AF 447 report out
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To me, the actions of the Horizontal Stabiliser seem very important. Why did it stop trimming when the a/c started its climb? Why did it start again just prior the Stall, and go to its stop and stay? BEA write that the simulation provided affirmation that the system worked according to its logic, what is its logic?
It's inhibitions and transits are deeply involved in loss of control. Although an understanding may further condemn the pilots in their apparent confusion, eg. With a -13.2 degree tailplane, locked in, the a/c handles differently than it would if it was at, say +3 and locked... I cannot see why trim is needed at all in AL Law, it is inhibited in DIRECT. If it is the only source of pitch control, DIRECT is clear, straightforward.
Are the elevators inhibited with the THS at Full NU? If the elevators can perform, why do they need additional authority? If they cannot perform, they should fail, and the aircraft needs to be handled accordingly. Trimmed, the elevators are always capable of greater than untrimmed "authority" A fluctuating tailplane causes the limits of the elevators to fluctuate.....in both directions.
Just prior to the first warning of Stall, the PF made his first pull on the stick, with a left roll bias......"What's that?....."
It's inhibitions and transits are deeply involved in loss of control. Although an understanding may further condemn the pilots in their apparent confusion, eg. With a -13.2 degree tailplane, locked in, the a/c handles differently than it would if it was at, say +3 and locked... I cannot see why trim is needed at all in AL Law, it is inhibited in DIRECT. If it is the only source of pitch control, DIRECT is clear, straightforward.
Are the elevators inhibited with the THS at Full NU? If the elevators can perform, why do they need additional authority? If they cannot perform, they should fail, and the aircraft needs to be handled accordingly. Trimmed, the elevators are always capable of greater than untrimmed "authority" A fluctuating tailplane causes the limits of the elevators to fluctuate.....in both directions.
Just prior to the first warning of Stall, the PF made his first pull on the stick, with a left roll bias......"What's that?....."
Last edited by Lyman; 12th Aug 2012 at 16:06.
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To me, the actions of the Horizontal Stabiliser seem very important. Why did it stop trimming when the a/c started its climb? Why did it start again just prior the Stall, and go to its stop and stay? BEA write that the simulation provided affirmation that the system worked according to its logic, what is its logic?
This is a lead buoy for the pilots in case of problems
Why not only "Normal law" and "Direct law" .. like for the Concorde ?
Why impose to the pilots a complicated "Alternate law" ?
More:
In addition to the laws "Normal" and "Alternate", there are on Airbus a law called "
Unusual attitudes ", which is activated in case some values very critical
are affected, especially when the incidence exceeds 30 °.
1 minute 25 after the pitot icing, the aircraft reached 447 this incidence of 30 ° and
this law "Unusual Positions" went into action, replacing the law "Alternate"
with the effect of eliminating the automatic action of the PHR.
The PHR is then to full nose and is therefore fixed in position by law
"Unusual Attitudes", as the aircraft came into stall 40 seconds earlier.
The only course of action would have been the drivers of the PHR bring in "Manual" to its normal position.
This law "unusual attitudes" has not had an adverse effect because the fate of the aircraft was
already sealed, but it is obviously disorder in the design of the Airbus and the BEA
therefore denied that she is enabled by arguing that:
"Because of the rejection of 3 ADR (Air Data Reference) by the flight control computers
(PRIM), the law of unusual attitudes could not be triggered on criteria related to
inertial parameters, which were never met "
The BEA does not provide any justification for this assertion, which one looks in vain for a trace
in the documentation of the A330.
The little credit to be given to the assertion of the BEA's report appears on page 101, which
shows that the FD (flight directors) were valid for 53 seconds at a time
where the incidence of 30 ° was reached (02h November 30).
However, for the FD run, it took at least 2 ADR in operation and in this case,
during this period of 53 seconds, we maintain that the law "unusual attitudes"
was very active and full PHR frozen pitch, prohibiting a de facto attempt to recover
the stall!
Unusual attitudes ", which is activated in case some values very critical
are affected, especially when the incidence exceeds 30 °.
1 minute 25 after the pitot icing, the aircraft reached 447 this incidence of 30 ° and
this law "Unusual Positions" went into action, replacing the law "Alternate"
with the effect of eliminating the automatic action of the PHR.
