A Sukhoi superjet 100 is missing
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the pilot only had 9 seconds to avoid the cliff.
Either the Sukhoi was winning the speed contest at 5600 km/hour for that 9 seconds, or there was a lot more time from the last known coordinates. Of course the last known coordinates are not particularly useful in knowing when the occupants of the flight deck saw the holes in the cheese lining up.
The pilot had a visual of the obstacle (mountain or cliff)
“Oh my God, what is this?”
Last edited by jcjeant; 20th Jun 2012 at 00:00.
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With all due respect, gentlemen, I think the nine seconds to react quoted in the news article is a red herring.
Think about what might make any of us to have our final words captured on CVR saying "Oh my God, what is this?”
It's all about what happened to create that dismal situation. We may never know the full story, but it is very very sad with such an experienced crew and a new aircraft.
And IMO any attempts to place the blame on ground controllers are total BS from someone trying to CYA. Even sadder.
Think about what might make any of us to have our final words captured on CVR saying "Oh my God, what is this?”
It's all about what happened to create that dismal situation. We may never know the full story, but it is very very sad with such an experienced crew and a new aircraft.
And IMO any attempts to place the blame on ground controllers are total BS from someone trying to CYA. Even sadder.
Psychophysiological entity
Perhaps a translation error.
Perhaps. I imagine it was simply two separate statements that somehow got merged in the translation.
It sounds even more as though he was in that trough, convinced he was between the mountains.
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Seems they just mixed knots with kmh's.
Nothin new in this "pravda" article. But again, can anyone confirm that there WAS flight plan, and if so, that it INCLUDED flight to the shore resort? Because if it is so, crew can't be unaware about mountains ahead.
Nothin new in this "pravda" article. But again, can anyone confirm that there WAS flight plan, and if so, that it INCLUDED flight to the shore resort? Because if it is so, crew can't be unaware about mountains ahead.
Last edited by Kulverstukas; 20th Jun 2012 at 12:35.
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ENOUGH IS ENOUGH
After dozens of pages of so many experts raising all possible explanations for his accident, it's cristal clear what really happened:
a stupid case of CFIT, nothing more than this.
It was a boysh, criminal negligence on part of this captain to take the risk of descending on an unknow terrain, flying in clouds close to mountains, unnecessarily. Just to show his 'abilities'. Nothing much different than the youngster that just soloed a Cessna 150 e go buzzing over girlfriend's house.
It was not a 'systemic failure', not a complex malfuction, it was just a reckless, complete lack of airmanship, a suicide/murder maneuver.
Unfortunately, for each Capt Sully one hundred Yablontsevs are born. The Russian astronaut medical (as well as many others) are useless to detect potential psichological and psychyatric disfunctions that could develop into dangerous behaviors.
Hope some day we'll be able to detect it as efficiently as sugar or cholesterol levels.
a stupid case of CFIT, nothing more than this.
It was a boysh, criminal negligence on part of this captain to take the risk of descending on an unknow terrain, flying in clouds close to mountains, unnecessarily. Just to show his 'abilities'. Nothing much different than the youngster that just soloed a Cessna 150 e go buzzing over girlfriend's house.
It was not a 'systemic failure', not a complex malfuction, it was just a reckless, complete lack of airmanship, a suicide/murder maneuver.
Unfortunately, for each Capt Sully one hundred Yablontsevs are born. The Russian astronaut medical (as well as many others) are useless to detect potential psichological and psychyatric disfunctions that could develop into dangerous behaviors.
Hope some day we'll be able to detect it as efficiently as sugar or cholesterol levels.
Last edited by fullforward; 20th Jun 2012 at 19:46.
fullforward, and which one of the ‘one hundred Yabs’ are you? If not, then please share with us the 'Sully-like' qualities which will enable you (and us) to avoid such circumstances.
I am surprised that you dare quote having a Captaincy when displaying such weak human factors knowledge and presenting an ill-considered view.
But in mitigation, hindsight is a powerful bias requiring strong self-control when drawing conclusions from limited facts – after the fact.
CFIT appears to be the most likely conclusion – the result. However, until we can understand what led up to this, what influenced the crew’s behaviour, and how they understood the situation at that time, there will be few opportunities for learning and improving safety from the ‘why’ aspects .
Alternatively, with a narrow, self-centred, and biased view there are limited opportunities for learning, other than perhaps how not to present safety conclusions.
