AF 447 report out
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There were lots of short cuts in the story portrayed by that programme, and the bit about immediately pulling fully back is simply wrong. This has been done to death before on the numerous threads here.
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Ref the Ch 4 prog could someone exolain to me, how three aircrew on the flight-deck, one of whom had 11,000 hours experience, couldn't sense that an aircraft was falling (In a "Flat" stall) at 10,000 to 15,000 a minute ?
Nick
Nick
So .. maybe it can be explained by the global warming effect ?
It is surprising that the BEA have not investigated this possible cause ...
Last edited by jcjeant; 17th Sep 2012 at 01:21.
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NAROBS, one cannot sense the velocity of falling (or any other velocity), only changes in velocity (accelerations). Have you never been in a lift and unable to tell whether it is moving or still? Ever been on a train and unable to tell whether your train is moving or the one next to it in a station?
The initial accelerations downwards would have been mixed in with various up and down sensations caused by turbulence.
The initial accelerations downwards would have been mixed in with various up and down sensations caused by turbulence.
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Originally Posted by NAROBS
I think that storms in Caribean have been getting more intense - witness Katrina, which managed to blow-over the 60,000 ton WW2 Battleshipship USS Alabama whilst it was mounted in its wetdock cradle in Mobile harbour - that I believe is the first time that happened since WW2.
NAROBS/others
I promise to be gentle: In the last few years the AF447 accident topics such as pitot heaters, crew behaviour, falling sensations, autopilot and back up instrumentation have been been discussed in great length and in much detail here in several Pprune threads
I'm not sure many of us have the appetite to start that hamsterwheel rolling again, but "Search" and you shall find
I promise to be gentle: In the last few years the AF447 accident topics such as pitot heaters, crew behaviour, falling sensations, autopilot and back up instrumentation have been been discussed in great length and in much detail here in several Pprune threads
I'm not sure many of us have the appetite to start that hamsterwheel rolling again, but "Search" and you shall find
Last edited by wiggy; 17th Sep 2012 at 08:08.
I'm with Jeremy Clarkson on 'global warming' - it's a load of total greenwash.
How come Britain was so warm that it was a major wine exporter in Roman times, yet we had a 'little Ice Age' in mediaeval times....? It's because the world's climate is a cyclical event over which the weeny-greenies can scratch their beards, rustle their sandals and fake as much information as they like, but can actually do nothing. That's simply the way of the world....literally. Telling us all to ride ethnic peace-bicycles, to worry about our 'carbon footprint' and to stop flying won't actually do a damn thing about the polar ice caps... But it's a convenient ruse for the government to con 'eco-tax' money out of us all.
Back to AF447. Normally there is suitable system redundancy to cope with a single sensor failure; even for total loss of airspeed there is a QRH 'unreliable airspeed' checklist. As Learmount said - it's basically to 'do nothing'. Just maintain a level flight attitude and maintain the thrust setting.... Why was the training and knowledge of the 2 AF co-pilots so abysmally weak that they were clearly unaware of this?
How come Britain was so warm that it was a major wine exporter in Roman times, yet we had a 'little Ice Age' in mediaeval times....? It's because the world's climate is a cyclical event over which the weeny-greenies can scratch their beards, rustle their sandals and fake as much information as they like, but can actually do nothing. That's simply the way of the world....literally. Telling us all to ride ethnic peace-bicycles, to worry about our 'carbon footprint' and to stop flying won't actually do a damn thing about the polar ice caps... But it's a convenient ruse for the government to con 'eco-tax' money out of us all.
Back to AF447. Normally there is suitable system redundancy to cope with a single sensor failure; even for total loss of airspeed there is a QRH 'unreliable airspeed' checklist. As Learmount said - it's basically to 'do nothing'. Just maintain a level flight attitude and maintain the thrust setting.... Why was the training and knowledge of the 2 AF co-pilots so abysmally weak that they were clearly unaware of this?
Last edited by BEagle; 17th Sep 2012 at 08:12.
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With regards to stalling. The F/O (PIC) beleived they were going too fast, and losing height, and hence started pulling back. No-one can be sure why he continued to hold the pull back once the stall warner went off. It is possible that the 2 more experience pilots were not aware that the F/O was continuing to pull back on the stick.
Last edited by foxmoth; 17th Sep 2012 at 08:20.
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I find it hard to believe that there isn't an integrated fall-back system which could provide equivalent data, even inferentiallyi.e. Sateillite GPS or airframe strain guages, that would enable the flight computer(s) to continue normal or near normal operation. Don't modern commercial aircraft flight control systems allow for such eventualities ?