The PHR is then to full nose and is therefore fixed in position by law
"Unusual Attitudes", as the aircraft came into stall 40 seconds earlier.
The only course of action would have been the drivers of the PHR bring in "Manual" to its normal position.
This law "unusual attitudes" has not had an adverse effect because the fate of the aircraft was
already sealed, but it is obviously disorder in the design of the Airbus and the BEA
therefore denied that she is enabled by arguing that:
"Because of the rejection of 3 ADR (Air Data Reference) by the flight control computers
(PRIM), the law of unusual attitudes could not be triggered on criteria related to
inertial parameters, which were never met "
The BEA does not provide any justification for this assertion, which one looks in vain for a trace
in the documentation of the A330.
The little credit to be given to the assertion of the BEA's report appears on page 101, which
shows that the FD (flight directors) were valid for 53 seconds at a time
where the incidence of 30 ° was reached (02h November 30).
However, for the FD run, it took at least 2 ADR in operation and in this case,
during this period of 53 seconds, we maintain that the law "unusual attitudes"
was very active and full PHR frozen pitch, prohibiting a de facto attempt to recover
the stall!
PDF translated in english available here (as HTML page)
translate_f.zip
Last edited by jcjeant; 12th Aug 2012 at 19:16.
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Originally Posted by Lyman
To me, the actions of the Horizontal Stabiliser seem very important.
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 12th Aug 2012 at 17:45.
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I guess a lot of people here have no clear understanding of the Airbus concept and are led by gossip and myths.
Guess what happen ... ? ALL catastrophes (fatal) concerning Airbus planes are result of pilot errors (the pilots involved were all morons ?)
NEVER because the design or concept
This is a pattern there ......
Alternate law has certain protection features compared to direct law. Why give them up if you can have them? You never know if you need them.
(and stay away from any protection as you are supposed also in normal law).
It is also easy to fly in direct law, but of course with the additional task of trimming.
Is what we consider the current pilots too lazy (or incompetent) to use trim ?
Or use of trim manually is considered dangerous by many in a Airbus ?
Last edited by jcjeant; 12th Aug 2012 at 22:44.
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No airplane at that altitude will not stall doing what they did. Who cares how the trim works with competent pilots. Remember it is aviate, navigate and communicate. That is the way it has always been. They didn't aviate.
By the way aviating doesn't mean follow a flight director. Also you need to be able to ignore warnings to aviate properly, just get it under control. If that is difficult for you, find another profession.
I sadly think Airbus has convinced pilots that they are protected so they can not stall. Why would this PF have kept pulling up if he was a normal pilot?
By the way aviating doesn't mean follow a flight director. Also you need to be able to ignore warnings to aviate properly, just get it under control. If that is difficult for you, find another profession.
I sadly think Airbus has convinced pilots that they are protected so they can not stall. Why would this PF have kept pulling up if he was a normal pilot?
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I said on the other thread - if anyone hears words to the effect that an FBW Airbus cannot be stalled under any circumstances whether in training or on the line, the person who said it needs to be reported ASAP.
Why would this PF have kept pulling up if he was a normal pilot?
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Human factors.
Gents, with an alarmingly high frequency, I see posts with questions about technicalities of A-330 wizz by on PPRUNE.
Let me reiterate that within weeks of finding the recorders of AF447, the BEA issued an interim report in which they stated, in street language, well, the recorders told us nothing that we did not suspect already, from ACARS messages, wreckage investigation and such. For now, we will spend a year to study human factors, which appear to be the dominating factor in the accident.
Let me illustrate the overwhelming power of the human mind with the following quote, from Airliner, issue 1996 Quarter 2 (Airliner is a Boeing publication, the predecessor of today's AERO magazine).
Quote:
Case Study #1.
It is just after 10:00PM local time. The crew receives a departure clearance from an air traffic controller who uses non-standard phraseology. The crew doesn't fully understand the clearance. The air traffic controller does not challenge the crew's incorrect readback. Instead of using the modern “glass” cockpit to their advantage, the crew enters the first reporting point into the flight management computer, rather than using the published and required standard departure procedure.
