Another 787 electrical/smoke incident (on ground)
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Thanks, airsound. I should have looked up the deliveries, but the larger point is unchanged. There are not many of them out there, and these are not just random issues or "teething" problems.
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dozzy
by the way, the rudder on the 737 was not mitigated by a higher vapp. crossover speeds were raised demanding the ineficient use of flaps.
yes the DC8 could extend inboard thrust reversers inflight, but not with devastating results.
and I said single digit douglas ( not including the later MD)
The method of construction on the douglas was very strong...can't think of any pop tops like aloha 737.
but, back to the thread...haven't seen much response to the fuel portion I brought up.
by the way, the rudder on the 737 was not mitigated by a higher vapp. crossover speeds were raised demanding the ineficient use of flaps.
yes the DC8 could extend inboard thrust reversers inflight, but not with devastating results.
and I said single digit douglas ( not including the later MD)
The method of construction on the douglas was very strong...can't think of any pop tops like aloha 737.
but, back to the thread...haven't seen much response to the fuel portion I brought up.
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yes the DC8 could extend inboard thrust reversers inflight, but not with devastating results.
Vliegtuigongeval op 04 JUL 1966 met Douglas DC-8-52 ZK-NZB - Auckland International Airport (AKL)
And STILL no-one can indicate to me exactly how this aircraft can qualify under ETOPS...
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Strictly speaking, neither is rudder hardover or inflight thrust reverse. Or the success ratio of engineers trying to pitch market acceptance and relative entry performance. Slagging the T7 to make the 787 look like one of the crowd, does this guy know Dozy?
Two of these aircraft had inflight emergencies due to fire, and landed well ahead of some ETOPS minimums. Why did these flights not press on, and gain some impressive buzz re: airworthiness? Missed opportunity?
Since we heard marketing and OT performance from the project engineer, maybe this time a PR person to interpret the technology?
In my opinion, things were at a manageable level until some dimbulb decided to task an engineer with sales, and lecturing out of his field....
It could have been a ploy...Make corporate look so dumb, the actual issues disappear from the discussion...
By the way, the engineer said Boeing relies on cabin pressure to keep smoke out of the cabin. That's a neat trick with doors open, and a couple hundred people inside, waiting to leave.
The fact that there is atmospheric communication between the cabin/cockpit, and the battery bays at all, is troubling. Both emergency landings involved smoke in the cabin, at altitude, no? 35,000 feet?
Two of these aircraft had inflight emergencies due to fire, and landed well ahead of some ETOPS minimums. Why did these flights not press on, and gain some impressive buzz re: airworthiness? Missed opportunity?
Since we heard marketing and OT performance from the project engineer, maybe this time a PR person to interpret the technology?
In my opinion, things were at a manageable level until some dimbulb decided to task an engineer with sales, and lecturing out of his field....
It could have been a ploy...Make corporate look so dumb, the actual issues disappear from the discussion...
By the way, the engineer said Boeing relies on cabin pressure to keep smoke out of the cabin. That's a neat trick with doors open, and a couple hundred people inside, waiting to leave.
The fact that there is atmospheric communication between the cabin/cockpit, and the battery bays at all, is troubling. Both emergency landings involved smoke in the cabin, at altitude, no? 35,000 feet?
Last edited by Lyman; 10th Jan 2013 at 15:48.
Smoke in the cabin ...
... probably saved this airplane. All of the fire/smoke detection and suppression systems that flight crews depend on in flight didn't appear to do a bit of good in this recent case. With nobody on the flight deck to notice alarms (if any were even operational in this mode), all that was left was some observant cleaning crew.
While this isn't as serious (from a loss of life point of view) as a fire in flight, I'm certain that airlines are not going to be happy about having their latest capital investments spontaneously combust while parked at the gate.
While this isn't as serious (from a loss of life point of view) as a fire in flight, I'm certain that airlines are not going to be happy about having their latest capital investments spontaneously combust while parked at the gate.
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From an early release, there were mechanics present when the fire was noticed, as well as Cabin Cleaners.
It was not established who these mechanics represented. My assumption was JAL, or contract.
When this situation becomes only about loss of Capital investment, I stop flying.
It was not established who these mechanics represented. My assumption was JAL, or contract.
When this situation becomes only about loss of Capital investment, I stop flying.
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FWIW in Corporate America a Project Engineer "engineers" the project. His job is to squeeze the best possible compromise out of the real engineers to meet his budget and schedule.
At best he's a super-engineer who perfectly understands what all the disciplines are telling him and what all that babble means in terms of building an excellent airplane, and leaps tall buildings with a single bound.
At worst, it's all babble to him, but he makes the decisions anyway because that's his job.
In any case the Senior of him sits with upper management, with all that means in terms of making platitudinous noises when The Press is present.
At best he's a super-engineer who perfectly understands what all the disciplines are telling him and what all that babble means in terms of building an excellent airplane, and leaps tall buildings with a single bound.
At worst, it's all babble to him, but he makes the decisions anyway because that's his job.
