A few simple “Whys” exposes the inadequacy of the simplistic and problematic “pilot error” view:
Why did the aircraft end up in that specific (and inappropriate) place?
Why were none of the flight crew situationally aware? (Or, if aware, not vocal or assertive?)
If the TAWS was ignored (or disabled), why?
If the vis was so reduced as to affect the ability to remain VFR (or VMC) why did the crew continue flight in an unfamiliar area at that altitude?
If the aircraft deviated from its flight plan, or its intended and briefed activity, why?
There are many other “whys” in this (and every) case. (Including, for instance, several related to ATC).
Most of those "why's" were also asked after the Air New Zealand CFIT into Mt Erebus.
Why does it still happen??
BOAC, “… 'getting the **** out of there' is the most valuable time …”; yes, but not being there to begin with is even better. Thus time spent in assessing a situation before it deteriorates, and even more so, planning not to be in either the physical or mental situation which precedes the event, are important aspects.
Would appear that lesson needs to be taught many times.