After takeoff and at 750 feet, the Boeing 767 crew turns and proceeds directly to their first reporting point, which is 150 miles from the departure airport. They retract the gear and flaps without incident and accelerate the aircraft to 250 knots. Less than two minutes into the flight, the Mark V GPWS warnings begin: “Terrain! Terrain! Pull Up! Pull Up! Terrain! Terrain!”
The First Officer responds with a gentle pull up from 9.3 to 12.5 degrees. After gaining 200 feet, he lowers the nose to 11.2 degrees, just before the airplane's left wing clips the last 20 feet of a 300-foot uncharted tower – on top of a 3,000 foot mountain! After the incident, the crew raises the nose to 16.9 degrees and applies full thrust.
The airplane returns to the departure airport, and lands with a six-foot long, two-foot deep hole in the left wing leading edge, a ruptured fuel tank, damage to the flap drive, stringers and front spar – and a scar of the tower's red paint across the top of the wing (Figure7).
Unquote.
I know that at first sight, this accident has nothing to do with AF447, right?
Well, let us look at the similarities, or rather, let us look at the arguments used in the AF447 / A-330 case and see how they apply to this situation.
The AF447 captain was crazy to leave the flight deck, prior to the cossing of that terrible zone of terror, the Inter Tropical Conversion Zone.
The B-767 captain was in his seat, as Pilot Not Flying, still the accident happened. Moreover, the captain entered the direct to Henry (waypoint) himself, or he agreed with the copilot doing it.
The A-330 suddenly, unexpectedly dropped itself into the hands of the poor crew, that was never trained to hand fly at cruise altitude. The Alternate Law is way to difficult to handle, etcetera.
The B-767 was hand flown from take-off, all through the standard clean up schedule. No confusing flight laws, how much more plain vanilla than a B-767 can you get? The accident happend at 3,000 feet, in thick, reliable air with lots of engine and aerodynamic performance available.
The A-330 crew was overwhelmed by all sorts of cautions and warnings, with confusing and unreliable faiure indications. The Airbus is geared very much to providing information via the visual channel and the most important warning was an audio warning (STALL STALL).
In the B-767 all systems worked without any glitch, there was absolute serenity in the cockpit, from a systems point of view. The only warning, “Terrain! Terrain! Pull Up! Pull Up! Terrain! Terrain!” was unequivocally loud and clear, and the aircraft, a B-767 does not suffer from the emphasis on overloading the visual channel, to the detriment of the audio input channel into the pilot's brain.
In the A-330 the PNF was not able to monitor what the PF was doing, due to the sidesticks not being interconnected in a physical way, and being obstructed from view. The fact that the state of the aircraft was clearly shown in the form of it's attitude on the perfectly indicating Primary Flight Displays is no reason to exonerate the stupid sidestick configuration.
The B-767 has big, conventional, interconnected yokes, in full view and with lots of tactile feedback to both pilots. The thrust levers ditto, whether actuated by autothrottle servo or by pilot's hand. Still, the PNF did not challenge the PF's lack of reaction to the GPWS warning, one of the most critical warnings in civil aviation. The only signal that got this crew into proper action was the sound of impact with the television antenna.
The AF447 copilots were products of the Nintendo generation, not trained to properly fly aircraft. Culture and training at Air France must be of a terrible standard.
The B-767 event happened in 1992, to a properly trained crew of a reputable German carrier. The Nintendo generation at that time was still, well, playing Nintendo, Super Mario Brothers was just available in stores.
The AF447 crew was caught off guard, surprised by the sudden degradation of their aircraft.
The B-767 crew had plain old fashioned paper Jeppesen charts depicting a Minimum Sector Altitude of 4,300 feet to the north of the airport and clear elevation contour lines and high spots indicating 3,000 feet elevations 5 miles to the northeast of the airport. The mountain El Copey cannot be overlooked from wherever you are at Isla Margarita. Granted, the crew may have arrived in darkness, the night before, and may have spent their entire day in bed, to be properly rested for the accident flight, so, truely, they may never have seen the mountain, but Jepp charts should be enough for proper piloting. How much more prepared could they have been for a GPWS warning? Still, they turned towards the mountain and reacted, well, did not react, to the PULL UP warning.
