AF 447 report out

[DozyWannabe]

@TTex600:

Apropos of nothing, in the sim, the Stall Warning was by far the loudest aural warning throughout the sequence - to the extent that the guy in the LHS had to turn it off so we could think straight. I'm not saying this was how it was in AF447's case, but the Stall Warning was certainly noticaeble.

[Huck]

At some point in their careers, most aviation professionals realize that one can improve aircraft design and operation by studying all accidents, even the "pilot error" ones.

One can say "these pilots could have been given better information" without expressly defending them. There's lots to learn from this accident.

[TTex600]

Originally Posted by Huck

At some point in their careers, most aviation professionals realize that one can improve aircraft design and operation by studying all accidents, even the "pilot error" ones.

One can say "these pilots could have been given better information" without expressly defending them. There's lots to learn from this accident.

Not around here. Defense of dead pilots is equated to offense against the manufacturer.

Don't offer this either: the Airbus doesnt "fly" like any other airplane.

BTW, Aren't you FredEx 72? I'd trade you a little bus anytime?

[TTex600]

Originally Posted by OK465

The documentation says the stall warning cannot be silenced.

Just slow down below 60kts. Done deal!

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by OK465

The documentation says the stall warning cannot be silenced.

It can be - temporarily at least - through use of Emer Canc. However if the situation has not been recovered (or on the way to being recovered) it will come back. That's what happened in the sim anyway (in that case "Emer Canc" was pressed mid-recovery).

[bubbers44]

A competent pilot will block out warnings and bells and aviate not letting warnings take his attention from AC control. For a simple UAS letting your aircraft go into a full stall from FL350 and crash into the ocean is beyond comprehension. Even though they had thousands of hours most were spent monitoring an autopilot. That isn't flying, it is monitoring.

If we continue to use 300 hr pilots and put them in automatic airplanes and not let them hand fly, we have a problem. Watch what will happen.

[mike-wsm]

bubbers44

Have you ever flown anything that has an L/D of 2? Your good friend Chuck has, perhaps he can give you some guidance.

Engines were no use because they couldn't provide thust which was D/L times weight and because they produced adverse moment.

The horizontal control surfaces were ineffectual because they weren't designed to work when aoa was so great.

The only way out was to recognise what had happened and wind back the maxed out THS.

Would you have found this in time?

(I'm not a pilot etc)

[syseng68k]

Yes TurbineD, some of us are willing to defend the pilots. I have, and will continue to do so. I've written that they badly mishandled the situation, but there, IMHO, were contributing factors that deserve some blame as well.

Yes and so do I. We should perhaps remember, in the comfort of our armchairs
that they are no longer here to defend themselves. They were let down by the systems
and there's enough hints in the report to support that view...

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by syseng

They were let down by the systems
and there's enough hints in the report to support that view.

- this is the nub of it. While we are all amazed at the 'incompetence' both in handling and CRM they demonstrated, and some of us have 'doubts' about the role played by the aircraft FBW systems, it is important to remember they were put in the seats by an airline training and checking system and that is where most of the responsibility for the loss of life must lie. They were either 'fit' to operate in the assigned roles or they were not. I believe the latter.

Has Air France made any significant formal admission of failure yet?

[mm43]

Originally Posted by BOAC

Has Air France made any significant formal admission of failure yet?

Their insurers would love them to do just that.

[Mike X]

What a hampsterwheel. Backup instruments, just keep it as level as you can.

Pure pilot error, IMO.

[galaxy flyer]

Mike x

If you call it pilot error, then what feedback is there to correct the training program that trained in the error? I agree they royally messed up what should not have been difficult to handle, but by putting the blame on pilot error, you're saying AF's training is sufficient.

[The Ancient Geek]

Not a training issue, just pure idiocy probably caused by panic.

There is one and only one case where holding full backstick is the correct response to a problem.

AF447 was not an AN-2 with an engine failure in IMC.
The A330 is not a STOL biplane with leading edge slats.

