategies for the operation. Not suggesting additional regulation, awareness and decision making reinforcement in the management of the operation. Regulation or prohibitions adversely affect the utility that is afforded.

This accident will result in an interesting report, it is obviously a high profile and confronting event. A comparison of accident rates and severities of police/ambulance/fire vehicles in the metro area over a representative period would make for an interesting comparison before the city takes any action to restrict rotary operations. Logically, a limitation of such operations would make the case for closing the city airport, and heathrow for exactly the same rationales. Politics will demand a review being called for by the elected officials, hope they look seriously at the issues.

[Flenit]

Would it be possible to use a transponder on obstacles like the crane ? Would appear like a traffic on the screen.

[fireflybob]

Am interested in the exact time of the accident. Sunrise at London City was 0755 and the classic time for after dawn thickening is 30 mins after sunrise. I suggest this as a factor wrt weather. Also flying east into low rising run and ramifications for inflight visibility and seeing obstructions.

[DaveReidUK]

flying east into low rising run and ramifications for inflight visibility and seeing obstructions

I don't think we know for sure that when he hit the crane he was on an easterly heading:

[Capt H Peacock]

I'm not a helicopter pilot and not familiar with the 109.

Would anyone care to enlighten us as to the effect of icing on the 109's engines and rotors of the rapid ice accretion likely to be encountered in FZFG.

A thorough check of the fan blades and warm air de-icing is normal for those of us fixed wing aviators after FZFG encounters.

Might he have had problems maintaining altitude, were he to have been so affected?

[fireflybob]

I don't think we know for sure that when he hit the crane he was on an easterly heading:

DaveReidUK, agreed.

[mixture]

NAROBS,

Would making use of this type of facility compulsory in the Flight Planning process have avoided yesterday's tragedy:-

JeppView Electronic Charting - Jeppesen Aviation Supplies

(a) No doubt a commercial operation such as the one operating the heli yesterday already uses some form of planning software. Its unlikely the commander writes up PLOGS by hand using a whizzwheel.

(b) The more gadgets, the more scope for bugs, software crashes and GIGO (Garbage In .... Garbage Out).

(c) The decision of the PIC on a flight is final and can overrule whatever the electronics are telling him/her if he/she feels something is up. Has always been, and will always be.

(d) Look up a video on ewe-toob called "Children of the magenta line"

Also, is TCAS available to helicopters ? And, if so, why isn't it made a compulsory fitting, especially on carriers operating over centres of population.

TCAS..... Traffic Collison Avoidance System ..... hmmm... let me see.... that would have avoided yesterday's incident how exactly ?

The point about yesterday's incident is you're supposed to be visual over London in the heliroutes for good reason .... speculation suggests that the weather closed in around this poor chap and he struggled and subsequently failed to extricate himself safely. However I think its best we wait for the results of the investigation before jumping to conclusions as to whether or not he should have made the decision to depart in the first place..... there may well have been other contributing factors we don't yet know about.

[Pace]

Cap Peacock

Icing in the majority of cases is only a problem if your flying in cloud/Fog not on top of it or hitting the occasional lump of it!
IE if he was flying IFR in IMC then yes cloud could create an icing problem.
As the pilot was flying VFR and visual it is more likely he was scud running.

I can remember 15 years ago moving a very basic C150 to another airport for a friend.
No nav kit only a radio.
I set off in light rain and 1000 foot cloudbase and elected to follow a river which I knew would stop me running into high ground. The River past within a couple of hundred meters of the destination airfield some 80 miles away.
Before I knew it I was down at 600 feet staying visual over the river. The rain had intensified and visibility was down to 2k.
Things got worse and I was now down at 400 feet with 1000 meter viz.
I waited to break out into better conditions but now at 400 feet was chopping in and out of scud cloud and cloud was appearing below as well.
That was it I pulled up into the clouds still over the river climbed to 2500 feet in solid IMC with the intention of calling a military unit who could offer me a PAR to land. As it was 10 miles further on I exited the front into clear blue skies.
It sounds more than likely that this pilot was slightly off from where he thought he was hit some cloud and was met by a building. Turning away he probably did not see the Crane arm.
But this is only a guess as we do not know what other problems he may or may not have had.
I still feel that such structures near aircraft routes should be well marked with high intensity lighting as unlike a building they are hard or near impossible to see in such conditions.

[Glamdring]

With it being mentioned earlier that he HAD been receiving a service from NATS but had not yet contacted the Heliport, could this be a case of a frequency change distracting the pilot at just the wrong time?

[Lemain]

I still feel that such structures near aircraft routes should be well marked with high intensity lighting as unlike a building they are hard or near impossible to see in such conditions.

I disagree. In the old days when accurate nav was impossible - particularly for the solo pilot - there was a good case for lighting but these days we, aviators and the industry, should stay clear of high objects. Yes, huge chimneys, radio masts, etc. in the middle of practically nowhere need special care and they get it. High intensity lighting is expensive, wasteful of energy, unsightly and pollutes the night sky.

I'm still baffled why the pilot chose to fly into an urban area with that clag when there are so many alternates with minimal terrain clearance issues all with brilliant rail/road and air links to wherever, and excellent ground/engineering services. If you're anywhere near Battersea you are literally spoilt for choice and there are are excellent visual routes out (trunk roads) that can be followed in an emergency. Based only on the high praise the deceased pilot has been receiving from the industry it makes me think that he had some emergency other than weather to contend with. Ill health, airframe or engine problems, instrumentation,...might even have been fuel, of course. Despite the prima facie evidence that there was considerable fuel on board, it doesn't follow that it was reaching the engines or maybe the pilot's instrumentation indicated a fuel problem. More probable than an experienced pilot flying into a crane

[riverrock83]

Presuming that he was meaning a TAWS or GPWS rather than TCAS, they rely on a database of heights of obstacles / terrain. Since this building isn't on any maps yet they wouldn't be any use in this scenario. They aren't going to react to NOTAMs.

Although they are available for helicopters, I'd be very surprised if one was fitted. Flying through London I suspect there would be many false positives - to such an extent a pilot may well turn it off anyway.

[RTM Boy]

We may not know his heading before striking the crane, but he headed due south after he hit it...