The almost katatonic reaction of the B-767 crew is a HUMAN FACTORS affair, just like the almost panicky, completely lost, reaction of the AF447 crew is a HUMAN FACTORS affair.
If only the French and the German coplitots had swapped their reactions, both accidents would not have happened!.
Boeing, in the same article has more interesting observations:
Quote:
Failure to Monitor or Manage the Autoflight System.
The advancement of technology in today's modern airplanes has brought us flight directors, autopilots, autothrottles, and flight management systems. All of these devices have been designed to reduce workload and keep track of altitude, heading, airspeed, and approach flight path with pinpoint accuracy. These devices have all made a significant contribution to flight safety.
However, it is possible for them to lead to unquestioned trust by flight crews. The flight crews may unknowingly misuse these devices, or operate them with faulty data. Since autoflight systems are machines, they will do anything asked of them; occasionally, these systems do exactly what they are inadvertantly asked to do – and fly perfectly good airplanes into the ground.
Unquote
Now, back to discussions about autotrim etcetera.
Let me reiterate that within weeks of finding the recorders of AF447, the BEA issued an interim report in which they stated, in street language, well, the recorders told us nothing that we did not suspect already, from ACARS messages, wreckage investigation and such. For now, we will spend a year to study human factors, which appear to be the dominating factor in the accident.
Let me illustrate the overwhelming power of the human mind with the following quote, from Airliner, issue 1996 Quarter 2 (Airliner is a Boeing publication, the predecessor of today's AERO magazine).
Quote:
Case Study #1.
It is just after 10:00PM local time. The crew receives a departure clearance from an air traffic controller who uses non-standard phraseology. The crew doesn't fully understand the clearance. The air traffic controller does not challenge the crew's incorrect readback. Instead of using the modern “glass” cockpit to their advantage, the crew enters the first reporting point into the flight management computer, rather than using the published and required standard departure procedure.
After takeoff and at 750 feet, the Boeing 767 crew turns and proceeds directly to their first reporting point, which is 150 miles from the departure airport. They retract the gear and flaps without incident and accelerate the aircraft to 250 knots. Less than two minutes into the flight, the Mark V GPWS warnings begin: “Terrain! Terrain! Pull Up! Pull Up! Terrain! Terrain!”
The First Officer responds with a gentle pull up from 9.3 to 12.5 degrees. After gaining 200 feet, he lowers the nose to 11.2 degrees, just before the airplane's left wing clips the last 20 feet of a 300-foot uncharted tower – on top of a 3,000 foot mountain! After the incident, the crew raises the nose to 16.9 degrees and applies full thrust.
The airplane returns to the departure airport, and lands with a six-foot long, two-foot deep hole in the left wing leading edge, a ruptured fuel tank, damage to the flap drive, stringers and front spar – and a scar of the tower's red paint across the top of the wing (Figure7).
Unquote.
I know that at first sight, this accident has nothing to do with AF447, right?
Well, let us look at the similarities, or rather, let us look at the arguments used in the AF447 / A-330 case and see how they apply to this situation.
The AF447 captain was crazy to leave the flight deck, prior to the cossing of that terrible zone of terror, the Inter Tropical Conversion Zone.
The B-767 captain was in his seat, as Pilot Not Flying, still the accident happened. Moreover, the captain entered the direct to Henry (waypoint) himself, or he agreed with the copilot doing it.
The A-330 suddenly, unexpectedly dropped itself into the hands of the poor crew, that was never trained to hand fly at cruise altitude. The Alternate Law is way to difficult to handle, etcetera.
The B-767 was hand flown from take-off, all through the standard clean up schedule. No confusing flight laws, how much more plain vanilla than a B-767 can you get? The accident happend at 3,000 feet, in thick, reliable air with lots of engine and aerodynamic performance available.
The A-330 crew was overwhelmed by all sorts of cautions and warnings, with confusing and unreliable faiure indications. The Airbus is geared very much to providing information via the visual channel and the most important warning was an audio warning (STALL STALL).