I am surprised that you dare quote having a Captaincy when displaying such weak human factors knowledge and presenting an ill-considered view.
But in mitigation, hindsight is a powerful bias requiring strong self-control when drawing conclusions from limited facts – after the fact.
CFIT appears to be the most likely conclusion – the result. However, until we can understand what led up to this, what influenced the crew’s behaviour, and how they understood the situation at that time, there will be few opportunities for learning and improving safety from the ‘why’ aspects .
Alternatively, with a narrow, self-centred, and biased view there are limited opportunities for learning, other than perhaps how not to present safety conclusions.
Last edited by PEI_3721; 20th Jun 2012 at 19:38.
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PEI
Not being personal: unless somebody with a gun had forced him to go 'holliganning' at high speed on unfamiliar hilly terrain I cannot see any justifiable reason to do so.
I guess if you are a professional pilot you certainlly understand that.
Would you imagine somebody in the right mind set would ever consider doing this? It's crazy, pathetic going into 'political correctness' trying to justify this absurd. It only harms us as a professional group.
As for improving the system I was quite clear on my suggestion: the industry needs to look further on the psychological/psychiatriac factors and detect them before it's too late.
I fully stand my view.
I guess if you are a professional pilot you certainlly understand that.
Would you imagine somebody in the right mind set would ever consider doing this? It's crazy, pathetic going into 'political correctness' trying to justify this absurd. It only harms us as a professional group.
As for improving the system I was quite clear on my suggestion: the industry needs to look further on the psychological/psychiatriac factors and detect them before it's too late.
I fully stand my view.
Last edited by fullforward; 20th Jun 2012 at 20:03.
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You can psycho-analyse all you wish, but I suspect at the end of the day we will find he was in the wrong valley and cumulo-granitus outclimbed the aircraft. He certainly is not the first, and nor will he be the last, but I don't think we need to waste too much time worrying about 'opportunities for learning'.
The 'Opportunities for learning' are obvious. The lesson is simple and clear - know where you are, and if you are not sure, get the **** out of there. Try not to fly to many bystanders into the hill with you.
The 'Opportunities for learning' are obvious. The lesson is simple and clear - know where you are, and if you are not sure, get the **** out of there. Try not to fly to many bystanders into the hill with you.
fullforward, our views differ.
Mine may be biased, but it is formed on reflection that I flew in near identical circumstances, frighteningly similar; task, crew, objectives, and in some respects terrain. I completed my flight, but it’s ‘success’ did not qualify me as being something other than a Yab, in fact much closer to being one; nor did the safe outcome excuse the quality of judgement or minimise the risks.
Many years of reflection has enabled a view of some of the contributing factors and how humans can be adversely influenced by these. We are all very, very fallible, but the more we that we can identify the risk issues – contributions and behaviours of thought, then perhaps we can make better judgements and continue to fly safely
BOAC, “… time worrying about 'opportunities for learning'” is the most valuable time in your life.
Mine may be biased, but it is formed on reflection that I flew in near identical circumstances, frighteningly similar; task, crew, objectives, and in some respects terrain. I completed my flight, but it’s ‘success’ did not qualify me as being something other than a Yab, in fact much closer to being one; nor did the safe outcome excuse the quality of judgement or minimise the risks.
Many years of reflection has enabled a view of some of the contributing factors and how humans can be adversely influenced by these. We are all very, very fallible, but the more we that we can identify the risk issues – contributions and behaviours of thought, then perhaps we can make better judgements and continue to fly safely
BOAC, “… time worrying about 'opportunities for learning'” is the most valuable time in your life.
Last edited by PEI_3721; 20th Jun 2012 at 21:16.
BOAC, “… 'getting the **** out of there' is the most valuable time …”; yes, but not being there to begin with is even better. Thus time spent in assessing a situation before it deteriorates, and even more so, planning not to be in either the physical or mental situation which precedes the event, are important aspects.
With these in mind, then trying to understand this accident in this context might help us identify aspects which could enable safety lessons to be learnt, e.g. what was planned and flown on the first flight, what was the plan for the second flight?
With these in mind, then trying to understand this accident in this context might help us identify aspects which could enable safety lessons to be learnt, e.g. what was planned and flown on the first flight, what was the plan for the second flight?
PEI 3721
Sometimes it's just not worth the effort...
