Another 787 electrical/smoke incident (on ground)
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Battery position
Tu.114,
Unfortunately, moving the battery to an unpressurized position is not possible - I had the same thoughts until I read the spec. for the cells: min. operating temp. is minus 18 degrees C.
See this link:
http://www.s399157097.onlinehome.us/...s/LVP10-65.pdf
I fully agree with you that the avionics compartment is not the most "pleasant" battery location in case of fire, explosions or other problems.
Unfortunately, moving the battery to an unpressurized position is not possible - I had the same thoughts until I read the spec. for the cells: min. operating temp. is minus 18 degrees C.
See this link:
http://www.s399157097.onlinehome.us/...s/LVP10-65.pdf
I fully agree with you that the avionics compartment is not the most "pleasant" battery location in case of fire, explosions or other problems.
Last edited by grebllaw123d; 14th Jan 2013 at 20:05.
Typically they are starting to feel well (meaning low internal resistance, high C rate capability) at room temperature.
They deliver best performance at around 50 - 60°C. Unfortunately that is close to the point where self -destruction starts (Usually between 75 and 95°C). They are not well suited to cold operation at all. That is a big disadvantage in power tools as well.
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The Classic 747 battery is under the FE's table. On the DC-8 its in the right wheelwell. 
I like Boeing, Douglas and taildraggers in general, but thinking of the diverse and innovative 787 being a real electric jet, with circuit boards assembled in Mexico and lithium batteries...what could go wrong?
The Douglasaurus Direct Cable-8 is looking darn good right now.
I like Boeing, Douglas and taildraggers in general, but thinking of the diverse and innovative 787 being a real electric jet, with circuit boards assembled in Mexico and lithium batteries...what could go wrong?
The Douglasaurus Direct Cable-8 is looking darn good right now.
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radken
Twins and their certifications ....
It is fortuitous when aircraft we build sometimes warn us, through the medium of non-fatal demonstration, of our various engineering, production, or operational oversights. The penalty for ignoring or white-washing these shortcomings is often a quite fatal “Can you see the problem now?” event later on. I often think on the “almost fatal” DC 10 aft cargo door incident” near Windsor back in ’72. The machine essentially told us we’d better step up, pay the price, and make an immediate fix, or pay an even greater price later, which, of course, was the way it turned out in France for Turkish Airlines. Oh, yeah, the industry had plenty of money to get the job done right the second time around. Exposed, however, was the soft underbelly of the cozy FAA/industry sleeping arrangements vis a vis grounding AD’s and non-grounding service bulletins demanded by the bean counters.
No different today as the high stakes players continue with a much more advanced game of “‘kidding yourself” called ETOPS. Nobody back in ’72 flew twins much over lonely waters, but a new industry driving paradigm came to pass in the 80‘s, that “By God, we’re going to fly over those damn oceans with no more than two motors and two pilots come hell or high water!” Thus we took our first steps off the rock on to the sandy shore and murky world of our engineered to the max big and small twins.
I won’t belabor the issue of what one or two more engines brings to the safety of flight equation insofar as the flying public masses are concerned. Ignorance of these issues on their part is certainly pure bliss as they sit suspended in space three hours southwest of Honolulu in their two motored, complex retractables.
Was that flaming LI battery pack in the 787 last week related to the on-ground APU start? Are they starter batteries? Was that a portent of something very dangerous that could happen in flight, a fortuitous message? What if they’d had to start it 3 hr’s SW of Honolulu say at FL 300? I don’t know if batt’s are even used for 78‘s APU start when either of the engines are operating. But what if they were already operating SE out there at their drift down altitude, and had to start APU. Would this battery fire have occurred? Could the plastic hull integrity have been easily compromised, pressure lost, and further descent made mandatory, with fuel consumption increasing to an even more ridiculous level? Would a good landfall have then been within reach? QF 32 (380) with two more motors comes to mind. The latter probably would not have made it. And what about an empennage fire starting in flight from that battery rack. Took the fire dept. 20 min. to kill it? What kind of fire suppression is on board to help out in this instance? Real questions needing real answers from certification folks.