In the B-767 all systems worked without any glitch, there was absolute serenity in the cockpit, from a systems point of view. The only warning, “Terrain! Terrain! Pull Up! Pull Up! Terrain! Terrain!” was unequivocally loud and clear, and the aircraft, a B-767 does not suffer from the emphasis on overloading the visual channel, to the detriment of the audio input channel into the pilot's brain.
In the A-330 the PNF was not able to monitor what the PF was doing, due to the sidesticks not being interconnected in a physical way, and being obstructed from view. The fact that the state of the aircraft was clearly shown in the form of it's attitude on the perfectly indicating Primary Flight Displays is no reason to exonerate the stupid sidestick configuration.
The B-767 has big, conventional, interconnected yokes, in full view and with lots of tactile feedback to both pilots. The thrust levers ditto, whether actuated by autothrottle servo or by pilot's hand. Still, the PNF did not challenge the PF's lack of reaction to the GPWS warning, one of the most critical warnings in civil aviation. The only signal that got this crew into proper action was the sound of impact with the television antenna.
The AF447 copilots were products of the Nintendo generation, not trained to properly fly aircraft. Culture and training at Air France must be of a terrible standard.
The B-767 event happened in 1992, to a properly trained crew of a reputable German carrier. The Nintendo generation at that time was still, well, playing Nintendo, Super Mario Brothers was just available in stores.
The AF447 crew was caught off guard, surprised by the sudden degradation of their aircraft.
The B-767 crew had plain old fashioned paper Jeppesen charts depicting a Minimum Sector Altitude of 4,300 feet to the north of the airport and clear elevation contour lines and high spots indicating 3,000 feet elevations 5 miles to the northeast of the airport. The mountain El Copey cannot be overlooked from wherever you are at Isla Margarita. Granted, the crew may have arrived in darkness, the night before, and may have spent their entire day in bed, to be properly rested for the accident flight, so, truely, they may never have seen the mountain, but Jepp charts should be enough for proper piloting. How much more prepared could they have been for a GPWS warning? Still, they turned towards the mountain and reacted, well, did not react, to the PULL UP warning.
The almost katatonic reaction of the B-767 crew is a HUMAN FACTORS affair, just like the almost panicky, completely lost, reaction of the AF447 crew is a HUMAN FACTORS affair.
If only the French and the German coplitots had swapped their reactions, both accidents would not have happened!.
Boeing, in the same article has more interesting observations:
Quote:
Failure to Monitor or Manage the Autoflight System.
The advancement of technology in today's modern airplanes has brought us flight directors, autopilots, autothrottles, and flight management systems. All of these devices have been designed to reduce workload and keep track of altitude, heading, airspeed, and approach flight path with pinpoint accuracy. These devices have all made a significant contribution to flight safety.
However, it is possible for them to lead to unquestioned trust by flight crews. The flight crews may unknowingly misuse these devices, or operate them with faulty data. Since autoflight systems are machines, they will do anything asked of them; occasionally, these systems do exactly what they are inadvertantly asked to do – and fly perfectly good airplanes into the ground.
Unquote
Now, back to discussions about autotrim etcetera.
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@EMIT
While I understand the point you're making with your post, in the long run it doesn't really help matters. The vast majority of those who subscribe to the belief that Airbus FBW was intended to sideline pilots will not be shaken from that belief by the circumstances of the incident you posted.
Getting involved in a turf war between the two western airliner heavyweights is counterproductive. Saying that an incident would have happened in one type but not another is provably false - if it weren't then Airbus and Boeing would not have collaborated in a research programme to iron all the bugs out of their stall-related procedures in the wake of AF447.
At the end of the day, people are going to believe what they want to believe - you can only provide the facts and hope they are disseminated among those for whom safety is more important than politics and reach the widest possible audience.
While I understand the point you're making with your post, in the long run it doesn't really help matters. The vast majority of those who subscribe to the belief that Airbus FBW was intended to sideline pilots will not be shaken from that belief by the circumstances of the incident you posted.
Getting involved in a turf war between the two western airliner heavyweights is counterproductive. Saying that an incident would have happened in one type but not another is provably false - if it weren't then Airbus and Boeing would not have collaborated in a research programme to iron all the bugs out of their stall-related procedures in the wake of AF447.