In any case the Senior of him sits with upper management, with all that means in terms of making platitudinous noises when The Press is present.
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poorjohn. Yes, thanks. There is a BS in Interdisciplinary Studies in the family.
Apropos?
My point is that damage control can cause its own damage. It is too early to polish this turd.
Apropos?
My point is that damage control can cause its own damage. It is too early to polish this turd.
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kbrockman...
FWIW I wrote INBOARD...the accident report indicated number 4 engine was reversed...that is not an inboard engine.
and it is a training accident...training is different than normal passenger operations.
FWIW I wrote INBOARD...the accident report indicated number 4 engine was reversed...that is not an inboard engine.
and it is a training accident...training is different than normal passenger operations.
angryrat , I'd like to be a fly on the wall for that 'review'. I was at Boeing after a 757 crash when the FAA handed Boeing its head on a platter over QA issues. Back then, our manufacturing certificate was at risk. But we (I was a part of the engineering group tasked with straightening things out) pulled that one out of the fire.
It sounds like things went downhill after I left. I should have told them, "Don't make me come back there!" on my way out.
The problem is: The last time, it was corrective action plus a civil penalty because management said, "We didn't know it was in violation of regulations". You can't use that excuse twice. People may have changed, but institutional memory is supposed to bridge the generational gap.
It sounds like things went downhill after I left. I should have told them, "Don't make me come back there!" on my way out.
The problem is: The last time, it was corrective action plus a civil penalty because management said, "We didn't know it was in violation of regulations". You can't use that excuse twice. People may have changed, but institutional memory is supposed to bridge the generational gap.
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The method of construction on the douglas was very strong...can't think of any pop tops like aloha 737.
About 1980 a DC9-80 test flight landed at Edwards AFB dropping its tail on the runway, and leaving the fuselage in pieces. That Douglas airplane was new. The the Aloha was very high time, had far more cycles than any other 737 fleet with similar hours, and also had corrosion issues.
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FAA should ground them now.
Pulling the plug would give Boeing an out, mandating them to do the battery replacement which would cost each airline a seat or two in weight.
The FAA should do this in the interests of protecting not only the passengers but also the manufacturer.
Last not least, casualties created by the current battery system would discredit the agency itself.
A design mistake can creep into a piece of equipment, it is no big problem to admit it and yank it out.
The FAA should do this in the interests of protecting not only the passengers but also the manufacturer.
Last not least, casualties created by the current battery system would discredit the agency itself.
A design mistake can creep into a piece of equipment, it is no big problem to admit it and yank it out.
Last edited by edmundronald; 11th Jan 2013 at 04:02.
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reparit
the DC980 incident/accident at edwards is interesting...an FAA pilot flying the plane exceeded design limits on touchdown.
the aloha was within limits but failed.
and you don't see the same failure mode in the douglas ...take a close look at the fuselage of the douglas and see the ''finger laps'' used...no such construction on the 737
the DC980 incident/accident at edwards is interesting...an FAA pilot flying the plane exceeded design limits on touchdown.
the aloha was within limits but failed.
and you don't see the same failure mode in the douglas ...take a close look at the fuselage of the douglas and see the ''finger laps'' used...no such construction on the 737
Originally Posted by PJ2
the DC8-40 series (RR Conway powered) was certified for in-flight reverse on all four with thrust at MCT.
Why on earth would anybody want that certification point? Runway change=high on slope?
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[Not a pilot--discard or ignore if necessary] At this stage are there not about four scenarios? 1) The plane was designed with the idea that batteries sometimes smoke and everything worked as it should have. 2) The battery failed because 2a) it or 2b) the installation was defective. 3) The battery failed because of improper procedures. 4) The battery failed because the design concept was flawed.
While, 3) should presumably not be allowed to happen, it might be forgiven if someone invented a novel mistake. I presume that 4) is unlikely or the aviation authorities never would have allowed it to the production stage.
Can any of these be ruled out yet?
While, 3) should presumably not be allowed to happen, it might be forgiven if someone invented a novel mistake. I presume that 4) is unlikely or the aviation authorities never would have allowed it to the production stage.
Can any of these be ruled out yet?
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re FAA Special Conditions for 787 certification (2007)
"The FAA shares the commenter's (ALPA) concern over a fire
erupting in flight. The regulations and the rigid requirements defined
in these special conditions are intended to prevent lithium battery
fires on board the aircraft. We have made no change as a result of this
comment."
Seems likely the FAA screwed up this time. To many free lunches?
.
erupting in flight. The regulations and the rigid requirements defined
in these special conditions are intended to prevent lithium battery
fires on board the aircraft. We have made no change as a result of this
comment."
Seems likely the FAA screwed up this time. To many free lunches?
.
Last edited by toffeez; 11th Jan 2013 at 07:23.
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The DC9-80 incident occured duringperformance trials when they were trying to get the shortest landing figures. Technique was to come in at Vat and chop the power at 50ft. It fell out of the sky and, effectively, crashed and the newly lengthened fuselage broke in two. Bit late on the round out Hoskins! Lessons were learned.