It is fortuitous when aircraft we build sometimes warn us, through the medium of non-fatal demonstration, of our various engineering, production, or operational oversights. The penalty for ignoring or white-washing these shortcomings is often a quite fatal “Can you see the problem now?” event later on. I often think on the “almost fatal” DC 10 aft cargo door incident” near Windsor back in ’72. The machine essentially told us we’d better step up, pay the price, and make an immediate fix, or pay an even greater price later, which, of course, was the way it turned out in France for Turkish Airlines. Oh, yeah, the industry had plenty of money to get the job done right the second time around. Exposed, however, was the soft underbelly of the cozy FAA/industry sleeping arrangements vis a vis grounding AD’s and non-grounding service bulletins demanded by the bean counters.
No different today as the high stakes players continue with a much more advanced game of “‘kidding yourself” called ETOPS. Nobody back in ’72 flew twins much over lonely waters, but a new industry driving paradigm came to pass in the 80‘s, that “By God, we’re going to fly over those damn oceans with no more than two motors and two pilots come hell or high water!” Thus we took our first steps off the rock on to the sandy shore and murky world of our engineered to the max big and small twins.
I won’t belabor the issue of what one or two more engines brings to the safety of flight equation insofar as the flying public masses are concerned. Ignorance of these issues on their part is certainly pure bliss as they sit suspended in space three hours southwest of Honolulu in their two motored, complex retractables.
Was that flaming LI battery pack in the 787 last week related to the on-ground APU start? Are they starter batteries? Was that a portent of something very dangerous that could happen in flight, a fortuitous message? What if they’d had to start it 3 hr’s SW of Honolulu say at FL 300? I don’t know if batt’s are even used for 78‘s APU start when either of the engines are operating. But what if they were already operating SE out there at their drift down altitude, and had to start APU. Would this battery fire have occurred? Could the plastic hull integrity have been easily compromised, pressure lost, and further descent made mandatory, with fuel consumption increasing to an even more ridiculous level? Would a good landfall have then been within reach? QF 32 (380) with two more motors comes to mind. The latter probably would not have made it. And what about an empennage fire starting in flight from that battery rack. Took the fire dept. 20 min. to kill it? What kind of fire suppression is on board to help out in this instance? Real questions needing real answers from certification folks.
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In 1997, shortly after EIS of the RR powered A330, Cathay Pacific and Dragonair took the decision to park their RR T700 powered fleets after the 4th in flight engine failure in a matter of a few weeks. At the time the OEMs were presenting Weibull analysis 
justifying continued operation, but ultimately the airline showed its own commitment to safety. The row of parked aircraft focused a few minds in Derby and Toulouse.
justifying continued operation, but ultimately the airline showed its own commitment to safety. The row of parked aircraft focused a few minds in Derby and Toulouse.
Last edited by Busbert; 14th Jan 2013 at 22:16.
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radken, go back and read what I wrote in post #99 on this thread. Fate has so far been very kind by giving the aviation world the chance to acknowledge these apparent flaws without loss of life or even serious airframe damage. And I do feel that it would be serious folly to ignore these warnings becase of the great economic stakes involved.
I am not sure whether the analogy is apt or not, but recall the warnings given by the Morton Thiokol engineer about the solid rocket booster O-rings on the Space Shuttle. They were ignored until calamity occurred.
I am not sure whether the analogy is apt or not, but recall the warnings given by the Morton Thiokol engineer about the solid rocket booster O-rings on the Space Shuttle. They were ignored until calamity occurred.
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What caused the failure?
Hi,
There are two possibilities (discarding other less probable factors):
I hope the pack is protected by independent cell sensors (temperature and voltage) such as used in serious Lithium battery pack designs.
But there is a threat: May they learn what caused the incident?
It seems very difficult to identify the trigger. In this scenario certainly we have a problem. And a threat that will require a change.
What kind of change? IMO the proper action should be a redundant change:
As a designer (*) with a passion for Reliability i consider this a serious issue and it seems FAA (review) started very well. We hope the bureaucrats to have no way to suppress the Technical people voice.
