A few simple “Whys” exposes the inadequacy of the simplistic and problematic “pilot error” view:
Why did the aircraft end up in that specific (and inappropriate) place?
Because the crew placed it there intentionally?
Why were none of the flight crew situationally aware? (Or, if aware, not vocal or assertive?)
They were aware of the situation, if they intentionally flew into it, but they recognized the the imminent danger of crashing too late, when gravity was stronger than the lifties.
If the TAWS was ignored (or disabled), why?
Becuse it was clear to them, that it would shout all the time.
If the vis was so reduced as to affect the ability to remain VFR (or VMC) why did the crew continue flight in an unfamiliar area at that altitude?
Do we know that already? They could have crashed in VFR as well, imho it is more plausible then the CFIT in IMC. They just couldn´t outclimb the terrain, an oppinion, i stated in one of my first posts on this thread. Nothing becoming known since then did change my mind on that.
If the aircraft deviated from its flight plan, or its intended and briefed activity, why?
Do we know the flightplan? If a former poster is correct, then it looks like they planned that thing. Fly to BOGOR training area, , descent to 6.000, fly (VFR?) to the beach resort (through the mountains), and then back for landing.
There are many other “whys” in this (and every) case. (Including, for instance, several related to ATC).
I´m seeing none with ATC what so ever.
The answers to such questions will expose factors that need to be addressed to prevent a recurrence of a similar accident.
Yes, agreed, but it does not help to close ones eyes to the obvious on hand. We are discussing here, not doing the final accident investigation. Therefore everybody is entiteled to his oppinion. People like BOAC, fullforward, others and myself have seen this stuff happening before despite all rules and regs and despite all expierience of the crew.
The notion of accident prevention through lessons to be learned and the resulting widespread advancements in the real benefits of proactively examining contributing factors (such as culture and human factors) seems to have left a few people behind.
You are dead wrong there.
One major reason aviation is as safe as it is, is as a direct result of such processes in the review of incidents and accidents. (That fact applies equally to the medical (surgical) profession and other safety critical endeavours.)
I can underwrite that statement, and we will see, what the final outcome of the investigation will show. And when it is published, we will have to accept the result and learn of it.