Theoretically you could use some other type of force sensor (measuring dynamic pressure, for instance) but then you encounter similar problems to those of a pitot tube: If you have a dynamic pressure sensor then what happens if you fly through heavy rain, or hail/ice clouds? You'll get abnormally high dynamic pressures and thus inaccurate speeds. Pitot tubes are used because they are robust and of good accuracy, off the top of my head I can't think of any comparable alternatives.
*Unless you have other complementary data but that is hard to get and is not too accurate in a lot of cases.
I'm with Jeremy Clarkson on 'global warming' - it's a load of total greenwash.
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Reading the report again it seems the PNH did take over correctly, but then the PH took it back, but without saying anything, there should have then been an automated "priority right" callout, but this may well have been missed in the chaos, meaning the LHS pilot thought he had control when he did not!
AF 447
At all times the a/c had two fully functioning engines, a Stby artificial horizon, a Sby compass, and a GPS Groundspeed readout available??
What more do you need, fly the plane!
I remember an early conversion detail on the B747-400, in the simulator. On a rolling takeoff I 'stood up' the Thrust Levers pressed TOGA and the instructor failed the Auto/Throttle, so the Thrust Levers did not move, so I discontinued the takeoff.
The instructor asked why, and I mentioned the lack of Thrust Lever movement, ''Whats your arm for ?'' he replied.
Easy to forget the basics.
What more do you need, fly the plane!
I remember an early conversion detail on the B747-400, in the simulator. On a rolling takeoff I 'stood up' the Thrust Levers pressed TOGA and the instructor failed the Auto/Throttle, so the Thrust Levers did not move, so I discontinued the takeoff.
The instructor asked why, and I mentioned the lack of Thrust Lever movement, ''Whats your arm for ?'' he replied.
Easy to forget the basics.
Last edited by cessnapete; 17th Sep 2012 at 15:10.
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I've said this on JB, but as pilots, what do you think of the Captain's apparent indifference to the Cu Nims he knew were ahead?
It seems to me as SLF that he took an astonishingly blase and relaxed view of them before retiring for a kip.
Other aircraft went around the storm.
And stop insulting each other! There is at least one highly respected member of this forum who lost colleagues/friends on that flight.
It seems to me as SLF that he took an astonishingly blase and relaxed view of them before retiring for a kip.
Other aircraft went around the storm.
And stop insulting each other! There is at least one highly respected member of this forum who lost colleagues/friends on that flight.
Last edited by angels; 17th Sep 2012 at 12:21.
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Being new to this hamsterwheel and not having read much of the previous 51 pages, I found the programme last night to be concise and helpful.
I don’t know if criminal negligence charges have been brought against Air France but they certainly should be. The unbelievable sense of arrogance from the Captain and his 2 idiots for co-pilots was shocking as was their complete inability to recognise a stall situation (which they caused) sitting around dumb struck while the aircraft plummeted to the ocean.
Those 3 people are at fault for this tragedy and Air France is equally culpable and people should serve time. The bottom line is that if that had been an African or other Third World operator you could bet that they would soon be on the EU black list and quite rightly so.
As for the technology debate I expect it’s already been done to death but it certainly doesn’t help when you’ve got a clueless Captain that he wasn’t able to see what the HP was doing to his side stick.
The whole thing made my blood boil when so called professionals were so utterly incompetent.
I don’t know if criminal negligence charges have been brought against Air France but they certainly should be. The unbelievable sense of arrogance from the Captain and his 2 idiots for co-pilots was shocking as was their complete inability to recognise a stall situation (which they caused) sitting around dumb struck while the aircraft plummeted to the ocean.
Those 3 people are at fault for this tragedy and Air France is equally culpable and people should serve time. The bottom line is that if that had been an African or other Third World operator you could bet that they would soon be on the EU black list and quite rightly so.
As for the technology debate I expect it’s already been done to death but it certainly doesn’t help when you’ve got a clueless Captain that he wasn’t able to see what the HP was doing to his side stick.
The whole thing made my blood boil when so called professionals were so utterly incompetent.
angels
I didn't see the programme but from reading the voice recorder transcripts I'd agree the captain's handover brief perhaps wasn't the most comprehensive I've ever read or heard but I wonder what would you'd expect him to say about the Cu Nims?
The AF crew had been briefed on the weather conditions along the route of flight, the Cu Nims were where they were forecast to be, all three pilots would have been taken weather avoidance around Cu Nims in the past, (though the most junior pilot probably wouldn't have been overly experienced in doing so). If I was in the captain's shoes that night I might have mentioned we were yet to cross the ITCZ/ line of Cu Nims but if I was talking to two supposedly rated co-pilots I wouldn't expect to have to brief chapter and verse the hazards of Cu Nims and techniques for weather avoidance........(and BTW as far as I understand the crew were attempting to go around "the storm" just before the pitot tubes froze).