This is common and the example mentioned by RobertS975 on the Challenger disaster is typical.
* (Started to design with vacuum tubes after working maintaining aircraft radios like Collins ART-13, ARC-2, BC348, ARR15 and ground station equipt. (HF, VHF and Teletype gear) like 4WTFA, ERCO CFR etc.)
There are two possibilities (discarding other less probable factors):
- A cell failure triggering failures to other cells.
- A failure of electronic circuitry. Charger(s), current limiters or sensor(s)
I hope the pack is protected by independent cell sensors (temperature and voltage) such as used in serious Lithium battery pack designs.
But there is a threat: May they learn what caused the incident?
It seems very difficult to identify the trigger. In this scenario certainly we have a problem. And a threat that will require a change.
What kind of change? IMO the proper action should be a redundant change:
- Repositioning of the pack(s)
- Better sensors in the pack(s)
- Higher reliability electronic circuitry
- Data monitoring (a data recorder)
As a designer (*) with a passion for Reliability i consider this a serious issue and it seems FAA (review) started very well. We hope the bureaucrats to have no way to suppress the Technical people voice.
This is common and the example mentioned by RobertS975 on the Challenger disaster is typical.
* (Started to design with vacuum tubes after working maintaining aircraft radios like Collins ART-13, ARC-2, BC348, ARR15 and ground station equipt. (HF, VHF and Teletype gear) like 4WTFA, ERCO CFR etc.)
Last edited by RR_NDB; 15th Jan 2013 at 01:36. Reason: Add: (discarding other less probable factors)
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Your questions
Chris Scott
A good environmental control of the cells (temperature and voltage monitoring) would guarantee the pack operates properly. Minimizing risks of "runways".
Certainly the recharger receives power from the APU or from the System. Probably the same recharger.
The size very probably will not be enough for a NiCd of similar capacity.
The recharging system certainly is completely different.
Probably the pack was still being recharged or completed it.
I started to comment on this serious issue in previous post.
A good environmental control of the cells (temperature and voltage monitoring) would guarantee the pack operates properly. Minimizing risks of "runways".
Certainly the recharger receives power from the APU or from the System. Probably the same recharger.
The size very probably will not be enough for a NiCd of similar capacity.
The recharging system certainly is completely different.
Would be interesting to know whether this battery fire/explosion occurred under load, or under recharge.
I started to comment on this serious issue in previous post.
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The battery underwent an X-ray CT scan at an independent test facility this weekend “to document the internal condition of the battery prior to disassembling it,” the agency said in an update on its inquiry into the fire.
Investigators also removed burned wire bundles, the battery charger and several electronic-control memory modules.
The two combined flight-data and cockpit voice recorders from the jet were taken to NTSB headquarters as well. The flight data is being analyzed by the investigative team.
Last edited by FlightPathOBN; 15th Jan 2013 at 03:33.
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FlightPathOBN:
Some FDR channels will need to be used to monitor cells (temp and voltage), charger electronics, load limiters, etc.
Batteries are becoming too complex to be used without integrated recorders.
Very difficult task to learn root cause. Perhaps impossible.
The best scenario would be trace it to a defective charger (hard failure like a defective component).
Highly improbable to learn something from the remains of the battery.
Some FDR channels will need to be used to monitor cells (temp and voltage), charger electronics, load limiters, etc.
Batteries are becoming too complex to be used without integrated recorders.
Very difficult task to learn root cause. Perhaps impossible.
The best scenario would be trace it to a defective charger (hard failure like a defective component).
Highly improbable to learn something from the remains of the battery.
Would be interesting to know whether this battery fire/explosion occurred under load, or under recharge.
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Two years old but seems they know one reason why Li cells may catch fire...
BBC News - Cause of battery fire identified in Cambridge study
BBC News - Cause of battery fire identified in Cambridge study
Cause of battery fire identified in Cambridge study
Scientists have identified a reason why lithium batteries in laptops and mobile phones may overheat and catch fire.