At the end of the day, people are going to believe what they want to believe - you can only provide the facts and hope they are disseminated among those for whom safety is more important than politics and reach the widest possible audience.
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True
Hello Dozy,
Thanks for the reply, aim of my post, as you understand, not to wage any A versus B war, but an attempt to wake up the "technical posters" to the fact that this accident has everything to do with us, fallible humans.
Thanks for the reply, aim of my post, as you understand, not to wage any A versus B war, but an attempt to wake up the "technical posters" to the fact that this accident has everything to do with us, fallible humans.
Last edited by EMIT; 14th Aug 2012 at 00:29.
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@EMIT
I think I've brought "B" up in at most about 5% of my posts on the subject, highlighted the early problems in the A320 FBW design - along with the efforts to rectify them - and yet I'm still singled out as "defending 'A'".
As such, it doesn't matter what you're actually trying to say - there are those that will always try to bring it down to the same old arguments.
The truth about the FBW design on both sides of the Atlantic is very easy to look up, and neither manufacturer ever set out to use the technological advances to sideline human pilots. But people believe what they want to believe and have their reasons for doing so. If it becomes obvious that you're talking to someone who will hold on to their prejudice no matter how much hard data you dig up, it's best to leave it there for the sake of your own sanity.
I think I've brought "B" up in at most about 5% of my posts on the subject, highlighted the early problems in the A320 FBW design - along with the efforts to rectify them - and yet I'm still singled out as "defending 'A'".
As such, it doesn't matter what you're actually trying to say - there are those that will always try to bring it down to the same old arguments.
The truth about the FBW design on both sides of the Atlantic is very easy to look up, and neither manufacturer ever set out to use the technological advances to sideline human pilots. But people believe what they want to believe and have their reasons for doing so. If it becomes obvious that you're talking to someone who will hold on to their prejudice no matter how much hard data you dig up, it's best to leave it there for the sake of your own sanity.
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I agree, some pilots are stupid enough to stall any airplane. Most of us won't. FBW makes it difficult for the PNF to see what inputs are being put in by the other pilotl. Flying my B757 I knew exactly what the FO was doing every second. When he would tell me the spastic approach was turbulence I knew it wasn't because the yoke told me what it was told to do. He did it, not turbulence. B52 pilots are not my favorite people to fly with because they can't fly very well. At least the ones I flew with.
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Given that this was the case, the idea that the PNF in AF447 needed a connected yoke or stick to figure out what was going on is thrown into considerable doubt. If a non-flying pilot lacks the confidence to take command when he or she spots something amiss, you could have a flashing light and klaxon mounted in front of them and it may not make any difference.
* - The Captain in this case was a Turkish Air Force veteran...
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 14th Aug 2012 at 00:30.
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I agree, getting the captain back up to the cockpit is a bit lame. He should have taken over and not let him do his silly full stick up sh#t. I think they were both autopilot monitors, not pilots. He didn't have the confidence to take over so called for the captain. Pretty pathetic. When I was flying we didn't have anybody that weak because they had been flying for 10 years at least with our airline and had the confidence to take comand. I couldn't get hired until i had 5500 hrs, lots in jets as PIC including 4 engine jets.
AF hires them fresh out of school and they monitor autopilots.
AF hires them fresh out of school and they monitor autopilots.
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* - The Captain in this case was a Turkish Air Force veteran...
AF hires them fresh out of school and they monitor autopilots.
But there is also a common
Veteran or fresh out of school .. they both had the same doom
So ... what ?
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Reviewing the posts, yes that was another incident. I think the captain could have saved the flight with experience but the FO's didn't have the experience to fly the aircraft without autopilot. Unfortunately the captain got to the cockpit too late to save it.
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I don't know what you said but I don't think any FO on our airline would let another pilot pitch up 15 degrees without taking over at FL350. It makes no sense.
Not sure that his answer would be the same today
All men learn in one of three ways:
1. Some learn by being told.
2. Some learn by being shown.
3. Then there are those that learn by experience. They just have to urinate on the electric fence.
Last edited by jcjeant; 14th Aug 2012 at 03:25.