If fullforward truly believes that this accident was caused solely by the Captain's actions – and his "psychiatric factors";
and if BOAC truly believes that the lesson here “is simple and clear - know where you are, and if you are not sure, get the **** out of there”
then it’s likely nothing you or I or anyone else writes will change their minds.
The notion of accident prevention through lessons to be learned and the resulting widespread advancements in the real benefits of proactively examining contributing factors (such as culture and human factors) seems to have left a few people behind. Accident investigators, safety professionals, and most professional pilots the world over have come a long way in the years since fullforward and BOAC’s view of things was the norm.
A few simple “Whys” exposes the inadequacy of the simplistic and problematic “pilot error” view:
Why did the aircraft end up in that specific (and inappropriate) place?
Why were none of the flight crew situationally aware? (Or, if aware, not vocal or assertive?)
If the TAWS was ignored (or disabled), why?
If the vis was so reduced as to affect the ability to remain VFR (or VMC) why did the crew continue flight in an unfamiliar area at that altitude?
If the aircraft deviated from its flight plan, or its intended and briefed activity, why?
There are many other “whys” in this (and every) case. (Including, for instance, several related to ATC).
The answers to such questions will expose factors that need to be addressed to prevent a recurrence of a similar accident. One major reason aviation is as safe as it is, is as a direct result of such processes in the review of incidents and accidents. (That fact applies equally to the medical (surgical) profession and other safety critical endeavours.)
One cannot expect to reduce incidents and accidents if one does not examine each of the factors or actions that, if removed or amended, would have prevented the accident.
veteres canes somnum
Sometimes it's just not worth the effort...
If fullforward truly believes that this accident was caused solely by the Captain's actions – and his "psychiatric factors";
and if BOAC truly believes that the lesson here “is simple and clear - know where you are, and if you are not sure, get the **** out of there”
then it’s likely nothing you or I or anyone else writes will change their minds.
The notion of accident prevention through lessons to be learned and the resulting widespread advancements in the real benefits of proactively examining contributing factors (such as culture and human factors) seems to have left a few people behind. Accident investigators, safety professionals, and most professional pilots the world over have come a long way in the years since fullforward and BOAC’s view of things was the norm.
A few simple “Whys” exposes the inadequacy of the simplistic and problematic “pilot error” view:
Why did the aircraft end up in that specific (and inappropriate) place?
Why were none of the flight crew situationally aware? (Or, if aware, not vocal or assertive?)
If the TAWS was ignored (or disabled), why?
If the vis was so reduced as to affect the ability to remain VFR (or VMC) why did the crew continue flight in an unfamiliar area at that altitude?
If the aircraft deviated from its flight plan, or its intended and briefed activity, why?
There are many other “whys” in this (and every) case. (Including, for instance, several related to ATC).
The answers to such questions will expose factors that need to be addressed to prevent a recurrence of a similar accident. One major reason aviation is as safe as it is, is as a direct result of such processes in the review of incidents and accidents. (That fact applies equally to the medical (surgical) profession and other safety critical endeavours.)
One cannot expect to reduce incidents and accidents if one does not examine each of the factors or actions that, if removed or amended, would have prevented the accident.
veteres canes somnum
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A few simple “Whys” exposes the inadequacy of the simplistic and problematic “pilot error” view:
Why did the aircraft end up in that specific (and inappropriate) place?
Why were none of the flight crew situationally aware? (Or, if aware, not vocal or assertive?)
If the TAWS was ignored (or disabled), why?
If the vis was so reduced as to affect the ability to remain VFR (or VMC) why did the crew continue flight in an unfamiliar area at that altitude?
If the aircraft deviated from its flight plan, or its intended and briefed activity, why?
There are many other “whys” in this (and every) case. (Including, for instance, several related to ATC).
Why did the aircraft end up in that specific (and inappropriate) place?
Why were none of the flight crew situationally aware? (Or, if aware, not vocal or assertive?)
If the TAWS was ignored (or disabled), why?
If the vis was so reduced as to affect the ability to remain VFR (or VMC) why did the crew continue flight in an unfamiliar area at that altitude?
If the aircraft deviated from its flight plan, or its intended and briefed activity, why?
There are many other “whys” in this (and every) case. (Including, for instance, several related to ATC).
Why does it still happen??
BOAC, “… 'getting the **** out of there' is the most valuable time …”; yes, but not being there to begin with is even better. Thus time spent in assessing a situation before it deteriorates, and even more so, planning not to be in either the physical or mental situation which precedes the event, are important aspects.