[Turbine D]

what feedback is there to correct the training program that trained in the error?

In the recommendation listing in the BEA's final report, if you subtract out those pertaining to communications, there are 21 recommendations left.
- 4 are administration types directed at EASA or DGAC
- 2 are required change recommendations to the aircraft- AOA indicator- Flight deck camera scanning instruments
- 6 are study recommendations involving changes to the aircraft
- 9 are training recommendations

- Manual handling training at high altitudes
- Added SAR training
- Type rating & recurrent training to take in specifics of the aircraft being
flown
- Recurrent training that takes in account theoretical knowledge on flight
mechanics
- Reinforce CRM training in unexpected events
- Defining selection & recurrent training for instructors
- Improved fidelity of flight simulators
- Introduce into training the effects of suprise
- Improve feedback process (content of training programs)

I think some of these recommendations are being or have been incorporated, see the section on actions taken after the AF447 crash listed in the Final Report.

[bubbers44]

All the pilots I started with in the airlines had over 5,000 hrs and a lot of jet PIC time. We knew what to do at FL350 with no training to not get into a stall and how to recover if we did. No training was required at our first airline in my class. 300 hr guys that get on automatic airplanes and are incouraged not to hand fly will never know how to hand fly at high altitude if the AP fails.

Now we have seen what this has created. Pilots with a few thousand hours that can not hand fly because they were not allowed to or didn't want to. Management created this with cheap new hire pilots because automation didn't require real piloting skill, just autopilot skills. Airbus preached this so that is why new pilots get hired with 300 hrs. Didn't happen in my time.

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by The Ancient

Not a training issue, just pure idiocy probably caused by panic.

- you forgot the lack of cockpit management? 'Idiocy' is supposed to be examined during the thorough company training and testing programme and weeded out where possible.

Originally Posted by mm43

Their insurers would love them to do just that.

- since you have no clues in your profile as to your qualifications to comment here on piloting proficiency, perhaps I need to advise you that responsibility for pilot proficiency is delegated under EUOPS to individual airlines who issue and renew the pilot proficiency certificates at regular intervals and are thus directly responsible in law for the 'quality' of their crews. I suspect AF's insurers are well aware of this and more than a little anxious.

[pedrobaltic]

@ bubbers44

Its a general trend of dumbing down that is happening worldwide and of the bottom line being god.

The new aircraft are being designed to be simpler to fly. Not sure if it is the manufacturers driving this, in response to airlines telling them that they want to use less skilled / experienced pilots (i.e less training therefore cost) or if they are being smart / thinking ahead and want to pre-empt your less accomplished pilots of the future having to think too much. It could be a bit of both.

[VinRouge]

Aeroseafety world.

There is a good summary of the af447 accident in Augusts aerosafety world magazine. Well worth a read if the BEA report is a little too heavy for you.

http://flightsafety.org/asw/aug12/asw_aug12_p14-18.pdf

[TTex600]

Vin Rouge, thanks for the link.

Good article, but the reader will assume nothing more than pilot incompetences to be the cause of 228 deaths. Statements such as "reacting as designed" lead an uninformed reader to conclude the aircraft was functioning normally.

The article quotes the PF as stating "I have no more displays" but failed to expand on what is both implied and clearly stated in those words. The same can be said for the PM's, "We have no valid indications".

To the authors credit, he did write it correctly with these words, "Among the checklist actions is disengagement of the flight directors, which can — and did in this case — present erroneous cues in the absence of consistent airspeed information."

The author also included information about the stall warning returning when " the speeds became valid again", without any explanation why they became invalid in the first place.

We're I Air France, I'd be more more than slightly upset about articles such as this; they imply pilot error as the sole cause and pilot error puts AF in a precarious position liability wise. At least it does from my (non attorney) opinion.

[TTex600]

Pedrobaltic, serious question. Do you believe that manufacturers intentionally attempt to design aircraft that are "simpler to fly"?

I honestly don't know what design criteria is followed other than max efficiency.