Cambridge University researchers said the growth of metal fibres, called dendrites, could cause short circuits.
snip
"Fire safety must be solved before we can get to the next generation of lithium-ion batteries and before we can safely use these batteries in a wider range of transport applications."
Scientists have identified a reason why lithium batteries in laptops and mobile phones may overheat and catch fire.
Cambridge University researchers said the growth of metal fibres, called dendrites, could cause short circuits.
snip
"Fire safety must be solved before we can get to the next generation of lithium-ion batteries and before we can safely use these batteries in a wider range of transport applications."
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NTSB Update On 787 Probe
NTSB Update On 787 Probe
"Fire and rescue workers who responded to a Boeing 787 lithium-ion battery fire at Logan Airport last week reported that it was difficult to access the battery for removal during extinguishing efforts, the NTSB said Monday, in an update on its investigation. All the workers who responded to the incident had previously received aircraft familiarization training on the 787. The board said investigators have examined the battery using radiographic and tomography scans to document its internal condition, and will disassemble it this week. The NTSB also has downloaded all the data from the airplane's flight data and cockpit voice recorders for analysis.
In addition, investigators took possession of burned wire bundles, the APU battery charger, and several memory modules. The maintenance and APU controller memory modules will be downloaded to obtain any available data. Investigators also documented the entire aft electronics bay, including the APU battery and the nearby affected structure where components and wire bundles were located. The Japan Airlines 787 had been in service for less than a month when the fire occurred. All passengers had disembarked before the fire was detected."
"Fire and rescue workers who responded to a Boeing 787 lithium-ion battery fire at Logan Airport last week reported that it was difficult to access the battery for removal during extinguishing efforts, the NTSB said Monday, in an update on its investigation. All the workers who responded to the incident had previously received aircraft familiarization training on the 787. The board said investigators have examined the battery using radiographic and tomography scans to document its internal condition, and will disassemble it this week. The NTSB also has downloaded all the data from the airplane's flight data and cockpit voice recorders for analysis.
In addition, investigators took possession of burned wire bundles, the APU battery charger, and several memory modules. The maintenance and APU controller memory modules will be downloaded to obtain any available data. Investigators also documented the entire aft electronics bay, including the APU battery and the nearby affected structure where components and wire bundles were located. The Japan Airlines 787 had been in service for less than a month when the fire occurred. All passengers had disembarked before the fire was detected."
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researchers said the growth of metal fibres, called dendrites, could cause short circuits.
There is, to the best of my knowledge, NO way to stop the thermal runaway in a Lithium cell , once it has started....containment is the only option.
(though Boeing "could" redesign the racking etc, so the fireball simply burns it's way down through the bottom of the fuselage and drops to the ground/sea/town 30,000 feet below/school/church/hospital....no, it would have to "plummet" then
Given the relatively large size and large energy-storage in the 787 application, the difficulty of seperating cells and individually "sandbagging" them is totally impractical.....older, proven technologies are the safest option.
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I am not sure if it has been mentioned before but yes you can stop the thermal runaway of a Lithium Battery fire (cockney steve) - First extinguish the fire (halon etc.) - then you need to cool it, ideally with water.
I know that this does not sound right, putting water onto an electrical fire - but that is the recommended course of action from of a number sources.
I know that this does not sound right, putting water onto an electrical fire - but that is the recommended course of action from of a number sources.
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Water is actually one of the best fire extinguishers also for low voltage installations. Clean water will not conduct low voltages and water is one of the best substances to cool down the burning material. The water vapor will be about 1600x the water volume and efficiently replace oxygen.
Polluted water and salt water CAN conduct even low voltages like 220V, so make sure the water is clean. Never use water on burning liquids or high voltage installations.
Polluted water and salt water CAN conduct even low voltages like 220V, so make sure the water is clean. Never use water on burning liquids or high voltage installations.
Is the airplane still in BOS?
Reportedly the aircraft has now been released by the NTSB back to JAL, but I suspect the airline won't want to have anything to do with it in the short-term.
My money would be on a temporary repair at BOS to allow a one-time ferry flight back to Boeing, but even that could take quite some time.