Last edited by prospector; 21st Jun 2012 at 04:09.
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OK!
According to PEI and Grizzled reasonings every rape, murder or mistake that lead to loss of life or heavy property damage is completely justifiable by the perpetrador own problems. He could be a victim of early trauma, drunken father, being bullied at school etc.
Sorry, but this is ridiculous.
If I drive my car at crazy speeds on any road I'll be taking risks, period.
If I drink and drive, even worse.
There's no room for 'whys', for God sake!
Nobody forced this Yab to do that! He, as a commander, took that risk.
If this isn't criminal negligence what else is?
It wasn't an emergency, it wasn't a complex malfunction. They plainlly ignored the "Terrain, terrain" for 11 times.
Yes, you're right: unless some proof comes that this 'commander' acted under the pressure of a gun poined to his head nothing will change my view about this crime.
Sorry, but this is ridiculous.
If I drive my car at crazy speeds on any road I'll be taking risks, period.
If I drink and drive, even worse.
There's no room for 'whys', for God sake!
Nobody forced this Yab to do that! He, as a commander, took that risk.
If this isn't criminal negligence what else is?
It wasn't an emergency, it wasn't a complex malfunction. They plainlly ignored the "Terrain, terrain" for 11 times.
Yes, you're right: unless some proof comes that this 'commander' acted under the pressure of a gun poined to his head nothing will change my view about this crime.
Last edited by fullforward; 21st Jun 2012 at 04:11.
He's in an area with mountains & weather is predictably unpredictable. He's flying below the height of the mountains for whatever 'look-see' reason. To an ignorant like myself the cause of this so far seems simple. Flew too low in an area with clouds & mountains.
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examining contributing factors (such as culture and human factors) seems to have left a few people behind.
How many times do you have to learn from people flying themselves into mother earth ignoring rules?
If there's high terrain, weather, an area your not familiar with, a W.A.R.N.I.N.G. system telling you 11 TIMES to get out of there, and you continue on, what else do you need to learn from?
If there's a culture that allows that, get them out of the air.
Why is it so hard for people these days to understand the fact that individuals need to take responsibility for their own actions?
There's ALWAYS an excuse isnt there?
Some possible answers......
A few simple “Whys” exposes the inadequacy of the simplistic and problematic “pilot error” view:
Because the crew placed it there intentionally?
They were aware of the situation, if they intentionally flew into it, but they recognized the the imminent danger of crashing too late, when gravity was stronger than the lifties.
Becuse it was clear to them, that it would shout all the time.
Do we know that already? They could have crashed in VFR as well, imho it is more plausible then the CFIT in IMC. They just couldn´t outclimb the terrain, an oppinion, i stated in one of my first posts on this thread. Nothing becoming known since then did change my mind on that.
Do we know the flightplan? If a former poster is correct, then it looks like they planned that thing. Fly to BOGOR training area, , descent to 6.000, fly (VFR?) to the beach resort (through the mountains), and then back for landing.
I´m seeing none with ATC what so ever.
Yes, agreed, but it does not help to close ones eyes to the obvious on hand. We are discussing here, not doing the final accident investigation. Therefore everybody is entiteled to his oppinion. People like BOAC, fullforward, others and myself have seen this stuff happening before despite all rules and regs and despite all expierience of the crew.
You are dead wrong there.
I can underwrite that statement, and we will see, what the final outcome of the investigation will show. And when it is published, we will have to accept the result and learn of it.
Why did the aircraft end up in that specific (and inappropriate) place?
Why were none of the flight crew situationally aware? (Or, if aware, not vocal or assertive?)
If the TAWS was ignored (or disabled), why?
If the vis was so reduced as to affect the ability to remain VFR (or VMC) why did the crew continue flight in an unfamiliar area at that altitude?
If the aircraft deviated from its flight plan, or its intended and briefed activity, why?
There are many other “whys” in this (and every) case. (Including, for instance, several related to ATC).
The answers to such questions will expose factors that need to be addressed to prevent a recurrence of a similar accident.
The notion of accident prevention through lessons to be learned and the resulting widespread advancements in the real benefits of proactively examining contributing factors (such as culture and human factors) seems to have left a few people behind.
One major reason aviation is as safe as it is, is as a direct result of such processes in the review of incidents and accidents. (That fact applies equally to the medical (surgical) profession and other safety critical endeavours.)
Last edited by RetiredF4; 21st Jun 2012 at 14:03.