I didn't see the programme but from reading the voice recorder transcripts I'd agree the captain's handover brief perhaps wasn't the most comprehensive I've ever read or heard but I wonder what would you'd expect him to say about the Cu Nims?
The AF crew had been briefed on the weather conditions along the route of flight, the Cu Nims were where they were forecast to be, all three pilots would have been taken weather avoidance around Cu Nims in the past, (though the most junior pilot probably wouldn't have been overly experienced in doing so). If I was in the captain's shoes that night I might have mentioned we were yet to cross the ITCZ/ line of Cu Nims but if I was talking to two supposedly rated co-pilots I wouldn't expect to have to brief chapter and verse the hazards of Cu Nims and techniques for weather avoidance........(and BTW as far as I understand the crew were attempting to go around "the storm" just before the pitot tubes froze).
Last edited by wiggy; 17th Sep 2012 at 18:10.
HP
Then it might be worth you reading the previous 50 plus pages, plus the other threads on the subject,and better still read the official accident report which is freely available on-line, rather than simply relying on a TV programme's version of events.
FWIW we still don't know why, and we will probably never know why the two pilots at the controls behaved the way they did when the airspeed information "went missing", and whilst we may know what they did and said, we don't know what they perceived or were thinking.
As for the captain's actions - I rather suspect that by the the time he returned to the flight deck it was highly unlikely there was much if anything he could do.
Being new to this hamsterwheel and not having read much of the previous 51 pages, I found the programme last night to be concise and helpful.
FWIW we still don't know why, and we will probably never know why the two pilots at the controls behaved the way they did when the airspeed information "went missing", and whilst we may know what they did and said, we don't know what they perceived or were thinking.
As for the captain's actions - I rather suspect that by the the time he returned to the flight deck it was highly unlikely there was much if anything he could do.
Last edited by wiggy; 17th Sep 2012 at 13:47.
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FWIW we still don't know why, and we will probably never know why the two pilots at the controls behaved the way they did when the airspeed information "went missing", and whilst we may know what they did and said, we don't know what they perceived or were thinking.
jcj
Agreed, and of course that then raises questions about training and checking........
incompetence may be a factor (important) that must be taken into account to explain the (supposedly) inexplicable catastrophe
Last edited by wiggy; 17th Sep 2012 at 14:12.
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and the bit about immediately pulling fully back is simply wrong.
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I have been doing my best to follow this thread and do not wish to turn the hamster wheel. If the sidesticks cannot be centrally located, would there be any advantage in having a single switch on the centre pedestal for controlling which SS is flying the aicraft? At least then, to gain control a pilot must do something that is cleary visible to his colleague(s). If it really is necessary to have a switch on the stick itself or close to it, a guarded switch, only to be used in emergencies, could be provided in addition to the central switch. As SLF, one thing the programme did drive home was that "SS in control" is indicated only by an indicator which could be missed, like lots of info on this flight. Apologies in advance if subject previously kicked to death.
Last edited by pedrobaltic; 17th Sep 2012 at 15:06.
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Your post is most reasonable, but indicative of a deeper problem, one that is left to training. The operation of the aircraft as designed is not intuitive, and the cueing concerning who is in charge of the controls is instructive.
That leaves to co-operation (CRM) a life or death situation, and here, we find CRM if not untrained, then poorly so.
The fundamental problem of this accident is that very thing. Training, if poor, is insufficient reason to condemn anyone.
To create a platform that is entirely dependent on training, and rote, plus consultation with a manual (whilst piloting), is absurd.
Piloting used to involve use of Human skills almost exclusively, few mechanical advantages even existed. Currently, the acceptance of a format that removes intuiton, experience, and thought from the flightdeck is demonstrably fatal.
Let alone the opportunity to engage in real time experience of manual control.
You make the call.
That leaves to co-operation (CRM) a life or death situation, and here, we find CRM if not untrained, then poorly so.
The fundamental problem of this accident is that very thing. Training, if poor, is insufficient reason to condemn anyone.
To create a platform that is entirely dependent on training, and rote, plus consultation with a manual (whilst piloting), is absurd.
Piloting used to involve use of Human skills almost exclusively, few mechanical advantages even existed. Currently, the acceptance of a format that removes intuiton, experience, and thought from the flightdeck is demonstrably fatal.
Let alone the opportunity to engage in real time experience of manual control.
You make the call.